Israel-Gaza: Navigating the Buffer Zone Dilemma

An Israeli Merkava tank near the separation barrier between southern Israel and Gaza (Reuters)
An Israeli Merkava tank near the separation barrier between southern Israel and Gaza (Reuters)
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Israel-Gaza: Navigating the Buffer Zone Dilemma

An Israeli Merkava tank near the separation barrier between southern Israel and Gaza (Reuters)
An Israeli Merkava tank near the separation barrier between southern Israel and Gaza (Reuters)

Inherently, humans are territorial. Throughout the agricultural revolution, spanning over 15 thousand years, land has been a focal point of conflict among peoples.

The possession of land equates to power and wealth, leading to wars of invasion and occupation, culminating in the era of colonization during the industrial revolution.

Even in today’s age, with the technological revolution, territorial wars and invasions persist, ranging from Ukraine to Gaza.

Land control remains a fundamental consideration in strategic and security calculations.

Geographic depth, in a way, is deemed essential for both individual and national security.

The spatial dimension can be translated into time, ensuring early warning of impending danger. The farther away the geographical threat, the more time is available to prepare for its deterrence.

The geographical buffer may be artificial or, more precisely, prearranged between certain countries.

It can serve as an alternative solution to military confrontation, particularly when the interests of these nations intersect.

In the Great Game between Russia and Britain in Central Asia, what is now known as Afghanistan was established.

This occurred after the English Lord Mortimer Durand drew a 2,670-kilometer line that did not define the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Consequently, Afghanistan can be seen as playing the role of a buffer state during that time.

Israel grapples with a geographical dilemma, lacking geographic depth in terms of its length and width.

For instance, Israel’s width in its narrowest region does not exceed 15 kilometers, situated between the West Bank and the sea.

From a purely security standpoint, this distance means that a single Katyusha rocket has the potential to disrupt life in Tel Aviv.

Israel is currently engaged in a campaign of eradication in Gaza, occasionally alluding to the establishment of buffer zones within the territory.

As for past experiences, Israel has experimented with buffer zones, notably through the use of smart fences, but these attempts have proven unsuccessful.

The limited size of the Gaza Strip (365 square kilometers) does not allow for the creation of buffer zones within it, particularly given its high population density.

Israel cannot maintain control within the buffer zones in the presence of fighters from Hamas and other organizations.

Therefore, the situation necessitates the complete elimination of all organizations in the sector. So far, the factor of time is working against Israeli forces.

If all organizations are eliminated, who will govern Gaza? Who will volunteer for such a task? Can the Security Council issue a resolution to manage the sector, considering the possibility of a Chinese or Russian veto?



Iran’s Centrifuges: The Long Road Towards a Nuclear Bomb

This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
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Iran’s Centrifuges: The Long Road Towards a Nuclear Bomb

This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)

The UN nuclear agency has confirmed that Iran plans to install around 6,000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium, according to a report seen by AFP on Friday.

“Iran informed the Agency that it intended to feed” around 6,000 centrifuges at its sites in Fordo and Natanz to enrich uranium to up to five percent, higher than the 3.67 percent limit Tehran had agreed to in 2015.

The Iranian decision came in response to a resolution adopted on November 21 by the UN nuclear watchdog that censures Tehran for what the agency called lack of cooperation.

On Thursday, Iran had threatened to end its ban on acquiring nuclear weapons if Western sanctions are reimposed.

The country’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, said in an interview that the nuclear debate inside Iran is likely to shift towards the possession of its own weapons if the west goes ahead with a threat to reimpose all UN sanctions,

What are centrifuges?

They are precise devices with cylinders that rotate much faster than the speed of sound, to collect enriched uranium atoms.

To explain how centrifugation works, rotating cylinders are much like medical laboratory equipment used to test blood.

The high rotation speeds exert a rotational force that separates the various components of blood as a function of their density and quantity in the sample.

In the case of uranium, the centrifuge operates using the familiar principle of centrifugal force. This force separates two gases of unequal masses in a spinning cylinder or tube. The heavier uranium-238 isotope collects at the outer edges of the cylinder while the lighter uranium-235 collects near the axis of rotation at the center.

Around 20 kg of uranium enriched to a 90% purity level would be needed for a single nuclear weapon. It would take about 1,500 SWU to produce a weapon-equivalent of 90 percent-enriched uranium from this enriched uranium.

At Fordo, Iran is currently using the two only operating cascades of IR-6 centrifuges there to enrich to 60% from 20%.

There are 1,044 centrifuges active at the Fordo uranium enrichment plant, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian said.

He had earlier asked the Iran Atomic Energy Agency to begin inserting uranium gas into newly activated advanced centrifuges.

Early this month, a spokesperson for the US State Department said Iran's expansion of uranium enrichment activities in defiance of key nuclear commitments is "a big step in the wrong direction”.

His statement came after Tehran announced it would start injecting uranium gas into centrifuges at Fordo.

Dispute

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 2015 between Tehran and Western countries, says advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment could operate until January 2027.

The difference between the first generation of centrifuges (IR-1) and the other generations is speed. The latest generation, IR-6, could enrich uranium up to 10 times faster than the first-generation IR-1, according to Iranian officials.

During the heyday of its nuclear program, Iran operated a total of 10,204 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz and Fordo facilities. But under the deal, Iran's commitments included operating no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges for a period of 10 years.

Although the centrifuges that Iran installed before the 2015 nuclear deal were of the first generation, Tehran’s recent uranium enrichment activity at nuclear sites has reached disturbingly advanced levels, potentially increasing the nuclear proliferation risk.

Major centrifuge activities in Iran

May 2008: Iran installed several centrifuges including more modern models.

March 2012: Iranian media announced 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz.

August 2012: The International Atomic Energy Agency announced that Iran had installed large parts of the centrifuges at Fordo.

November 2012: An IAEA report confirmed that all advanced centrifuges had been installed at Fordo, although there were only four working centrifuges, and another four fully equipped, vacuum tested, and ready to go.

February 2013: IAEA says Iran has operated 12,699 IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz site.

June 2018: Iran’s supreme leader revealed Tuesday that it ultimately wants 190,000 nuclear centrifuges — a figure 30 times higher than world powers allowed under the 2015 deal.

September 2019: Iran mounted 22 IR-4, one IR-5, 30 IR-6, and three IR-6 for testing, outside the treaty boundaries.

September 2019: Iran announced it started operating advanced and fast centrifuges to enrich uranium.

November 2024: Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announces that his country will operate several thousand advanced centrifuges.

November 2024: Iranian state television broadcasts AEOI Chief Mohammad Eslami announcing that “gasification of a few thousands of new generation centrifuges has been started.”