Russia’s Threat to Pull Out of Ukraine Grain Deal Raises Fears About Global Food Security 

A harvester is seen in the field during harvest near the town of Shabla, Bulgaria, 10 July 2023. (EPA)
A harvester is seen in the field during harvest near the town of Shabla, Bulgaria, 10 July 2023. (EPA)
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Russia’s Threat to Pull Out of Ukraine Grain Deal Raises Fears About Global Food Security 

A harvester is seen in the field during harvest near the town of Shabla, Bulgaria, 10 July 2023. (EPA)
A harvester is seen in the field during harvest near the town of Shabla, Bulgaria, 10 July 2023. (EPA)

Concerns are growing that Russia will not extend a United Nations-brokered deal that allows grain to flow from Ukraine to parts of the world struggling with hunger, with ships no longer heading to the war-torn country's Black Sea ports and food exports dwindling.

Türkiye and the UN negotiated the breakthrough accord last summer to ease a global food crisis, along with a separate agreement with Russia to facilitate shipments of its food and fertilizer. Moscow insists it's still facing hurdles, though data shows it has been exporting record amounts of wheat.

Russian officials repeatedly say there are no grounds for extending the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which is up for its fourth renewal Monday. It's something they have threatened before — then have twice gone on to extend the deal for two months instead of the four months outlined in the agreement.

The UN and others are striving to keep the fragile deal intact, with Ukraine and Russia both major suppliers of wheat, barley, vegetable oil and other food products that countries in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia rely on. It has allowed Ukraine to ship 32.8 million metric tons (36.2 million tons) of grain, more than half of it to developing nations.

The deal has helped lower global prices of food commodities like wheat after they surged to record highs following the invasion last year, but that relief has not reached kitchen tables.

Russia's exit would cut off a source for World Food Program aid for countries at risk of famine, including Somalia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, and compound food security problems in vulnerable places struggling with conflict, economic crisis and drought.

"Russia gets a lot of good public will for continuing this agreement," said Joseph Glauber, senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute. "There would be a cost to pay in terms of public perception and global goodwill, I think, as far as Russia is concerned" if the deal isn't extended.

The amount of grain leaving Ukraine already has dropped, with Russia accused of slowing joint inspections of ships by Russian, Ukrainian, UN and Turkish officials and refusing to allow more vessels to join the initiative.

Average daily inspections — meant to ensure vessels carry only food and not weapons that could aid either side — have fallen from a peak of 11 in October to just over two in June.

That has led to a decline in grain exports, from a high of 4.2 million metric tons in October to 1.3 million in May, a low for the year-old initiative. They rose to 2 million in June as shipment sizes grew.

If the deal isn't extended, "the countries that had relied on Ukraine for their imports are going to have to look at other sources for imports, very likely Russia, which is something that I imagine Russia was intending," said Caitlin Welsh, director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The UN has been negotiating with Russia to stick with the initiative, with spokesman Stephane Dujarric saying Monday that top officials are "doing whatever we can to ensure the continuation of all of the agreements."

Ukraine's Infrastructure Ministry said Tuesday on Facebook that the final two ships are loading grain — heading for Egypt — while 29 vessels are waiting in the waters off Türkiye because Russia has refused to allow their inspection.

"Ukrainian agricultural products play a significant role in global food security," Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov said. But "for the past few months, the grain corridor has been practically closed."

Russia insists the agreement hasn't worked for its own exports, blaming Western sanctions for hindering financing and insurance.

While sanctions don't affect food and fertilizer, Moscow is seeking carveouts from restrictions on the Russian Agricultural Bank, as well as movement on its ammonia, a key ingredient in fertilizer, to a Ukrainian Black Sea port. But the ammonia pipeline has been damaged in the war, the UN said.

"There is still time to implement the part of the agreements that pertains to our country. So far, this part has not been fulfilled," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters last week. "And so, at the moment, unfortunately, we don’t see any particular grounds for extending this deal."

Russia, however, has increased its wheat exports to all-time highs following a large harvest. Shipments went from 33 million metric tons in 2021 to 44 million metric tons last year to expectations of 46 million this year, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's shipments have fallen by around 60%, from 19 million tons in 2021 to predictions of about 7 or 8 million tons this year — a big hit to its agriculture-dependent economy.

With less from Ukraine and more from Russia, the world's available wheat stocks are the same as in 2021 — and there is enough of it to go around, said Peter Meyer, head of grain analytics at S&P Global Commodity Insights.

Europe and Argentina are expected to boost wheat shipments, while Brazil saw a banner year for corn, of which Ukraine is also a major supplier. Meyer wouldn’t expect more than a temporary bump to grain prices on world markets if the Black Sea deal isn’t renewed.

"Markets just adapt extremely quickly," he said. "The fact of the matter is that the global grain markets, they balance each other out."

Ukraine can send its food by land or river through Europe, so it wouldn’t be completely cut off from selling grain, but those routes have a lower capacity than sea shipments and have stirred disunity in the European Union.

"We are a cat running out of lives in this situation," said Simon Evenett, professor of international trade and economic development at the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland. "It only takes one thing to go wrong before we’re into trouble."

While the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s food price index has fallen below the record highs it hit when Russian troops entered Ukraine, food costs were already high because of COVID-19, conflict and drought.

Then Russia's war helped push up the costs to produce food — including energy, fertilizer and transportation.

In developing nations increasingly relying on imported food, from Kenya to Syria, weakening currencies are keeping local prices high because they are paying in US dollars.

