Move to Repeal Syria’s Anti-Brotherhood Law Raises Questions over Group’s Political Return

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)
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Move to Repeal Syria’s Anti-Brotherhood Law Raises Questions over Group’s Political Return

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)

Syrian lawmakers are gathering signatures to propose repealing a law that makes membership in the Muslim Brotherhood punishable by death, as the group signals it wants to return to politics after decades of prohibition.

The parallel moves have raised questions about whether Syria’s transitional authorities will allow the Brotherhood back into political life, and how much room they will give political parties.

Abdel Nasser Houshan, chairman of the People’s Assembly’s Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the proposal to repeal Law No. 49 of 1980 was still at the signature-gathering stage and had not been submitted to the assembly.

Under the assembly’s rules, 17 members must first approve the proposal before a bill can be drafted and submitted for referral to the relevant committee, he said.

The legacy of Law 49

Media leaks had suggested lawmakers could discuss the proposal at their next session, expected in the middle of this month. Houshan’s comments indicate that the steps needed to bring it before the assembly remain incomplete.

Enacted in July 1980 under former President Hafez al-Assad, Law 49 classified every member of the Muslim Brotherhood as a criminal punishable by death. It became a key weapon in the former government’s confrontation with the group, whose members and supporters faced decades of arrests and persecution.

Hussam Jazmati, a researcher on Islamist organizations and groups, expects “broad support inside and outside the assembly” for repealing the law, given the abuses associated with it under the former government.

Repealing the “strange” law matters regardless of whom it targeted, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He called it “one of the instruments of state terror under the Assad regime,” saying security agencies used it to pursue people merely suspected of belonging to the Brotherhood.

The law left a deep legacy of intimidation in Syrian society, particularly in conservative and religious communities, he said.

“Sympathy for its victims could provide a basis for supporting its repeal, even among groups that do not support the Brotherhood politically.”

Yet the law’s legal status is itself unclear.

The declaration issued at the “Victory Conference” on Jan. 29, 2025, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, suspended all exceptional laws. It remains unclear whether that covered Law 49 — or whether the law still requires a legislative repeal.

The declaration also dissolved the Baath Party, the parties of the National Progressive Front and their affiliated organizations, and banned their reconstitution.

It dissolved military factions and revolutionary political and civilian bodies, requiring their integration into state institutions.

But it did not dissolve all political parties without exception, leaving unresolved the legal basis for party activity during the transition.

A test of political will

For Abdel Rahman al-Haj, a researcher specializing in Islamist movements, bringing the repeal before the People’s Assembly would be “a test of the transitional government’s political will.”

An indefinite delay could signal that the authorities do not want to ease the Brotherhood’s return to politics or allow it an active role in the next phase, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Leaving the law in place without invalidating it in the constitutional declaration, and leaving it to the People’s Assembly, will be understood as additional pressure on the group,” he said.

The Brotherhood had already faced various forms of pressure to dissolve itself, he added.

The Syrian Brotherhood’s Shura Council held its fifth regular session on Sept. 27, 2026, issuing a 16-point statement on political, security and economic developments, as well as regional and international issues.

The statement affirmed the group’s desire to participate in political life and called for pluralism and rules governing party activity. Observers read it as preparation for a return to politics inside Syria.

Al-Haj said its second and sixth points showed that “the group wants to engage in party competition and is preparing for the return of political life as set out in the constitutional declaration.”

The Brotherhood appears to feel it faces “systematic exclusion and marginalization,” he said. At this stage of the transition, he added, it needs to test how serious the government is about establishing a legal framework for political activity ahead of an agreed political transition.

Jazmati sees a more immediate obstacle.

“The return of political life depends on the authorities’ will,” he said, adding that they do not appear to want organized parties, at least during the transition.

Still, he believes the Brotherhood could return to political activity “in one way or another.” Syria has a broad religious current that could find expression in several political parties and organizations, whether or not a new political parties law is enacted.

Sympathy for victims, doubts about the group

Jazmati draws a distinction between sympathy for the Brotherhood’s treatment under Assad and support for the organization today.

“There is widespread sympathy for the victims of arrests, persecution and abuses committed by the former regime, and support for addressing the injustices and providing redress for the harm they suffered,” he said.

That sympathy, however, “does not necessarily mean support for the group’s return in its current organizational form.”

