Baghdad: An Intelligence Battleground in Iran’s Latest War

A flag of Iraq's pro-Iran paramilitary group Hezbollah Brigades (Kataib Hezbollah), flutters against the backdrop of people taking a swing ride at an amusement park during Eid al-Fitr celebrations, marking the end of the Muslim holy fasting month of Ramadan, in Baghdad on March 21, 2026. (Photo by AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / AFP)
A flag of Iraq's pro-Iran paramilitary group Hezbollah Brigades (Kataib Hezbollah), flutters against the backdrop of people taking a swing ride at an amusement park during Eid al-Fitr celebrations, marking the end of the Muslim holy fasting month of Ramadan, in Baghdad on March 21, 2026. (Photo by AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / AFP)
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Baghdad: An Intelligence Battleground in Iran’s Latest War

A flag of Iraq's pro-Iran paramilitary group Hezbollah Brigades (Kataib Hezbollah), flutters against the backdrop of people taking a swing ride at an amusement park during Eid al-Fitr celebrations, marking the end of the Muslim holy fasting month of Ramadan, in Baghdad on March 21, 2026. (Photo by AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / AFP)
A flag of Iraq's pro-Iran paramilitary group Hezbollah Brigades (Kataib Hezbollah), flutters against the backdrop of people taking a swing ride at an amusement park during Eid al-Fitr celebrations, marking the end of the Muslim holy fasting month of Ramadan, in Baghdad on March 21, 2026. (Photo by AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / AFP)

Within days of the outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Iran, Quds Force officers began arriving in Iraq to oversee “attrition operations” and establish a support command for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The move reflects contingency planning for possible escalation inside Tehran.

At the same time, Baghdad has become a hub for espionage activity, with intelligence operations unfolding alongside the military conflict, according to sources cited by Asharq Al-Awsat. Sources report that in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, communication between Iranian operatives and Iraqi militia leaders was briefly disrupted before being restored by the third day of the war, on March 3, 2026.

Iranian officers entered Iraq in stages to supervise attacks against US interests and allied targets. They are supported by long-established Iranian advisers inside Iraq who coordinate networks of armed groups across multiple factions. According to political and security sources, the strategy aims to “spread instability in areas hosting US interests” and ultimately “consolidate Iranian influence over Iraq after the war.”

Some analysts, however, view the operations as defensive, to protect missile and drone stockpiles supplied by Tehran for later use. They note that Iraqi militias lack the capacity for large-scale strategic warfare compared with Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

Sources familiar with meetings among Iran-aligned factions say Iranian officers have established an operations room in Baghdad to create a new deterrence framework against US forces and potentially serve as a fallback command center if conditions worsen in Tehran. Despite these efforts, Iranian activities in Baghdad have reportedly been exposed, leading to deadly strikes attributed to the United States that caused casualties among Iranian personnel.

Aftermath of Khamenei’s Killing

The first wave of Quds Force officers is believed to have arrived shortly after Khamenei’s death on Feb. 28, 2026. Iraqi sources suggest some personnel had already been deployed earlier, including operatives traveling on Iraqi and Lebanese passports who also moved to Beirut.

Shortly after Khamenei’s death, the umbrella group known as the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” launched a series of attacks, claiming responsibility for 16 operations involving dozens of drones both inside and outside Iraq.

The network includes major militias such as Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, as well as smaller groups that emerge during periods of escalation, including Ashab al-Kahf and Saraya Awliya al-Dam. These are widely seen as front organizations for Iran-backed factions.

A protester in Baghdad holds a picture of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei after the announcement of his death on February 28 (Reuters)

Once communications were restored, Iraqi officials sought clarity from Iranian counterparts about the trajectory of the conflict. According to one official, the response was that the Iranian leadership was focused primarily on retaliation and targeting US forces. Iranian officers have since established themselves in secure locations across Baghdad, Najaf, Diyala, and Basra, with Iraqi factions providing protection and logistical support. A senior militia figure stated that Iran has mobilized groups it has cultivated over many years for what it views as a decisive confrontation.

