In Türkiye Election, Erdogan Doesn’t Flinch as He Fights for Political Life

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses his supporters during a rally ahead of the May 14 presidential and parliamentary elections, in Ankara, Türkiye April 30, 2023. (Reuters)
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses his supporters during a rally ahead of the May 14 presidential and parliamentary elections, in Ankara, Türkiye April 30, 2023. (Reuters)
TT
20

In Türkiye Election, Erdogan Doesn’t Flinch as He Fights for Political Life

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses his supporters during a rally ahead of the May 14 presidential and parliamentary elections, in Ankara, Türkiye April 30, 2023. (Reuters)
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses his supporters during a rally ahead of the May 14 presidential and parliamentary elections, in Ankara, Türkiye April 30, 2023. (Reuters)

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has nurtured an image of a robust and invincible leader over his two decades in power, yet he appears vulnerable as the political landscape may be shifting in favor of his opponent in Sunday's presidential vote.

Erdogan emerged from humble roots to rule for 20 years and redraw Türkiye’s domestic, economic, security and foreign policy, rivalling historic leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who founded modern Türkiye a century ago.

The son of a sea captain, Erdogan has faced stiff political headwinds ahead of Sunday's election: he was already facing blame over an economic crisis when a devastating earthquake hit in February. Critics accused his government of a slow response and lax enforcement of building rules, failures they said could have cost lives.

As opinion polls show a tight race, critics have drawn parallels with the circumstances that brought his Islamist-rooted AK Party to power in 2002, in an election also shaped by high inflation and economic turmoil.

Two days before the vote, Erdogan said he came to office through the ballot boxes and if he had to, would leave the same way.

"We will accept as legitimate every result that comes out of the ballots. We expect the same pledge from those opposing us," he said in a televised interview on Friday.

For his enemies the day of retribution has come.

Under his autocratic rule, he amassed power around an executive presidency, muzzled dissent, jailed critics and opponents and seized control of the media, judiciary and the economy. He crammed most public institutions with loyalists and hollowed critical state organs.

His opponents have vowed to unpick many of the changes he has made to Türkiye, which he has sought to shape to his vision of a pious, conservative society and assertive regional player.

The high stakes in Sunday's presidential and parliamentary election are nothing new for a leader who once served a prison sentence - for reciting a religious poem - and survived an attempted military coup in 2016 when rogue soldiers attacked parliament and killed 250 people.

A veteran of more than a dozen election victories, the 69-year-old Erdogan has taken aim at his critics in typically combative fashion.

He has peppered the run-up with celebrations of industrial milestones, including the launch of Türkiye’s first electric car and the inauguration of its first amphibious assault ship, built in Istanbul to carry Turkish-made drones.

Erdogan also flicked the switch on Türkiye’s first delivery of natural gas from a Black Sea reserve, promising households free supplies, and inaugurated its first nuclear power station in a ceremony attended virtually by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

His attacks against his main challenger, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, have included accusations without evidence of support from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been waging an insurgency since the 1980s in which more than 40,000 people have been killed. Kilicdaroglu has denied the accusations.

'Building Türkiye together'

Polls suggest voting could go to a second round later this month - if neither Erdogan nor Kilicdaroglu win more than 50% of the vote - and some show Erdogan trailing. This hints at the depth of a cost-of-living crisis sparked by his unorthodox economic policies.

A drive by authorities to slash interest rates in the face of soaring inflation aimed to boost economic growth, but it crashed the currency in late 2021 and worsened inflation.

The economy was one of Erdogan's main strengths in the first decade of his rule, when Türkiye enjoyed a protracted boom with new roads, hospitals and schools and rising living standards for its 85 million people.

Halime Duman said high prices had put many groceries out of her reach, but she remained convinced Erdogan could still fix her problems. "I swear, Erdogan can solve it with a flick of his wrist," she said at a market in central Istanbul.

The president grew up in a poor district of Istanbul and attended Islamic vocational school, entering politics as a local party youth branch leader. After serving as Istanbul mayor, he stepped onto the national stage as head of the AK Party (AKP), becoming prime minister in 2003.

His AKP tamed Türkiye’s military, which had toppled four governments since 1960, and in 2005 began talks to secure a decades-long ambition to join the European Union - a process that later came to a grinding halt.

Greater control

Western allies initially saw Erdogan's Türkiye as a vibrant democracy. But his drive to wield greater control polarized alarmed international partners. Fervent supporters saw it as just reward for a leader who put Islamic teachings back at the core of public life in a country with a strong secularist tradition, and championed the pious working classes.

Opponents portrayed it as a lurch into authoritarianism by a leader addicted to power.

After the 2016 coup attempt authorities launched a massive crackdown, jailing more than 77,000 people pending trial and dismissing or suspending 150,000 from state jobs. Rights groups say Türkiye became the world's biggest jailer of journalists for a time.

Erdogan's government said the purge was justified by threats from coup supporters, as well as ISIS and the PKK.

At home, a sprawling new presidential palace complex on the edge of Ankara became a striking sign of his new powers, while abroad Türkiye became increasingly assertive, intervening in Syria, Iraq and Libya and often deploying Turkish-made military drones with decisive force.



Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
TT
20

Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)

The arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, marked by periods of resolution and banning of activities, is not disconnected from the long history of the group’s journey in the kingdom, dating back to the mid-1940s when it was first established.

However, this journey—characterized by varying relations with successive governments—began with collaboration and ended in conflict. How did this unfold?

Leaders of Jordan’s Islamic movement, encompassing both the banned Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, consistently supported Jordan’s stability during the last decades of the 20th century.

This support, however, shifted into decades of confrontation with the authorities after the divisions within the movement emerged.

A key moment in the movement's history came when Jordanian authorities accused the group of plotting to “stir chaos” and possessing “explosive materials,” marking a significant turning point for the Islamic movement in the kingdom.

This came especially after recordings revealed the arrested individuals’ ties to the unlicensed Brotherhood group in Jordan.

Founded in 1946, the Brotherhood initially operated as a charitable society, providing aid through fundraising efforts. It attracted young people who were influenced by its leaders’ calls for public activism.

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an alliance with the government. Its leaders gradually moved into senior official positions, using their power to expand their grassroots support and promote their message within Jordanian society, which historically had a strong conservative religious base.

During this time, the Brotherhood’s influence on school students was significant. It encouraged protests and sit-ins against political forces opposed to them, particularly the Communist and Ba’ath parties before the latter's split. Clashes occurred between these groups in downtown Amman and in key cities across the kingdom.

In the 1970s, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the government evolved into one of partnership and alliance, particularly under the leadership of former Prime Minister Wasfi Tal. This period saw prominent Islamic leader Ishaq Farhan appointed as Minister of Education and later as Minister of Awqaf, overseeing important reforms in educational curricula.

Farhan’s task of reforming the education system included incorporating the Brotherhood’s religious teachings into school textbooks, reflecting the growing influence of the group in shaping Jordanian public life.

Meanwhile, members of the Brotherhood, funded by the government, pursued advanced studies in the United States, returning to hold key positions in the Ministry of Education, with Abdullatif Arabiyat, a senior member, serving as the ministry’s deputy for almost a decade.

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Brotherhood sought to capitalize on regional developments, aiming to increase its political influence. Its leadership, particularly in key urban centers such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, began to broaden its outreach.

The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Awqaf became critical battlegrounds for the Brotherhood, enabling it to infiltrate mosques through imams and transform them into organizational hubs.

This religious outreach laid the groundwork for political mobilization, with gatherings and lessons organized after evening prayers, further solidifying the Brotherhood’s presence in the public sphere.

The political journey of the Brotherhood in Jordan took a dramatic turn in 1989, when the country lifted martial law and resumed parliamentary life after decades of authoritarian rule.

The Brotherhood seized the opportunity, winning a powerful bloc in the 11th Parliament and securing popular support, positioning itself as a key political player.

That era also marked the Brotherhood’s first foray into governance, backing Prime Minister Mudar Badran’s cabinet as part of a national effort to support Iraq against a US-led coalition. It was a rare alignment with the state, underscored by the election of Arabiyat as parliamentary speaker for three consecutive terms — a move widely seen as part of a government-Brotherhood alliance.

In 1992, the group formalized its political arm with the creation of the Islamic Action Front, cementing the link between its religious mission and political ambitions. But the distinction between party and group remained blurred, with critics arguing that the party remained under Brotherhood control.

That same year, tensions flared when the Brotherhood opposed Jordan’s participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, prompting a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Taher Masri. Although Masri resigned voluntarily, the incident marked the start of growing rifts between the Brotherhood and the state.

The following parliamentary elections in 1993 deepened internal fractures, both within the movement and between the Brotherhood and its political allies. The rift widened further in 1994, when Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the vote on the treaty, signaling a decisive shift from cooperation to confrontation.

In the aftermath of the peace treaty, the Brotherhood distanced itself from official alliances and became a staunch opponent of normalization with Israel. The group boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections, a move that triggered an exodus of leaders who opposed the boycott. Some dissidents went on to form the moderate Islamist Wasat Party, led by Abdel Rahim Akkour.

Distrust between the Brotherhood and the government deepened under the shadow of King Hussein’s illness and the succession of King Abdullah II. The movement remained politically dormant until 2003, when the Islamic Action Front re-entered parliament following a two-year suspension of legislative life during the Second Intifada. The party secured 16 seats in the 14th Parliament.

However, the rocky relationship persisted. In 2007, the Brotherhood and its party participated in elections again after negotiations with then-Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit. But allegations of large-scale vote rigging saw the Islamic Action Front secure only six seats — a result it denounced as a betrayal of the agreement with the government.

The controversial election result sparked a leadership crisis within the Brotherhood. The group’s hardline faction, known as the Hawks, overpowered the traditional moderates (the Doves) in internal polls, leading to a purge of long-standing leaders.

Accusations emerged that the group had been hijacked by Hamas sympathizers, reshaping the Brotherhood’s identity and guiding principles.

In the years that followed, former leaders split from the movement, accusing its new leadership of dragging the Brotherhood and its political arm into a confrontational path aligned with regional Islamist movements.

From mainstream political player to marginalized actor, the Brotherhood’s trajectory in Jordan mirrors a broader regional trend — one where Islamist movements rise through democratic openings but often clash with the state over ideology, foreign policy, and the limits of political power.