Ghassan Salameh to Asharq Al-Awsat: Elements for Resolving Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Unavailable Yet

Ghassan Salameh speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat in Paris.
Ghassan Salameh speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat in Paris.
TT

Ghassan Salameh to Asharq Al-Awsat: Elements for Resolving Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Unavailable Yet

Ghassan Salameh speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat in Paris.
Ghassan Salameh speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat in Paris.

At the end of every year, we always pause to assess the developments that took place over the past months and what impact they will have on the coming year. Asharq Al-Awsat sat down with Lebanese former minister Ghassan Salameh in Paris to review 2023 and discuss what 2024 has in store. 

Sitting down with Salameh, who had worked with the United Nations in Iraq, Libya and Myanmar, is an enriching experience in itself given his extensive experience and long career. Asharq Al-Awsat sat with him for an in-depth assessment of the situation in the region and the world. 

Quick glance at 2023 

What are the key moments that stood out for you in 2023? 

The year 2023 was a lot more positive on the economic level than was predicted in 2022, which was very negative. We witnessed China’s return to the global market and weak growth in western countries as the world combated rising inflation. 

The war on Ukraine continued unabated in 2023. Ukraine launched its counteroffensive against Russia in Donbas, and it ended in failure. Ukraine has only really reclaimed few of its territories. This has weakened the position of the Ukrainian president, who is staring down the barrel of a gun, so to speak. 

Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeded in crushing the revolt by the Wagner chief, who had taken everyone by surprise. Two months later, he was killed in a plane accident. Putin continues to bank on time, which he believes is in his favor. Russia has the capabilities to secure the needs of its army, while Ukraine can only rely on foreign assistance in providing it with gear and weapons. 

Turning to Africa, 2023 witnessed the return of military coups that took place in eight of its countries. So, democracy in Africa is on the decline. Another development is the expulsion of French forces from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and others. So, France’s influence there is also on the decline. 

The world is meanwhile bracing for elections in over 60 countries, including the United States, India, South Africa and others. The European Union will be voting for a new European parliament. All of this will impact foreign policies as they become intertwined with electoral interests. 

Diseases of Arab countries 

Varied and numerous crises are sweeping the region, from Lebanon to Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia and Sudan. Is there a common factor that is leading to this turmoil and is there a solution to it? 

There are several common factors to these crises, but each country also has its own unique elements. One of the common elements is the massive population growth that took place in these countries in the 20th century. The rise dipped slightly in the 21st century. The generation produced by the population explosion is now in its 20s and 30s and they are struggling to find jobs. 

We are primarily paying the price for this population explosion. The unemployed youth, who have earned their education at universities, have grown frustrated with the lack of opportunities. 

This is the general sentiment across the Arab world, from Morocco to Iraq. Another factor that has fueled the crises are the so-called Arab Spring revolts that had an impact on nearly half of the Arab world, including Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen and others, and had brought with them hopes for change. The hopes were dashed, and the revolts were a failure. Perhaps those hopes were never real in the first place. 

The youths in particular had high hopes that change was possible. Regimes that they sought to change replaced the hope they clung onto. These regimes are even more controlling than the ones toppled by the Arab Spring. Civil wars were also another product of these failed revolts, and they continue to rage to this day in Yemen and Syria. 

Fate of ‘Lebanese formula’ 

Let’s turn to Lebanon, which is racking up one crisis after another, from financial, constitutional, institutional, social, political and the list goes on. I have a radical question: Are the successive crises a sign that the so-called “Lebanese formula” is no longer viable? Can there be a replacement? 

My reply won’t be any less radical. Circumstances would have it that I played a modest role in drafting the Taif Accord. I worked alongside the Arab committee that was seeking to resolve the Lebanese civil war in 1989. I want to stress that it never occurred to us at the time that we were working on reaching the best constitutional model suitable for Lebanon. We were only seeking an end to war, an end to the severe shelling, destruction and death. In short, we were seeking a transitional formula that would end the war. 