The Brotherhood’s record during the Syrian revolution draws a less favorable assessment, he said, citing accusations that it tried to dominate opposition institutions and bore some responsibility for their failures, along with criticism of its management of political and relief work.

He described that negative view as resting on “a set of facts as well as a set of exaggerations,” stressing the need to distinguish between former detainees and victims of the government and the political organization that exists today.

Early in the revolution, sections of the Brotherhood’s support base welcomed its participation in preparatory conferences to establish the opposition Syrian National Council. Criticism of its performance within opposition institutions later intensified.

“The group’s popularity declined during those years, while other Islamist currents rose, particularly the current from which the leaders of Syria’s present authorities emerged,” Jazmati said.

Could a return spur other groups?

The Brotherhood’s signals have also raised questions about what its return could mean for Islamist organizations and other political forces waiting for rules governing party activity.

Al-Haj sees the prospect of its return encouraging other Islamist organizations as “possible, but unlikely.”

The Brotherhood’s presence rests on “its organizational and political history, rather than solely on its Islamist ideology,” he said. Other currents compete to represent that ideology, including the one from which Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emerged.

He expects the group to attract some Syrians who share its ideological outlook and are dissatisfied with the course of the transition.

Its return could do more to encourage non-Islamist organizations than Islamist ones to prepare for political participation, he said. But the transition’s uncertain contours make the consequences difficult to predict.

With the repeal proposal still at an early stage and the rules for party activity unresolved, the Brotherhood’s return to politics would test more than its own future.

It would also test the limits of pluralism Syria’s transitional authorities are prepared to allow.



Iraq Refers Oil Smuggling Case to Judiciary as Security Forces Deploy in Jurf al-Sakhar

20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq Refers Oil Smuggling Case to Judiciary as Security Forces Deploy in Jurf al-Sakhar

20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

The Iraqi government announced on Saturday that it had referred an oil smuggling case to the judiciary, with possible arrests of individuals suspected of involvement, as security forces redeployed in Jurf al-Sakhar in northern Babil province under an agreement providing for the gradual withdrawal of Kataib Hezbollah, which has dominated the area for more than a decade.

Government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi said Saturday that protecting oil pipelines was the government's responsibility and a priority across the country. He noted that security agencies had submitted reports and intelligence to the prime minister concerning suspected smuggling operations and that the case had been referred to the judiciary.

In remarks carried by the Iraqi News Agency (INA), al-Aboudi said the investigations could lead to the arrest of individuals involved and that anyone named in the probe would face judicial accountability. He did not identify any suspects or groups, nor did he disclose details of the smuggling operations under investigation.

According to officials, the government's recent measures in Jurf al-Sakhar have gone beyond replacing the forces deployed in the area. They also include securing oil pipelines and facilities and reorganizing the administration of a territory that has remained largely outside effective government control for years.

Security forces began redeploying in Jurf al-Sakhar on Friday under an agreement calling for the phased withdrawal of Kataib Hezbollah's three brigades from the area.

Where Will Kataib Hezbollah's Forces Go?

Saad Maan, head of Iraq's Security Media Cell, said Saturday that the first battalion of the 45th Brigade had begun withdrawing and that the 72nd and 79th brigades of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) would take over their duties. The troop rotation is expected to be completed in less than a month.

Maan added that Kataib Hezbollah's three brigades would be assigned duties in other areas.

A senior official told Asharq Al-Awsat that the faction had begun redeploying its forces south of al-Qaim in Anbar province. Under the agreement, two battalions would withdraw each day in succession as government security forces moved in, with no obstacles reported so far.

However, the withdrawal was not yet complete. Videos circulating on Saturday showed Kataib Hezbollah members still stationed at the entrance to the area from the al-Fadhiliya side, even as the al-Fadhiliya overpass reopened to civilian traffic after nearly 12 years of closure.

Reporters on the ground also said armed members of the faction remained deployed along dirt roads in the area, obstructing the movement of official security units.

Avoiding a Confrontation

The ongoing arrangements reflect an effort by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's government to bring the area under the control of official security institutions without triggering a direct confrontation with the armed faction.

Addressing security forces entering Jurf al-Sakhar, al-Zaidi said the approach was based on "containment, not exclusion," stressing that everyone would operate under one flag, one command and one law. He also reiterated his opposition to any weapons outside state control.

