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Saudi Arabia in 2024: Positive Expectations Underpinned by Political Will and Economic Capacities

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the South Korean President attend a session of the Future Investment Initiative (SPA)
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the South Korean President attend a session of the Future Investment Initiative (SPA)
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Saudi Arabia in 2024: Positive Expectations Underpinned by Political Will and Economic Capacities

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the South Korean President attend a session of the Future Investment Initiative (SPA)
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the South Korean President attend a session of the Future Investment Initiative (SPA)

In an increasingly uncertain world, constants remain our main reference for forecasting the near future. These constants, the factors upon which projections about the future are based, can be summarized into three factors: The first is political will, the primary determinant of the direction a state will take and the objectives it sets.

The second is economic capacity, which enables states to execute their political will and allows them to turn plans into tangible reality.

As for the third factor, it is global changes, which can either positively or negatively affect the implementation of these plans. This is the major cause for uncertainty regarding the future, and state policies play a crucial role in determining it. When applying this perspective to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, one can anticipate what the next year might look like.

Saudi Arabia 2023

Starting with political will, domestically, the Kingdom continues to pursue its ambitious Vision 2030 - a pursuit reinforced by the fact that it has achieved targets ahead of schedule. Many of these initiatives have certainly started to bear fruit, especially those that began early in restructuring some of the state's sectors.

The Kingdom did not stop at the programs it launched with the inception of its Vision. It pursued many projects and initiatives in sectors such as tourism, entertainment, and sports. In the latter, the implications of the state's determination to transform plans into reality are particularly evident. In just a few years, the Saudi football league has stolen the spotlight from globally followed football leagues, with the world turning its attention to the Kingdom after the sports sector was restricted and the role of the private sector in the sports system was invigorated.

Since the Vision is comprehensive and encompasses all vital sectors, the interconnections of its different projects and their mutual reinforcement of one another have become evident. For example, recognizing the need for logistical support in the tourism sector, the Public Investment Fund launched Riyadh Air to help the Kingdom reach tourism targets.

This principle of interconnectedness applies to many intersections within the Vision. The progress made in these various sectors is further enhanced by the direct oversight of the Kingdom's senior leadership over national strategies, which ensures the integration and staves off redundancies.

Political will in the Kingdom also has obvious implications for its foreign relations with other countries. For years, the Kingdom has built bridges of communication with the world under the banner of shared interests and the exchange of values. 2022 concluded with the visit of the Chinese President to Riyadh, and these high-level visits continued into 2023, with the Kingdom hosting several major summits, such as the Saudi-African Summit, the Gulf-ASEAN Summit, the Saudi-Caribbean Summit, the Arab Summit, and the Islamic Summit.

The objectives of these summits vary and include political, economic, and cultural aspects. However, the Kingdom takes the same approach to all countries with shared interests and mutual benefits.

The Kingdom also participated in global summits, notably the G20 Summit in India and the Summit for a New Financing Pact in Paris. The impact of these efforts and international visits became apparent when the Kingdom won the bid to host Expo 2030 by attaining the majority of votes from countries and leveraging its strong global relationships.

Economic capacity

The second factor is economic capacity, which may be represented by the state budget for the next year. The Kingdom has continued to expand spending, setting a budget of over 1.2 trillion Riyals, while making conservative revenue projections. The deficit in the state's general budget did not exceed 2 percent, and the government continues to spend on various sectors without making any significant changes, thereby ensuring the continuity of the state's strategies for these sectors and their alignment with the shifts all around us.

While oil revenues decreased due to OPEC's proactive policy to maintain market stability, non-oil revenues continued to increase, reaching 441 billion riyals - about 37 percent of the state's revenues, up from approximately 32.5 percent in 2018.

The Kingdom's capacity to keep up this spending reflects two things: first, it is confident that its economy is solid, and it can sustain this expansionary spending without increasing public debt relative to GDP or depleting its reserves; second, its commitment to pursuing the programs of Vision 2030 and its reassurance about their positive outcomes for the national economy.

