Elusive Assassination Target, ‘Shadow Unit’ Founder: Who Is Mohammed al-Sinwar?

An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
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Elusive Assassination Target, ‘Shadow Unit’ Founder: Who Is Mohammed al-Sinwar?

An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)

Doubts persist over whether senior Hamas military commander Mohammed al-Sinwar has been killed or survived an alleged Israeli strike, as Israeli officials intensify efforts to confirm his assassination while Hamas remains tight-lipped.

Multiple sources within the group have refused to confirm or deny al-Sinwar’s fate, fueling speculation surrounding the elusive commander, who has a decades-long track record of evading Israeli assassination attempts.

Al-Sinwar, the younger brother of slain Hamas leader Yehya al-Sinwar, has remained a top Israeli target throughout the Gaza war.

Yet, for more than 18 months of fighting, Israel has not officially confirmed a direct strike on him — a fact that reinforces his reputation as a master of disguise and a “high-value, hard-to-detect” target.

Despite a 13-year age gap — Yehya was born in 1962 and Mohammed in 1975 — the two shared not only blood ties but a deep-rooted partnership within Hamas, rising through the ranks together to lead the group’s military and political strategies.

The timing of Israel’s apparent attempt to target al-Sinwar — roughly 24 hours after the release of Israeli-American soldier Edan Alexander — has raised questions about whether the move was a calculated signal or the result of an intelligence breakthrough.

Sources within Hamas and other Gaza-based militant factions declined to confirm or deny whether the operation to recover Alexander was linked to locating al-Sinwar’s suspected hideout.

Tuesday’s intense airstrike, followed by a continued bombardment of the area on Wednesday that created a fire belt to prevent any rescue attempts, suggests Israel believed it was striking a high-value target.

Israel’s use of fire belts in a recent air assault on southern Gaza has drawn comparisons to previous assassination attempts targeting senior figures in Hezbollah and Hamas, including Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and top Hamas military commanders Marwan Issa, Ahmed al-Ghandour, Bassem Issa and Jamal al-Zebda during the 2021 Gaza war.

On Tuesday night, Israeli warplanes dropped dozens of bombs and missiles on the emergency yard and rear compound of the European Gaza Hospital east of Khan Younis, as well as surrounding areas — with strikes extending up to 500 meters in some directions and about 300 meters in others, according to field sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

Israeli public broadcaster Kan reported that the attack involved bunker-busting bombs aimed at destroying a suspected underground tunnel network in the area. The strikes targeted multiple tunnel entrances to ensure that anyone hiding inside would be killed, even if not directly hit.

Sources from Gaza-based factions told Asharq Al-Awsat that the location did in fact contain a tunnel system previously damaged in the 2014 war. Hamas’ military wing, Al-Qassam Brigades, reportedly managed to restore the tunnels, which had only suffered minor damage in earlier attacks during the current conflict.

As his role within Hamas expanded, al-Sinwar became a frequent target of Israeli assassination attempts spanning more than two decades.

One of the closest calls came during the 2021 conflict, when he was lightly wounded in a tunnel strike alongside Rafaa Salama, the former commander of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade.

Both men survived the attack with minor injuries.

Salama was later killed in an Israeli strike in July, along with Mohammed Deif, Hamas’ elusive military chief, in the coastal al-Mawasi area.

Al-Sinwar has survived at least seven Israeli assassination attempts over the past two decades, according to Hamas sources — a track record that has helped cement his image as one of the group’s most elusive and high-value operatives.

One early attempt came during the Second Intifada, which erupted in September 2000. In 2003, an explosive device was planted in the wall of his home, but he escaped unscathed.

In 2006, an Israeli strike targeted a vehicle believed to be carrying al-Sinwar. He was not inside at the time, and the operation failed — one of several similar attempts over the years.

In 2008, Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that al-Sinwar outwitted Israeli intelligence by manipulating radio communications.

He allegedly used pre-recorded transmissions to give the impression he was speaking live over a two-way radio, prompting Israeli forces to bomb the signal’s location. The attack missed its target — al-Sinwar was never there.

In another reported incident in 2019, local media claimed that al-Sinwar, Salama and other Hamas commanders were the targets of an Israeli commando operation involving a plot to poison and abduct them from a beach in Khan Younis. The Al-Qassam Brigades swiftly denied the report, calling it baseless.

Al-Sinwar is credited with founding the group’s secretive “Shadow Unit,” tasked with guarding high-value captives, including Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

The unit was established with approval from Mohammed Deif, the elusive commander of Hamas’ armed wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades. Al-Sinwar personally oversaw the formation of its initial core, selecting trusted field operatives from his home city of Khan Younis in southern Gaza.

