Bahbah to Asharq Al-Awsat: Second Phase of Gaza Ceasefire Begins Next Month

 Palestinians walk along a street surrounded by buildings destroyed during Israeli air and ground operations in Gaza City, Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2025. (AP)
Palestinians walk along a street surrounded by buildings destroyed during Israeli air and ground operations in Gaza City, Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2025. (AP)
TT

Bahbah to Asharq Al-Awsat: Second Phase of Gaza Ceasefire Begins Next Month

 Palestinians walk along a street surrounded by buildings destroyed during Israeli air and ground operations in Gaza City, Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2025. (AP)
Palestinians walk along a street surrounded by buildings destroyed during Israeli air and ground operations in Gaza City, Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2025. (AP)

The second phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement is expected to begin in January, likely in the first or second week, according to Bishara Bahbah, head of the Arab Americans for Peace Committee and a mediator closely aligned with the US administration on the Gaza file.

Bahbah told Asharq Al-Awsat on Wednesday that preparations for managing Gaza are already complete, with the names of the prospective committee finalized and Palestinian Health Minister Majed Abu Ramadan emerging as the most likely candidate to lead the body.

Bahbah, who remains close to White House deliberations on Gaza, said Washington supports the presence of Turkish forces as part of an international stabilization force, viewing them as the most capable of maintaining stability in the enclave.

He said the anticipated meeting between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later this month will be decisive for the second phase, noting that the United States will press for its launch next month and for a decision on Türkiye’s participation in the stabilization force.

Defining the mission

Bahbah disclosed details of a meeting held on Tuesday in the Qatari capital Doha on the formation of an international stabilization force for Gaza.

He said one of the main objectives was for Washington to clearly identify which countries are prepared to participate and to determine the nature of each country’s contribution, whether through troops, training, or technical and logistical support.

He said the second objective of the meeting was to clarify how the forces would coordinate with one another and establish a command structure, noting that one proposal under discussion is for a US general to lead the international force.

Discussions also covered deployment locations and whether the force would be stationed outside the so-called yellow line separating Israeli-controlled areas from Hamas-held zones, within that line, or inside densely populated areas, as well as which parties would provide funding, he added.

Rejection of Israel’s approach

On deployment plans, Bahbah said discussions are ongoing but that the model sought by Israel was rejected by an overwhelming majority of participating countries, indicating broad agreement on monitoring rather than combat roles.

On the nature of the mission, he stated that most participating states are unwilling to play any role related to disarmament, instead seeking to act as a buffer between Israeli forces and populated areas in order to protect civilians.

The ultimate objective of the force’s presence is Israel’s gradual withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, he stressed.

“These forces will not act on Israel’s behalf, particularly on disarmament,” Bahbah said, adding that Hamas leaders had expressed to him a willingness to negotiate on the issue.

“Using force will not work,” he warned, noting that Israel had failed to disarm Hamas by force over the past two years and that no international party would succeed in doing so militarily.

A car is seen partially submerged next to a small boat in a flooded area after heavy rains in a makeshift camp for displaced Palestinians in Zawaida, central Gaza Strip, Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2025. (AP)

Türkiye’s participation pivotal

On Türkiye’s role, Bahbah described Ankara’s participation as pivotal, saying Türkiye is the closest country to Hamas and the most capable of engaging with the group over its weapons, something other states struggle to do.

He said the presence of Turkish forces in Gaza would be essential and would lead to greater stability, adding that Washington supports their involvement.

Bahbah said Trump is expected to pressure Netanyahu during their upcoming meeting in the United States later this month to accept Turkish participation.

He added that Israel is likely to seek conditions, possibly pushing for a compromise in which Türkiye’s role would be technical rather than armed, but stressed that pressure from the US administration would be decisive.

Second phase commitments

On the so-called Peace Council, Bahbah noted that Trump has spoken of many world leaders wanting to join it, stressing that membership would not be free and would entail commitments, including funding, providing security forces, or other obligations.

Asked about potential members, he said names he has seen for the executive council include US envoys Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, former British prime minister Tony Blair, former US ambassador Richard Grenell, and former Bulgarian diplomat Nickolay Mladenov.

On Gaza’s administration, Bahbah revealed that a list of 42 candidates for a technocratic committee has been approved by Hamas, Fatah, and Egypt, adding that Health Minister Abu Ramadan is likely to chair the committee.

Despite talk of obstacles to moving to the second phase, Bahbah said he expects it to be launched in the first or second week of January, specifically after the Trump-Netanyahu summit resolves outstanding issues.

He denied knowledge of any arrangements for Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to attend the summit.