Security researcher Fadel Abu Ragheef said al-Zaidi's remarks indicated that the government was not pursuing a confrontation with any faction and that the current arrangements aimed to resolve the situation through troop rotations and adherence to the law.

He noted that Kataib Hezbollah had alternative positions in other areas, as well as positions within PMF brigades, adding that a limited contingent could remain in Jurf al-Sakhar under the agreement.

Rehabilitation and the Return of Displaced Residents

The return of residents to Jurf al-Sakhar remains one of the government's biggest challenges. Thousands of displaced people have been unable to return to their homes since military operations ended with the recapture of the area from ISIS in 2014.

Since then, Jurf al-Sakhar has become a heavily militarized area where Kataib Hezbollah wields considerable influence, amid persistent disputes over land administration and the return of residents.

Al-Aboudi said the command headquarters established in the area was intended to facilitate its full reopening and allow residents to return home.

He added that the government would take Jurf al-Sakhar's particular circumstances into account when preparing the 2027 budget, stressing that it did not want areas of the country to continue giving the impression of instability.

However, the return of residents requires measures beyond replacing military units.

A PMF commander stationed in the Jurf al-Sakhar sector said rehabilitating the area would take approximately one month, including completing the troop rotation and clearing landmines. He described mine clearance as a major undertaking that must be completed before arrangements for the return of displaced residents can begin.

Government plans also include addressing unauthorized housing built along oil pipeline routes.

Al-Zaidi instructed provincial governors to identify, document and address these violations, while ensuring that eligible residents of the affected properties are covered by the Watan housing initiative, which includes a project to provide one million residential plots.

The Interior Ministry has also secured more than five kilometers of oil pipelines.

Security affairs researcher Hussein Allawi said the government's actions were linked to intelligence reports concerning violations involving oil resources, not only in Jurf al-Sakhar but also in other oil-producing provinces.

He added that the government was seeking to bring the sector under federal institutional oversight while addressing the aftermath of the war against ISIS. These efforts include conducting security screenings of displaced residents, clearing remnants of war and reorganizing agricultural land.

Allawi suggested that the command headquarters could eventually evolve from a security body into a broader civilian and administrative structure, with an official appointed to coordinate with local authorities and relevant agencies in neighboring provinces.

A Test of State Authority

The developments come amid disputes between Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali.

Meanwhile, a video circulated on social media showing a group of masked men announcing the formation of a new faction called Asaib al-Jihad and its affiliation with the so-called Resistance Coordination Committee.

The group's identity and affiliations remain unclear, and no independently verified information has established a connection between its emergence and the dispute between the two factions.

However, a security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the appearance of the new group came amid efforts to reorganize certain armed factions.

The source also spoke of Iranian efforts to establish new armed groups in Iraq, but provided no evidence that could be independently verified.


Taiz Faces Collapse in Essential Services as Houthi Siege Nears Third Month

Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)
Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)
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Taiz Faces Collapse in Essential Services as Houthi Siege Nears Third Month

Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)
Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)

Yemen's city of Taiz is approaching its third month under a Houthi-imposed siege, with essential supplies dwindling and food and fuel prices soaring. The crisis has spread beyond markets to hospitals and healthcare services, threatening residents' ability to meet their daily needs.

United Nations data show that deliveries of medicines and water to the city have fallen by as much as 90%, while fuel and cooking gas supplies have dropped by approximately 97%. The sharp declines have resulted from bottlenecks caused by road closures and blocked supply routes, which have severely disrupted the transport of goods and essential materials.

According to the UN Information Centre, these restrictions have driven food prices up by 60% and fuel and cooking gas prices by around 300%, while transportation costs have quadrupled. The increases have placed further strain on household budgets and reduced residents' ability to afford basic necessities.

The siege has affected not only the availability and prices of goods but also the healthcare sector, which faces severe shortages of fuel, surgical supplies and anesthetic medicines, according to Health Cluster data.

Healthcare workers warn that continued supply disruptions threaten emergency services and hinder surgical procedures, the operation of medical equipment and the production of oxygen needed in intensive care units.

Hospitals are facing growing difficulties maintaining their services as medical needs increase and supplies remain limited. The risk of being unable to treat critically ill and injured patients is also rising, particularly those requiring urgent surgery and specialized care.

Limited Supplies

In an effort to ease shortages, the World Health Organization (WHO) delivered 19.6 metric tons of medicines and medical supplies to three health facilities in Taiz, while humanitarian organizations are planning additional support for two hospitals.

