Over more than three decades, the approaches taken by Lebanon’s presidents toward Hezbollah and its weapons have shifted in response to changes in the domestic balance of power and regional and international circumstances. The decision to exempt Hezbollah’s weapons from disarmament on the grounds that they constituted “resistance” against the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon was the first clear breach of the Taif Agreement, which called for the dissolution and disarmament of all militias that had fought during the civil war.
The presidency of the late Lebanese President Elias Hrawi was not in a position to treat Hezbollah on an equal footing with the militias that were dissolved and disarmed. Syrian tutelage, which controlled Lebanon’s political decision-making in coordination with the Iranian regime, had instructed that Hezbollah be elevated from a “militia” to a “resistance” force. This arrangement remained in place until Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon on May 25, 2000. Lebanon then entered a new phase in which Hezbollah remained a political and military actor whose capabilities surpassed those of the state institutions.
From “Militia” to “Resistance”
When Army Commander Emile Lahoud was elected president in October 1998 with the endorsement of the Syrian regime, Hezbollah’s influence within the state grew stronger, particularly after the Israeli withdrawal. The formula of “army, people and resistance” was subsequently entrenched in the ministerial statements of successive governments, particularly after Israel’s war on Lebanon in July 2006.
The same approach continued through most of Michel Suleiman’s presidency, as he dealt with Hezbollah as a resistance force despite major domestic and external changes, most notably the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon on April 25, 2005, under American pressure, and the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.
In his assessment of this trajectory, former MP Fares Saeed, head of the Saydet al-Jabal Gathering, argues that “the Israeli occupation of part of southern Lebanon and Syria’s control over the internal political game imposed a distinction between Hezbollah and the other Lebanese militias that existed during the civil war.” He says these circumstances “led to Hezbollah being elevated from the status of a militia to that of a resistance force, while the other militias were dissolved and disarmed.”
The Shift Following the Historic Bishops’ Call
Fares Saeed recalls the events of 2000, when Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon, coinciding with the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in June of that year. He says these developments encouraged the Maronite Council of Bishops, headed by the late Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, to take a stronger position and call for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon.
“This historic and courageous position was based on a clear logic,” Saeed says. “Since Israel had withdrawn from southern Lebanon, why should Syria not withdraw as well? There was no longer any reason for it to remain in Lebanon.”
The historic call marked a key moment in reopening the debate over the Syrian presence and the future of Lebanese political life. Along with other factors, it paved the way for the formation of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, which played a prominent role in the political opposition to the Syrian presence.
Saeed says the Qornet Shehwan Gathering began at that stage by advising Hezbollah to join the call for the Syrian regime to withdraw from Lebanon. This came during Emile Lahoud’s presidency, when Lebanon was closely aligned with Syria and the Iranian axis. He considers that the political and security circumstances at the time did not allow the existing equation to be changed, and therefore Hezbollah’s weapons remained outside the substantive debate over the state’s exclusive control of arms.
The “Wooden Equation”
The presidential terms that followed the Taif Agreement, up until Lebanon was drawn into the war in support of Gaza, were not able to move beyond Hezbollah, even on the most sensitive domestic issues. Michel Suleiman himself was elected president as an initial outcome of the Doha Agreement, which followed Hezbollah’s takeover of Beirut on May 7, 2008.
Former MP Fares Saeed stresses that Suleiman’s arrival at Baabda Palace “did not lead to any fundamental change in the approach to Hezbollah’s weapons, as they continued to be treated as resistance.” He notes that Suleiman “did not engage in a direct confrontation with Hezbollah during most of his presidency, except in its final phase, when he described the ‘army, people and resistance’ formula as a ‘wooden equation.’” This, he says, represented a significant shift in the Lebanese debate over the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s weapons.
The Failed Bet on President Michel Aoun
When President Suleiman’s term ended on May 25, 2014, Lebanon entered a presidential vacuum after the Lebanese Parliament was effectively prevented from electing a successor under pressure from Hezbollah, which imposed the equation: “Either Michel Aoun is president, or there will be no president.”
Aoun was eventually elected on October 31, 2016, prompting Hezbollah to declare victory in the battle, viewing it as “the culmination of the victory of the Iranian axis in Syria and Iraq and the Houthi coup against the legitimate government in Yemen.”
Fares Saeed does not hide his view that “the bet by some on Michel Aoun’s ability to Lebanese Hezbollah failed miserably.” After his election, he says, Aoun secured gains in power, appointments, and deals with Hezbollah’s assistance, and “handed the country over to Hezbollah and Iran.”
President Joseph Aoun’s Positions: A Break With Previous Presidencies
The rhetoric of current President Joseph Aoun represents a break with all previous presidencies that had yielded to the will of Hezbollah and Iran. His speech two days ago marking the 81st anniversary of General Security was perhaps the strongest attack yet on Hezbollah.
“In addition to the conflict with Israel, we are living through an internal war with a faction that stands in opposition to the state and its institutions,” he said. “We tell them: whatever you do, we will continue for the sake of the nation.”
Assessing the speech, Fares Saeed, head of the Saydet al-Jabal Gathering, says the fundamental difference today “lies in the circumstances surrounding Joseph Aoun’s presidency.”
He stresses that “the boldness President Joseph Aoun is showing in addressing Hezbollah’s weapons stems, in part, from his knowledge of the nature of Hezbollah and its intentions toward the Lebanese state, as well as his awareness of its previous attempts to dominate the state’s decision-making.”
He also emphasizes “the importance of the major changes that have taken place, beginning with Hezbollah’s military defeat in its confrontation with Israel, followed by the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the collapse of a key part of the Iranian axis in the region.”
