What Does the End of MINURSO Mean for the Future of Western Sahara?

A United Nations Security Council meeting titled "Maintenance of international peace and security" at UN headquarters in New York City, US, October 29, 2026. REUTERS/Jeenah Moon
A United Nations Security Council meeting titled "Maintenance of international peace and security" at UN headquarters in New York City, US, October 29, 2026. REUTERS/Jeenah Moon
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What Does the End of MINURSO Mean for the Future of Western Sahara?

A United Nations Security Council meeting titled "Maintenance of international peace and security" at UN headquarters in New York City, US, October 29, 2026. REUTERS/Jeenah Moon
A United Nations Security Council meeting titled "Maintenance of international peace and security" at UN headquarters in New York City, US, October 29, 2026. REUTERS/Jeenah Moon

Russia has plunged the Western Sahara dispute into an unprecedented geopolitical impasse after vetoing an amended US-drafted resolution at the United Nations Security Council that sought to fundamentally reshape the longstanding regional conflict.

Although the US draft secured the support of 11 council members, Russia's unexpected veto blocked its adoption.

Washington responded swiftly, using its own veto to block a rival Russian draft resolution that proposed a conventional technical extension of the UN mission's mandate without altering its underlying structure.

The diplomatic confrontation between the two powers prompted Morocco's King Mohammed VI to announce, in an urgent statement issued by the Royal Cabinet, the closure of the chapter on the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) after 35 years of operations.

The king also called for the issue to be removed entirely and permanently from the Security Council's agenda, describing the existing framework as outdated and ineffective on the ground.

Competing legal frameworks and the legacy of Resolution 2797

At the heart of the dispute between Washington and Moscow are competing legal and institutional frameworks that each side has sought to establish, a confrontation that began taking shape with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2797 on Oct. 31, 2025.

That resolution marked a significant shift by endorsing Morocco's autonomy proposal as the basis for negotiations.

The latest US draft sought to build on Resolution 2797 by establishing expanded autonomy as the exclusive and definitive framework for resolving the dispute, removing references to a referendum from the UN framework and reducing the mission's military component ahead of its eventual administrative dissolution.

Russia, by contrast, sought to halt that process, which Washington had pursued under the framework established by Resolution 2797.

Moscow's permanent representative to the United Nations objected to what he described as an attempt to override existing balances, while Russia introduced an alternative resolution proposing to extend MINURSO's mandate until Oct. 31, 2027.

The Russian proposal would have retained the mission's name and traditional responsibilities, leaving room for broader interpretations of the political process that could accommodate all parties, including Algeria and the Polisario Front.

What does the shift mean for the parties and their allies?

The change in the international approach to Western Sahara is reshaping the calculations of regional and international powers involved in the dispute.

For Morocco's international allies, the Security Council deadlock presents a new reality.

Major European capitals, including Paris and Madrid, now face pressure to translate their political support for Morocco's autonomy initiative into direct bilateral and economic partnerships with Rabat, rather than relying primarily on diplomatic negotiations and votes at the United Nations.

Moroccan diplomacy has increasingly favored that approach as an alternative to the UN-led framework.

Meanwhile, countries supporting the traditional UN approach, including African governments aligned with Algeria, face a different set of challenges.

Although Russia's veto succeeded in blocking the US attempt to rewrite the legal framework governing the dispute, it also shifted greater responsibility for maintaining stability to regional actors.

Regional alliances may therefore have to reconsider their strategies in dealing with a Morocco seeking to exercise full sovereignty over the territory without UN monitoring, and a Polisario Front searching for alternative diplomatic channels to compensate for the loss of the Security Council framework.

What next for regional stability after the institutional vacuum?

The region is entering a new phase in the management of the Western Sahara dispute following the expiration of MINURSO's mandate without renewal.

The absence of a renewed mandate threatens to end the mission's longstanding role as an international third-party observer monitoring the lines of contact and ceasefire arrangements.

Without that UN framework, the parties could face fewer institutional and diplomatic constraints, leaving developments on the ground increasingly dependent on their respective positions on sovereignty and territorial control.

