New Evidence Bolsters Theory of Mossad Role in Abduction of Retired Lebanese Officer

Israeli pilot Ron Arad, who went missing in southern Lebanon in 1986. (Israeli Air Force)
Israeli pilot Ron Arad, who went missing in southern Lebanon in 1986. (Israeli Air Force)
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New Evidence Bolsters Theory of Mossad Role in Abduction of Retired Lebanese Officer

Israeli pilot Ron Arad, who went missing in southern Lebanon in 1986. (Israeli Air Force)
Israeli pilot Ron Arad, who went missing in southern Lebanon in 1986. (Israeli Air Force)

A growing body of evidence from Lebanese security and judicial investigations is strengthening suspicions that Israel’s Mossad intelligence service orchestrated the luring and abduction of retired General Security captain Ahmed Shukr, whose disappearance nearly two weeks ago has raised alarm within Lebanon’s security establishment.

As investigations led by the Information Branch of the Internal Security Forces progress, officials describe what they consider to be high-quality findings, firmly placing the case in the category of a coordinated intelligence operation.

Beyond initial suspicions

Search efforts have so far failed to uncover any trace of Shukr on Lebanese territory. A senior Lebanese judicial source told Asharq Al-Awsat that “all the evidence and data collected so far point to the hypothesis of Shukr’s abduction.”

He added that investigators have “moved beyond the stage of initial suspicions and entered an in-depth analysis of the luring process, communications patterns, and field developments before and after the moment of his disappearance.”

The case is linked to suspicions over Shukr’s connection to the long-unresolved file of the disappearance of Israeli air force pilot Ron Arad in southern Lebanon in 1986, he remarked.

Key leads

Among the most significant leads bolstering this hypothesis, the judicial source said, is “precise monitoring of internal and external communications involving Shukr in the hours and days before he was lured to the Kark area near the city of Zahle in the Bekaa Valley, where he disappeared under circumstances still under investigation.”

The data revealed an unusual pattern suggesting “tight, cross-border coordination.”

Shukr belongs to the family of Fuad Shukr, a Hezbollah leader who was assassinated by Israel on July 30, 2024, in an airstrike on a building in the Haret Hreik area of Beirut’s southern suburbs.

However, Abdul Salam Shukr, Ahmed's brother, rejected any attempt to link them closely to Fuad Shukr. “No one in the town even knew Fuad Shukr,” he said.

“Since the early 1980s, he left the town and never returned, and he was distant from his relatives.”

He stressed that Ahmed Shukr, since retiring from military service, “never left the Bekaa. He stayed at home and played cards with his friends at night.”

Carefully planned operation

In a development described as highly significant, the source revealed what was termed an “important” piece of evidence from surveillance cameras.

“CCTV footage captured an image of a car in the Kark area at the time Shukr was lured and disappeared,” the source said. “The same car was seen later that night heading from Beirut toward the road leading to Beirut’s international airport, carrying a Swedish national suspected of direct involvement in the luring and abduction.”

Security agencies later verified the route by which the Swede left Lebanon. According to the judicial source, the man “traveled abroad just hours after the incident, and investigators now have sufficient information about his departure and destination.”

This, the source told Asharq Al-Awsat, is an additional indication of “prior, carefully coordinated planning that goes beyond the capabilities of conventional local networks.”

New development

The abduction of Ahmed Shukr now appears to be one of Lebanon’s most dangerous security cases, given its intelligence dimensions and the broader questions it raises about security breaches and the covert confrontation between Lebanon and Israel.

At the same time, a new development has brought renewed attention to a Lebanese man identified by his initials A.M., who resides in Kinshasa.

He had previously contacted Shukr, asking him to assist people who claimed they wanted to purchase property in the Bekaa, an approach investigators believe was central to the luring operation.

A.M. has since returned from abroad and surrendered himself to the security services.

Accounts differed over why A.M. returned to Beirut after a wanted notice had been issued against him on suspicion of a possible role in the case.

While some information suggested he was pressured by the Lebanese community abroad to return and turn himself in, sources close to the investigation said he offered a completely different account.

According to these sources, A.M. said that he too “fell victim to the same group that targeted and abducted Ahmed Shukr,” and that he came to Lebanon of his own free will “to clear his name and place the information he has at the disposal of the security services.”

Security information indicates that A.M. arrived in Beirut on Sunday evening and was initially questioned by General Security before being handed over to the Information Branch of the Internal Security Forces, at the order of Public Prosecutor Judge Jamal al-Hajjar, who is personally overseeing the investigation due to the case’s sensitivity and complexity.

Findings expected within days

Sources said the initial questioning of A.M. is expected to be completed within a maximum of three days, after which the results of the investigation will be announced, including whether his account aligns with the technical data and evidence already in the possession of security agencies.

Earlier, Asharq Al-Awsat sources had revealed that the missing officer is the brother of Hassan Shukr, a fighter who was part of the group involved in the capture of Ron Arad after his aircraft was shot down over southern Lebanon on October 16, 1986.

