Shalgham: Gaddafi Believed Saddam Paid Price for His Actions, Squandered Iraq’s Resources

Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT
20

Shalgham: Gaddafi Believed Saddam Paid Price for His Actions, Squandered Iraq’s Resources

Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, notable politician, and renowned Libyan writer, held significant positions within the Libyan government alongside Muammar Gaddafi.

He transitioned from being responsible for media affairs in the Revolutionary Leadership Council to serving as his country’s ambassador to Rome for an extended period.

Later, he assumed the role of Foreign Minister, ultimately representing Libya at the UN in the period leading up to the fall of the Gaddafi regime.

Shalgham remained close to Gaddafi, defending him until the surge of protests against his regime erupted. During this time, Shalgham publicly declared his refusal to suppress the protests through force.

Moreover, the former top diplomat had conceded to international UN resolution number 1970, imposing sanctions on Libya, a decision he described as contributing to the dismantling of the “fascist regime” in Tripoli.

In excerpts from a forthcoming memoir titled “Years of My Life: Memoirs,” Shalgham delves into various stages of his relationship and proximity to Gaddafi, the former Libyan leader.

Shalgham does not conceal his admiration for Gaddafi’s persona and addresses two events that he asserts had the most significant impact on Gaddafi.

The first event is US-led airstrikes on Tripoli and Benghazi in response to the 1988 bombing of the US plane over the Scottish town of Lockerbie.

The second event is the US invasion of Iraq, which heightened Gaddafi’s concerns that the aftermath of the invasion might extend to other Arab regimes, with the aim of forcibly altering them.

Shalgham also conveys Gaddafi’s opinion on the former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, quoting Gaddafi as saying that Saddam was more interested in his personal glory than in Iraq’s reputation.

Shalgham’s recollections provide an insightful glimpse into the dynamics of these critical historical moments and sheds light on the perspectives of both Shalgham and Gaddafi.

The memoir is set to be published by Dar Al-Farjani.

Say what you will about Gaddafi; you are free to critique his personality through speech, political commentary, or ideological discourse. However, it is undeniable that he was a first-rate reader and a meticulous student of what he read, carefully selecting his books.

He delved into Niccolò Machiavelli’s “The Prince” early on and kept it as a constant companion throughout his life. Similarly, he engaged with Adolf Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” and Mao Zedong’s “The Little Red Book,” in addition to Ibn Khaldun’s “Muqaddimah.” He also explored works of both ancient and modern history.

In his own “Green Book,” Gaddafi did not directly quote or rely on these texts or anyone else for that matter in its composition. Instead, he conceived the idea of creating a book to encapsulate his thoughts, titling it “The Third Universal Theory” in green ink, amid the backdrop of the events he experienced.

In 1982, Eng. Ibrahim Ali informed Shalgham that Gaddafi intended to establish an extensive library within the leadership and sought his collaboration in selecting titles. When Shalgham met with Ali, he sought specific topics that Gaddafi wished to explore.

Shalgham expressed his belief that Gaddafi likely did not have the time to read complete volumes, so it would be prudent to select books dealing with contemporary subjects, especially in social, political, religious, philosophical, and economic realms.

Shalgham also did not neglect historical works, given Gaddafi’s passion and deep dive into history.

The former minister then commenced with compiling indices of modern Arabic publications and selected a multitude of titles spanning various subjects.

Afterwards, Shalgham presented these selections to Ali who conveyed his gratitude and appreciation. He then initiated communication with relevant sources to acquire the requested books.

The library became a favored retreat for Gaddafi, where he spent extended periods of time.

Within its walls, he received guests, conducted meetings, and seized moments to read various books.

Shalgham recalls numerous instances when Gaddafi engaged him in conversations about certain Arab books and authors, particularly highlighting Moroccan scholar Abdullah al-Arwi, who authored several works, as well as Tunisian thinker Abdelmajid Sharfi and Iraqi intellectual Ali al-Wardi, among others.

In Shalgham’s estimation, Gaddafi experienced moments of cultural restlessness. He displayed a proclivity for reading and exploring modern Arab and foreign intellectual publications.

However, the rigors of politics and both domestic and foreign crises often disrupted his ability to dedicate time to reading.

Despite this, Gaddafi, the intellectual, differed from the revolutionary and politician. He exhibited a strong sense of democracy and openness in his intellectual conversations and debates. He was keen on absorbing any piece of information he had not encountered before, often recording it in his memoir.

There were occasions when Shalgham was summoned for political matters, finding him initially agitated and emotional. Yet, as soon as the discourse veered into a realm of thought or literature, particularly poetry and philosophy, Gaddafi transformed into a calm, engaged conversationalist, often evolving into an inquirer.

Gaddafi, Saddam & Iraq’s Invasion

Following the US invasion of Iraq and the downfall of Saddam and his Baathist regime, Gaddafi grappled with a range of emotions and concerns.

