Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
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Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)

The arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, marked by periods of resolution and banning of activities, is not disconnected from the long history of the group’s journey in the kingdom, dating back to the mid-1940s when it was first established.

However, this journey—characterized by varying relations with successive governments—began with collaboration and ended in conflict. How did this unfold?

Leaders of Jordan’s Islamic movement, encompassing both the banned Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, consistently supported Jordan’s stability during the last decades of the 20th century.

This support, however, shifted into decades of confrontation with the authorities after the divisions within the movement emerged.

A key moment in the movement's history came when Jordanian authorities accused the group of plotting to “stir chaos” and possessing “explosive materials,” marking a significant turning point for the Islamic movement in the kingdom.

This came especially after recordings revealed the arrested individuals’ ties to the unlicensed Brotherhood group in Jordan.

Founded in 1946, the Brotherhood initially operated as a charitable society, providing aid through fundraising efforts. It attracted young people who were influenced by its leaders’ calls for public activism.

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an alliance with the government. Its leaders gradually moved into senior official positions, using their power to expand their grassroots support and promote their message within Jordanian society, which historically had a strong conservative religious base.

During this time, the Brotherhood’s influence on school students was significant. It encouraged protests and sit-ins against political forces opposed to them, particularly the Communist and Ba’ath parties before the latter's split. Clashes occurred between these groups in downtown Amman and in key cities across the kingdom.

In the 1970s, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the government evolved into one of partnership and alliance, particularly under the leadership of former Prime Minister Wasfi Tal. This period saw prominent Islamic leader Ishaq Farhan appointed as Minister of Education and later as Minister of Awqaf, overseeing important reforms in educational curricula.

Farhan’s task of reforming the education system included incorporating the Brotherhood’s religious teachings into school textbooks, reflecting the growing influence of the group in shaping Jordanian public life.

Meanwhile, members of the Brotherhood, funded by the government, pursued advanced studies in the United States, returning to hold key positions in the Ministry of Education, with Abdullatif Arabiyat, a senior member, serving as the ministry’s deputy for almost a decade.

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Brotherhood sought to capitalize on regional developments, aiming to increase its political influence. Its leadership, particularly in key urban centers such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, began to broaden its outreach.

The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Awqaf became critical battlegrounds for the Brotherhood, enabling it to infiltrate mosques through imams and transform them into organizational hubs.

This religious outreach laid the groundwork for political mobilization, with gatherings and lessons organized after evening prayers, further solidifying the Brotherhood’s presence in the public sphere.

The political journey of the Brotherhood in Jordan took a dramatic turn in 1989, when the country lifted martial law and resumed parliamentary life after decades of authoritarian rule.

The Brotherhood seized the opportunity, winning a powerful bloc in the 11th Parliament and securing popular support, positioning itself as a key political player.

That era also marked the Brotherhood’s first foray into governance, backing Prime Minister Mudar Badran’s cabinet as part of a national effort to support Iraq against a US-led coalition. It was a rare alignment with the state, underscored by the election of Arabiyat as parliamentary speaker for three consecutive terms — a move widely seen as part of a government-Brotherhood alliance.

In 1992, the group formalized its political arm with the creation of the Islamic Action Front, cementing the link between its religious mission and political ambitions. But the distinction between party and group remained blurred, with critics arguing that the party remained under Brotherhood control.

That same year, tensions flared when the Brotherhood opposed Jordan’s participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, prompting a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Taher Masri. Although Masri resigned voluntarily, the incident marked the start of growing rifts between the Brotherhood and the state.

The following parliamentary elections in 1993 deepened internal fractures, both within the movement and between the Brotherhood and its political allies. The rift widened further in 1994, when Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the vote on the treaty, signaling a decisive shift from cooperation to confrontation.

In the aftermath of the peace treaty, the Brotherhood distanced itself from official alliances and became a staunch opponent of normalization with Israel. The group boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections, a move that triggered an exodus of leaders who opposed the boycott. Some dissidents went on to form the moderate Islamist Wasat Party, led by Abdel Rahim Akkour.

Distrust between the Brotherhood and the government deepened under the shadow of King Hussein’s illness and the succession of King Abdullah II. The movement remained politically dormant until 2003, when the Islamic Action Front re-entered parliament following a two-year suspension of legislative life during the Second Intifada. The party secured 16 seats in the 14th Parliament.

However, the rocky relationship persisted. In 2007, the Brotherhood and its party participated in elections again after negotiations with then-Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit. But allegations of large-scale vote rigging saw the Islamic Action Front secure only six seats — a result it denounced as a betrayal of the agreement with the government.

The controversial election result sparked a leadership crisis within the Brotherhood. The group’s hardline faction, known as the Hawks, overpowered the traditional moderates (the Doves) in internal polls, leading to a purge of long-standing leaders.