Assessments from militia sources indicate that the current level of engagement exceeds that seen after Oct. 2023, driven by concerns that a collapse of Iran’s political system would threaten the survival of these groups in Iraq. One source cited anger and a desire for revenge as key motivations, while another emphasized that these groups were specifically designed for such a conflict and remain closely tied to Iranian command structures.

Analysts argue that the operations are effectively directed by Iran, with Iraqi factions serving primarily as a local cover. Political researcher Akeel Abbas noted that militia actions are “essentially extensions of the Revolutionary Guard operating under a local façade.”

A Fragile State Position

An Iraqi government official warned that the likelihood of keeping militias out of the conflict is diminishing as the war continues. He described the state as “an invisible presence caught between two fighters,” noting that confronting the militias could risk direct conflict with Iran or trigger internal Shiite divisions.

Another militia leader suggested that the war has clarified the balance of power in Baghdad, reinforcing the dominance of armed factions. Initial attacks focused on US diplomatic facilities in Baghdad and Erbil, along with military bases. They later expanded to include Iraqi radar systems and government communications infrastructure.

Sources estimate that more than 15 US and French radar systems - part of contracts signed since 2022 worth roughly $350 million - have been destroyed. The objective, they say, was to disable drone detection capabilities and prevent surveillance of Iranian movements. Iraqi military officials declined to comment on the extent of these losses or those responsible. Instructions to militias reportedly include severing intelligence-sharing and operational coordination between Iraqi security agencies and the United States.

Attacks have also targeted Camp Victory, a logistical base near Baghdad International Airport used by US forces and Iraqi units. According to an Iraqi officer, some explosive-laden drones struck service facilities used by Iraqi personnel located near US positions.

A Decentralized Strategy

The deployment of Iranian officers to Iraq is also intended to establish an alternative command structure in what sources describe as “a friendly country that provides political and security cover.” According to these sources, part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ activity in Iraq is designed to relieve pressure caused by US and Israeli strikes inside Iran.

They added that Iraq offers faster and more reliable communication channels with regional allies than those available in Tehran, making it effectively “the last regional arena” for the Revolutionary Guard. Observers believe Iran’s security system is designed to function in a decentralized manner. A Shiite source said the plan includes protecting a core group of elite officers in case assassinations escalate inside Iran.

Sources also revealed that Iran has activated a “backup plan” built around mixed, hard-to-trace cells drawn from different armed factions. Those networks that had been quietly prepared over several years.

This escalation coincided with a rare public statement by Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force, in his first remarks since the killing of Ali Khamenei. He praised Tehran’s allies in what he called the “axis of resistance” for confronting the United States and Israel.

Although Qaani stressed the “independence” of these groups, he effectively reaffirmed control over a broad, multi-layered network operating under a flexible, decentralized structure.

Iraqi politician Hamed al-Sayed said Qaani’s statement clarified his central wartime role: managing Iran’s networks of influence abroad. He added that Iraq’s importance requires direct Iranian oversight of armed factions, as developments there could threaten political gains linked to Iran’s ruling system. While this model is not new, al-Sayed noted that what has changed is “its intensity and its integration into a wider regional war.”

Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Iran’s current strategy operates on a broader scale, aiming to “spread disruption and instability across multiple arenas, including areas previously considered outside the conflict.”

A photo distributed by the government’s media office on March 22 shows Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani (right) inspecting the damage after a drone attack targeted a building belonging to the intelligence service in Baghdad

Baghdad: A City of Spies

The military escalation has been accompanied by what sources describe as an intense intelligence war inside Baghdad, peaking with attacks on sensitive sites, including facilities belonging to Iraq’s intelligence service.

On March 21, the agency announced that one of its officers had been killed in what it described as a terrorist attack carried out by outlaw groups. Two days later, Kataib Hezbollah claimed that 90 percent of the agency’s personnel had been infiltrated, even naming a specific officer accused of leading a network that leaked information to foreign actors.

Sources said armed factions strongly suspect the intelligence service to be one of the few government institutions still maintaining close ties with the United States. They believe a faction within the agency has been supplying intelligence and coordinates on militia and Iranian movements.

