Accusations, Troop Buildup Raise Fears of Sudan-Ethiopia Clash

Chairman of the Transitional Military Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed Ali  during a previous meeting in Khartoum (Photo courtesy of the Ethiopian prime minister’s office)
Chairman of the Transitional Military Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed Ali  during a previous meeting in Khartoum (Photo courtesy of the Ethiopian prime minister’s office)
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Accusations, Troop Buildup Raise Fears of Sudan-Ethiopia Clash

Chairman of the Transitional Military Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed Ali  during a previous meeting in Khartoum (Photo courtesy of the Ethiopian prime minister’s office)
Chairman of the Transitional Military Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed Ali  during a previous meeting in Khartoum (Photo courtesy of the Ethiopian prime minister’s office)

Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia are experiencing an unprecedented escalation after the two countries exchanged political and military accusations over support for armed groups and drone attacks, amid military movements along their shared border and growing fears that the crisis could slide into an open regional confrontation.

The tensions come as Sudan faces extremely complex internal conditions because of the continuing war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, raising questions about Khartoum’s ability to handle a new external crisis and whether the mutual accusations will remain within the bounds of political and security escalation or develop into a direct military clash between the two countries.

Attention has focused on comments by Cameron Hudson, a former US diplomat and expert on Sudan and the Horn of Africa, who warned of deteriorating diplomatic relations between Sudan and Ethiopia and said Khartoum was massing forces near the shared border.

His comments came days after the Sudanese army accused Addis Ababa of involvement in hostile acts targeting Sudan and of allowing Ethiopia’s Bahir Dar base to be used as a launch site for drones operated by the Rapid Support Forces.

US concerns

Hudson said in a post on X that Sudan had “severed diplomatic relations with Ethiopia” and deployed new forces along the border, expressing concern over the consequences of the historic tensions between the two countries and the possibility that they could escalate into a broader confrontation at a time when Sudan is already living through highly sensitive conditions because of the internal war that has continued since 2023.

Although Sudan has not issued an official announcement confirming a complete severing of diplomatic relations, the Sudanese government recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia after the Sudanese army accused Addis Ababa and the United Arab Emirates of involvement in drone attacks targeting Khartoum airport and other sites.

Hudson’s post said Sudan had severed ties, while AP reported that Sudan recalled its ambassador and that Ethiopia denied the accusations as baseless.

The Sudanese army said last week that the latest attacks were launched from Ethiopia’s Bahir Dar airport, an accusation Addis Ababa categorically denied, describing it as “baseless.”

Reuters reported that the Sudanese armed forces accused Ethiopia and the UAE of aiding a drone attack on Khartoum International Airport, and that Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry rejected the allegation.

These developments came months after an investigative report by Reuters said there was a secret camp inside Ethiopia used to train thousands of fighters from the Rapid Support Forces in the Benishangul-Gumuz region bordering Sudan, citing field sources and satellite images.

Reuters said the camp was evidence that Sudan’s war was expanding regionally, while Ethiopia did not issue an official comment on the report.

In the same context, a report by Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab said it had detected indications of Ethiopian military support for the Rapid Support Forces at a base in Asosa last April.

Ethiopia, in turn, responded with counteraccusations. Its Foreign Ministry said Sudan supports hostile groups in the Tigray region and violates Ethiopia’s territorial integrity.

It also accused Khartoum of using Tigrayan rebel elements in the war against the Rapid Support Forces, saying it had previously avoided making these accusations public in order to preserve bilateral relations.

A history of accusations

The current escalation is rooted in a long history of suspicion and undeclared conflict between the two countries.

Ethiopia hosted Sudanese opposition groups at various stages and played a political role in mediating between Sudanese factions, particularly with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by John Garang.

After the current Sudanese war broke out, Addis Ababa hosted Rapid Support Forces commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, as well as meetings of Sudanese civilian opposition groups, including the Taqaddum coalition led by former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.

Sudan also played an influential role in Ethiopia’s internal conflicts over past decades. The late Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan Al-Turabi said in media interviews that Ethiopian rebels entered Addis Ababa in Sudanese tanks driven by Ethiopians.

Former Sudanese national security adviser and retired air force Lt. Gen. al-Fatih Erwa said he piloted the plane that flew former Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi from Khartoum to Addis Ababa in 1991 after the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime.

Relations between the two countries later entered a period of sharp tension after the attempted assassination of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995 while he was attending an Organization of African Unity summit.