Accusations emerged that the group had been hijacked by Hamas sympathizers, reshaping the Brotherhood’s identity and guiding principles.

In the years that followed, former leaders split from the movement, accusing its new leadership of dragging the Brotherhood and its political arm into a confrontational path aligned with regional Islamist movements.

From mainstream political player to marginalized actor, the Brotherhood’s trajectory in Jordan mirrors a broader regional trend — one where Islamist movements rise through democratic openings but often clash with the state over ideology, foreign policy, and the limits of political power.



Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
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Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)

When Israeli and US strikes killed Ali Khamenei at the start of the Middle East war, Iran's security chief Ali Larijani became even more powerful than he had been for decades.

Israel's Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Tuesday that Larijani had been killed, though Iran's authorities have not confirmed his death.

Larijani had since the start of the war played a far more visible role than the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since he was appointed to replace his slain father.

The security chief, on the other hand, was seen walking with crowds at a pro-government rally last week in Tehran, in a sign of defiance against Israel and the US.

His killing, if confirmed, would be a major blow against Iran, undermining a key figure seen as capable of navigating both ideology and diplomacy.

- Pragmatist -

Adept at balancing ideological loyalty with pragmatic statecraft, Larijani was central prior to the war to Iran's nuclear policy and strategic diplomacy.

Bespectacled and known for his measured tone, the 68-year-old was believed to enjoy the confidence of the late Khamenei, after a long career in the military, media and legislature.

In 2025, after Iran's last war with Israel and the US, he was appointed head of Iran's top security body, the Supreme National Security Council -- a position he had held nearly two decades earlier -- coordinating defense strategies and overseeing nuclear policy.

He later became increasingly visible in the diplomatic arena, travelling to Gulf states such as Oman and Qatar as Tehran cautiously engaged in nuclear negotiations that were ultimately scuppered by the war.

- 'Canny operator' -

"Larijani is a true insider, a canny operator, familiar with how the system operates," Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's project director for Iran, said before the Middle East war began.

Born in Najaf, Iraq in 1957 to a prominent Shiite cleric who was close to the Islamic Republic's founder Khomeini, Larijani's family has been influential within Iran's political system for decades.

Some of his relatives have been the targets of corruption allegations over the years, which they denied.

He earned a PhD in Western Philosophy from the University of Tehran.

A veteran of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq war, Larijani later headed state broadcasting IRIB for a decade from 1994 before serving as parliamentary speaker from 2008 to 2020.

In 1996, he was appointed as Khamenei's representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). He later became secretary of the SNSC and chief nuclear negotiator, leading talks with Britain, France, Germany and Russia between 2005 and 2007.

He ran in the 2005 presidential elections, losing to populist candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with whom he later had disagreements over nuclear diplomacy.

Larijani was then disqualified from running for president in both 2021 and 2024.

Observers viewed his return as the head of the SNSC as signaling a turn reflecting his reputation as a conservative capable of combining ideological commitment with pragmatism.

Larijani supported the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with world powers which unraveled three years later after US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement.

In March 2025, Larijani warned that sustained external pressure could alter Iran's nuclear posture.

"We are not moving towards (nuclear) weapons, but if you do something wrong in the Iranian nuclear issue, you will force Iran to move towards that because it has to defend itself," he told state television.

Larijani repeatedly insisted negotiations with Washington should remain confined to the nuclear file and defended uranium enrichment as Iran's sovereign right.

- Violent repression -

Larijani was among officials sanctioned by the US in January over what Washington described as "violently repressing the Iranian people", following nationwide protests which erupted weeks earlier due to the rising cost of living.

According to rights groups, thousands of people were killed in the government's brutal crackdown of the protests.

Larijani acknowledged that economic pressures had "led to the protests", but blamed the violence which ensued on foreign involvement by the United States and Israel.


Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
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Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)

Western diplomatic sources have outlined to Asharq Al-Awsat the tight inner circle surrounding Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, shedding light on the key figures shaping decision-making at a critical moment for the country.

According to these sources, any serious discussion of a comprehensive ceasefire in the ongoing war with Israel and the US is unlikely to begin until this inner circle concludes that the country has reached a point of military exhaustion and that prolonging the conflict would only deepen its strategic predicament.

The sources also dismissed claims over Khamenei’s lack of experience over decision-making. Khamenei has long been involved in the decision-making process within the office of his late father, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, they stressed. He has also maintained extensive ties with Iran’s military leadership, particularly within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

A key figure in this circle is Mohsen Rezaei, appointed by Mojtaba Khamenei as a senior military adviser. Often described as a “man of war”, Rezaei is also believed to have been among those who advised Khomeini to accept the ceasefire with Iraq at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian forces were reportedly exhausted.

The sources identified several influential figures in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle. The most prominent among them is parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander who is said to have played a leading role during last year’s 12-day conflict with Israel.

