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Sami Nasman, a Hamas Foe, Returns to Run Gaza Security

Sami Nasman (X)
Sami Nasman (X)
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Sami Nasman, a Hamas Foe, Returns to Run Gaza Security

Sami Nasman (X)
Sami Nasman (X)

Even the most optimistic advocates of change in Gaza’s system of governance did not expect the list for the proposed Gaza Administration Committee to include figures long described as among Hamas’s fiercest opponents.

Many Palestinians, across factional and popular lines, were surprised by the emergence of Sami Nasman, one of the most prominent officers in the Palestinian General Intelligence Service since its establishment, as the figure selected to oversee the security file in Gaza.

Nasman has a long record of what has been described as hostility toward, and pursuit by, Hamas, which appeared to have little room to reject the names chosen to join the committee.

Who is Sami Nasman?

Sami Nasman was born in 1967 in the Beach refugee camp west of Gaza City and spent most of his life in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood in the city’s north.

During his secondary and university studies, he joined the Fatah Youth Movement and was active in the first Palestinian uprising that erupted in 1987.

He also took part in armed activities that made him a target for Israeli forces after he formed a cell that targeted those accused of collaborating with Israel’s Shin Bet security agency. That forced him, along with several Fatah activists, to flee the Gaza Strip in 1988.

Nasman experienced a brief period of what was described as limited hostility with Hamas activists during the group’s early formation in 1987, a phase that quickly faded after his departure from Gaza.

While in exile, Nasman moved between Cairo, Tunis, and other capitals, where he met the late Palestinian president Yasser Arafat, according to sources close to him cited by Asharq Al-Awsat.

Return to Gaza, return to hostility

In 1994, as the Palestinian Authority began deploying in Gaza and parts of the West Bank under the 1993 Oslo Accords, Nasman returned to the enclave with others and later settled again in Sheikh Radwan.

He became a senior officer in the Palestinian General Intelligence Service and was considered the right hand of Amin al-Hindi, the agency’s first chief.

Nasman wielded significant influence within the intelligence service, across the broader Palestinian security apparatus, and within Fatah’s institutional circles. He was often described as a “hard man to reckon with,” the sources said.

They added that he held several key posts, including serving as the intelligence chief’s private office chief, leading the counterintelligence department, overseeing investigations into foreigners permitted to enter Gaza, and handling other sensitive assignments.

After his return, and amid Palestinian security activity targeting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members, Nasman was accused of leading arrest campaigns against them between 1996 and 2000.

In February 1996, Islamic Jihad accused him of responsibility for the killing of two of its senior field operatives who had carried out an attack in Beit Lid inside Israel that killed more than 20 Israelis.

The two men were surrounded in a house in the Beach camp, just tens of meters from the intelligence service’s Mushtal compound and were killed during an attempted arrest after refusing to surrender.

Sources close to Nasman denied his involvement, saying another officer was responsible. That account could not be independently confirmed, although some testimonies at the time placed him at the scene.

The second intifada

Hostility between Nasman and Hamas deepened with the outbreak of the second Palestinian uprising in late 2000 and the escape of Hamas and Islamic Jihad members from Palestinian Authority prisons.

Tensions escalated further after Hamas won the 2006 legislative elections, a year that also saw an assassination attempt on the intelligence service’s second chief, Ahmed Shaniora, known as Tariq Abu Rajab.

That was followed by an attempt on the life of Maj. Gen. Baha Balousha, which killed his wife and children.

The confrontation between Nasman, his security apparatus, and Hamas reached its peak after Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2006, forcing him, like dozens of other officers, to flee for fear of his life amid accusations that he had overseen the arrest and pursuit of Hamas members.

Nasman exited Gaza via Israeli land crossings to Ramallah, where he later became responsible for the Gaza file within the intelligence service and then an adviser to the agency’s chief for the southern governorates.

Accusations and convictions in absentia

The hostility did not end with his departure. In 2015, Hamas accused Nasman of running networks inside Gaza from Ramallah to stir unrest and carry out assassination attempts against its leaders and officials.

In August 2015, Hamas gave him 10 days to turn himself in.