Al-Sinwar’s central role in the 2006 abduction and concealment of Shalit near the Rafah border prompted the creation of the unit. Sources say it was formed roughly three months after the kidnapping, following several Israeli airstrikes on suspected Shalit hideouts.

The unit’s existence remained classified until 2016 — five years after Shalit’s release in a prisoner swap — when al-Qassam released previously unseen footage of the soldier during his captivity.

According to the same sources, both Deif and al-Sinwar ordered the establishment of the unit, with many of its founding members hailing from the Khan Younis refugee camp.

They included senior field commanders such as Abdul Rahman al-Mubasher, Khaled Abu Bakra, and Mohammed Dawoud — all of whom were later killed in Israeli operations in 2013 and 2021.

Other key figures linked to the unit included Sami al-Humaidah from Rafah, killed in 2008, and Abdullah Labad, a top explosives engineer from Gaza’s al-Shati camp, who was assassinated in 2011 along with his brother Ismail, a senior field operative involved in weapons production and smuggling.

Al-Sinwar continued to expand and develop the Shadow Unit for years, discreetly recruiting new members and enhancing its capabilities. Its full mission only became clearer following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel.

Within Hamas, al-Sinwar has long been seen as the de facto operational commander of the al-Qassam Brigades, sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

While Deif remained the official general commander, al-Sinwar is believed to have overseen many of the group’s military and administrative portfolios, shaping battlefield tactics and command structures behind the scenes.

 

 



Beirut Transfers 128 Syrian Convicts Home

Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
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Beirut Transfers 128 Syrian Convicts Home

Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese army soldiers secure the area at the entrance of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah village, southern Lebanon, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

Lebanon has transferred 128 Syrian convicts to their home country, a Lebanese security source told AFP on Wednesday, the second batch of handovers under an agreement the two sides signed earlier this year.

Overcrowded Lebanese prisons host around 2,000 Syrian nationals held on various charges.

Many are still awaiting trial, while hundreds have been brought before military courts on charges of "terrorism" or related offences, including attacks on Lebanese forces.

Others are in custody for alleged membership in militant or armed groups that were opposed to now-ousted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, who was supported by Lebanon's Hezbollah during the Syrian civil war.

The security source, who requested anonymity, said that Beirut "handed over the second batch of Syrian convicts in Lebanon to Damascus, numbering 128 convicts" on Wednesday.

The transfer follows the handover of more than 130 Syrian detainees in March, under an agreement signed between the two countries the previous month, which will cover almost 300 convicts who have served 10 years or more in Lebanese prisons.

Under the agreement, they will be required to complete the remainder of their sentences in Syria.

At least 260 convicts have now been sent to Syria's Adra prison out of 356 in Lebanon's Roumieh, the source added.

The issue of the detainees had been a sticking point in Beirut-Damascus relations following Assad's overthrow in December 2024.

It was discussed by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam during his visit to Damascus in May, where he met Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Over the past year, both sides have repeatedly expressed their determination to open a new chapter in their relations.


Syrian Troop Killings Expose Repeated Attacks, Security Lapses

Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)
Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)
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Syrian Troop Killings Expose Repeated Attacks, Security Lapses

Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)
Syrian army personnel on a military vehicle in Deir Hafer, rural Aleppo, in January 2026. (Reuters)

The recent killing of two Syrian army members near Manbij, east of Aleppo, was not an isolated attack. It was part of a recurring pattern of strikes on government forces, exposing serious administrative and security gaps that groups opposed to Syria’s new administration are using to target its personnel.

Syria’s Ministry of Defense media and communications department said on June 20 that two soldiers from the 76th Division were killed after unknown gunmen attacked them near Manbij.

The soldiers were riding a motorcycle on a road near the city when they came under direct fire.

Since the fall of the Assad regime, Asharq Al-Awsat has tracked many similar attacks on Syrian security and army personnel. Most have occurred as members were heading to or leaving their posts, often on motorcycles or via irregular transport.

Many see the pattern as evidence of weak protection measures and poor organization of personnel rotations.

Rural Aleppo has witnessed several assassinations this year. Among the most prominent were the killing of two Syrian army members in March and another member of the Interior Ministry in April near the town of al-Rai.

Similar incidents have also been reported across most Syrian provinces, including Daraa, Latakia, rural Hama and Homs.

Embarrassing the Syrian state

Demands have grown for personnel to avoid moving alone, wearing military uniforms or using motorcycles in remote areas where the risk is high and support is hard to reach.