Morocco views the mission's absence as an opportunity to end what it considers a temporary arrangement and proceed with the administration and development of the territory it claims as its own, without the restrictions associated with UN monitoring and reporting.

The Algeria-backed Polisario Front, meanwhile, faces the prospect of losing a central UN platform through which it has pursued its demand for a referendum on self-determination.

The institutional shift could move the dispute away from the Security Council's negotiating chambers and toward developments on the ground and direct bilateral diplomacy.

The future of stability and sovereignty in North Africa would then depend increasingly on the measures taken by the parties themselves and the regional and international alliances supporting them.



Aoun: Israel, Iran Are 2 Main Obstacles to Lebanon’s Full Independence

Lebanese national flags line a highway ahead of the country's 83rd Independence Day celebrations in the Dbayeh coastal suburb, north of Beirut, Lebanon, 20 November 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese national flags line a highway ahead of the country's 83rd Independence Day celebrations in the Dbayeh coastal suburb, north of Beirut, Lebanon, 20 November 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
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Aoun: Israel, Iran Are 2 Main Obstacles to Lebanon’s Full Independence

Lebanese national flags line a highway ahead of the country's 83rd Independence Day celebrations in the Dbayeh coastal suburb, north of Beirut, Lebanon, 20 November 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese national flags line a highway ahead of the country's 83rd Independence Day celebrations in the Dbayeh coastal suburb, north of Beirut, Lebanon, 20 November 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said on Saturday that Israel and Iran represent the two principal obstacles to the completion of Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, stressing on the eve of Independence Day that the country must not remain captive to either project.

Aoun said Lebanon is facing a critical and defining test, arguing that the two challenges are inextricably linked.
He identified them as “the Israeli occupation of parts of our territory” and “foreign interference in our internal affairs, particularly by influential actors within the Iranian regime, through weapons and decision-making structures that operate outside the authority of the Lebanese state.”

According to Aoun, each of these realities serves to justify and perpetuate the other. “Each obstacle invokes the other, derives legitimacy from it, and provides it with a pretext,” he said, adding that “in both cases, Lebanon is the one that pays the price.”

The president said his administration has advanced a national rescue plan based on addressing both issues simultaneously.
“Our vision is founded on the parallel and simultaneous resolution of both problems: no occupation under any circumstances, and no weapons outside the authority of the (Lebanese) state that take orders from, or serve the interests of, any foreign power, whoever that power may be.”

Addressing the issue of Hezbollah’s arsenal, Aoun acknowledged the group’s past role while arguing that its continued possession of arms has come at a heavy cost.

“Hezbollah’s weapons served their purpose during an earlier period, and there were genuine sacrifices and achievements associated with them. In a later phase, however, they exhausted its community, its social environment, its people, and the country as a whole. They imposed immense losses on them, and on all of us, once they became openly dedicated to causes that were not Lebanese.”

He concluded with a direct appeal: “The weapons must be handed over.”


Iraq Refers Oil Smuggling Case to Judiciary as Security Forces Deploy in Jurf al-Sakhar

20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq Refers Oil Smuggling Case to Judiciary as Security Forces Deploy in Jurf al-Sakhar

20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

The Iraqi government announced on Saturday that it had referred an oil smuggling case to the judiciary, with possible arrests of individuals suspected of involvement, as security forces redeployed in Jurf al-Sakhar in northern Babil province under an agreement providing for the gradual withdrawal of Kataib Hezbollah, which has dominated the area for more than a decade.

Government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi said Saturday that protecting oil pipelines was the government's responsibility and a priority across the country. He noted that security agencies had submitted reports and intelligence to the prime minister concerning suspected smuggling operations and that the case had been referred to the judiciary.

In remarks carried by the Iraqi News Agency (INA), al-Aboudi said the investigations could lead to the arrest of individuals involved and that anyone named in the probe would face judicial accountability. He did not identify any suspects or groups, nor did he disclose details of the smuggling operations under investigation.

According to officials, the government's recent measures in Jurf al-Sakhar have gone beyond replacing the forces deployed in the area. They also include securing oil pipelines and facilities and reorganizing the administration of a territory that has remained largely outside effective government control for years.