Trump will not allow the agreement to fail, he remarked, describing this as “100 percent certain” and adding that Hamas remains committed to the ceasefire despite continued Israeli violations.

Bahbah said the movement understands that Israel is seeking any pretext to resume what he described as acts of annihilation in Gaza and is therefore showing greater restraint to deny it that opportunity.



Iraqis Queue for Fuel as Regional War Disrupts Imports

An Iraq's traffic police officer controls the queues at a petrol station in the Iraqi capital Baghdad on September 5, 2026. (AFP)
An Iraq's traffic police officer controls the queues at a petrol station in the Iraqi capital Baghdad on September 5, 2026. (AFP)
TT

Iraqis Queue for Fuel as Regional War Disrupts Imports

An Iraq's traffic police officer controls the queues at a petrol station in the Iraqi capital Baghdad on September 5, 2026. (AFP)
An Iraq's traffic police officer controls the queues at a petrol station in the Iraqi capital Baghdad on September 5, 2026. (AFP)

Drivers formed long lines outside fuel stations in Baghdad on Saturday as gasoline supplies dropped in oil-rich Iraq due to import disruptions caused by the Middle East war.

Despite being OPEC's second largest oil producer, Iraq imports oil derivatives because its refineries do not produce enough gasoline to meet domestic demand.

In recent weeks, as regional hostilities drag on, long queues have been reappearing every few days, mostly outside government-run fuel stations in Baghdad and other provinces.

Baghdad resident Ibrahim Hashem waited for two hours outside a fuel station on Friday without any luck, only to return early the next day hoping to fill his car.

"It is unreasonable that we produce so many barrels of oil a day, yet still do not have enough gasoline to meet our daily needs," Hashem told AFP outside a fuel station in central Baghdad.

"We already suffer from traffic congestion because of the roads and lack of services. Now, it has become worse due to the gasoline shortage," he added.

Iraq's average daily consumption of gasoline is 33 million liters, but demand rises to 38 million when people panic over shortages, according to authorities.

The oil ministry said Friday that "regional events and the ongoing conflict are causing logistical challenges to tanker traffic, delaying their arrival at Iraqi ports."

It urged citizens to buy only the quantities they need and avoid crowding fuel stations for small amounts of gasoline.

Oil Minister Bassem Mohammed Khudair said on Friday that his ministry was addressing the "temporary shortage of gasoline" and that new shipments will arrive soon to help stabilize supplies.

Like other oil producers, Iraq has been greatly affected by the US-Iran conflict, which has choked off the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Iraq is hugely dependent on oil exports, which make up about 90 percent of its budget revenues.

Before the war erupted in February, Iraq produced around four million barrels per day, and exported an average of 3.4 million bpd, mostly via Hormuz.

After a significant drop, Iraqi oil exports recovered to more than 2.2 million bpd in August, according to the oil ministry.

Last month, Iran's state news agency IRNA said that over the past six months, Tehran has granted permission to "a number of Iraqi oil tankers" to pass through Hormuz.


US Ambassador Calls Violent Israeli Settlers ‘Terrorists’ After Weeks of West Bank Unrest

US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee (C-L) meets residents as he visits the West Bank village of Turmus Ayya, near Ramallah, West Bank, 05 September 2026. (EPA)
US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee (C-L) meets residents as he visits the West Bank village of Turmus Ayya, near Ramallah, West Bank, 05 September 2026. (EPA)
TT

US Ambassador Calls Violent Israeli Settlers ‘Terrorists’ After Weeks of West Bank Unrest

US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee (C-L) meets residents as he visits the West Bank village of Turmus Ayya, near Ramallah, West Bank, 05 September 2026. (EPA)
US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee (C-L) meets residents as he visits the West Bank village of Turmus Ayya, near Ramallah, West Bank, 05 September 2026. (EPA)

The United States ambassador to Israel condemned Israeli settler violence in the occupied West Bank again on Saturday, calling the behavior an “act of terror" as he visited with Palestinian American residents shaken by months of attacks. 

Ambassador Mike Huckabee referred to such settlers as “terrorists,” a word that US officials usually reserve for Palestinian militants. 

“If there are squatters that come in and put up their own flags and take possession of something that does not belong to them, if they burn a car, if they torch a mosque, if they go into someone’s home and vandalize it, paint graffiti on the walls, that’s a criminal act. But it extends beyond a criminal act. It’s an act of terror,” Huckabee said during his visit to the village of Turmus Ayya, which has reported frequent attacks by settlers over the past year. 

Such attacks have surged since the war in Gaza began with the Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, according to the United Nations humanitarian office. 