Responding to this, Ahmed Shukr’s brother said: “Hassan joined military service in 1979, which means he was a state employee when Arad disappeared in 1986. It is well known that state employees do not engage in political parties.”



How Egypt Benefits From Expanding Nile Basin Power, Water Projects

Tanzania’s president and Egypt’s prime minister attend the inauguration of the Julius Nyerere Dam in Tanzania last month. (Egyptian Cabinet/Facebook)
Tanzania’s president and Egypt’s prime minister attend the inauguration of the Julius Nyerere Dam in Tanzania last month. (Egyptian Cabinet/Facebook)
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How Egypt Benefits From Expanding Nile Basin Power, Water Projects

Tanzania’s president and Egypt’s prime minister attend the inauguration of the Julius Nyerere Dam in Tanzania last month. (Egyptian Cabinet/Facebook)
Tanzania’s president and Egypt’s prime minister attend the inauguration of the Julius Nyerere Dam in Tanzania last month. (Egyptian Cabinet/Facebook)

Egypt is seeking funding for 36 projects in the southern Nile Basin, expanding its role in the region through hydropower, electricity and water schemes that experts say could benefit both Cairo and its neighbors.

The projects include power interconnections, transmission lines, water supplies and multipurpose schemes. Experts told Asharq Al-Awsat that Egypt’s growing involvement was guided by a principle of mutual benefit.

The southern Nile Basin countries are Burundi, Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. They are among the Nile’s upstream countries and, together with the eastern Nile countries of Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and Eritrea, make up the Nile River Basin region.

Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam said on Friday that Cairo had agreed to support efforts to mobilize funding for the 36 projects after studying them, exchanging information, assessing their impacts and reaching agreement through consultations.

Sewilam pointed to Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere Dam as a practical example of cooperation among Nile Basin countries. The Egyptian-Tanzanian partnership had brought gains to both sides, he said.

The dam provides electricity for Tanzania, Sewilam said, and its power could also support regional integration, cross-border connections and electricity trade with neighboring countries.

He also cited the Grand Fula Dam project in South Sudan, saying Egypt supported Juba’s development goals, including that project.

Tanzania inaugurated the Julius Nyerere hydropower dam and plant in late August. The Egyptian consortium of Arab Contractors and Elsewedy Electric built it over five years, with 1,700 Egyptian engineers and technicians among a workforce of about 12,000.

Hussein al-Buheiri, an African affairs expert at the National Center for Middle East Studies, said Egypt had the resources and capabilities to play a central role in developing Nile Basin and Horn of Africa countries, particularly through hydropower dams and irrigation and agricultural projects.

He said Egyptian companies’ work on the Julius Nyerere Dam and Egypt’s help in building power plants in countries such as Djibouti showed how the country could act as a strategic development partner.

African countries gained development, while Egypt gained investment and thousands of jobs, he said.

That approach also advanced Egyptian foreign policy and helped protect its Nile water security by drawing basin countries closer to Cairo and countering Ethiopian moves, al-Buheiri said.

Salah Halima, deputy chairman of the Egyptian Council for African Affairs and a former assistant foreign minister, said Egypt’s support for development projects reflected a broader commitment to shared interests and sustainable development across the basin.

Egypt had long supported water and electricity projects in Nile Basin countries, approving and helping carry out dozens of them, he said. That record showed Cairo’s support for those countries’ right to develop without harming others.

Halima described current water projects as an expression of partnership and mutual investment between Egypt and its African neighbors. Their expansion, he said, was part of longstanding collective action and close cooperation.

The message, he said, was clear: understanding and cooperation, rather than confrontation or dispute, should guide the management of international rivers.


Can Libyan Lawmakers Force a Change in Parliament’s Leadership?

A still from the Libyan House of Representatives’ latest session on Sept. 15 (video posted by the House on its Facebook page)
A still from the Libyan House of Representatives’ latest session on Sept. 15 (video posted by the House on its Facebook page)
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Can Libyan Lawmakers Force a Change in Parliament’s Leadership?

A still from the Libyan House of Representatives’ latest session on Sept. 15 (video posted by the House on its Facebook page)
A still from the Libyan House of Representatives’ latest session on Sept. 15 (video posted by the House on its Facebook page)

A push to change the rules of Libya’s parliament and rotate its leadership has put a question to the Benghazi-based chamber: Can lawmakers unseat Speaker Aguila Saleh after nearly 12 years at its helm?

The effort has also raised questions about why a bloc opposed to Saleh’s “unilateral decision-making” is acting now, whether its campaign is tied to the “4+4” agreement, and whether that deal can be carried out.

The agreement is seen as a possible route out of Libya’s political divide through a unified executive authority that would lead the country to elections within two years.

The lawmakers opposing Saleh say they will press on with efforts to “reform parliament and change its leadership.”

They say they were blocked from holding a session on the issue in the middle of last week when the chamber’s Benghazi headquarters was closed on its leadership’s orders.