According to these accounts, the agency has come under mounting pressure during the war, as a parallel intelligence conflict unfolds between Iranian operatives, Iraqi intelligence officers, and US CIA personnel, each side attempting to outmaneuver the others. In this environment, Baghdad has at times become a deadly espionage battleground.

One source said these groups have been monitoring one another closely since the war began, tracking movements street by street across the capital.

However, many observers question claims that Iran was behind the attack on the intelligence facility, attributing it instead to internal political rivalries among Shiite factions that have spilled over into the agency, which has long struggled to remain independent.

The Jurf al-Sakhar Trap

Iranian coordination with armed factions appears to have created a classic intelligence vulnerability. Their increasingly visible activities made it easier for US forces to detect and track them, according to assessments circulating among members of those factions.

Sources confirmed that a strike — widely believed to have been carried out by the United States — on the town of Jurf al-Sakhar, south of Baghdad, in early March 2026 marked the first direct US targeting of Revolutionary Guard activity in Iraq following Khamenei’s killing.

Jurf al-Sakhar has been a major stronghold for Iraqi factions since 2014 and is believed to have evolved into a strategic military hub, housing training camps, detention facilities, storage depots, and sites for missile and drone development.

Political analyst Akeel Abbas described the strike as “the most significant in the Iraqi theater, as it targeted command-and-control structures.”

Sources, including individuals close to armed factions, said the area has shifted from being a strategic asset for Iran’s allies into a growing intelligence liability, threatening the core of their security and economic operations.

Subsequent strikes in Baghdad’s Karrada and Jadriya districts were reportedly aimed at senior Iranian figures. Abbas noted that the Jadriya strike in particular appeared intended to eliminate those directing operations linked to Jurf al-Sakhar. A resident of Jadriya told Asharq Al-Awsat that the targeted house had long been used by Iranian figures, whom locals had assumed were part of the Iranian diplomatic presence.

Fragile Ceasefire and Continued Strikes

Following these developments, Kataib Hezbollah announced a conditional unilateral ceasefire, pledging to halt attacks on the US embassy in Baghdad in exchange for an end to Israeli strikes in Beirut’s southern suburbs. However, the group Ashab al-Kahf violated the ceasefire within two days.

Later statements attributed to armed factions claimed that the United States had sought a temporary truce to allow its forces to withdraw. Pro-Iran activists circulated nighttime footage allegedly showing US military vehicles leaving Iraq overland toward Jordan.

The US State Department and the embassy in Baghdad declined to comment on reports of indirect negotiations with Iraqi factions. However, a diplomatic official told Asharq Al-Awsat that US air operations against Iran-aligned targets in Iraq “will continue until their operational capabilities are dismantled.”

Toward a “Final Battle”?

Hadi al-Amiri, leader of the Badr Organization, called on the Popular Mobilization Forces to mobilize for what he described as a “battle of truth against falsehood.” The group has suffered significant losses in US strikes targeting sites in Salah al-Din and Kirkuk.

Abbas does not expect this mobilization to escalate into full-scale war alongside Iran. He argues that Iraqi factions primarily serve logistical functions, including storing missiles and drones that Iran could deploy if pressure intensifies inside Iran or on Hezbollah’s front.

He added that these factions do not constitute a decisive fighting force on their own but operate as instruments of the Revolutionary Guard, reinforcing the idea that Iraq is being used as a strategic pressure platform.

In contrast, Shiite leaders in Baghdad increasingly believe that the Revolutionary Guard is preparing the capital for a “final battle” that may become necessary in its confrontation with the United States.

One such leader told Asharq Al-Awsat that a key lesson drawn by the Revolutionary Guard is the need to implement sweeping changes to Iraq’s political and security systems, including abandoning previous rules governing engagement with international actors.

Another Shiite leader said armed factions have long sought to bring remaining independent security institutions under their control. These assessments align with broader indications that Tehran, in the absence of a political settlement with Washington, may attempt to impose a new reality of direct influence in Iraq, reshaping the country’s governing structure. One political figure suggested this explains “why Iran has delayed the formation of a new Iraqi government until after the war ends.”