In March 2016, it sentenced him in absentia to 15 years in prison, along with others who received varying terms, after publishing confessions by Palestinian security operatives who said Nasman had recruited them to carry out the alleged plots.

Sources close to Nasman dismissed the accusations as unfounded, describing them as part of the political infighting that accompanied the Palestinian split.

During the most recent war in Gaza, Hamas again accused him of overseeing an intelligence network that monitored the entry of international and Arab aid convoys into the enclave for espionage purposes, an allegation neither Fatah nor the Palestinian Authority commented on.

In recent months, Nasman joined the ranks of officers who were “forcibly retired and marginalized,” according to sources close to him. He subsequently developed new ties with associates working with the camp of exiled Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan, meeting them frequently in Cairo.

Other sources said he was nominated by the Dahlan-aligned camp to lead the public security file within the new committee.

Hamas’s position

Nasman’s appointment to the security portfolio has sparked widespread debate in Palestinian circles, raising questions about Hamas’s stance, particularly among its grassroots and organizational ranks, given the well-known hostility toward him.

Officially, Hamas welcomed the formation of the technocratic committee in a joint statement with other Palestinian factions, without voicing objections.

However, Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the movement was “compelled at this critical stage to set aside differences, as it has done with other Palestinian Authority and Fatah figures, for the sake of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.”

Another senior Hamas source said the movement “has little room to maneuver, as it seeks to secure a ceasefire agreement that implements its terms and moves Palestinians into a new political and national phase.”

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Arab World

Iraq: Fuel Crisis Exacerbates the Country’s Problems, Citizens’ Burdens

A scene of congestion at a gas station in Baghdad (Iraqi News Agency)
A scene of congestion at a gas station in Baghdad (Iraqi News Agency)
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Iraq: Fuel Crisis Exacerbates the Country’s Problems, Citizens’ Burdens

A scene of congestion at a gas station in Baghdad (Iraqi News Agency)
A scene of congestion at a gas station in Baghdad (Iraqi News Agency)

Many Iraqi provinces, including the capital Baghdad, are facing a severe fuel shortage, forcing motorists in some cases to wait for hours to get gasoline. This is placing additional burdens on citizens who are already dealing with deteriorating public services, fewer hours of available electricity, and delays in the payment of pensions and salaries for public-sector employees.

Despite repeated government promises to overcome the fuel crisis, long lines of vehicles can frequently be seen at gas stations across Baghdad, Kirkuk, Babil, Basra, and most provinces of the Kurdistan Region. This is further deepening public distrust in government statements.

According to observers, the current fuel crisis "is one of the consequences of the war and the ongoing state of tension between Washington and Tehran, and its negative repercussions for Iraq since the war began on February 28."

At the same time, successive Iraqi governments face intense public criticism for failing to build enough oil refineries to meet domestic demand in a country that sits on vast oil reserves.

"Deliberate Manipulation"?

While many experts link the fuel crisis to the negative effects of the US-Iran war, particularly following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the disruption of most of Iraq's oil exports and foreign imports, sources close to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's government do not rule out "deliberate manipulation" within the Oil Ministry that is worsening the crisis.

They link this alleged manipulation to groups that were recently affected by arrests targeting senior ministry officials on charges of stealing billions of dinars and dollars. Those arrested include former Deputy Oil Minister for Refining Affairs Adnan al-Jumaili, Deputy Oil Minister for Distribution Affairs Ali Maaraj al-Bahadli, Director General of the Oil Products Distribution Company Hussein Talib Abboud, and other figures.

In contrast, the Oil Ministry attributes the current fuel crisis to several factors, including increased demand and higher daily domestic gasoline consumption, technical failures that forced some production units at local refineries to shut down, and delays in the arrival of imported fuel shipments because of security tensions at ports and along regional transportation routes.

Despite the lines of cars at filling stations in more than one province, Oil Minister Basim Mohammed al-Abadi insists that petroleum products are available. During a meeting attended by senior ministry officials, he said that "the temporary shortage of gasoline is being addressed" and that additional gasoline shipments would arrive soon, helping to stabilize supplies and meet citizens' needs.

He added that "gasoline consumption averages around 33 million liters per day and rises to around 38 million liters when citizens become concerned."

