Israeli Settler Outposts Spread Among West Bank Villages and Fuel Fear of More Attacks

An Israeli settler outpost stands in the middle of a valley next to olive trees in the West Bank town of Turmus Ayya, Wednesday, Nov. 12, 2025. (AP)
An Israeli settler outpost stands in the middle of a valley next to olive trees in the West Bank town of Turmus Ayya, Wednesday, Nov. 12, 2025. (AP)
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Israeli Settler Outposts Spread Among West Bank Villages and Fuel Fear of More Attacks

An Israeli settler outpost stands in the middle of a valley next to olive trees in the West Bank town of Turmus Ayya, Wednesday, Nov. 12, 2025. (AP)
An Israeli settler outpost stands in the middle of a valley next to olive trees in the West Bank town of Turmus Ayya, Wednesday, Nov. 12, 2025. (AP)

The fear is palpable in this Palestinian village. It’s clear in how farmers gather their harvests quickly, how they scan the valley for movement, how they dare not stray past certain roads. At any time, they say, armed Israeli settlers could descend.

“In a matter of minutes, they get on their phones. They gather themselves, and they surprise you,” said Yasser Alkam, a Palestinian-American lawyer and farmer from the village of Turmus Ayya. “They hide between the trees. They ambush people and beat them up severely.”

In recent months, Alkam says Turmus Ayya has weathered near-daily attacks by settlers, especially after they set up an outpost that the anti-settlement watchdog group Peace Now says is on his village’s land.

Alkam says he can’t reach his own fields for fear of being assaulted. In a particularly gruesome attack, he watched a settler beat a Palestinian woman unconscious with a spiky club.

The fear is shared throughout the West Bank. During October's olive harvest, settlers across the territory launched an average of eight attacks daily, according to the United Nations humanitarian office, the most since it began collecting data in 2006. The attacks continued in November, with the UN recording at least 136 more by Nov. 24.

Settlers burned cars, desecrated mosques, ransacked industrial plants and destroyed cropland. Israeli authorities have done little beyond issuing occasional condemnations of the violence.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the attackers as a minority that did not represent most settlers in the West Bank, where settlements are considered illegal by most of the international community. But their continued expansion of outposts — conducted in public with seemingly few legal repercussions — and the violence have cemented a fearful status quo for their Palestinian neighbors.

A brutal assault on a grandmother

While driving in fields east of Turmus Ayya on Oct. 19, Alkam saw Afaf Abu Alia, a grandmother from a nearby village, harvesting a grove of olive trees. They were loaned to her after the Israeli military bulldozed her own 500 trees this year, she said.

She worked until she heard yelling in Hebrew. Settlers descended on the road nearby. Suddenly, one ran toward her with a club.

“The monsters started beating me,” she told The Associated Press three weeks after the attack. “After that, my memories get all blurry.”

Video of the attack obtained by the AP shows a settler beating Alia with the jagged club, even after she was motionless. She was hospitalized for four days, requiring 20 stitches on her head, she said.

Asked for comment on the attack, the military said its troops and police had “defused” a confrontation in which Israeli civilians were torching vehicles and using violence.

In rare move, Israel charges settler responsible Police arrested a man named Ariel Dahari for beating Abu Alia. An Israeli court charged him later with terrorism.

Dahari is being represented by Honenu, an organization that provides legal aid to settlers, who say the West Bank is part of the biblical Jewish homeland and often cast attacks as self-defense. According to an article about Dahari on the group's website, he has received at least 18 administrative orders since 2016 that included house arrest and confinement to his town in Israel.

He told the Israeli news site Arutz Sheva in 2023 that he had been kicked out of the territory twice. It is not clear how he was able to return.

Palestinians and human rights workers say Israeli soldiers and police routinely fail to prosecute attacks by violent settlers. Their sense of impunity has deepened under Israel's far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, a settler, and Defense Minister Israel Katz, who in January released settlers from administrative detention, Israel’s practice of detaining individuals without charge or trial.

The number of investigations opened into settler violence since 2023, Ben-Gvir's first year in office, has plummeted, according to a report by Israel's Channel 12 TV that cited official police data. Police opened only 60 investigations into settler violence in 2024, compared with 150 cases in 2023 and 235 cases in 2022, the report said.

About 94% of all investigation files opened by Israeli police into settler violence from 2005 to 2024 ended without an indictment, according to Israeli rights group Yesh Din. Since 2005, just 3% of those investigations led to convictions.