Other key figures include General Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of the IRGC, who previously served as minister under both presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and was the first commander of the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the IRGC.

General Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser during the tenure of the slain Khamenei, General Ali Abdollahi, head of operations at the armed forces’ general staff, General Majid Mousavi, commander of the IRGC’s missile unit, and Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, head of its naval forces, are also part of the new supreme leader’s inner circle.

Despite the heavy blows, the Iranian regime has so far succeeded in preventing any fragmentation within its military and leaderships, the sources noted.

Developments indicate that Iran’s military leadership had preprepared a strategy aimed at making any war against it extremely costly for both the region and the global economy.

This strategy, they said, rests on two main pillars: first, “drawing Gulf states into the theater of war through missile and drone attacks under the pretext of targeting US presence”; and second, “causing widespread or total disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.”

The sources added that Tehran is betting on what it perceives as US President Donald Trump’s limited patience for prolonged conflict, especially amid rising oil prices, which Iran hopes could approach $200 per barrel, the proximity of US midterm elections, and the lack of broad public support for war.

On the other side, US and Israeli forces have escalated strikes in an effort to demonstrate the scale of destruction inflicted on Iran’s military arsenal and defense industries.

The objective of regime change appears to have receded in favor of a strategy of attrition, one that could compel Iran to scale back what the sources described as its “self-destructive behavior.”

The sources suggested that the new supreme leader may initially find it difficult to adopt a flexible or conciliatory stance in his first test of leadership. However, a growing sense that continued attrition could trigger internal unrest — or even raise questions about the regime’s survival — may ultimately lead senior military figures to conclude that preserving the system justifies accepting painful compromises.

They also warned that missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could prove counterproductive, particularly as they have largely struck civilian targets.

The sources stressed that the Gulf states’ significant regional and international standing could form the basis for mounting global pressure on Iran to agree to a ceasefire. When that moment comes, Tehran may find that the war has set it back by years.


Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
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Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)

Cheap and deadly, Iranian-designed Shahed drones have inflicted major damage in the Middle East war, and have anti-jamming and other capabilities that make them difficult to stop.

- Offline navigation -

Designed to explode on impact, Shahed drones connect to GPS to register their location shortly before or after takeoff, then typically turn off their receivers, said Thomas Withington, a researcher at Britain's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

The drones then travel long distances towards their target using gyroscopes that measure their speed, direction and position -- known as an "inertial navigation system".

"GPS is going to get jammed by whatever is protecting the target," Withington told AFP.

"If you look at a map of GPS jamming at the moment in the Middle East, you see that there's a lot of jamming... By not using the GPS, you avoid that."

The drones can then return to GPS just before impact for a more precise strike, or remain offline.

"It's not always necessarily very accurate, but it's as accurate as it needs to be," said Withington.

- Anti-jamming mechanisms -

Russia has been making Shahed-style drones to use in its war in Ukraine.

The US-based Institute for Science and International Security found in 2023 that those drones used "state-of-art antenna interference suppression" to remove enemy jamming signals while preserving the desired GPS signal.

Anti-jamming mechanisms were found in the wreckage of an Iranian-made drone that struck Cyprus in the opening days of the Middle East war, a European industry source told AFP.

"They have put (the Shahed) together using off-the-shelf parts, but it has... many of the capabilities that US military GPS equipment has," Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, told AFP.

Defending against them now requires sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.

"The Shaheds have been upgraded," said Ukrainian air force spokesman Yuriy Ignat.

- Stealth materials -

The Shahed is built from "lightweight radar-absorbing materials", such as plastic and fiberglass, a 2023 RUSI paper said.

Their small size and low altitude allow them to slip through aerial defense systems.

- Other positioning systems? -

Some experts think Iran is using multiple positioning systems, making it easier for its drones to dodge jamming.

Serhii Beskrestnov, a technology adviser to the Ukrainian defense ministry, said Iran is using the BeiDou system, a Chinese rival to the US-developed GPS.

And the Russia-made version of Shaheds uses both BeiDou and the Russian equivalent, GLONASS, he said.

Others suspect Iran may be using LORAN, a radio navigation system developed during World War II.

LORAN, which does not require satellites, largely fell out of use when GPS emerged.

But Iran said in 2016 it was reviving the technology, which requires a network of large ground-based transmitters, though experts have not confirmed it is active today.

- Counter-strategies -

Militaries have mainly defended against Shaheds by shooting them down with cannon fire, missiles and interceptor drones, with the United States and Israel also developing lasers.

But jamming can work, as Ukraine has shown, as can "spoofing", which involves hacking into the drone's navigation system to change its destination.

Ukraine used electronic warfare to neutralize 4,652 attack drones from mid-May to mid-July 2025 -- not far off the number it shot down in the same period, 6,041, according to AFP analysis of Ukrainian military data.

Its experts insist that electronic and conventional defenses are often used in tandem against the drones.