Washington Targets Hezbollah Funding with More Sanctions

Hezbollah supporters wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026.  (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)
Hezbollah supporters wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026. (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)
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Washington Targets Hezbollah Funding with More Sanctions

Hezbollah supporters wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026.  (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)
Hezbollah supporters wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026. (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)

The United States imposed sanctions Wednesday on a Lebanon-based charity as it sought to target funding for Hezbollah, marking Washington's latest move to step up pressure on Tehran.

The US Treasury Department took aim at the Wa Ta'awanu Association, which provides emergency relief services for southern Lebanon, charging that it also funnels donor funds towards Hezbollah's "terrorist activities."

"The Iranian regime's attempts to infringe on Lebanon's sovereignty through terror proxies like Hezbollah will not be tolerated," Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement announcing the sanctions.

He added that Washington will continue to "disrupt Iran's attempts to exert influence in the region and fund its proxies."

The latest move is meant to raise pressure on Hezbollah's "illicit financing networks" as it tries to resist calls for it to disarm.

The US State Department accused the Wa Ta'awanu Association of claiming to deliver emergency relief in southern Lebanon while moving Hezbollah operatives and storing the group's weapons, plus channeling funds towards the group's activities.

On Wednesday, the US Treasury also imposed sanctions on members of a "gold and cash smuggling network" that it said was run by Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force.


Iran Shadows Washington’s Moves in Lebanon as Visits, Calls Fuel Race for Influence

Ali Larijani, former senior adviser to Khamenei, with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (File photo: Lebanese Parliament Media Office)
Ali Larijani, former senior adviser to Khamenei, with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (File photo: Lebanese Parliament Media Office)
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Iran Shadows Washington’s Moves in Lebanon as Visits, Calls Fuel Race for Influence

Ali Larijani, former senior adviser to Khamenei, with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (File photo: Lebanese Parliament Media Office)
Ali Larijani, former senior adviser to Khamenei, with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (File photo: Lebanese Parliament Media Office)

Iran is keeping a close watch on Washington's moves in Lebanon and moving swiftly to counter them.

From dispatching senior officials to Beirut to calling Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri directly, Tehran has repeatedly sought to match or respond to US diplomatic initiatives in a contest for influence over Lebanese decision-making.

The message, according to the pattern of Iranian moves, is clear: Tehran will not let Washington dictate Lebanon's next chapter alone.

"Every time a US official visits Beirut, an Iranian official follows, even when there is nothing to discuss," a former Lebanese prime minister told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The pattern has become more pronounced in recent years, particularly since the 2024 war, the former premier said.

Ministerial sources said Iranian envoys typically follow US diplomatic moves with visits and meetings, particularly with Tehran's Lebanese allies, to gauge Washington's latest positions and learn what was discussed behind closed doors.

The contacts are also part of an exchange of political messages between Tehran and Washington, the sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Iran, they said, wants to show that it still holds the Lebanese card — and retains the leverage to shape political settlements.

The pattern was particularly evident in the autumn of 2024, as international efforts, led largely by Washington, intensified to halt Israel's war on Lebanon.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Beirut on Oct. 4. A week later, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf arrived, saying he had diverted his trip to Switzerland to deliver a "message of support" from then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The diplomatic maneuvering continued in November as a US ceasefire initiative gained ground.

On Nov. 14, US Ambassador Lisa Johnson handed Berri a draft of Washington's ceasefire proposal.

The following day, Ali Larijani, then an adviser to Iran's supreme leader, arrived in Beirut for talks with Berri and then-Prime Minister Najib Mikati.

He declared Iran's support for "any decision Lebanon makes to achieve a ceasefire."

Tehran's Familiar Playbook

Former Lebanese minister Boutros Harb sees little new in Tehran's approach.

Iran, he said, has long treated Lebanese groups aligned with it as subordinates, speaking and negotiating on their behalf rather than allowing Lebanon to pursue an independent negotiating position based on its national interests.

But the stakes are now higher, Harb told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Lebanon has an opportunity to capitalize on international diplomatic efforts, he said, while Iran is working to prevent the Lebanese file from being separated from its own negotiations with Washington.

Tehran wants to keep that card in hand to demonstrate that it remains an influential regional player, he added.