Major Khaled al-Abdullah, director of the Syrian interior minister’s office, said the defense and interior ministries had repeatedly issued circulars banning personnel from wearing official uniforms outside working hours and requiring them to follow safety measures suited to Syria’s current conditions.

He said the immediate aim of attacks by groups opposed to the new administration, including Islamic State and remnants of the ousted regime, was to “try to embarrass the Syrian state.”

Abdullah stressed that authorities were working hard to impose security, eliminate armed groups and organizations, and had made significant progress on what he called a difficult path.

But in remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, he also pointed to “continued internal and external challenges that the Syrian state is working to overcome and whose danger it seeks to end.”

Manbij, the most dangerous route

Abu Mohammed al-Hussein, who oversees a cluster of checkpoints in eastern rural Aleppo, said the movement of personnel had become a problem. He said he had repeatedly asked for buses to transport rotating shift members, especially in rural areas far from the city center.

Hussein said one member of his checkpoint group survived an assassination attempt on the Manbij-al-Bab road in eastern rural Aleppo at the end of March. The incident pushed him to issue special orders regulating how his personnel move.

“A civilian car offered to take one of my men to Aleppo city,” he said. “After they had driven several miles, they claimed there was an emergency and said they had to return. As soon as he got out, the driver’s companion fired several shots at him with a pistol. Two hit his magazine pouch and one pierced his foot. He survived by a miracle.”

He said shift rotations are “decided centrally by sector commanders” and are often carried out at night because service areas are far from where personnel live. He said a ban on carrying weapons and moving through residential areas had also made personnel easier targets.

“With repeated assassination attempts, I issued a decision banning nighttime shift rotations, prohibiting movement in civilian cars or on motorcycles, which have also become easy targets, and limiting transport to road security vehicles,” he added.

Hussein said they were still waiting for approval of a request to allocate a bus to transport security and military checkpoint personnel deployed along the Aleppo-Manbij road.

He described it as “one of the most dangerous land routes,” linking Aleppo to outlying areas and Raqqa province, and passing through an area that remained for years under the control of the ousted regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Ban on keeping weapons

Haider al-Mohammed, a special tasks member, disagreed. He said “transport buses are, in practice, the easy target” and are often attacked, meaning the problem of securing personnel goes beyond transport.

He said decisions that stripped personnel of the means to protect their safety and identity were the direct reason behind the rise in assassinations, alongside the exceptional conditions in the country and the process of “clearing out groups that believe they can create chaos and fear.”

He said among the most important of these decisions were “the ban on wearing face coverings, the ban on keeping registered weapons, and the strict instruction not to carry personal weapons, along with leniency over wearing official uniforms.”

As a result, he said, personnel are exposed, easy targets for these groups, and left without weapons to defend themselves.

On this point, Major Khaled al-Abdullah said Syria’s security and military institutions were working to “implement solutions to facilitate and reduce regular movement in a way that helps end the threat and strengthen the safety of their personnel.”

He said the pattern of attacks “confirms their randomness.” The failure to select specific targets or have prior knowledge of the personnel being targeted, he said, was “an attempt to create chaos and confuse the Syrian state.”


Arab Parliament Speaker Stresses Need for Solidarity to Confront Regional Challenges

Arab Parliament Speaker Stresses Need for Solidarity to Confront Regional Challenges
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Arab Parliament Speaker Stresses Need for Solidarity to Confront Regional Challenges

Arab Parliament Speaker Stresses Need for Solidarity to Confront Regional Challenges

Speaker of the Arab Parliament Mohammed Al-Yamahi stressed the importance of solidarity, unity of ranks, positions, and voices, and strengthening consensus among Arab countries in addressing the growing challenges and risks facing the region, which require greater solidarity, cohesion, and joint Arab action now more than ever.

He made the remarks today during the preparatory committee meeting for the Eighth Conference of the Arab Parliament and Speakers of Arab Councils and Parliaments, which is being held in partnership with the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union, SPA reported.

Al-Yamahi explained that this year's conference is being convened at a critical and exceptional stage for the Arab nation, requiring the highest levels of coordination, consultation, and unified positions on issues and challenges affecting the Arab world's present and future.

He noted that the conference will address several strategic issues, foremost among them the serious developments surrounding the Palestinian cause, the Arab world's primary concern.

It will also discuss recent highly dangerous security developments in the region and Iranian attacks against Arab states, as well as the topic of enhancing Arab digital sovereignty, which has emerged as a strategic issue driven by rapid digital transformation.

He said the issue calls for the development of a unified Arab parliamentary vision that protects Arab interests, strengthens digital security, and supports sustainable development efforts.