Dahari told Arutz Sheva that he was determined to stay in the West Bank.

“We will not give up our grip on our land because of one order or another. We will continue to build it and make it flourish everywhere,” he said, adding that he hoped “the security establishment” would “invest all its resources in the war against the Arab enemy, who is the real enemy of us all.”

When reached by the AP, Dahari’s lawyer, Daniel Shimshilashvili, sent a statement from Honenu, saying there was “slim evidence” against Dahari.

Threats are reinforced by settler outposts

The villagers from Turmus Ayya say it's not enough to arrest one settler — the threat of violence is reinforced by the outpost in the nearby valley called Emek Shilo.

Emek Shilo was founded this year on private Palestinian land, according to Peace Now. It was started by a well-known settler named Amishav Melet, said three Palestinians living in Turmus Ayya and Yair Dvir, the spokesperson for Israeli rights group B'tselem. On his personal X account, Melet posted videos of the outpost’s construction.

Villagers alleged that Melet travels the valley in an all-terrain vehicle, surveilling their activities. He’s frequently armed, they said.

Usually little more than a few sheds and a pen for livestock, such outposts can impose control on nearby land and water sources. They often turn into authorized settlements, spelling the end of Palestinian communities.

Israeli police did not comment when asked about Melet.

Abdel Nasser Awwad had to halt construction of a new family home when the outpost was established. In security camera footage he shared with AP, masked figures showed up at the construction site, smashing his truck with a club and appearing to cut piping. He said they have stoned three of his workers.

When AP visited the village, groups of settlers were visible around the outpost and a settler tractor patrolled the area. Drones hummed in the air.

Melet was convicted of assaulting police in 2014, according to court records. In an interview with Israel's Ynet news in 2015, Melet said he had received administrative orders barring him from the West Bank.

In response to questions from the AP, Melet said he was a “peace activist.”

“Any claim against me that I am active or connected to violence or terrorism or any illegal action is a lie and a falsehood!” he wrote.

He called the AP’s questions “part of a cruel and false campaign” against Zionism that “reeks” of antisemitism.

In video from Oct. 20 shared with the AP by Alkam, a man who Alkam said was Melet was recorded telling a farmer picking olives to leave. The farmer responded, “The army allowed us to be here today.”

“Where is the army?” the man identified as Melet said. “I am the army.”

When settlers descend on Turmus Ayya, the mosque emits a loud siren. Young men dash quickly to the village entrance, forming a barrier between their families and the settlers.

During the harvest, many villagers brought cameras into the fields, hoping footage showing assaults would help hold settlers accountable.

It’s a far cry from past olive harvests, when families spent all day in the groves, picnicking beneath the trees.

Abu Alia, the grandmother, said nothing will prevent her from returning.

“I’ll be back next year.”



Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)

A US defense agreement with Ethiopia was announced days before an important visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Cairo that saw agreements and memorandums of understanding signed in several fields and coincided with joint Egyptian-Chinese air exercises.

The timing raised questions over whether Washington’s military cooperation with Addis Ababa was driven by “US anger at Cairo” and what objectives it serves amid tensions in the Horn of Africa.

The United States and Ethiopia signed a defense agreement on Aug. 21 during an official visit by an Ethiopian military delegation to Washington. Both sides described it as a strategic framework aimed at strengthening military and security cooperation, protecting national interests and securing mutual benefits.

Raafat Mahmoud, head of the African Affairs Research Unit at the Egyptian Cabinet's Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC), told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington was seeking to rebuild ties with Addis Ababa after years of tension, particularly over the Tigray war and US criticism of Ethiopia’s human rights record.

He argued that the agreement showed Ethiopia had become part of broader US calculations involving Red Sea security, countering Chinese and Russian influence and combating armed groups in the Horn.

Ethiopian lawmaker Mohammed Al-Arusi noted that Washington views the Horn as directly linked to Red Sea security, international trade and maritime routes, while also facing terrorist threats.

“Ethiopia lies at the heart of this geography, with its demographic, political and military weight across a broad region, and it hosts the permanent headquarters of the African Union,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. Washington, he added, was not seeking a temporary stance but it is “rebuilding its position in a region where the balance of power is changing.”

US Republican and strategic affairs expert Adolfo Franco cautioned that the agreement lacks formally binding treaties and direct financial funding, adding that future defense exports remain subject to strict restrictions and case-by-case assessments, including human rights considerations.