Huckabee also used the term “terrorists” last month after weeks of unrest in the West Bank town of Qusra, where settlers surrounded several homes including one owned by a Palestinian American. Days later, residents of the West Bank village of Bazariya said settlers burned a mosque and left a message on a wall in graffiti reading “Huckabee regards from the terrorists" in Hebrew. 

“I’m glad they admitted it,” the ambassador said Saturday of the incident, adding: “I don’t think that’s what they intended to do, but I do think that they represent a very tiny minority.” 

A week ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned the actions of a “handful of rioters,” and the foreign ministry called the settlers’ actions “a disgrace.” 

Netanyahu’s government is the most ultranationalist and religious in Israel’s history. It has presided over a surge of settlement construction in the West Bank. Most of the international community views settlements as illegal. 

On Saturday's visit to Turmus Ayya, the ambassador began his remarks by making clear he was addressing US citizens, who make up a small percentage of the roughly 3 million Palestinians in the West Bank. 

“I’m very aware that a lot of the American people who live in Turmus Ayya and other communities across this region are not enjoying the life they deserve to live, not enjoying it in a peaceful way,” Huckabee said. “It’s a life that is disturbed by people who have created extraordinary challenges that are unfair and illegal.” 

The US Embassy can't investigate criminal activity, he said, but it can tell its host government “there are needs that need to be addressed, there are issues that cannot go unnoticed, and specific crimes and acts of terror that cannot continue without that country doing the investigation and adjudication that every person has a right to expect.” 

Huckabee met with about 10 Palestinian American residents who described the impact of the violence on their lives and properties, the municipality told The Associated Press. 

Israel captured the West Bank, along with Gaza and east Jerusalem, in the 1967 Mideast war, territories the Palestinians want for a future state. The UN and much of the international community consider them to be illegally occupied. 

Since then, the Israeli government has built nearly 150 settlements that are home to well over 500,000 Jewish settlers. Many settlements resemble developed suburbs. 

Israel’s military operates in all parts of the West Bank, but rights groups have said the military frequently turns a blind eye to settler violence. The settlers are Israeli citizens, and Israel’s defense minister recently announced plans to fully transfer law enforcement among settlers to the Israeli police. 


Could Sudan’s Conflict Become a Regional War?

Members of the Sudanese army take part in a military parade in Gedaref in August. (AFP)
Members of the Sudanese army take part in a military parade in Gedaref in August. (AFP)
TT

Could Sudan’s Conflict Become a Regional War?

Members of the Sudanese army take part in a military parade in Gedaref in August. (AFP)
Members of the Sudanese army take part in a military parade in Gedaref in August. (AFP)

Fears that Sudan’s war could turn into a regional conflict are no longer merely assessments raised by observers following cross-border strikes and mutual accusations between Sudan and Chad, alongside troubling military movements near the border with Ethiopia.

Massad Boulos, senior adviser to the US president for Arab and African affairs, conveyed those concerns to the UN Security Council, warning that the repercussions could fuel the conflict and threaten to draw neighboring countries more deeply into the war.

The US warnings do not appear to have emerged in a vacuum. They are difficult to separate from Washington’s extensive intelligence capabilities, which allow it to monitor military movements, weapons and drone routes, and cross-border networks.

Raising the level of concern to the Security Council therefore reflects a US assessment that the risks are real and growing, even if the administration has not publicly disclosed all the information on which that assessment is based.

The warning was reinforced by a call Boulos held with Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Deby following reports of a military strike inside Chadian territory.

Boulos said the two expressed “deep concern about the war in Sudan spilling across its borders, fueling further escalation and threatening regional peace and stability,” while calling for an end to external support for the warring parties.

More than three years after the war began, it is no longer simply an internal confrontation between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. As fighting has moved into areas bordering Chad and Ethiopia and the use of sophisticated weapons has expanded, Sudan has become the center of a conflict in which the calculations of neighboring countries intersect with the interests of regional and international powers.

Growing internationalization

Evidence of the war’s internationalization can be seen in the UN Fact-Finding Mission’s finding that weapons, military technology, fighters and external supply networks are helping prolong the conflict and strengthen the capabilities of both sides.

The mission described a cross-border network linked to individuals, entities and countries that it said had provided the RSF with weapons, equipment, logistical support and foreign personnel. The countries concerned have denied the accusations, saying they remain neutral and support peace efforts.

The mission, meanwhile, said its investigations into sources of external support for the army were still at a preliminary stage.

Sudanese researcher Kholood Khair, director of Confluence Advisory, told the Financial Times in April that the war had “spread across the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel,” and that none of Sudan’s seven neighbors was entirely removed from its effects.