Security forces began redeploying in Jurf al-Sakhar on Friday under an agreement calling for the phased withdrawal of Kataib Hezbollah's three brigades from the area.

Where Will Kataib Hezbollah's Forces Go?

Saad Maan, head of Iraq's Security Media Cell, said Saturday that the first battalion of the 45th Brigade had begun withdrawing and that the 72nd and 79th brigades of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) would take over their duties. The troop rotation is expected to be completed in less than a month.

Maan added that Kataib Hezbollah's three brigades would be assigned duties in other areas.

A senior official told Asharq Al-Awsat that the faction had begun redeploying its forces south of al-Qaim in Anbar province. Under the agreement, two battalions would withdraw each day in succession as government security forces moved in, with no obstacles reported so far.

However, the withdrawal was not yet complete. Videos circulating on Saturday showed Kataib Hezbollah members still stationed at the entrance to the area from the al-Fadhiliya side, even as the al-Fadhiliya overpass reopened to civilian traffic after nearly 12 years of closure.

Reporters on the ground also said armed members of the faction remained deployed along dirt roads in the area, obstructing the movement of official security units.

Avoiding a Confrontation

The ongoing arrangements reflect an effort by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's government to bring the area under the control of official security institutions without triggering a direct confrontation with the armed faction.

Addressing security forces entering Jurf al-Sakhar, al-Zaidi said the approach was based on "containment, not exclusion," stressing that everyone would operate under one flag, one command and one law. He also reiterated his opposition to any weapons outside state control.

Security researcher Fadel Abu Ragheef said al-Zaidi's remarks indicated that the government was not pursuing a confrontation with any faction and that the current arrangements aimed to resolve the situation through troop rotations and adherence to the law.

He noted that Kataib Hezbollah had alternative positions in other areas, as well as positions within PMF brigades, adding that a limited contingent could remain in Jurf al-Sakhar under the agreement.

Rehabilitation and the Return of Displaced Residents

The return of residents to Jurf al-Sakhar remains one of the government's biggest challenges. Thousands of displaced people have been unable to return to their homes since military operations ended with the recapture of the area from ISIS in 2014.

Since then, Jurf al-Sakhar has become a heavily militarized area where Kataib Hezbollah wields considerable influence, amid persistent disputes over land administration and the return of residents.

Al-Aboudi said the command headquarters established in the area was intended to facilitate its full reopening and allow residents to return home.

He added that the government would take Jurf al-Sakhar's particular circumstances into account when preparing the 2027 budget, stressing that it did not want areas of the country to continue giving the impression of instability.

However, the return of residents requires measures beyond replacing military units.

A PMF commander stationed in the Jurf al-Sakhar sector said rehabilitating the area would take approximately one month, including completing the troop rotation and clearing landmines. He described mine clearance as a major undertaking that must be completed before arrangements for the return of displaced residents can begin.

Government plans also include addressing unauthorized housing built along oil pipeline routes.

Al-Zaidi instructed provincial governors to identify, document and address these violations, while ensuring that eligible residents of the affected properties are covered by the Watan housing initiative, which includes a project to provide one million residential plots.

The Interior Ministry has also secured more than five kilometers of oil pipelines.

Security affairs researcher Hussein Allawi said the government's actions were linked to intelligence reports concerning violations involving oil resources, not only in Jurf al-Sakhar but also in other oil-producing provinces.

He added that the government was seeking to bring the sector under federal institutional oversight while addressing the aftermath of the war against ISIS. These efforts include conducting security screenings of displaced residents, clearing remnants of war and reorganizing agricultural land.

Allawi suggested that the command headquarters could eventually evolve from a security body into a broader civilian and administrative structure, with an official appointed to coordinate with local authorities and relevant agencies in neighboring provinces.

A Test of State Authority

The developments come amid disputes between Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali.

Meanwhile, a video circulated on social media showing a group of masked men announcing the formation of a new faction called Asaib al-Jihad and its affiliation with the so-called Resistance Coordination Committee.

The group's identity and affiliations remain unclear, and no independently verified information has established a connection between its emergence and the dispute between the two factions.

However, a security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the appearance of the new group came amid efforts to reorganize certain armed factions.