Global changes

The third factor is global changes, which can either pose risks or create opportunities for the Kingdom. These changes could be geopolitical, such as the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, which affects the stability of oil prices, or changes in the course of Israel’s assault on Gaza, which impacts the entire region, or the Houthi attacks disrupting maritime navigation in the Red Sea.

These changes may also be reflected in the global economy. Global economic growth remains slow due to factors such as inflation, the austere monetary policies adopted by central banks to curb it, and the aftermath of the pandemic, which has had an impact on global supply chains.

Saudi Arabia 2024

The forecasts for the Saudi economy in the next year are generally positive. Fitch predicted that the Saudi economy would grow between 2.6 and 3.3 percent, while Moody's expects growth of around 4.6 percent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) raised its growth projections for the Kingdom to 4 percent in a short period. The preliminary budget statement from the Ministry of Finance has said that real GDP is expected to grow by 4.4 percent.

These forecasts are driven by several factors, including the events of 2023 and the policies being pursued by the Kingdom. Despite reducing its oil production, the Kingdom's revenues increased this year. This increase was driven by rising non-oil revenues, and these revenues are expected to continue to rise next year, as they have over the past five years.

This increase is due to the increasing role of the private sector, which has been invigorated by various government measures and programs tied to Vision 2030. This approach taken by the Saudi government is to mitigate potential risks in global oil markets. That is among the major axes of Vision 2030, which aims to diversify revenue sources in order to ensure sustainable growth and development in the Kingdom.

The developments seen in 2023 reflect a number of projections. For example, it would not be surprising if Saudi Arabia launched several projects related to its hosting of Expo 2030. These could include determining the location of the event, holding activities such as conferences tied to the Expo, like exhibitions, and strategic plans, and possibly establishing a governmental body tasked with overseeing this major event.

Moreover, we can also expect changes in the Saudi sports sector next year. Given that Saudi Arabia began privatizing clubs by transferring the ownership of four clubs to the Public Investment Fund, this trend could continue next year, with more clubs being transferred to major Saudi companies.

An increase in pace at the Ministry of Sports can also be anticipated in preparation for the expected announcement of its successful bid to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup. This preparation might involve submitting a proposal that includes constructing new stadiums and infrastructure to ensure that the Kingdom provides fans with a distinguished experience and that the sports sector meets the high aspirations that have been set for it.

With Saudi Arabia hosting Expo 2030 and the 2034 World Cup, many infrastructure projects are anticipated. These include ongoing large-scale infrastructure projects in Riyadh, such as King Salman Airport, the Qiddiya Project, King Salman Park, and other significant initiatives. Other cities in the Kingdom that may play an important role, especially in organizing the World Cup, are also expected to see major projects.

Those following the progress being made on Vision 2030 projects can see that it started with several ambitious projects like NEOM, Red Sea, Amaala, and Qiddiya. It began with the launch of numerous projects in Riyadh at the start of Vision 2030, and then we saw other projects in other cities, such as Jeddah Central, Rua Al Medina, and the Sudah and Abha Airport projects.

This might indicate that more projects will be seen in other cities across the Kingdom, whether broad infrastructure projects or sight-specific ones, like agricultural projects suited to cities and their geography and environment. This means that the next year will see the persistence, God willing, of Vision 2030, and the expansion of its initiatives to more Saudi cities that align with their cultural and geographical characteristics.

Flexibility of the Kingdom

The Kingdom has shown itself to be flexible through how it has dealt with economic and political events in recent years. It was not significantly affected by the inflation generated by the pandemic, unlike other countries, and it managed to stave off the negative repercussions of global geopolitical conflicts. Rather, it launched global initiatives aimed at addressing the ramifications of these developments, as it had with its initiatives for global supply chains.

