A bombing targeted on August 26, 1992, Algeria’s Houari Boumedienne Airport. It was evidence that the country was headed towards a confrontation between the security forces and Islamist extremists. The bombing was not the first attack carried out by supporters of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in wake of the annulment of elections which the party was on the brink of winning.
The results of the first round of the elections were annulled in January 1992, marking the beginning of what is known in Algeria as the “Black Decade” that left thousands of casualties.
The airport bombing claimed the lives of nine people and wounded 118 others. The mastermind of the operation was Hocine Abderrahim, former deputy head of the FIS that was banned after the annulment of the polls.
Abderrahim and a number of his supporters were arrested in wake of the attack. Among the detainees was Rachid Hechaichi, a pilot in the national carrier Air Algérie and head of the “Islamic Syndicate”. National television broadcast their confessions and they were also published in local newspapers. Abderrahim was sentenced to death in May 1993 and he was executed along with four others.
Asharq Al-Awsat is publishing a series of British government documents that shed light on the British view of the bombing that was based on a report by the UK embassy in Algiers.
The report was written by Charge d’Affaires Keith Bloomfield after the confessions of the accused were shown on television and before their execution.
The report concluded that there was a “growing shift towards radicalism” in the FIS that was eclipsing its more moderate movements.
“You might find it useful to have a more detailed analysis of the various revelations on TV recently about Islamic terrorism in Algeria,” read the report.
“Before looking at what those concerned actually said, it is worth asking whether they are the real terrorists, and whether their confessions are genuine. In the Arab world (and elsewhere) staged 'confessions' are a common propaganda weapons and, in the case of the Algiers airport bombers, the multiple links between the FIS and the terrorists look too convenient to the regime's purpose to be entirely credible,” it added.
“Despite the FIS attempts to muddy the waters (e.g. by rumors that one of those who appeared on TV had been dead for several weeks as a result of torture) the general feeling here is nonetheless that Hocine Abderrahim and his co-conspirators are genuine. We know for example that Abderrahim was elected as FIS deputy for Bouzareah on 26 December 1991, and we have been able to confirm that he was indeed in Madani’s cabinet,” it continued.
“As to whether the confessions have been subject to manipulation, the answer has to be a firm 'Yes'. Despite allegations of torture, the way in which the individuals spoke did not look like a classic torture-induced performance,” it noted. “The confessions could however have been extracted in return for promises of clemency, and there are some who believe that they were filmed with hidden cameras.”
“It is also odd that, while claiming responsibility for other previous bombs, there was no mention of the second wave of airline bombings on 23 September - a possible explanation is that the TV confessions were filmed before 23 September,” said the report.
“As for the presentation of the confessions, both on the TV and subsequently the press, this was undoubtedly stage-managed. All sorts of conclusions have been drawn, many of which are completely unjustified by what was actually said.”
The report went on to note that nowhere in the confessions was there: “any indication that the airport or other bombs were ordered by the FIS. (Abderrahim said it was his own idea.) Any indication that the 'mainstream' FIS leadership (as opposed to discredited former leaders) had any contact with violent groups before the January coup. Any indication that foreign governments, as opposed to individuals or groups operating on foreign soil, were involved in supplying money or weapons.”
“What is alleged in the confessions is that several armed Islamist groups came into being during that time of the FIS's legality, that there was coordination between them, and that four former FIS leaders whose membership of the FIS was suspended at Batna in July 1991.
“Are these confessions plausible? Hachemi Sahnouni and Azouz Zebda have both recently appeared to give evidence in court in a separate case, and have both spoken to the press. (...) In their press interviews, both deny Abderrahim's accusations.”
“I do not want to imply by putting forward these theories that the FIS is unconnected with the current terrorist campaign. Indeed, my letter of 7 September pointed out the growing radicalization of the FIS and the eclipse of the moderate Djaz'ara faction since January. But clearly, we must beware of taking the TV confessions at their face value. They are just one element in a fairly complicated picture and reinforce once again the dangers of talking about 'the FIS' as if it were a monolithic whole.”
“One spin-off of the confessions and the subsequent publicity has been a fair amount of new information about individuals in the Algerian Islamic movement. We are now systematically recording such information on a card index,” said the report.
