Gaza Tunnels Pose Challenge to Israel in War on Hamas

Islamic Jihad fighters guard a Gaza tunnel in March. (Getty Images)
Islamic Jihad fighters guard a Gaza tunnel in March. (Getty Images)
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Gaza Tunnels Pose Challenge to Israel in War on Hamas

Islamic Jihad fighters guard a Gaza tunnel in March. (Getty Images)
Islamic Jihad fighters guard a Gaza tunnel in March. (Getty Images)

Exactly ten years ago in October 2012, Israel announced the discovery of the “first offensive tunnel” in the Gaza Strip. The tunnel stretched 800 meters, from Khan Younis to a hundred meters into Israeli territory, and was 20 meters deep underground and was two meters in width and height.

Israel did not find any weapons or explosives in the tunnel, with experts speculating that Hamas was using it to kidnap Israeli soldiers. A major Israeli military commander declared to Haaretz at the time: “We will make them regret this and we will push them to despair.”

The army destroyed the tunnel, as it did others it had previously discovered. The military even set up a unit dedicated to the destruction of tunnels. It included scientists whose task was to build electronic devices that can detect the underground passages.

Then commander of the Southern Command Yoav Gallant said: “It is a war of minds between us and Hamas. We are waging it for one sole purpose: victory.” Gallant is now defense minister, and the tunnels now extend far and wide in Gaza. He still speaks of “victory” and even of genocide.

In the past ten years, the Israeli army realized that it could not eliminate the tunnel phenomenon. Rather, the tunnels have since grown and become more developed. At first, they were built to allow Hamas fighters to counter Israeli ground attacks and ambush their troops.

They then used them to kidnap soldiers and succeeded in 2014. Two soldiers were kidnapped, and they are still held by Hamas. Israel then decided to build a massive wall, stretching 65 kilometers, above and below ground to prevent Hamas from building tunnels that can extend into Israeli territory. The wall cost Israel a billion dollars, but Hamas only needed to hire contractor for 200 dollars so he can drive bulldozer into the wall and destroy a portion of it.

The movement then expanded the tunnels deep into Gaza. It constructed a massive network that can only be compared to ones in North Korea. The Israelis have not ruled out the possibility that Pyongyang, not just Tehran, may have aided Hamas in the planning.

Furthermore, Hamas may have even benefited from Israeli expertise. In 1980, it had built a whole underground floor under al-Shifa hospital in Gaza when it was still occupying the enclave.

Underground fortress

Israel preoccupied itself in recent years in monitoring the expansion of the tunnels in Gaza and inside its own territories. To destroy some of the tunnels, it used a material that would expand and harden and use up all empty space, sealing off the tunnels.

Meanwhile, Hamas took its time in enlarging its network of tunnels in Gaza. The tunnels now total around 1,300, reaching around 70 meters underground and extending 500 kilometers. Jacob Nagel, former head of Israel's National Security Council, said the tunnels are probably even longer than that, extending thousands of kilometers.

The Israeli army has claimed that it has “detailed maps” of the tunnels and was preparing the right plans to turn them into “graveyards” for Hamas leaders, who in turn, have said that the tunnels have been heavily developed in the past two years. The technology there will shock the Israelis and turn them into a huge trap for its soldiers, they have warned.

The tunnels have become a major headline of the Gaza war. Hamas leaders and some 20,000 fighters are using the tunnels, which are like an underground fortress.

'Lower Gaza’

There isn’t exactly a life in the tunnels given how difficult it can be to live there. However, they are more than just long passageways that the word tunnel implies. Hamas has in fact built an actual city - “Lower Gaza” - under Gaza. Some people have spoken of two Gazas under the ground, meaning that there is actually a third Gaza below the underground city.

The network boasts rest areas, meeting rooms, and sleeping areas. It is fully equipped and features a modern ventilation system. It holds storage for food, medicine and fuel and has its own encrypted telecommunications system that Israel has failed in deciphering, as demonstrated in Hamas’ surprise attack on October 7.

Israel has weighed its option in how to destroy the tunnels. Experts said it could seal them off with a foam material that expands and hardens in empty spaces and could enlarge to several meters thick. It could use vacuum bombs to destroy them and kill everyone using them. Hamas has stated it is aware of the options at Israel’s disposal and its fighters are ready to defy it.