It is not surprising that this approach will continue next year, with precautions being taken to avoid any changes that could negatively impact its economic and strategic interests. The Kingdom will leverage the robustness of its economy and global relationships to find solutions that ensure prosperity, all while maintaining its national project aimed at elevating its strategic and vital sectors.

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Assad in Syria and Lebanon: Quarter of a Century of Dictatorship and Destruction

People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
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Assad in Syria and Lebanon: Quarter of a Century of Dictatorship and Destruction

People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)

Hazem Saghieh

The advent of the 21st Century brought with it historic developments. The most significant for Syria and Lebanon took place on June 10, 2000 with the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Many openly mourned his passing. Many having experienced firsthand the cruelty of the ruler. In secret however, they said: “This is the first time Assad does something useful.”

Hafez was in effect the president of two countries. Weeks before his death, he met with US President Bill Clinton in Geneva to discuss resuming negotiations between Syria and Israel. On May 25, 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in line with an electoral pledge made by Ehud Barak.

The day was a calamity to Assad’s Lebanese and Syrian supporters, who saw in the withdrawal the end of their excuses to carry arms outside state control. So, they described the move as a “conspiracy” and suddenly, like a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat, they cited Israel’s continued occupation of the long-forgotten Shebaa Farms. Israel had occupied the area from Syria in 1967. Calls for war mounted, demanding that Israel withdraw or suffer the consequences. Soon after, however, tensions eased, and Hezbollah declared the withdrawal a “liberation” achieved with the support of “Syria’s Assad”.

Training Bashar and Lebanese politicians

Syrians recalled the story of a peasant from Daraa who headed to Damascus to attend Hafez’s funeral. On his way, he saw a billboard that read: “The Assad (Arabic for lion) is immortal and does not die.” So the peasant turned back and returned home believing that the news of Hafez’s death were rumors spread by enemies.

The peasant wasn’t completely wrong or so it would seem when Hafez’s son, Bashar, came to power to follow in his father’s footsteps. Despite the changes the new young ruler introduced to the country and his marriage to a “modern” British-born woman, the apple did not fall far from the tree, and he maintained his father’s iron-fisted grip on power.

Bashar forged ahead along his father’s destructive path and where better to gain experience than in Syria’s favorite training ground: Lebanon.

Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and US President Bill Clinton meet in Geneva in 2000. (Getty Images)

In 1998, two years before he came to power and four years after his older brother Bassel’s death, Bashar was put in charge of the Syrian military presence in “brotherly” Lebanon, where 40,000 Syrian soldiers were deployed. As part of Bashar’s training, he documented his relations with Lebanese politicians, the majority of whom bowed their heads to the lowliest of Syrian officers.

Three Lebanese figures stood out for Bashar. Two had his unabashed admiration and one was an abhorred thorn in his side:

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was the leader of the resistance party and enjoyed Bashar’s full support. He was viewed as the man of the 2000 liberation. He represented to Bashar everything that he could not achieve because he inherited power, while Nasrallah earned his way to the top. However, Hafez had the upper hand over Nasrallah when negotiating with Iran; the young inexperienced Bashar did not.

Bashar’s admiration of Nasrallah stemmed from what he could never achieve, while his admiration for Emile Lahoud stemmed from what was possible. The Lebanese army and naval commander was chosen by Damascus to be president in 1998. Lahoud, the commander of the very modest Lebanese navy, was as much a military man as Bashar, the ophthalmologist, was a doctor.

With the very little time needed to run the navy, Lahoud spent his leisure hours oiling himself up to tan under the sun at the Bain Militaire resort in Beirut. In all likelihood, Bashar was drawn to Lahoud because of their shared weakness in articulating words and putting sentences together, following that up with weak laughter, leaving their statements utterly meaningless.

The thorn in Bashar’s side was wealthy businessman and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who lavished gifts on Syrian officers hoping for political leniency in return. This was not the type of wealthy man who Bashar was drawn to. Bashar looked up to the wealthy man whose sole ambition was to keep his riches from being seized.