"With approximately 80% of East Africa’s grain being exported from Russia and Ukraine, over 50 million people across East Africa are facing hunger, and food prices have shot up by nearly 40% this year," said Shashwat Saraf, the International Rescue Committee's regional emergency director for East Africa.

"It is vital for the international community to not only forge a long-term deal but also build durable solutions to tackle food insecurity," he said.



Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
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Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)

The arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, marked by periods of resolution and banning of activities, is not disconnected from the long history of the group’s journey in the kingdom, dating back to the mid-1940s when it was first established.

However, this journey—characterized by varying relations with successive governments—began with collaboration and ended in conflict. How did this unfold?

Leaders of Jordan’s Islamic movement, encompassing both the banned Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, consistently supported Jordan’s stability during the last decades of the 20th century.

This support, however, shifted into decades of confrontation with the authorities after the divisions within the movement emerged.

A key moment in the movement's history came when Jordanian authorities accused the group of plotting to “stir chaos” and possessing “explosive materials,” marking a significant turning point for the Islamic movement in the kingdom.

This came especially after recordings revealed the arrested individuals’ ties to the unlicensed Brotherhood group in Jordan.

Founded in 1946, the Brotherhood initially operated as a charitable society, providing aid through fundraising efforts. It attracted young people who were influenced by its leaders’ calls for public activism.

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an alliance with the government. Its leaders gradually moved into senior official positions, using their power to expand their grassroots support and promote their message within Jordanian society, which historically had a strong conservative religious base.

During this time, the Brotherhood’s influence on school students was significant. It encouraged protests and sit-ins against political forces opposed to them, particularly the Communist and Ba’ath parties before the latter's split. Clashes occurred between these groups in downtown Amman and in key cities across the kingdom.

In the 1970s, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the government evolved into one of partnership and alliance, particularly under the leadership of former Prime Minister Wasfi Tal. This period saw prominent Islamic leader Ishaq Farhan appointed as Minister of Education and later as Minister of Awqaf, overseeing important reforms in educational curricula.

Farhan’s task of reforming the education system included incorporating the Brotherhood’s religious teachings into school textbooks, reflecting the growing influence of the group in shaping Jordanian public life.

Meanwhile, members of the Brotherhood, funded by the government, pursued advanced studies in the United States, returning to hold key positions in the Ministry of Education, with Abdullatif Arabiyat, a senior member, serving as the ministry’s deputy for almost a decade.

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Brotherhood sought to capitalize on regional developments, aiming to increase its political influence. Its leadership, particularly in key urban centers such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, began to broaden its outreach.

The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Awqaf became critical battlegrounds for the Brotherhood, enabling it to infiltrate mosques through imams and transform them into organizational hubs.

This religious outreach laid the groundwork for political mobilization, with gatherings and lessons organized after evening prayers, further solidifying the Brotherhood’s presence in the public sphere.

The political journey of the Brotherhood in Jordan took a dramatic turn in 1989, when the country lifted martial law and resumed parliamentary life after decades of authoritarian rule.

The Brotherhood seized the opportunity, winning a powerful bloc in the 11th Parliament and securing popular support, positioning itself as a key political player.

That era also marked the Brotherhood’s first foray into governance, backing Prime Minister Mudar Badran’s cabinet as part of a national effort to support Iraq against a US-led coalition. It was a rare alignment with the state, underscored by the election of Arabiyat as parliamentary speaker for three consecutive terms — a move widely seen as part of a government-Brotherhood alliance.

In 1992, the group formalized its political arm with the creation of the Islamic Action Front, cementing the link between its religious mission and political ambitions. But the distinction between party and group remained blurred, with critics arguing that the party remained under Brotherhood control.

That same year, tensions flared when the Brotherhood opposed Jordan’s participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, prompting a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Taher Masri. Although Masri resigned voluntarily, the incident marked the start of growing rifts between the Brotherhood and the state.

The following parliamentary elections in 1993 deepened internal fractures, both within the movement and between the Brotherhood and its political allies. The rift widened further in 1994, when Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the vote on the treaty, signaling a decisive shift from cooperation to confrontation.

In the aftermath of the peace treaty, the Brotherhood distanced itself from official alliances and became a staunch opponent of normalization with Israel. The group boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections, a move that triggered an exodus of leaders who opposed the boycott. Some dissidents went on to form the moderate Islamist Wasat Party, led by Abdel Rahim Akkour.

Distrust between the Brotherhood and the government deepened under the shadow of King Hussein’s illness and the succession of King Abdullah II. The movement remained politically dormant until 2003, when the Islamic Action Front re-entered parliament following a two-year suspension of legislative life during the Second Intifada. The party secured 16 seats in the 14th Parliament.

However, the rocky relationship persisted. In 2007, the Brotherhood and its party participated in elections again after negotiations with then-Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit. But allegations of large-scale vote rigging saw the Islamic Action Front secure only six seats — a result it denounced as a betrayal of the agreement with the government.

The controversial election result sparked a leadership crisis within the Brotherhood. The group’s hardline faction, known as the Hawks, overpowered the traditional moderates (the Doves) in internal polls, leading to a purge of long-standing leaders.

Accusations emerged that the group had been hijacked by Hamas sympathizers, reshaping the Brotherhood’s identity and guiding principles.

In the years that followed, former leaders split from the movement, accusing its new leadership of dragging the Brotherhood and its political arm into a confrontational path aligned with regional Islamist movements.

From mainstream political player to marginalized actor, the Brotherhood’s trajectory in Jordan mirrors a broader regional trend — one where Islamist movements rise through democratic openings but often clash with the state over ideology, foreign policy, and the limits of political power.