Issam al-Jehani, a prominent member of the bloc, said its 86 lawmakers could meet in any Libyan city where they could carry out their duties.

Their aim was “neither a conspiracy nor an attempt to take Saleh’s seat,” he said, but reform in response to Saleh’s unilateral decisions and determination to stay in office.

Other political figures say the campaign could splinter and fade. Its momentum, they argue, depends on the balance of power in eastern Libya and on regional pressure.

Lawmaker Ali al-Takbali expects it to lose steam. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that a similar call in March for a session to change parliament’s rules came to nothing.

He also questioned whether Saleh’s opponents could keep enough lawmakers together to hold a session to remove him. They may unite over a grievance, al-Takbali said, but become harder to assemble once they return home, particularly if some reconsider their position because of personal interests or tribal ties.

Fellow lawmaker Montaser al-Hassi warned that some members’ actions could split parliament. Lawmakers have the right to amend its rules, he said, but must do so through legal channels.

Libya has long been divided between two governments: the interim Government of National Unity led by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah in Tripoli, and Osama Hammad’s parliament-appointed government, which runs the east and some southern cities and is backed by Libyan National Army commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

Under the “4+4” agreement reached late last month by representatives of the Government of National Unity and the Libyan National Army under UN auspices, a new presidential council and unified government would prepare the country for general elections within two years.

Some observers and political figures say regional countries regard Saleh’s continued leadership as a safeguard against a split in the legislature, which they describe as the only institution to have remained intact through Libya’s institutional divisions.

Analyst Hossam Fnish linked the turmoil in parliament to the “4+4” deal. He said the reform bloc’s insistence on changing the rules before holding sessions would delay incorporating the agreement into Libya’s constitutional declaration, hindering a deal that could lead to elections and end the divide.

The UN mission, he said, prefers to incorporate the agreement through a constitutional amendment before seeking Security Council endorsement.

Fathi al-Shibli, head of the Voice of the People party, questioned the reform bloc’s motives. Complaints about Saleh making decisions alone and sessions going ahead without a quorum had circulated for years without drawing objections from lawmakers, he said.

That, in his view, lent weight to suspicions that the dispute was a struggle between blocs backed by powerful interests, rather than a drive for reform.

Al-Shibli expects Saleh to remain in office until the UN mission calls for a constituent council to replace parliament and the High Council of State to implement the “4+4” agreement. He said both bodies oppose a change to Libya’s political landscape.

Political analyst Mohammed Mahfouz likewise described the parliamentary dispute as a contest between powerful groups in eastern and western Libya, each seeking to show the international community that it can control the political scene.

Saleh’s hold on his position rests on two factors, Mahfouz told Asharq Al-Awsat: whether he and his allies can absorb the current anger, and whether regional and Western countries support him.

Saleh’s two deputies may help him contain the challenge, Mahfouz said, because they too could face replacement.


Iraq’s PM Tells UN The State Alone Will Decide War, Peace

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi speaks during the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 25, 2026. (AP)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi speaks during the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 25, 2026. (AP)
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Iraq’s PM Tells UN The State Alone Will Decide War, Peace

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi speaks during the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 25, 2026. (AP)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi speaks during the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 25, 2026. (AP)

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi said on Friday that one of his government’s priorities was to ensure the state alone decides matters of war and peace, stressing that weapons must remain in the hands of constitutional institutions.

“The practical measures to bring weapons and decisions on war and peace under state control are moving in the right direction,” al-Zaidi told the UN General Assembly.

He called them essential to building state institutions, protecting sovereignty and securing stability.

He said the end of the international coalition’s mission in Iraq would mark a new phase in relations with strategic partners, shifting from military cooperation to economic and development cooperation. Iraq would continue to strengthen its security and military capabilities, he added.

Al-Zaidi called for tighter border controls, the closing of security gaps and continued vigilance against conditions that could fuel extremism.

He reiterated Iraq’s support for dialogue, diplomacy, respect for sovereignty, noninterference and good neighborly relations, and urged countries to resolve conflicts through negotiations and prevent renewed wars.

He urged the world to engage more closely with Iraq, saying the country could contribute to security and stability.

He also highlighted the Development Road project as a “strategic corridor for trade, investment and energy” linking Iraq’s Grand Faw Port to Türkiye and, from there, Europe.

“Iraq has never been on the margins. It is at the heart of history and the pulse of the present, and it deserves a partnership for the future,” he said.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had warned Baghdad that militias must be disarmed to avoid the “Balkanization of Iraq,” amid growing pressure on the Iraqi government to bring weapons under state control.

Rubio expressed US support for al-Zaidi’s efforts to strengthen state authority and called for armed factions to be dismantled. He warned that competing centers of power could fragment Iraq and weaken its institutions.

Al-Zaidi had proposed a plan beginning with a 90-day period during which armed factions would cease attacks, with the transfer of weapons to the state to be completed by June 30, 2027.