The source also spoke of Iranian efforts to establish new armed groups in Iraq, but provided no evidence that could be independently verified.


Taiz Faces Collapse in Essential Services as Houthi Siege Nears Third Month

Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)
Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)
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Taiz Faces Collapse in Essential Services as Houthi Siege Nears Third Month

Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)
Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)

Yemen's city of Taiz is approaching its third month under a Houthi-imposed siege, with essential supplies dwindling and food and fuel prices soaring. The crisis has spread beyond markets to hospitals and healthcare services, threatening residents' ability to meet their daily needs.

United Nations data show that deliveries of medicines and water to the city have fallen by as much as 90%, while fuel and cooking gas supplies have dropped by approximately 97%. The sharp declines have resulted from bottlenecks caused by road closures and blocked supply routes, which have severely disrupted the transport of goods and essential materials.

According to the UN Information Centre, these restrictions have driven food prices up by 60% and fuel and cooking gas prices by around 300%, while transportation costs have quadrupled. The increases have placed further strain on household budgets and reduced residents' ability to afford basic necessities.

The siege has affected not only the availability and prices of goods but also the healthcare sector, which faces severe shortages of fuel, surgical supplies and anesthetic medicines, according to Health Cluster data.

Healthcare workers warn that continued supply disruptions threaten emergency services and hinder surgical procedures, the operation of medical equipment and the production of oxygen needed in intensive care units.

Hospitals are facing growing difficulties maintaining their services as medical needs increase and supplies remain limited. The risk of being unable to treat critically ill and injured patients is also rising, particularly those requiring urgent surgery and specialized care.

Limited Supplies

In an effort to ease shortages, the World Health Organization (WHO) delivered 19.6 metric tons of medicines and medical supplies to three health facilities in Taiz, while humanitarian organizations are planning additional support for two hospitals.

However, the crisis extends beyond healthcare facilities inside the city. Reports indicate shortages of medical and surgical supplies at facilities along the front lines, including areas controlled by the de facto authorities.

These conditions are prompting humanitarian organizations to explore alternative aid delivery routes while intensifying negotiations to secure humanitarian access. The aim is to ensure supplies reach hospitals on both sides of the front lines and prevent disruptions to medical services.

The supply bottlenecks have also coincided with a deterioration in municipal services. The closure of roads leading to the waste incinerator has caused garbage to accumulate inside the city, further demonstrating that the impact of blocked access routes extends beyond the movement of goods, fuel and medicines.

Gaps in Trauma Care

Health Cluster data reveal major gaps in trauma treatment and referral services. Funding has been secured for only four of the 35 planned trauma stabilization points, with none funded in Aden or the areas of Lahj province toward which the front lines are advancing.

Medical referral services also lack the necessary funding as burn injuries increase. Many hospitals can provide only first aid, stabilize patients and dress wounds, without the capacity to deliver the specialized care required.

Mental health services, psychosocial support and rehabilitation remain among the weakest components of the healthcare response. This leaves many patients and injured people at risk of interrupted treatment and inadequate comprehensive care, particularly given the limited resources available.

On the epidemiological front, Health Cluster data showed a decline in cholera cases across the five most affected governorates, with suspected cases falling from 638 in epidemiological week 40 to 321 in week 45.

However, the city of Tarim in Wadi Hadramout has reported a concerning development, recording 172 cases of acute diarrhea since week 43.

Of those cases, 78 tested positive using rapid diagnostic tests, while 22 were confirmed through laboratory cultures, amid suspicions of contamination of food and water sources.

Preparations are underway to establish a diarrhea treatment center in the city to contain the outbreak and provide medical care to affected patients. The developments are placing additional pressure on healthcare services and epidemic control efforts.

Funding Shortages

Alongside the worsening humanitarian and health conditions, funding shortages have emerged as one of the main challenges to sustaining relief operations in Yemen, raising concerns about the impact of limited resources on services provided to civilians.

According to humanitarian data, funding for the 32 WHO-supported medical teams is available only through January 2027, raising uncertainty over the future of their services as health and humanitarian needs continue to grow.

The WHO is also finalizing its third request for $2.4 million in funding from the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

The request includes support for mobile medical sites and teams, along with supplies proposed by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).