He wasn't remorseful for Saddam and his regime, but his question was whether what occurred would be an exceptional US strike or if it would pave the way for a policy of forcibly changing regimes. During the Arab Summit held in Damascus in 2008, Gaddafi addressed the gathering by stating: “The US invaded Iraq, executed its president, and we watched. The turn will come to all of you.”

Amid the tumultuous events in Iraq, Shalgham met with Gaddafi. He had his hand on his cheek, pondering numerous questions about the stances of Arab and foreign nations in light of the unfolding situation in Iraq.

During Shalgham’s conversation with Gaddafi, the Libyan leader remarked: “Saddam didn't work for Iraq, but rather harnessed his country's resources for his personal glory.”

“He engaged in futile battles with the Kurds and with Iran, and his invasion of Kuwait cost the lives of hundreds of Iraqis and squandered the immense resources of Iraq,” Gaddafi continued.

He emphasized that there was “no benefit in engaging in political clashes with anyone over what happened. Saddam paid the price for his reckless actions.”

This event deeply shook Gaddafi and prompted him to reexamine his policies and orientations, according to Shalgham.

For the first time, Shalgham heard from Gaddafi a phrase that he had carefully crafted in an intense question that echoed through the walls of the past, casting a massive stone into a lake where tributaries had flowed for years, filled with verbal, political, and military confrontation with the US.

“I don't know what led us to enter into a fierce and prolonged animosity and conflict with the US,” wondered Gaddafi.

Of course, Shalgham did not voice the answer he knew. Gaddafi understood more than anyone else the driving force that led him to engage in battles, both near and far, with the US, regardless of its Republican or Democratic leadership changes.



Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Assad Viewed Lebanon the Same Way Saddam Viewed Kuwait

Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)
Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)
TT
20

Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Assad Viewed Lebanon the Same Way Saddam Viewed Kuwait

Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)
Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)

Former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel said that the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad viewed Lebanon the same way the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein viewed Kuwait. He added that Assad “considered Lebanon a historic mistake that could be corrected by bringing it back into the Syrian fold.” He emphasized that Assad wanted “nothing more, nothing less than to annex Lebanon,” noting that he upheld his constitutional oath during 14 summit meetings with the Syrian president.

Gemayel made these comments in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, where he discussed Lebanon’s experience during the long “Assad era” and other key moments.

In the 1970s, Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb Party, received an invitation from Assad to visit Damascus. He brought along his sons Amine and Bashir. The Syrian president warmly welcomed them into his home, but the honeymoon did not last long.

Reminiscing stirred up painful memories for Gemayel, who carries two deep wounds: the assassination of his son, MP and Minister Pierre Gemayel, in 2006 amid a wave of killings that followed the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, and the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel, in 1982. Amine Gemayel assumed the presidency that same year, following two political earthquakes: the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and his brother’s assassination.

Hafez al-Assad welcomes Amine Gemayel in Damascus. (Photo courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

Hafez al-Assad and the ‘Lebanese mistake’

Asked what Hafez al-Assad wanted from Lebanon, Gemayel said: “You’re asking a foregone question, as the French saying goes. He wanted to annex Lebanon—nothing more, nothing less. Syrian politicians, even before Assad, couldn’t accept Lebanon’s existence. They saw it as an artificial country that should be part of Syria. They believed Lebanon was wrongly separated due to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Beirut’s port is closer to Damascus than Tartus, so they believed Lebanon was an inseparable part of Syria.”

“Assad also held this view. He couldn’t digest the idea of Lebanon as a stable, independent country. His ultimate goal was annexation. Every agreement or relationship Syria pursued was aimed at eventually achieving this annexation,” he revealed.

“Assad told me plainly, in a one-on-one meeting: ‘Don’t forget that Lebanon is part of Syria. We’re one country. Colonial powers divided us, and it’s in your interest as Lebanese to return to the Syrian fold. No matter how circumstances change, Lebanon must return to Syria.’”

“He was that blunt. He even tried to soften it by comparing it to European unity. ‘Europe united, why can’t we do the same?’ He argued that the countries had shared interests: political, security, economic. So why not unite?”

Asked whether Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait reminded him of Assad’s attempt to annex Lebanon, Gemayel said: “Yes. To Saddam, Kuwait was what Lebanon was to Hafez al-Assad.” He noted that Iraqi leaders claimed colonial powers had stolen Kuwait from Iraq—just as Syrian leaders believed colonialism had stolen Lebanon from Syria.

Still, Gemayel clarified: “Despite all this, I maintained a normal relationship with Assad. Even affection, you could say. We respected each other. He understood my position and would say, privately, that if he were in my place, he’d do the same. And I understood his views, though our ideologies were completely opposed.”

Amine Gemayel and Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel during the interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

“Assad would get infuriated by my rejections at times. He thought Lebanon was ripe for the picking—and there I was, blocking him. But he respected me for it. He knew that, in my place, he might have acted the same way. Still, he believed it was in Syria’s interest to ‘unite’ with Lebanon.”

