Lebanon, under sustained Israeli air strikes and an open war, is entering a pivotal week as it prepares for preliminary meetings expected next week that could open a new negotiating track to secure a ceasefire, stabilize the border, and regulate the south.
The move brings Lebanese-Israeli negotiations back into focus, not as a precedent, but as a continuation of a path shaped by wars and facts on the ground.
The key shift lies in the form. Most past negotiations were indirect, conducted through the United Nations, international mediators, or technical committees. Lebanon has seen only one formal round of direct negotiations at this level, the May 17, 1983, agreement. That makes the 2026 track, in form, the closest parallel, though it differs sharply in context, conditions, and aims.
From armistice to border demarcation: indirect track
Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel began with the 1949 Armistice Agreement, signed in Naqoura after the 1948 war and the Lebanese army’s participation in the al-Malikiyyah battle.
It established a ceasefire, adopted the armistice line based on international borders, and set up a joint committee under UN supervision.
Since then, all frameworks, except the 1983 deal, have stayed within indirect or technical formats.
In April 1996, Israel’s “Grapes of Wrath” operation and the Qana massacre led to the April Understanding, which barred targeting civilians. It set up a monitoring committee including Lebanon, Israel, the US, France, and Syria, helping curb escalation until Israel’s withdrawal from the south in 2000.
After the 2006 war, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 set the international framework for the southern border, including a halt to hostilities, deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River, expansion of UNIFIL, and restricting weapons in the area to the state.
In 2022, US-mediated indirect talks on maritime borders ended with the adoption of Line 23 and recognition of Lebanon’s right to develop the Qana field, seen as a model for technical, non-political negotiation.
In November 2024, border escalation produced a fragile ceasefire that included partial Israeli withdrawal from some points, expanded Lebanese army deployment south of the Litani, and a halt to hostilities. Repeated violations and weak implementation exposed its limits, prompting calls for a stricter mechanism.
“Mechanism”: toward direct engagement
In 2025, the term “mechanism” emerged as a practical framework to anchor a ceasefire. The proposal centers on a five-party committee including Lebanon, Israel, the US, France, and the United Nations, backed by technical and field monitoring.
Lebanon insists the Lebanese army alone must implement any arrangements on its territory, rejecting any Israeli operational role on the ground.
This marks the core shift. Unlike previous talks, which were indirect or technical, the 2026 meetings are set to be direct or semi-direct, making them the second such test after May 17.
Second time since 1983
Former MP Fares Soaid said Lebanon is entering “the second instance of formal direct negotiations with Israel,” after the first, which followed the 1982 invasion, when President Amine Gemayel pursued talks to secure Israeli withdrawal and reach an understanding.
He said 1983 unfolded under vastly different conditions. “The obstacles were enormous. The Cold War shaped the scene, and the Soviet Union, led by Yuri Andropov, opposed any track that could pull Lebanon fully into the US camp,” he said.
Arab capitals, led by Damascus under Hafez al-Assad, were not supportive, and Lebanese public opinion, especially among Muslims, was not ready, he added.
Although the May 17 agreement won majority backing in parliament, Damascus, aligned with the Soviet camp, mobilized local forces, leading to the February 6 uprising and the collapse of the deal, effectively besieging Gemayel in Baabda, Soaid said.
He said 2026 presents a different landscape. “There is no Soviet veto, the international climate is more positive, and Arab and Islamic positions are more open to negotiations,” he said.
“There is no objection from Damascus and no real internal opposition. The negotiating delegation is expected to be formed in line with the constitution and presidential powers,” he added, saying the chances of success are far higher than in 1983.
Negotiation is not normalization
A Lebanese parliamentary source said conflating negotiation with normalization has no legal or political basis, stressing that talks do not amount to diplomatic recognition or normal relations.
Lebanon has repeatedly negotiated, from the armistice to the April Understanding and the maritime demarcation, without changing its legal or political stance toward Israel, the source said.
“Negotiation is a political decision governed by international law and the Vienna and Geneva conventions,” the source said, adding that legal doctrine does not treat negotiation as recognition.
Lebanon has used multiple formats, from separate rooms to technical committees, all confined to specific files tied to security, borders, and sovereignty.
“The issue is not the form, but the substance,” the source said. “If the goal is to stabilize borders, stop violations, and restore sovereignty, that falls within the core duties of the Lebanese state.”