"Tehran treats Lebanon as an Iranian province, as though there were no state or government," Harb said.

He acknowledged that Lebanon's political landscape had changed to some extent under President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam.

"But unfortunately, the card is still in Iran's hands, and it is exploiting it to preserve its regional role," he said.

Lebanon Tied to US-Iran Talks

By 2026, Tehran's diplomatic push had increasingly shifted from visits to telephone calls carrying political messages tied to negotiations with Washington.

The shift became particularly apparent after Iran announced that it had told mediators any ceasefire agreement with the United States and Israel must also halt Israeli attacks on Lebanon.

On April 1, Berri said Araghchi had conveyed Iran's insistence that any agreement include Lebanon.

"What applies to Tehran applies to Beirut," Berri quoted the Iranian foreign minister as saying.

The pattern resurfaced on July 9, when a US diplomatic move in Beirut coincided with a visit by an Iranian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Vahid Jalalzadeh.

While US Ambassador Michel Issa met Aoun to discuss implementation of the Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement, the Iranian delegation held talks with Berri and Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri.

The latest episode came on Nov. 16, following a Beirut visit by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz.

Waltz met Lebanon's president, prime minister and parliament speaker and urged Hezbollah to voluntarily hand over its weapons to the state.

"No country can have two armies," he said.

That same day, Qalibaf called Berri, stressing Iran's "special interest" in Lebanon.

Regional calm, he said, could not return without an end to the war in Lebanon and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over all its territory.

Hezbollah's Weapons: Another Front

Iran's response to US moves has not been confined to ceasefire diplomacy.

The same pattern emerged in August 2025, when Lebanon's government decided to draw up a plan to bring all weapons under state control, amid US pressure to carry it out.

On Aug. 13, Ali Larijani, then secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, visited Beirut and met Lebanon's president, prime minister and parliament speaker.

He opposed foreign pressure over Hezbollah's weapons, calling instead for "dialogue among the Lebanese" and warning against imposing "foreign dictates on Lebanon."

Five days later, US envoy Tom Barrack and deputy US envoy Morgan Ortagus arrived in Beirut to follow up on Washington's roadmap for placing weapons exclusively under state control and to discuss security issues.


200 Yemeni Scholars Urge Action to End Houthi Siege of Taiz

The conference of Yemeni scholars and preachers in Makkah discussed a range of religious issues and efforts to counter the Houthis. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
The conference of Yemeni scholars and preachers in Makkah discussed a range of religious issues and efforts to counter the Houthis. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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200 Yemeni Scholars Urge Action to End Houthi Siege of Taiz

The conference of Yemeni scholars and preachers in Makkah discussed a range of religious issues and efforts to counter the Houthis. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
The conference of Yemeni scholars and preachers in Makkah discussed a range of religious issues and efforts to counter the Houthis. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Two hundred Yemeni religious scholars and preachers have called for a concerted official and public campaign to break the Houthi siege of Taiz, urging that the group's violations against religious scholars, mosques, Quran memorization schools and religious institutions be documented and brought before Islamic and international forums to hold the international community to its responsibilities.

In a final statement issued at their conference in Makkah, the scholars rejected any armed groups that challenge or undermine state institutions, declaring the establishment of a state a religious necessity and urging Yemenis to rally behind it.

They warned that the Houthi movement threatened Yemen's religion, unity, identity and security, calling for a coordinated response through scholarship, intellectual debate, religious outreach and the media.

The scholars also condemned terrorism and extremism in all forms, firmly rejecting the use of religion or sectarian affiliation to justify either. They reaffirmed the sanctity of life, property and honor and urged Yemeni scholars, preachers and citizens to put national interests first, close ranks and overcome their differences.

The demands emerged from a conference of Yemeni scholars and preachers held in Makkah on Wednesday under the auspices of Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance.

Its final statement praised the deep historical and fraternal ties between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, commending the kingdom's leadership and people for supporting Yemen, its government, scholars and institutions, and for promoting moderation and combating extremism and terrorism.

Participants condemned Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, its citizens and residents, as well as civilian sites and vital infrastructure in both countries.