Ethiopia and Egypt accused the government of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front of involvement in the operation, an accusation Khartoum denied at the time.

The border dispute in the al-Fashqa area of eastern Sudan also remained one of the main sources of ongoing tension between the two countries, especially after the Sudanese army redeployed in the area at the end of 2020, reclaiming land that Ethiopian groups had controlled for years, while Addis Ababa viewed the move as an attempt to exploit its preoccupation with the war in Tigray.

Skirmishes or war?

Amid the current escalation, a central question is whether these mutual accusations could develop into a direct war between the two countries.

Military experts say the chances of a full-scale war remain limited because of the high political, military, and economic costs for both sides, especially as the Sudanese army is already fighting a broad war against the Rapid Support Forces that began in April 2023, while Ethiopia faces internal unrest and complex security challenges in several regions.

Military expert and retired Sudanese army Brig. Gen. Jamal al-Shahid said the escalation between Sudan and Ethiopia had gone beyond traditional diplomatic disputes and entered a phase of strategic signaling and security pressure. But he ruled out a full military confrontation at present.

He said the tensions could lead to limited border skirmishes, especially given the unresolved issues related to al-Fashqa, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and mutual accusations of supporting armed groups.

He said Sudan is currently focused on resolving its internal conflict and restoring national stability, making an external war extremely costly.

Retired Air Force Lt. Col. al-Tayeb al-Malkabi, however, said the current escalation goes beyond political rhetoric and could indicate that a regional confrontation is approaching.

But he ruled out the Sudanese army’s actual readiness to wage an open war with Ethiopia, saying talk of an external threat could also be an attempt to ease pressure stemming from the complexities of the internal war.

Between diplomatic escalation, military movements, a history of border disputes, and mutual interference, Sudanese-Ethiopian relations appear to be facing an extremely dangerous test in a region already suffering from chronic security fragility and overlapping conflicts.

Any slide toward direct confrontation would pose an additional threat to the stability of the entire Horn of Africa.



Morocco Signs Agreement to Join Gaza International Force

 Palestinians gather around a blacksmith shop in Gaza City's Sabra neighborhood after it was hit by an Israeli military strike on Sunday, July 12, 2026. (AP)
Palestinians gather around a blacksmith shop in Gaza City's Sabra neighborhood after it was hit by an Israeli military strike on Sunday, July 12, 2026. (AP)
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Morocco Signs Agreement to Join Gaza International Force

 Palestinians gather around a blacksmith shop in Gaza City's Sabra neighborhood after it was hit by an Israeli military strike on Sunday, July 12, 2026. (AP)
Palestinians gather around a blacksmith shop in Gaza City's Sabra neighborhood after it was hit by an Israeli military strike on Sunday, July 12, 2026. (AP)

Morocco signed an agreement on Wednesday to participate in the International Stabilization Force (ISF) for Gaza, state media reported.

The agreement was signed in Rabat at a meeting attended by Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, senior defense officials ‌and Nickolay ‌Mladenov, the Board ‌of Peace ⁠envoy for Gaza, along ⁠with a delegation including the commander of the ISF, the state news agency MAP said.

The agreement "reflects the shared determination to contribute, through ⁠concrete humanitarian and security ‌actions, to the ‌establishment of a climate of ‌peace and security in the region," ‌MAP quoted a statement from the Moroccan defense administration as saying.

The Gaza Peace Council and ISF ‌leadership welcomed Morocco's decision to join the initiative, citing ⁠its ⁠planned deployment of senior military officers, gendarmerie and police personnel, as well as the creation of a military field hospital, MAP said.


Could Hezbollah Launch a New War in Support of Iran?

Supporters of Hezbollah carry Iranian and Hezbollah flags during a memorial ceremony for slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 08 July 2026. (EPA)
Supporters of Hezbollah carry Iranian and Hezbollah flags during a memorial ceremony for slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 08 July 2026. (EPA)
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Could Hezbollah Launch a New War in Support of Iran?

Supporters of Hezbollah carry Iranian and Hezbollah flags during a memorial ceremony for slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 08 July 2026. (EPA)
Supporters of Hezbollah carry Iranian and Hezbollah flags during a memorial ceremony for slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 08 July 2026. (EPA)

Amid deteriorating regional conditions and faltering US-Iranian understandings, Lebanese people fear that Hezbollah may once again launch a new round of war in support of Iran. This follows the party’s previous interventions, including its 2023 campaign backing Gaza and its retaliation for the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in March this year.