Al-Arusi pointed to a US-Ethiopian dialogue launched in May covering economics, trade, investment, defense and security. The defense track advanced just three months later, a sequence he said showed Washington was approaching Ethiopia with long-term considerations.

Mahmoud said growing US support could strengthen Ethiopia’s negotiating position not only on water but also in its efforts to secure maritime access and expand its presence in the Red Sea region.

Recent media reports have portrayed the US-Ethiopian rapprochement as Washington’s response to Egypt’s growing ties with China, highlighted by Xi’s visit to Cairo this week.

Mahmoud countered that Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement was not new, although recent developments naturally raised sensitivities in Washington, particularly amid expanding economic and security cooperation.

In January 2026, Ethiopia and China elevated their relations to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” nearly two years after Egypt and China upgraded their ties to a “strategic partnership” in 2024.

Al-Arusi argued that Washington’s expanding partnership with Addis Ababa should not be viewed as replacing one partner with another, but rather as evidence of Ethiopia’s growing strategic value.

Former US diplomat Henry Ensher told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington wants a security partner in the Horn and that Ethiopia is the best option given its capabilities.

While China and the United States compete in Africa, Egypt is the more important partner, he said, making it unlikely that Washington would use this approach to confront or punish Cairo.


Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
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Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)

Ahmad al-Hilali, deputy governor of Hasakah, told Asharq Al-Awsat on Friday that the integration process stipulated in the “January 29, 2026 Agreement” has moved, following the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the former Kurdish Autonomous Administration, from “the stage of understandings and negotiations to actual implementation, whether in civilian institutions or in the security and military sectors.”

He described the security situation as “much better” and said “stability is gradually strengthening,” stressing that the process “is moving toward completion, and what we want is for it to take place calmly.”

Since SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced from the presidential palace in Damascus on August 25 the dissolution of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration, Hasakah has witnessed a series of developments and changes signaling the emergence of a new phase in the governorate. Its defining features are the restoration of state authority across all sectors, stronger security and stability, the unification of institutions, and the end of administrative duplication, in accordance with the January 29 Agreement.

In his remarks, al-Hilali said that “the integration process is not simply a matter of transferring buildings or changing names. It is about reunifying institutional authority, administrative decision-making, and security and military command under the umbrella of the Syrian state.”

He said significant steps had already been completed in this direction, while work was underway to address the remaining files in an orderly manner that would prevent any institutional or security vacuum and preserve stability in the governorate.

Before the announcement of the SDF's dissolution, most cities and areas in Hasakah had experienced security disorder involving the Revolutionary Youth. Such incidents increased after the signing of the January 29 Agreement, when members of the group prevented the handover of institutions to the government. That situation, however, has now disappeared.

Al-Hilali attributed the disappearance of the previous unrest primarily to the fact that “the phase has changed.”

“Previously, there were attempts to obstruct the process of transferring state institutions, and some activities emerged aimed at disrupting this course. But as implementation of the agreement progressed and the direction toward ending institutional and security duplication became clear, these manifestations declined significantly,” he said.

According to al-Hilali, “There is now a growing conviction among everyone that state institutions should not be a subject of conflict or confrontation, and that the integration process is moving toward completion.”

“What we want is for this process to take place calmly, away from provocation and tension, and for all residents of the governorate to feel that the return of state institutions means the return of services, the rule of law and stability, and is not directed against any component of society,” he said.

Asked when the integration of military, security and civilian institutions would be fully completed, the deputy governor said: “I do not want to set an artificial date for a process of this scale and complexity, because some files require technical, administrative and security procedures before they can be formally closed.”

He added: “But I can say that we are at a very advanced stage and that the overall direction is clearly toward completing the integration as soon as possible.”

He noted that “the bulk of the work is now in the implementation phase, while what remains consists of detailed files requiring the completion of arrangements, verification and coordination among the ministries and relevant authorities.”

Women fighters from the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) take part in military traning in Hasakah, Syria, August 22, 2026. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

Pending Files

Al-Hilali said: “What matters most to us is that the integration be complete, genuine and sustainable, rather than merely a political announcement whose impact fades after a short period.”

Asked about the main outstanding issues preventing the completion of the integration process, al-Hilali said the remaining files could be divided into three main tracks.

“First is the military and security file, involving the completion of the restructuring of personnel and cadres and the integration of those who meet the requirements into the Ministries of Defense and Interior in accordance with the established procedures,” he said.