100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 sparked a wave of hope for a brighter future in Syria. But 100 days into the rule of Ahmed al-Sharaa and his allies, the political assessment of the new leadership remains mixed.

Before diving into the performance of the new authorities, it's important to recognize the scale of the challenges facing Syria. The country is deeply fragmented—politically and regionally—still grappling with foreign influence and various forms of external occupation. The economic toll is staggering.

Reconstruction is estimated to cost between $250 billion and $400 billion, and more than half the population remains displaced inside and outside the country. According to the United Nations, 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, and 16.7 million people—roughly three out of four—depend on humanitarian aid.

Against this backdrop, any political actor stepping in after Assad faces an uphill battle.

Yet, the new administration has managed to score some diplomatic wins. Despite its controversial background, the al-Sharaa-led government has succeeded in easing some international concerns and opening lines of communication with key regional and global players.

Several governments have formally recognized the new authority and begun to engage with it. The European Union and the United Kingdom have notably suspended sanctions on selected sectors and entities. France, once a vocal critic of Damascus, recently welcomed al-Sharaa to Paris.

However, Washington has yet to outline a coherent Syria policy under President Donald Trump. While the US has not objected to the Biden administration’s January 2025 move to ease restrictions on Syria’s energy and financial sectors, the broader sanctions remain in place.

Still, the first 100 days under the new leadership offer, at best, cautious optimism. The fundamental questions lie in the administration’s broader political and economic orientation, as well as its vision for Syria’s fractured society. There is no guarantee yet that the country is on a path toward long-term stability.

State Institutions, Security Forces

In the wake of Assad’s fall, Syria’s new leadership—dominated by former members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—moved swiftly to consolidate control over state institutions and security bodies during the transitional phase.

Following the regime’s collapse, an interim government was formed in December 2024, composed almost entirely of HTS members or close affiliates. The caretaker administration held power until a new cabinet was installed at the end of March 2025.

Al-Sharaa, Syria’s new de facto leader, has since appointed new ministers, governors, and security officials—many of whom have ties to HTS or allied armed factions. In a sweeping overhaul of the country’s military and intelligence apparatus, the new authorities established a Syrian army under their command.

Senior leadership positions were handed to HTS veterans, including long-time commander Marhaf Abu Qusra, who was promoted to general and named defense minister.

Beyond the security sphere, the leadership has moved to entrench its influence over Syria’s economic and social sectors. Key appointments have been made across professional syndicates, chambers of commerce, and civil society organizations—often bypassing elections and installing loyalists from within HTS's inner circle.

The moves suggest a systematic effort to centralize power and reshape Syria’s state apparatus under the new order, raising questions about the future of pluralism and institutional independence.

The absence of a comprehensive democratic process has cast a shadow over Syria’s early post-Assad transition, undermining key initiatives meant to lay the foundation for the country’s future—including the much-anticipated Syrian National Dialogue Conference.

Critics say the conference, billed as a cornerstone for participatory dialogue, was marred by poor planning, limited representation, and rushed sessions that left little room for meaningful debate. Political and civil society actors voiced frustration at being sidelined, warning that the process risked entrenching exclusion rather than fostering unity.

Similar concerns were raised over the interim constitution signed by al-Sharaa. The charter faced sharp criticism over the opaque selection of its drafting committee and the lack of public consultation.

New authorities established the General Secretariat for Political Affairs in late March under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Tasked with overseeing political events and activities, the secretariat is also responsible for shaping national policy strategies and coordinating their implementation. One of its more controversial roles includes repurposing the assets and structures of the defunct Baath Party and former National Progressive Front coalition.

The creation of the body signals an effort by the al-Sharaa administration to centralize political planning and regain control over the ideological tools once wielded by the Assad regime—this time under a new banner.

Neoliberal Agenda for the Economy

Syria’s new leadership has also quietly adopted a sweeping neoliberal economic model—without public consultation or parliamentary debate—signaling a long-term shift in the country’s economic trajectory, despite the government's interim mandate.

Since taking power, the al-Sharaa administration has rolled out policies that go beyond the scope of a transitional government. The economic vision, rooted in privatization, market liberalization, and austerity, has drawn sharp criticism for deepening inequality and placing additional strain on already struggling Syrians.