He said his ministry "continues to closely monitor supply and distribution flows and is taking the necessary measures to secure petroleum products and strengthen stability in the domestic market."

Regarding the country's current oil exports following the near-total disruption caused by the US-Israeli-Iranian war, Minister al-Abadi said that "crude oil exports were around 250,000 barrels per day when the government took office, while current crude oil production has exceeded 3 million barrels per day."

In a subsequent statement, the Oil Ministry explained that "the congestion at fuel stations is caused by a negative gap between production and consumption." It said the ministry had relied on imported shipments delivered through maritime entry points to make up the shortfall, but regional events and the ongoing conflict have created logistical difficulties for tanker movements, delaying their arrival or docking at Iraqi ports.

No Plans to Export

The Iraqi Oil Ministry on Saturday denied reports circulated by some media outlets and news agencies that it planned to export gasoline, stressing that its immediate priority is to achieve self-sufficiency.

The ministry said in a statement that "the future shift toward exporting certain petroleum products depends on completing expansion work at other refineries," which it is pursuing as part of its strategic plans to transform Iraq from an importer into an exporter.

The statement noted that Iraq currently exports fuel oil and naphtha, in addition to previous shipments of jet fuel and sulfur.

Arab World

Houthi Escalation Backfires in Taiz, on Yemen’s Western Coast

Yemeni government forces launch counteroffensive in Taiz, Hodeidah — military media
Yemeni government forces launch counteroffensive in Taiz, Hodeidah — military media
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Houthi Escalation Backfires in Taiz, on Yemen’s Western Coast

Yemeni government forces launch counteroffensive in Taiz, Hodeidah — military media
Yemeni government forces launch counteroffensive in Taiz, Hodeidah — military media

A large-scale Houthi ground offensive launched on Thursday across Yemen’s western coast, southern Hodeidah, and western Taiz was faltering on Saturday as government forces counterattacked on several fronts, backed by intensified air strikes and efforts to cut the group’s supply lines.

In the most significant battlefield development on Saturday morning, national resistance forces, backed by units from the Giants Brigades, launched a counterattack south of al-Jarrahi district in Hodeidah province.

National resistance drones simultaneously struck Houthi reinforcements in the area, according to its military media office.

The operation came as government forces advanced from Hays towards al-Jarrahi in southeastern Hodeidah, seeking to regain the initiative on one of the fronts where the Houthis had carried out major attacks in recent days.

Military sources said the group had suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment during the fighting.

In southeastern Taiz, government forces made further gains on the Hayfan front and seized al-Wathra hill and Saeed Taha hill in the al-Mafalis area, as well as the Dheiban, al-Khudaira and al-Najdain hills, according to a military source.

The recaptured positions are militarily significant because they overlook al-Khazja market and Houthi supply routes towards fronts in northwestern Lahj and southern Taiz, the source said. The source added that the group had suffered losses in personnel and equipment and that some of its fighters had fled their positions.

Counteroffensive

In western Taiz, government forces recaptured al-Khazan hill in Jabal Habashi district on Friday after fierce clashes with the Houthis, as fighting intensified on the Maqbanah and al-Kadaha fronts and government reinforcements arrived.

The rapidly unfolding developments on these fronts indicate that the initiative is gradually shifting from the Houthis to government forces after three days of fighting in which the group sought to break through in southern Hodeidah and western Taiz, particularly in Jabal Habashi.

On the Saqam front, the national resistance’s military media office said on Saturday that Second Division forces were inflicting heavy losses on the Houthis in the al-Muharraq mountains.

The national resistance’s naval forces said they destroyed two Houthi explosive-laden boats that had attempted to target the al-Fajra area south of al-Khokha and the port of Mokha.

Military sources also said a Houthi infiltration attempt from the eastern entrance to Taiz city had been thwarted and several members of the group killed, while fighting continued in various sectors of the front.

At the same time, Houthi shelling struck the Hayjat al-Abd road linking Taiz and Aden, killing four civilians and wounding nine others, according to local and medical sources. The attack also caused property damage at the site.

The incidents reflect the widening scope of the Houthi escalation to include roads and civilian areas alongside the group’s ground operations on the front lines.