So, I see this unshakable attachment to the Taif as misguided. We had hoped that post-war Lebanon would embark on a period of peace, stability and prosperity that would allow its people to come up with the system that they were hoping for. It is necessary to address this issue because some officials have turned the Taif Accord into some sort of holy book. It is not holy. It is beneficial and it was beneficial back then. I was proud to have been part of drafting it. 

A second point: A country that needs a year, or two or three to elect a president every time the post is vacant; or needs months and months to form a government; and then needs months and months to reach an agreement on extending the term of the army commander and naming an employee as head of the Central Bank are all signs that this country is suffering from a system that does not work for it. 

The current system doesn’t favor the Lebanese people. This is my radical answer to your radical question. 

So, what’s the substitute? The challenge is finding the right time and circumstances to broach this issue. Lebanon needs a degree of internal stability and foreign support to change hearts and minds that would pave the way for a new system. These conditions are not available. But in the meantime, I am not opposed to temporary solutions, such as electing a president from among the candidates who are running, or forming a government with whatever is at hand. 

The new president and government’s priority must be restoring normal work at state institutions and then tackling the constitutional issue: Do they want a more decentralized system or more centralized one? The Taif Accord does speak of decentralization, but some parties fear that it would lead to the fragmentation of the state. 

Gaza war and two-state solution 

Turning to the war on Gaza. I have three questions: How can this conflict be resolved? Are powers being serious about again floating the two-state solution or are they deluding the Palestinians? Can we count on the Americans being serious about reaching a political solution? 

I will ask my own questions here: Are the Palestinians ready to play this historic role of forming a viable Palestinian state? My answer is no. Hamas is not accepted and the Palestinian Authority is incapable. So, we are now confronted with Palestinian vacuum. There is a need to turn to a new, credible and acceptable Palestinian party. 

On the other side of the divide, we need an Israeli party. At the moment, that party is unavailable. We have a very extremist government that is very openly against the two-state solution. This position is not voiced by extremist ministers, like Bezalel Smotrich, alone, but even by its prime minister. The war cabinet is also very extremist. 

A solution needs a mediator between the Israelis and Palestinians. The only mediator who can pressure Israel is the United States. It deployed aircraft carriers to deter Israel’s enemies and decided to add 14 billion dollars to the 4 billion it already pays Israel every year. It is also preventing the UN Security Council from voting on a resolution that enjoys the support of the remaining 14 members. So, Washington has the real means to pressure Israel that any other party, including Europe and China, do not. 

The problem, however, is that the mediator – the US – is missing. Why? Because US President Joe Biden, back from when he was a senator and throughout 40 years of his life, has completely sided with Israel’s interests. This did not change when he became president. Biden is a greater Israel supporter than any one of his aides. I am not saying this from mere observation, but from actual knowledge. 

Biden’s hands are tied because he is entering the final year of his first term in office and is engaged in an electoral battle. Some voices from among the youth are urging him to be less extreme in this conflict. On the other hand, he needs funding that may or will be provided from sources that urge him to continue this unyielding support for Israel. 

Given the above, the solution is out of reach. I fear that the war will spill over into the West Bank, where tensions are high and over 300 Palestinians have been killed. The war may also spread to southern Lebanon. Some officials in Israel are claiming that conditions are ripe to wage a war on Lebanon. 

More and more voices in Israel are calling for war on Lebanon, including defense minister Yoav Gallant. But in spite of their support for Israel’s war on Gaza, the Americans are opposed to opening a new front with Lebanon. Biden informed them of this during the first week of the conflict and again some two weeks ago when more threats were made against Lebanon. The danger here is that Israel doesn’t always abide by America’s wishes.  



Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
TT

Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)

The Iranian government is scrambling to restore some of its influence in Syria as it still reels from the shock ouster of its close ally President Bashar al-Assad on December 8.

