The leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, said Lebanon “is facing an extremely complex dilemma, to the extent that merely observing developments is no longer enough to resolve it, because the root of the problem remains unresolved without effective treatment.”
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Geagea stressed that any negotiations or settlements currently under way “must lead to ending the state of open confrontation on Lebanon’s southern border once and for all, not to temporary calm or theoretical solutions.” He said what is required is “to restore normal conditions in Lebanon as an independent and sovereign state, away from external interventions and conflicts.”
Geagea said the objective of the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations due to begin next Thursday should be “to reach a normal and lasting situation on Lebanon’s southern border, not temporary calm followed by renewed confrontations every few months or years.” He said the Lebanese could no longer endure repeated cycles of escalation and anxiety, stressing the need to establish stability permanently.
He said how this objective could be achieved “should be left to the course of negotiations and the political authority, represented by the president, the prime minister and official institutions,” adding that the outcome of the talks would become clearer over time.
Geagea described the negotiations taking place in Washington as the most significant development at the current stage, “not because of a desire for negotiations in themselves, but because there is no serious alternative capable of pulling the country out of its current crisis.”
He said any party that had another “practical and serious” proposal should present it, considering negotiations to be the only available option for now.
Regional complexities
Geagea said the regional scene currently appeared highly complex amid the major uncertainty surrounding the US-Iran confrontation, adding that it remained difficult to predict how the confrontation might end or what its repercussions on the region would be.
As for Lebanon, Geagea said Iranian influence had entered a phase of decline, arguing that the “Iranian phase” in Lebanon was almost over or nearing its end, and that regional and international circumstances no longer allowed the previous reality to continue as it had.
He said Lebanon could not continue as an arena tied to external conflicts, but instead needed to reposition itself as a normal state with independent national decision-making, adding that any foreign role, whether Iranian or otherwise, should not come at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty and state institutions.
Asked about Lebanon’s red lines in the negotiations, Geagea said a realistic approach required looking for what can succeed with the fewest losses and complications, adding that any settlement must begin from Lebanon’s interests first.
Asked whether what was happening today was limited to security arrangements aimed at controlling the border and preventing escalation, or whether it could become a prelude to a broader process extending beyond security toward peace or political normalization in the future, Geagea said it was still impossible to determine the nature of the path events might ultimately take.
He said the current approach was based on testing the minimum steps needed to achieve stability, but that in the end it would be necessary to move forward with the option that was viable and implementable.
Official meetings after conditions are met
Geagea said the negotiations were being managed by President Joseph Aoun “in a proper manner,” explaining that no understanding with Israel would be announced before it included all Lebanese demands.
“The understanding is prepared first at the level of substance, and once practical results that meet Lebanese conditions become clear, it becomes possible to move to the stage of official meetings and the announcement or signing of the agreement,” he said.
Geagea said the president was handling this issue in a “good and organized” manner at the current stage, arguing that alternatives tested over the past 20 years “had not produced real solutions,” despite some parties continuing to cling to them.
He said Lebanon’s southern border had, over the past 60 years, been the main gateway to every crisis and period of instability the country had witnessed, and that resolving this issue permanently therefore constituted a national necessity.
Geagea added that the nature of the results the current negotiations might produce remained unclear, saying it was still too early to judge their final outcome.
National cover for negotiations
Geagea rejected claims that the negotiations lacked national backing, saying President Aoun enjoyed full constitutional and popular legitimacy. He noted that Aoun had been elected by a large majority of 98 votes in the 128-member parliament, reflecting broad Lebanese consensus around him.
He said this legitimacy was no less important than any democratic legitimacy elsewhere in the world, noting that US President Donald Trump had come to power with around 52 percent of the vote while fully exercising his constitutional powers.
Geagea added that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam also enjoyed similar legitimacy because he had been designated according to constitutional procedures and his government had won the confidence of a parliament elected through genuine competitive elections. He said Lebanon today possessed “a fully legitimate authority” representing the Lebanese at this stage, even if there was no complete consensus within any democratic system.
“Political divisions are normal in democracies,” Geagea said, citing the United States, where some Americans opposed Trump’s policies without stripping him of the legitimacy to negotiate and make decisions on behalf of the state. He concluded by stressing that the Lebanese delegation negotiating in Washington was doing so on the basis of this official legitimacy representing the Lebanese state.
Geagea said the Lebanese state, at the political level, had implemented what had been requested of it, citing a number of government decisions he described as “strategic,” in addition to measures taken at specific times over the past period.