Alan Boswell, director of the Horn of Africa project at the International Crisis Group, has similarly argued that the war is dividing the region and increasing polarization among surrounding countries over the two sides.

He considers Chad and South Sudan the most exposed to its repercussions, while also pointing to the need to watch Ethiopia and tensions in Somalia.

A prolonged conflict, he has warned, could drag the region into a “spiral of violence.”

Amin Ismail Majzoub, an expert on crisis management and negotiation at the Center for Research and Strategic Studies, ruled out the conflict developing into a direct military confrontation between Sudan and neighboring countries.

He said the more likely scenario was an escalation of “proxy warfare,” through continued financial and military support and the use of mercenaries and armed groups, which would prolong the war.

Majzoub told Asharq Al-Awsat that Khartoum’s accusations against Chad and Ethiopia were, according to Sudanese authorities, based on evidence submitted to the African Union, IGAD and the Security Council, in addition to reports that bases and airports had been used in support of the RSF.

He added that if those parties moved from indirect support to declared military intervention, Sudan’s regional allies could step in to back it, at which point the conflict could expand to include the Horn of Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.

Majzoub nevertheless dismissed that scenario, saying: “This will not happen,” because a comprehensive regional war would not be welcomed by the countries of the region.

At the same time, he noted that the conflict’s repercussions were already becoming visible inside neighboring countries, citing increasingly vocal opposition groups in Chad that reject what they say is support being provided to Arab groups aligned with the RSF.

Retired Sudanese army Maj. Gen. Kamal Ismail, for his part, warned that the intersection of regional interests was gradually pushing the conflict beyond Sudan’s borders.

“We have repeatedly warned that the conflict could move from inside Sudan into the region, and the indicators point to that direction,” Ismail told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He added that the widening scope of the fighting could lead to a broader civil war and further complicate the situation.

Ismail said intensifying competition over regional interests could push some actors toward direct intervention under the pretext of protecting their interests, warning that “the longer the war continues, the more its parties lose the ability to control its course or stop it.”

He urged Sudanese to unite to halt the fighting and preserve what remains of the country.

Ethiopia and Chad

The movement of military operations into Blue Nile state near the Ethiopian border is among the most worrying developments.

Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab has published reports based on satellite imagery and open-source analysis pointing to the assembly of brigade-size military support inside an Ethiopian National Defense Force base in Asosa and linking it to RSF activity.

Asosa is significant because of its proximity to Blue Nile and the town of Kurmuk. Any military presence in the area connected to the war, if confirmed, could therefore lay the groundwork for a new border front.

To the west, Chad stands at the center of the storm because of its long border with Darfur and the tribal ties spanning both sides.

Tensions escalated after Sovereignty Council Chairman and army commander Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan accused N’Djamena of facilitating support to the RSF, while Chad denies that its territory or airports are being used to transfer weapons.

Cameron Hudson, a former US official and Sudan expert, says the repercussions of strikes inside Chad are no longer confined to the battlefield but have developed into a diplomatic confrontation.

Countries affected by the war

South Sudan may be the country most exposed to the consequences of the war. Its economy depends on exporting oil through Sudanese facilities and ports, while it has received more than 1 million Sudanese and returning South Sudanese since the fighting began.

A halt in oil exports or the spread of fighting to the border could threaten Juba’s fragile stability.

Kenya, although it does not share a border with Sudan, is exposed to the spillover of political polarization, financing and fighter networks, as well as trade disruption and damage to the role of IGAD, of which Nairobi is a key pillar.

Uganda faces similar risks through South Sudan. Any renewed eruption of instability in Juba could trigger a new refugee influx into Uganda, which already hosts more than 1 million South Sudanese refugees. In this way, the effects of the war could spread from Sudan to South Sudan and then to Uganda and Kenya without regular armies ever crossing borders.

Egypt, for its part, faces repercussions related to refugees, security along its southern border, Nile waters and the balance with Ethiopia. Eritrea fears instability spreading into eastern Sudan and the Red Sea coast.

IGAD Executive Secretary Workneh Gebeyehu has said that peace and security challenges have become too interconnected for any single country or institution to confront alone, describing Sudan as one of the clearest examples of the convergence of military confrontation, humanitarian catastrophe, institutional fragmentation, regional spillover and geopolitical rivalry.

Sudan’s war has not yet become a full-fledged regional confrontation, but it long ago moved beyond the confines of an internal conflict. As the different strands become increasingly intertwined, the question in the future may no longer be: Will the war spread into the region? But rather has it already begun?