The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing multiple domestic and international crises, including an economy in shambles and continued tensions over its nuclear program. But it is the sudden loss of influence in Syria after the fall of Assad to opposition groups that is exercising Iranian officials most, reported The Guardian on Friday.

“In the short term they want to salvage some influence with the opposition in Damascus. Iranian diplomats insist they were not wedded to Assad, and were disillusioned with his refusal to compromise,” it said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview this week: “We had long ago reached the conclusion that the continuation of governance in Syria would face a fundamental challenge. Government officials were expected to show flexibility towards allowing the opposition to participate in power, but this did not happen.”

He added: “Tehran always had direct contacts with the Syrian opposition delegation. Since 2011, we have been suggesting to Syria the need to begin political talks with those opposition groups that were not affiliated with terrorism.”

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson insisted it only entered Syria in 2012 at Assad’s request to help defeat ISIS, continued The Guardian. “Our presence was advisory and we were never in Syria to defend a specific group or individual. What was important to us was helping to preserve the territorial integrity and stability of Syria,” he said.

Such explanations have not cut much ice in Damascus. Iran remains one of the few countries criticized by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader.

Short honeymoon

Many Iranian officials are claiming the current victory lap being enjoyed by Türkiye in Syria may be brief as Ankara’s interests will start to diverge from the government led by the HTS.

Senior cleric Naser Makarem Shirazi said: “We must follow the Syrian issue with hope and know that this situation will not continue, because the current rulers of Syria will not remain united with each other”.

The conservative Javan newspaper predicted that “the current honeymoon period in Syria will end due to the diversity of groups, economic problems, the lack of security and diversity of actors.”.

Officially Iran blames the US and Israel for Assad’s collapse, but resentment at Ankara’s role is rife, ironically echoing Donald Trump’s claim that Syria has been the victim of an unfriendly takeover by Türkiye.

In his speech responding to Assad’s downfall supreme leader Ali Khamenei said a neighboring state of Syria played a clear role” in shaping events and “continues to do so now”. The Fars news agency published a poster showing the HTS leader in league with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Benjamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden.

Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations questioned whether HTS would remain allies with Türkiye for long. It said: “Although Türkiye is only one of the main winners of Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power in the short term, Ankara can never bring a government aligned with itself to power in Syria. Even if HTS attempts to form a stable government in Syria, which is impossible, in the medium term, it will become a major threat to Türkiye, which shares an 830-kilometer border with Syria.”

Reliance on Türkiye

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani predicted a bleak future for Syria and Türkiye. “In recent weeks, all of Syria’s military power has been destroyed by Israel, and unfortunately, the militants and Türkiye did not respond appropriately to Israel. It will take years to rebuild the Syrian army and armed forces.”

Mohsen Baharvand, a former Iranian ambassador to the UK, suggested the Damascus government may find itself overly reliant on Türkiye. “If the central government of Syria tries to consolidate its authority and sovereignty through military intervention and assistance from foreign countries – including Türkiye – Syria, or key parts of it, will be occupied by Türkiye, and Türkiye will enter a quagmire from which it will incur heavy human and economic costs.”

He predicted tensions between Türkiye and the HTS in particular about how to handle the Syrian Kurdish demand in north-east Syria for a form of autonomy. The Turkish-funded Syrian National Army is reportedly ready to mount an offensive against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in Kobani, a Kurdish-majority Syrian town on the northern border with Türkiye.

Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Wednesday that if the issue were addressed “properly” Ankara would not seek a military intervention. “There is a new administration in Damascus now. I think this is primarily their concern now,” Fidan said.

More broadly, the Syrian reverse is forcing Iran to accelerate a rethink of its foreign policy. The review centers on whether the weakening of its so-called Axis of Resistance – comprising allied groups in the region – requires Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, or instead strengthen Iran by building better relations in the region.

For years, Iran’s rulers have been saying that “defending Iran must begin from outside its borders.” This hugely costly strategy is largely obsolete, and how Iran explains its Syria reverse will be critical to deciding what replaces that strategy.