“The second is the administrative and civilian file, particularly the status of employees and staff, the mechanisms for confirming their positions and paying their entitlements, and the integration of institutions and departments whose transfer to the state has not yet been completed.”

“The third involves a number of service-related, technical and administrative files linked to the transfer of powers and the reunification of operating systems, databases and resources.”

Al-Hilali said these issues “do not represent an obstacle to the integration process so much as they are implementation files that need to be completed.”

“The political decision is clear and the overall direction has been settled: state institutions will be unified, authority will rest with the Syrian state, and the rights of all citizens and components of the governorate will be preserved,” he said.

The rise of the Autonomous Administration

The first foundations of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, which sought to establish a “Kurdish project in Syria,” emerged through the formation of the Kurdish Supreme Committee. It was established by Syria's Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council following the signing of the Erbil Agreement on July 12, 2012.

A military wing was subsequently established for the committee, comprising the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) and the Asayish security forces. The SDF was later formed in 2015, under predominantly Kurdish leadership.

The geographic footprint of the Autonomous Administration expanded from three cantons in 2014 to six in 2016 and seven by 2023. This territorial expansion was accompanied by the growth of its military and security apparatus and civilian institutions, which collectively included tens of thousands of personnel.

The SDF subsequently lost a significant portion of its territory during armed clashes that erupted between its fighters and the Syrian army in late 2025 and early 2026. The fighting lasted about two weeks and was followed by the signing of the January 29, 2026 Agreement.

The agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF called for a ceasefire and the gradual integration into Syrian state institutions of the military and civilian institutions established by the Kurds during the years of conflict. It also called for the handover of border crossings and oil and gas fields, as well as the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the region.


Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
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Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)

Southern Lebanon's Ali al-Taher ridge, which the Israeli army on Thursday said it captured, was a strategic position for Iran-backed Hezbollah, where it was believed to have established a command center.

Hezbollah did not confirm losing the highland, which is around 10 kilometers (six miles) from the border with Israel and was targeted by several Israeli strikes in recent weeks despite a ceasefire.

The ridge, a flashpoint since Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in March, lies close to the major city of Nabatieh and the Litani River.

It is just a few kilometers from UNESCO-listed Beaufort castle, another strategic site that Israel captured in recent months and continues to occupy.

Ali al-Taher ridge, on the edge of the Israeli-proclaimed occupied "security zone", overlooks surrounding areas and key districts further north, and sits atop a network of tunnels.

During US-mediated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, Washington proposed the Lebanese military take over the ridge, but Hezbollah refused, according to a source close to the talks.

Military expert Riad Kahwaji told AFP that the ridge is "in between several villages and adjacent to the city of Nabatieh" with a "web of tunnels (that) connects these villages around it".

On Friday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the capture "marks the completion of the phase of securing control in the security zone in southern Lebanon", meaning the Lebanese territory Israel occupied during the war.

- 'Command centers' -

The Israeli military on Thursday said that the tunnel network included "command centers (and) weapons storage rooms".

"The infrastructure is a strategic underground network that was built over two decades and funded and planned by the Iranian terror regime," it added.

Kahwaji, who heads the INEGMA military analysis institute, said the hilltops overlook Iqlim al-Tuffah, an area further from the border where Hezbollah holds sway, as well as part of the country's east.

Control of the area would therefore "give the Israelis an easy passage to move on both sides".

Speaking to journalists including AFP last month, Hezbollah spokesman Youssef al-Zein refused to say how many of the group's fighters were at the Ali al-Taher position. He denied any Iranian personnel were there, as had been reported in some media outlets.

He claimed that Israel had "exaggerated the importance of Ali al-Taher" as a military objective but also vowed that Hezbollah would "defend this position as much as it can".

The ridge is located right above the Litani. Hezbollah agreed to disarm in areas south of the river under a 2024 ceasefire that sought to end its previous war with Israel.

Two years later, Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into the broader Middle East war by attacking Israel in support of Iran.

Israel responded with airstrikes and a ground invasion that Lebanon says have killed more than 4,300 people.

The conflict has calmed since a US-Iran memorandum of understanding and a framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel agreed in June. But Israeli strikes continue and violence persisted around Ali al-Taher.

On August 15, Israel's army launched its deadliest strikes in weeks in response to what it said was a Hezbollah attack against its soldiers in the area.

In June, Israel's army published an updated map showing the parts of south Lebanon it considers within its "security zone" where its troops are operating, expanding the area to include the Ali al-Taher ridge.