Air strikes enter the battle

For the first time, the Yemeni army said it had used combat aircraft to strike Houthi positions on the Taiz and Hodeidah fronts, marking a notable development in the course of the current fighting.

The armed forces’ media center said on Friday evening that combat aircraft had carried out more than 15 strikes on Houthi positions, gatherings and vehicles on the western coast fronts in Taiz and Hodeidah provinces, as artillery fire and ground clashes continued.

Military sources said Yemeni aircraft continued to strike Houthi positions in Taiz and Hodeidah, targeting supply lines and weapons depots. Houthi positions in the city of al-Hazm in al-Jawf province were also hit by air strikes, according to military sources.

Field sources said the Houthis had suffered heavy losses during three days of fighting, with hundreds of the group’s fighters killed or wounded. Hospitals under Houthi control in Hodeidah were facing mounting pressure as casualties arrived from the battlefronts, they said.

The group transferred another group of fighters killed or wounded in the clashes to hospitals in al-Jarrahi and Zabid, according to local media sources, indicating the scale of its losses during the offensive and subsequent efforts to repel the counterattacks.

The Houthis, meanwhile, continued to send reinforcements to the battle zones to hold positions they had initially advanced to and contain the government forces’ counteroffensive.

Protecting Bab al-Mandab

As the fighting widened, Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, and other council members monitored developments in the military operations and contacted military and field commanders to review the course of the battles, readiness levels, and operational and logistical needs, according to a statement from the office of the supreme commander of the armed forces.

Al-Alimi warned on Friday evening of the consequences of the Houthi escalation, holding the group responsible for the resulting humanitarian impact, including the displacement of hundreds of families from areas affected by the fighting.

He said government forces would not allow what he described as Iran’s objective of controlling the Bab al-Mandab Strait to be achieved, adding that any advance towards those areas would severely drain the Houthis.

The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation called on international organizations and donors to intervene urgently to help displaced and affected families in Taiz and Hodeidah.

It warned of growing needs for shelter, food, medicine, water and medical services, and called for field hospitals to be established to receive the wounded.

Mokha and its port were hit by a series of Houthi ballistic missile and drone attacks last August, in an escalation that struck civilian facilities and sites, disrupted port traffic, and put its facilities out of service.

Government forces responded with military operations and strikes targeting the group’s movements and offensive capabilities.

Arab World

Iraq’s Coordination Framework, Armed Factions Hit Deadlock in Talks

Iraqi police manage a queue of vehicles outside a fuel station in Baghdad, Sept. 5, 2026. (AFP)
Iraqi police manage a queue of vehicles outside a fuel station in Baghdad, Sept. 5, 2026. (AFP)
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Iraq’s Coordination Framework, Armed Factions Hit Deadlock in Talks

Iraqi police manage a queue of vehicles outside a fuel station in Baghdad, Sept. 5, 2026. (AFP)
Iraqi police manage a queue of vehicles outside a fuel station in Baghdad, Sept. 5, 2026. (AFP)

Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework has hit a deadlock with armed factions refusing to surrender their weapons as the Sept. 30 deadline for the final US withdrawal approaches, casting a shadow over government plans to celebrate the date as “Sovereignty Day.”

A three-member committee formed by the Framework has so far failed to secure a breakthrough with the factions, which reject demands to hand over their arsenals by the withdrawal date.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government had initially hoped Sept. 30 would mark both the departure of US forces and the transfer of factional weapons to government control. But negotiations between the Framework and the armed groups now appear to have reached an impasse.

According to the latest position expressed by the armed factions, articulated by Harakat al-Nujaba, as well as statements by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, there is no final or fixed deadline for handing over, restricting, disarming or freezing weapons held outside state control.

Several armed groups, foremost among them Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, have previously rejected demands to surrender their arsenals, saying they would not abide by any timetable because their weapons are ideological and not confined within national borders.

Ali al-Asadi, head of Harakat al-Nujaba’s Political Council, said the movement remained committed to its right to safeguard what he called the “sanctity” of the resistance’s weapons in the face of regional risks and threats.

In a post on X on Friday, Asadi said he had concluded a visit to leading figures in the Coordination Framework’s political process, during which he reaffirmed the movement’s position on the importance of “preserving the Popular Mobilization Forces as a national body that cannot be compromised.”