They also denounced any attacks on Makkah and Madinah, stressing the sanctity of the two holy cities and declaring that Saudi Arabia's security was inseparable from Yemen's. Any threat to the kingdom, they said, threatened regional security and stability.

The gathering praised Yemeni religious scholars and the Yemeni Scholars Association for speaking out, supporting the state and confronting the Houthi movement.

It also criticized religious figures who had issued fatwas, or religious rulings, in support of the Houthi militias and to justify their actions, singling out the so-called Yemen Scholars League.

The scholars urged Muslim religious leaders, organizations and scholarly councils to expose and condemn Houthi violations and oppose the group's targeting of Islam's two holiest mosques.

They thanked Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom's prime minister, for their longstanding support of Yemen and its legitimate government against the Houthi takeover.

They credited Saudi Arabia's support with helping, "after God," to halt the expansion of what they called the "Safavid project" in Yemen.

The participants also praised Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance Sheikh Abdullatif Al-Asheikh for sponsoring the Communication with Yemeni Scholars Program.

Scholars warn of threats to Yemen's identity

Held under the theme "Supporting the State and Protecting Identity," the conference examined the role of religious scholars in confronting the challenges facing Yemen.

Sheikh Mohammed al-Arifi, an adviser at the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs and supervisor of the Communication with Yemeni Scholars Program, called for closer cooperation among scholars and preachers to confront the intellectual and religious challenges facing Yemen and the wider region.

He praised Saudi Arabia's support for Yemen under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, highlighting the kingdom's consistent backing of Yemen's legitimate government.

Al-Arifi said the conference addressed one of the gravest challenges in Yemen's modern history: the role of religious scholars in confronting what he called Houthi terrorism.

He accused the Houthis of hijacking the state and seeking to erase Yemen's identity and heritage, replacing them with an alien identity rooted in what he described as an Iranian expansionist project rejected by Yemenis.

He cited what he called grave Houthi violations, including the killing of innocent people, intimidation of civilians, destruction of mosques and Quranic schools, and the siege of Taiz, which he said had left residents facing hunger and fear.

He also accused the group of tampering with school curricula, targeting the religious beliefs of younger generations and undermining the standing of the Prophet Muhammad's companions.

Al-Arifi said the Houthis had crossed every red line with attacks and threats against Islam's two holiest mosques, describing them as a flagrant violation of the sanctity of Islamic holy sites.

He also condemned attacks on Saudi cities and civilian facilities, stressing that the security of Saudi Arabia and Yemen was indivisible.

The gravity of Yemen's crisis, he said, placed a profound responsibility on religious scholars to protect society from extremist ideas, expose Houthi ideology and counter its arguments.

He stressed that establishing a state was a religious necessity to protect religion, life, property and honor.

Yemeni minister urges support for state, armed forces

Yemeni Minister of Endowments and Guidance Sheikh Turki al-Wadei said the gathering reflected the depth of ties between Yemen and Saudi Arabia and underscored the responsibility borne by religious scholars and preachers.

He urged scholars to expose what he described as the ideological deviations of the Iranian-backed Houthi militia and the dangers of its sectarian rhetoric, which he said fueled division and conflict.

He stressed their role in shielding communities from misinformation and extremism while safeguarding religion and holy sites.

Al-Wadei pointed to the suffering and attacks resulting from the Houthi takeover, saying the group's actions had threatened security in both Yemen and Saudi Arabia, as well as the safety of Islam's two holiest mosques and their visitors.

He said supporting state institutions and the armed forces in protecting religion and the country, restoring state authority and securing stability was a core duty of scholars and preachers.

He placed that responsibility within the "Dawn of Yemen" campaign announced by Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council.

Al-Wadei thanked Saudi Arabia's leadership, government and people for their longstanding support, citing continued military, political, economic, humanitarian and development assistance to Yemen.

He also praised the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance for its efforts in serving Islam and Muslims.

Conference sessions examined scholars' responsibility to preserve Yemen's religious and national identity, counter extremist ideologies, uphold the state's position under Islamic law and support the legitimate government.

They also reviewed the history of Saudi-Yemeni relations, highlighting the historical bonds and shared destiny of the two countries.