However, the crisis extends beyond healthcare facilities inside the city. Reports indicate shortages of medical and surgical supplies at facilities along the front lines, including areas controlled by the de facto authorities.

These conditions are prompting humanitarian organizations to explore alternative aid delivery routes while intensifying negotiations to secure humanitarian access. The aim is to ensure supplies reach hospitals on both sides of the front lines and prevent disruptions to medical services.

The supply bottlenecks have also coincided with a deterioration in municipal services. The closure of roads leading to the waste incinerator has caused garbage to accumulate inside the city, further demonstrating that the impact of blocked access routes extends beyond the movement of goods, fuel and medicines.

Gaps in Trauma Care

Health Cluster data reveal major gaps in trauma treatment and referral services. Funding has been secured for only four of the 35 planned trauma stabilization points, with none funded in Aden or the areas of Lahj province toward which the front lines are advancing.

Medical referral services also lack the necessary funding as burn injuries increase. Many hospitals can provide only first aid, stabilize patients and dress wounds, without the capacity to deliver the specialized care required.

Mental health services, psychosocial support and rehabilitation remain among the weakest components of the healthcare response. This leaves many patients and injured people at risk of interrupted treatment and inadequate comprehensive care, particularly given the limited resources available.

On the epidemiological front, Health Cluster data showed a decline in cholera cases across the five most affected governorates, with suspected cases falling from 638 in epidemiological week 40 to 321 in week 45.

However, the city of Tarim in Wadi Hadramout has reported a concerning development, recording 172 cases of acute diarrhea since week 43.

Of those cases, 78 tested positive using rapid diagnostic tests, while 22 were confirmed through laboratory cultures, amid suspicions of contamination of food and water sources.

Preparations are underway to establish a diarrhea treatment center in the city to contain the outbreak and provide medical care to affected patients. The developments are placing additional pressure on healthcare services and epidemic control efforts.

Funding Shortages

Alongside the worsening humanitarian and health conditions, funding shortages have emerged as one of the main challenges to sustaining relief operations in Yemen, raising concerns about the impact of limited resources on services provided to civilians.

According to humanitarian data, funding for the 32 WHO-supported medical teams is available only through January 2027, raising uncertainty over the future of their services as health and humanitarian needs continue to grow.

The WHO is also finalizing its third request for $2.4 million in funding from the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

The request includes support for mobile medical sites and teams, along with supplies proposed by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).


France Coordinates with US on UN Resolution to Fill Post-UNIFIL Vacuum

Indian UN peacekeepers patrol in the village of Mary, in southern Lebanon's Hasbaya district, Monday, Nov. 16, 2026. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)
Indian UN peacekeepers patrol in the village of Mary, in southern Lebanon's Hasbaya district, Monday, Nov. 16, 2026. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)
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France Coordinates with US on UN Resolution to Fill Post-UNIFIL Vacuum

Indian UN peacekeepers patrol in the village of Mary, in southern Lebanon's Hasbaya district, Monday, Nov. 16, 2026. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)
Indian UN peacekeepers patrol in the village of Mary, in southern Lebanon's Hasbaya district, Monday, Nov. 16, 2026. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)

French diplomats have begun drafting a resolution for the period following the expiration of the current mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on December 31, following a Security Council meeting at which members reaffirmed their steadfast commitment to Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Southern Lebanon is entering the final weeks of UNIFIL's mission with no clear indication of who will fill the vacuum left by the departure of the peacekeeping force, first deployed in 1978. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts are underway in several capitals to develop an alternative acceptable to the United States, Israel and Lebanon.

The 15 Security Council members exchanged views Thursday on the situation in Lebanon, the implementation of Resolution 1701 (2006) and the next steps in light of Resolution 2790 (2025).

They reaffirmed their support for UNIFIL and called on all parties to take all necessary measures to respect the safety and security of UN personnel and premises, as well as the mission's freedom of movement, in accordance with international law. They also urged all sides to refrain from any actions that could endanger peacekeepers.

Council members reiterated that peacekeepers must never be the target of attacks under any circumstances and called on all parties to fully comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.

They also demanded the full implementation of Resolution 1701, reaffirming their steadfast commitment to Lebanon's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity.