Key state assets are being sold off to the private sector, subsidies for bread and household gas have been slashed, and spending cuts have hit essential public services—measures that disproportionately affect lower-income families. Analysts say the policies largely benefit Syria’s emerging economic elite and business networks aligned with the new ruling class.

In a controversial move, the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade announced the dismissal of nearly one-third of the public-sector workforce.

Officials claimed the cuts targeted employees who were “receiving salaries without performing any actual duties.”

No official figures have been released on the total number affected, but some workers were placed on paid leave for three months pending further evaluation of their employment status.

The decision sparked a wave of protests from laid-off and suspended workers in cities across the country, highlighting growing discontent with the government’s top-down reforms and raising questions about the social cost of its economic overhaul.

Since the start of the year, the al-Sharaa administration has repeatedly pledged to raise public sector wages by 400%, setting a new minimum salary at 1,123,560 Syrian pounds—roughly $86.

While welcomed in principle, the measure remains unimplemented and falls far short of meeting basic living needs. By the end of March 2025, the minimum monthly expenses for a family of five in Damascus were estimated at 8 million pounds, or about $666.

Meanwhile, the government’s decision to reduce tariffs on more than 260 Turkish products has triggered backlash from local producers, particularly in the struggling industrial and agricultural sectors.

Critics say the move has undercut domestic output and opened the floodgates to cheaper Turkish imports. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Trade, Turkish exports to Syria rose by 31.2% in the first quarter of 2025, reaching $508 million, up from $387 million in the same period last year.

Political Fragmentation and Rising Sectarian Tensions

The new government has also made little headway in addressing Syria’s deep political and social fractures.

Efforts to build bridges with the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in the northeast and to engage Druze communities in the southern province of Sweida have largely faltered, facing both logistical hurdles and grassroots resistance.

Recent protests in Sweida, sparked by opposition to the interim constitution and broader government policies, highlight the growing public unrest.

The surge in violence along Syria’s coastal regions, where hundreds of civilians have been killed in recent weeks, has further inflamed sectarian tensions and raised alarms over the country’s fragile stability.

While the latest wave of violence in Syria’s coastal regions was initially triggered by remnants of the former Assad regime targeting civilians and security personnel, rights monitors say the government’s response has fueled further sectarian division.

Under the pretext of rooting out so-called regime “holdouts,” retaliatory violence has escalated, often blurring the line between former loyalists and the broader Alawite community.

Analysts warn that this narrative risks fostering collective blame and deepening intercommunal resentment.

Despite efforts by the al-Sharaa administration to de-escalate tensions, it has largely failed to prevent the violence from spiraling. Clashes and reprisals have continued, particularly affecting Alawite-populated areas, where community members have accused security forces of indiscriminate crackdowns.

Authorities in Damascus have described the incidents as isolated and attributed them to “undisciplined elements,” but critics say the lack of accountability and failure to investigate abuses have only emboldened perpetrators.

Despite pledges to usher in a new era of accountability, the al-Sharaa administration has failed to establish a comprehensive process to prosecute individuals and groups involved in war crimes committed over the past decade.

Rights advocates say such a mechanism could have helped prevent the current wave of retaliatory violence and sectarian polarization, but political observers argue that meaningful justice would likely expose actors the new leadership is reluctant to confront.

Regional Powers Stir the Pot

Amid the internal fragmentation, external actors—most notably Iran, Israel—have sought to exploit the country’s ethnic and sectarian divisions to serve their strategic interests.

Israeli officials have stepped up rhetoric in recent weeks, signaling a willingness to intervene militarily under the pretext of “protecting” Syria’s Druze minority. While the move is seen by many as an attempt to extend Tel Aviv’s influence in southern Syria, key Druze political and social leaders have largely rejected such overtures, reaffirming their national identity and support for Syria’s territorial unity.

Meanwhile, Tehran continues to entrench its presence in areas vacated by Assad’s forces, drawing criticism from opposition groups who accuse Iran of exacerbating sectarian fault lines to solidify its influence.

Despite a power-sharing agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Turkish military operations have persisted in the northeast, targeting Kurdish-controlled territories in apparent defiance of diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region.

Finally, what began in December 2024 with widespread optimism is now clouded by political ambiguity, social unrest, and a lack of clear direction—casting doubt on whether Syria’s post-Assad era can deliver the change many had hoped for.