“Deep state”
According to Geagea, the core problem remained what he called the “deep state” inside Lebanon, which he said delayed implementation of political decisions. He argued that this structure made any confrontation with it extremely complicated, because anyone entering into conflict with it faced two equally difficult options: submission or exclusion.
Hezbollah
Regarding Hezbollah’s position toward whatever the negotiations might produce, Geagea said the decisive moment had not yet arrived, unless an “unexpected change” prompted party officials to reconsider their approach. He also expressed pessimism about the possibility of such a shift, arguing that the party’s final decision was entirely linked to Iran, including for fighters on the ground who might understand the reality of the situation but did not control their own decision-making.
Geagea said it was natural in pluralistic democracies for there to be a party, even one with significant popular support, that adopted a different political approach, adding that this in itself was not a problem. He stressed, however, that political differences did not justify obstructing the work of the state or delaying implementation of its decisions.
“What is happening now gives the impression that there is more than one authority managing decision-making in the country,” he said, adding that each side appeared to be acting separately from the others. He described this situation as unacceptable, saying the state must be the sole decision-maker and the only authority in managing national affairs.
Geagea said a broad segment of this environment had lived for more than 40 years within a specific political and ideological climate for various historical, spiritual, emotional, material and economic reasons. He said exiting this reality could not happen overnight, but instead required time and gradual transformations.
At the same time, he stressed that this reality did not mean ignoring or bypassing other Lebanese components, saying that in a pluralistic country like Lebanon, it was natural for other groups to hold different views and approaches.
“How can the country be run if one side imposes its vision while other components oppose it?” he asked, in reference to the need to respect internal balances and abide by the logic of the state and institutions.
Managing disagreements through Taif
Geagea said having Lebanese groups with differing views required a return to constitutional mechanisms and official institutions to manage those differences. He noted that the Lebanese had originally agreed to regulate their disputes through the Taif Agreement, which produced a constitution placing authority in state institutions, from parliament to the cabinet and the presidency.
Geagea said Lebanon had lived for nearly 60 years in a state of permanent confrontation, particularly along its southern border, which remained “open” to various conflicts and armed organizations. He noted that the southern arena had moved from the presence of Palestinian factions to other Lebanese factions, eventually culminating in Hezbollah’s full control of the scene after sidelining other parties. This, he argued, turned Lebanon into an arena for settling regional and international scores, particularly after the Iraq war.
Geagea said this reality had left the Lebanese state, and Lebanon as a whole, in a constant state of fragility, leading over past decades to a major drain of younger generations searching for a future and opportunities for a normal life.
He stressed that Lebanese youth, despite education and hard work, found themselves facing a lack of job opportunities and absence of prospects because of the continuing political and security conditions.
State legitimacy and unified authority
Geagea stressed that having official legitimacy and state institutions remained far preferable to chaos or multiple competing authorities, arguing that any legitimate system, regardless of criticisms against it, was still capable of providing a minimum level of stability and governance.
The core issue lay in finding a final solution to Lebanon’s legitimacy crisis, so that the state alone would hold decision-making authority and sovereignty, he noted.
Geagea stressed that the continuation of ungoverned spaces and open fronts could not build a stable country, but instead kept Lebanon vulnerable to constant instability and conflict, and warned that building the state in Lebanon required courage, decisions and sacrifices, arguing that no one would hand the Lebanese a ready-made state if they did not take the initiative to build it themselves.
“The opportunity still exists,” he said, “but what is required is to seize it and carry it through to the end, instead of merely managing crises or waiting for external solutions.”
No risk of civil war
Regarding the internal Lebanese situation and divisions linked to the war imposed on the country, especially given the absence of a unified Lebanese position on the conflict and the charged atmosphere that continually revives memories of civil war and sectarian tensions, Geagea said he saw no real indications of the outbreak of civil war.
He argued that any war of this kind required two willing sides, and said he did not sense a desire among other parties to enter such a path.
According to Geagea, even if Hezbollah had different calculations, what mattered more was that state institutions, including what he had previously described as the “deep state,” moved quickly whenever internal tensions emerged to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control.
He cited shooting incidents in Beirut’s southern suburbs during the funeral of one fighter, saying the intervention of the security agencies and the containment of the situation indicated that there is a real decision to prevent any slide into chaos.
Geagea concluded by saying that although he believed the Lebanese state had not yet imposed its full authority across all Lebanese territory, he did not believe matters would be left to slide into internal confrontation, but rather that the state would intervene to prevent any friction that could lead to sectarian strife or civil conflict.