Lebanon has witnessed a drop in Israeli military operations, which have reached their lowest levels in weeks, despite Israel's continued occupation of a security zone extending up to ten kilometers deep inside Lebanese territory. Hezbollah has also halted all military operations since the ceasefire was announced in mid-June.

However, the resumption of attacks between the US and Iran leads observers to believe that Tehran could once again request its regional proxies, including Hezbollah, to reignite all fronts in its support, should it perceive that the situation is heading toward a major escalation against it.

These fears are compounded by past statements by Hezbollah lawmakers and leaders. Most recently, MP Ali Ammar pledged to stand behind Iran in the event of a new war.

Conversely, during his latest appearance, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem insisted on maintaining the diplomatic track between the US and Iran, while fiercely attacking the path of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.

Political analyst Qassem Qassir, who is close to Hezbollah's positioning, noted that “no one can definitively determine the red lines drawn by Hezbollah, which, if crossed, would prompt a return to resistance in its broadest sense.”

“However, it is expected that a broad Israeli assault on the Ali al-Taher hill would naturally compel the group to defend it,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“The same applies if attacks target other Lebanese areas still outside direct Israeli control, or if the enemy resumes wide-scale offensives and attacks against Nabatieh, Tyre, the southern suburbs of Beirut or other regions,” he added.

“Ultimately, the decision rests with Hezbollah's leadership, which has confirmed through its Secretary-General that it will not accept a return to the status quo prior to March 2” when the war with Israel erupted, he said.

“Consequently, matters remain contingent upon favorable conditions on the ground as well as the political climate. For instance, should direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations hit a dead end, it could prompt the resistance [Hezbollah] to resume direct military operations,” he remarked.

Security and defense analyst Dr. Riad Kahwaji said: “The red lines that could prompt Hezbollah to resume fighting are determined by Iran, not the party's own leadership.”

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he added: “Tehran alone decides when the party will reopen the support front.”


Israeli NGO Slams Investment Plan for West Bank Settlements

Construction cranes tower above a construction site in Givat HaMatos, an Israeli settlement suburb of Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem on January 2, 2026. (AFP)
Construction cranes tower above a construction site in Givat HaMatos, an Israeli settlement suburb of Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem on January 2, 2026. (AFP)
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Israeli NGO Slams Investment Plan for West Bank Settlements

Construction cranes tower above a construction site in Givat HaMatos, an Israeli settlement suburb of Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem on January 2, 2026. (AFP)
Construction cranes tower above a construction site in Givat HaMatos, an Israeli settlement suburb of Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem on January 2, 2026. (AFP)

An Israeli NGO on Wednesday condemned a government plan to invest around $2.7 billion in infrastructure and thousands of new residential units across several settlements in the occupied West Bank.

Since Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took office in 2022, his government has rapidly expanded settlements in the West Bank, drawing criticism from rights groups and the UN.

Earlier this week, Netanyahu and far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich signed an umbrella agreement to invest in settlements in the north of the Palestinian territory.

"This is another significant step in the settlement revolution we are leading in Judea and Samaria," Smotrich said on X, using the biblical name for the West Bank.

"As part of the agreement, approximately 12,000 new housing units will be established, alongside an investment of more than eight billion ILS (approximately $ 2.7 billion) in infrastructure, public institutions and settlement development."

Netanyahu hailed the agreement.

"Not only do we defend this place, we elevate it," he said.

Israeli anti-settlement watchdog Peace Now slammed the decision, accusing the government of squandering public funds and entrenching the occupation of the West Bank.

The group said the move would complicate any future withdrawal from the West Bank and the creation of a Palestinian state.

"Umbrella agreements are used for the rapid development of large-scale projects," Hagit Ofran, a spokeswoman for Peace Now, told AFP.

"From the government's perspective, it is a double win: unbridled construction in the settlements, along with shackling the next government to commitments that will make it difficult to roll back this terrible government's reckless policy."

Since taking office, Netanyahu's government, widely seen as one of the most right-wing in the country's history, has approved the establishment of 102 settlements in the West Bank, according to Peace Now.

All Israeli settlements are illegal under international law.

Excluding east Jerusalem, more than 500,000 Israelis live in settlements in the West Bank, which Israel has occupied since 1967, among some three million Palestinians.