“The Syrian army was already in Lebanon and had co-opted many Lebanese leaders who were ‘pilgrimaging’ to Syria. Assad thought the moment was right. He also mobilized pro-Syrian Palestinian factions,” recalled Gemayel.

“I stood in the way of this dream, which led to fierce political clashes between us—an intellectual struggle, if you will, between his push for unity and my defense of Lebanese independence. We had mutual respect. I met Assad 14 times during my presidency.”

Telling Assad ‘no’ required extraordinary courage’

“I debated, resisted, and stood firm. Facing Assad—his weight, his stature in Syria and the Arab world was no easy task. I had no army, no stable institutions, and Lebanese political leaders were scattered. The situation in Lebanon was dire,” Gemayel told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Eventually, even my own allies turned on me. Assad had even co-opted a faction of the Lebanese Forces. He thought I’d cave and sign the papers. But I didn’t. That moment was one of the hardest. Saying ‘no’ to Assad under those conditions required extraordinary courage.”

Asked whether the May 17 Lebanese-Israeli Agreement was the most difficult point in his relationship with Assad, Gemayel said: “No. The hardest point was the Tripartite Agreement between Amal, the Progressive Socialist Party, and the Lebanese Forces. With that agreement, Assad fully controlled the Lebanese scene—especially after winning over leaders like Elie Hobeika and Samir Geagea.”

“Assad believed Lebanon was in his grasp. Only I stood in the way. He didn’t care much about my position but needed my signature. As president, I had taken an oath to preserve the constitution and sovereignty.”

“Despite enormous internal and external pressure—even from within the Christian camp—I stood alone. But I was committed to the Lebanese cause. Ultimately, we won. The public, especially the Christian community, rallied around me. The other leaders who had sold out were exposed. That moment saved Lebanon’s sovereignty and its democratic system.”

Asked by Asharq Al-Awsat, if Assad resented him for sabotaging the Tripartite Agreement, Gemayel replied: “Assad thought he had Lebanon in the bag and was just waiting for congratulations. The day of the signing, King Hussein of Jordan was set to visit Syria. They delayed his visit to finalize the agreement. That’s how important it was to them.”

Pierre Gemayel and Hafez al-Assad. (AFP)

“Assad was frustrated, maybe even bitter. He couldn’t believe that I—stripped of power—dared to say no. But he respected me for it,” added Gemayel.

“After the deal collapsed, I was in Morocco. Syria’s ambassador, a close Alawite to Assad, visited me and conveyed Assad’s respect. It was a message to reopen communication. Assad may have been furious, but he still respected how I stood firm as a young leader facing such odds.”

The bomb on the presidential plane

Asked whether he feared assassination like Kamal Jumblatt, Gemayel replied: “All kinds of pressure were used to make me sign. One story Assad told me—casually—was about how Sadat informed him he was going to Jerusalem. Assad opposed it strongly. After Sadat left the room, Assad’s people asked if they should stop him, maybe even blow up his plane.”

“Assad said he thought about it, but his conscience stopped him. The way he told me the story, it felt like a warning. Like he wouldn’t make the same ‘mistake’ again,” said Gemayel.

“There were several attempts to assassinate me. The most serious one was when I was flying to Yemen. My plane had been rigged with a bomb. The pilot, a meticulous man named Makawiy, noticed a minor issue with the radio and refused to fly. They discovered a wire under the cockpit leading to a bomb.”

“Syrian intelligence was at the airport and immediately seized the bomb and equipment to block any investigation. Who else could rig a presidential plane under heavy guard? Clearly, only they had that kind of access.”

Amine Gemayel and his father Pierre during Bashir Gemayel’s funeral. (Getty Images)

Syrian intelligence behind Bashir’s assassination

Asked whether he believed Syrian intelligence was behind his brother Bashir’s assassination, Gemayel said: “That’s a fact. The killer was from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which was under direct Syrian intelligence control under Assad Hardan. The bomb was planted in Bashir’s office by Habib Chartouni, who had access to the building.”

“After the Syrian army ousted Michel Aoun from the presidential palace under President Elias Hrawi, they sent one unit to the palace and another to Roumieh Prison to free Chartouni. He walked free and gave a speech thanking Syria. That says everything.”

“Chartouni was initially too afraid to detonate the bomb, but party leaders pressured him. The operation was directly linked to Syrian intelligence,” added Gemayel.

Final meeting with Assad

Gemayel recounted his last meeting with Assad, two days before the end of his term: “We were trying to reach a deal: electing Michel al-Daher as president in exchange for certain guarantees. While I was with Assad explaining the plan, he received a note about a meeting in Lebanon between Geagea and Army Commander Michel Aoun.”

“He saw it as a coup attempt and ended the meeting abruptly. I returned to Beirut, but we couldn’t resolve the situation. Despite this, Assad—though ill—insisted on accompanying me to the airport, saying: ‘We are brothers no matter what.’”