He also stressed the need to preserve the “resistance” and the “sanctity of its weapons” in light of what he described as the “real and serious risks and threats” facing Iraq and the wider region.

Asadi also reiterated Nujaba’s policy of not participating in the political process, saying: “This approach is what keeps us alongside our people, experiencing what they experience, carrying their concerns and working to fulfill their demands.”

“This responsibility will remain on our shoulders until comprehensive change is achieved, ensuring sovereignty, security and prosperity, freeing our economy from American domination and stabilizing the domestic situation,” he said.

The Iraqi government, for its part, says through Sabah al-Numan, spokesperson for the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, that “no force in the world and no regional circumstances can break a state whose people, in all their components and communities, rally around its institutions.”

In a briefing, Numan warned of what he called “a flood of alarmism led by platforms financed with suspicious funds to peddle fear and exploit Iraqis’ emotions as the Sept. 30 deadline approaches.”

“The military and security establishment, which stood firm through the darkest and most difficult circumstances and sacrificed its most precious blood to protect this land, fully understands the scale of the challenges and is working around the clock in the field, away from the clamor of political posturing,” Numan said.

“The next phase requires wisdom, steadfastness and solidarity,” he added.

Asked about efforts to bring weapons under state control and the armed factions’ demands regarding the announced timetable for surrendering them, military and strategic expert Mukhlad Hazem told Asharq Al-Awsat that political blocs often made ill-considered statements that did not reflect what they were actually thinking behind closed doors.

“Everyone knows that their options are limited and that they could lose these gains, spoils, prestige and power at any moment,” Hazem said.

“Everyone agrees that the issue of bringing weapons under state control must be resolved because it is no longer a matter of domestic will alone, but also of external will. It is a trade-off between remaining in power and heading into the unknown,” he added.

Hazem said some politicians addressed their supporters merely to provide political cover while trying to appease the factions.

“The reality has been imposed not only on Iraq, but also on Syria, Lebanon and Yemen: No weapons can remain outside the authority of the state, and armed groups cannot be allowed to control decisions of war and peace,” he said.

“Everyone now has few options left in this regard. A decision on bringing weapons under state control has been made conclusively and finally.”

Maliki and Amiri

The three-member committee formed by the Coordination Framework — comprising former prime ministers Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and Nouri al-Maliki, as well as Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri — is continuing negotiations with armed factions that refuse to surrender their weapons.

However, recent statements by al-Maliki and al-Amiri have raised questions among political groups and the Iraqi public about the timetable agreed upon for bringing all weapons under state control.

Al-Maliki said there would be “no disarmament of the factions,” but rather a process to regulate their weapons. He gave no timeframe for doing so, which some sources said meant the process would be postponed until after the US withdrawal.

Al-Amiri went further, saying in a speech that the armed factions would remain in place. He said they had protected the political system by confronting what he called the “October sedition,” a reference to the mass uprising that erupted in 2019 and was violently suppressed.

Academic and political activist Faris Harram told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the first striking aspect of al-Amiri’s statement is that it is consistent with allegations made in several Western reports during the October protest movement that armed factions in Iraq were responsible for killing demonstrators.”

“Some reports at the time named leaders alleged to have been involved in liquidations, assassinations and the unjustified attacks carried out against the young participants in the October uprising,” Harram said.

“Such consistency should immediately draw the attention of Iraq’s public prosecutor,” he added. “I ask: Where has the public prosecutor’s office been in monitoring such statements since 2003? To this day, the public prosecution service has not fulfilled its role in pursuing cases that require judicial intervention.”

Harram said an investigation should have been opened into the statements about the factions’ role in suppressing the October protest movement, given their connection to reports that both the Iraqi government and the armed factions had denied at the time.

“We are therefore facing a connection that must be kept in mind,” he said.

“Al-Amiri must explain what he meant by the statement, which can be understood as saying that the factions were responsible” for suppressing the protests, Harram added.

He said this was also connected to remarks by then-Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi, who said the killings of demonstrators had been carried out by a “third party.”

“Unfortunately, we have grown accustomed in Iraq to everything passing without investigation as part of a broader pattern of impunity,” Harram said.