Incorporating the Trilateral Framework

Asharq Al-Awsat has learned that Council members agreed France, which serves as the penholder on Lebanon-related matters at the Security Council, should begin preparing a draft resolution in coordination with the United States.

Washington's position was conveyed by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz during his November 15-17 visit to Lebanon, when he met senior Lebanese officials, including President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.

During the visit, Waltz stressed the need to restore state sovereignty through the Lebanese Armed Forces and called on Hezbollah to disarm voluntarily, arguing that no country can have two armies.

He also discussed proposed updates to a new Security Council resolution that would revise elements of Resolution 1701 (2006), including the possibility of incorporating the Trilateral Framework reached by Lebanon and Israel under US mediation last June.

Waltz insisted that placing all weapons under state control was not optional and described Hezbollah as a cancer that must be eliminated.

French diplomacy is proceeding with considerable caution to avoid a public confrontation, particularly given Israel's opposition to Paris playing its traditional role in helping Lebanese authorities reestablish control over the country's entire territory.

France's approach begins with seeking agreement with Washington on Hezbollah's disarmament and securing a complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territory.

Given the limited time available, the simplest solution would be a short extension of UNIFIL's mandate, an option supported by most Council members.

However, Washington remains firmly opposed to any further extension, raising concerns among other members that a renewal proposal could face a US veto.

President Donald Trump's administration favors a direct security arrangement between Lebanon and Israel that would reduce outside involvement.

Following weeks of fighting that began when Hezbollah launched its offensive on March 2, Washington sponsored the first direct talks between Lebanon and Israel in more than four decades.

Those negotiations produced a framework agreement announced on June 26, establishing a sequence of pilot zones in which the Lebanese Army would deploy to oversee Hezbollah's disarmament and the dismantling of its infrastructure, in exchange for a gradual Israeli redeployment.

The agreement also established a Military Coordination Group comprising Israeli, Lebanese and American officers.

That arrangement differs from the mechanism established under the November 2024 ceasefire, which also included France and UNIFIL.

Stalled Process

The process has since stalled.

Israel accuses the Lebanese Army of failing to remove Hezbollah from the pilot zones, while Lebanon complains that Israeli military operations continue in both occupied and unoccupied areas. Hezbollah, meanwhile, rejects the agreement outright.

Among Washington's most notable proposals is one put forward by Secretary of State Marco Rubio on November 9, suggesting that the new mission could be civilian rather than military.

Observers acknowledge that civilian personnel could perform some of the mission's functions. However, essential responsibilities, including deconfliction and the protection of military observers, would require at least a limited armed presence.

Last June, UN Secretary-General António Guterres presented several options for an international mission to succeed UNIFIL.

The proposals varied in the size and cost of the force but shared several urgent priorities: deploying and protecting military observers, providing deconfliction services, clearing landmines and delivering engineering support.

That same month, France and Italy announced their willingness to participate in a new international coalition to support Lebanon after UNIFIL's withdrawal.

However, neither Paris nor Rome has yet presented a proposal acceptable to the United States, Israel and Lebanon alike, while Washington remains unwilling to deploy American troops to southern Lebanon.

According to an assessment by the International Crisis Group, the Security Council should put forward a credible proposal for a successor force in the form of a conventional UN peacekeeping mission, a model that has enjoyed broad acceptance in southern Lebanon for decades.

The group recommends establishing the mission under terms that make clear it would not simply replicate UNIFIL, but would instead constitute a new force designed to address American concerns.

Efforts to reassure Washington include proposals for a narrowly defined mandate, robust accountability measures, clear performance benchmarks and an approximate timetable for ending the mission.

Its priorities would be limited to military observation, mine clearance, escorting humanitarian aid convoys and facilitating access to isolated areas.

The cost of leaving a vacuum would extend beyond military considerations.

UNIFIL accompanies humanitarian convoys to predominantly Christian towns such as Ain Ebel, Rmeish and Debel, which are separated from the rest of Lebanon by Israeli-occupied territory.

It also helps farmers, residents and journalists gain access to sensitive areas.

Although the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which has operated under a separate mandate since 1948, can continue deploying its observers, it relies in practice on UNIFIL for security and logistical support.

Humanitarian organizations likewise depend on the peacekeeping mission's real-time information to carry out their work in southern Lebanon.

Under the current timetable, UNIFIL will begin drawing down its positions and withdrawing equipment on January 1, 2027, with no designated successor to assume its responsibilities.