Articles spoke about how Hariri was the one who was building Syria’s relations with the world, and he was the one who proposed to Damascus that it follow the “Chinese model” whereby power remains in the hands of the rulers, while freedom is introduced to the markets. Bashar resented Hariri for this and his sentiment deepened because Hariri was a Sunni leader and Bashar was Alawite. The Sunnis make up the majority in Lebanon and Syria where Alawites are a minority.

Rumors abounded that Hariri not only wanted to be the leader of the Sunnis in Lebanon, but in Syria as well. No wonder Bashar was suspicious. Rumors also spread that Hariri sought regional peace whereby the Palestinians and Israeli would continue where they left off in Oslo in 1993. Perhaps what irked Bashar the most about Hariri was that he was a self-made man.

From left to right: Former Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, slain former PM Rafik al-Hariri and slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (AFP file)

Regional tumult and crimes in Lebanon

The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon removed the Syrian regime’s excuse for keeping its forces deployed in Lebanon. Hafez’s death encouraged people to speak out. The man of the moment was late Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, who in September 2000 sponsored a Maronite call on Syria to pull out its troops. Sfeir forged ahead. In April 2001, he blessed the establishment of the Qornet Shewan gathering that marked the beginning of the emergence of an anti-Syria opposition.

The gathering brought together Christian politicians and helped extend bridges to Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, both of whom were upset with Bashar and his employee in Lebanon, Lahoud. In the summer of 2001, Sfeir sponsored a major reconciliation between the Christians and the Druze. Both sects were seen as the backbone of Lebanon’s national identity.

On August 7, Christian society was rattled by student protests held by supporters of the Lebanese Forces and former army commander Michel Aoun, who was in exile at the time. The protesters were summarily rounded up and imprisoned in shocking scenes. Hundreds were detained without any legal justification and for simply demanding freedom and the withdrawal of Syrian troops.

The region was in store for more tumult. In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and a year later Syria’s Kurds in Qamishli were encouraged to revolt against the regime. Bashar responded to the unrest by shipping terrorists to Iraq where they caused so much death and destruction. Washington soon began to mount its pressure on Bashar to ease meddling in Lebanon.

Bashar responded with a bombshell in Beirut. He remained steadfast in extending Lahoud’s term in office in 2004 despite deep opposition in Lebanon. In September later that year, the UN Security Council issued resolution 1559 that calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the dismantling of all militias. It was as clear as day that Bashar and Hezbollah were the main targets of the resolution.

Bashar and Nasrallah were determined to retaliate against the resolution and Jumblatt and Hariri were seen as the main targets. Jumblatt had joined the opposition, while Hariri, who openly opposed the extension of Lahoud’s term – in what was seen as a direct insult to Bashar – was suspected of having played a major role in the issuance of resolution 1559.

And so, Beirut would be struck with disaster on February 14, 2005. Hariri was assassinated in major car bombing that would also claim the life of minister Bassil Fleihan and 21 people. A slew of crimes and assassinations would ensue against politicians and journalists who were vocal in their opposition to Bashar and Nasrallah.

Lebanon would soon become divided into two camps: one known as “March 8”, named so after holding a large rally on that day in 2005 to “thank Syria’s Assad” for its role in Lebanon, and “March 14”, also named so after a rally on that day that dwarfed the first and that protested against Hariri’s killing and demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian forces.

The forces would eventually withdraw from Lebanon on April 30, 2005. Nasrallah eagerly gifted the head of the Syrian security apparatus in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh, the “rifle of resistance” because he wanted the Syrian troops to quit Lebanon with their heads held high, not weak and humiliated. Hariri’s “curse” would haunt Ghazaleh and his predecessor Ghazi Kanaan. Their mysterious fate would be added to countless others who died under the Assad rule.

Syrian forces deployed in Lebanon. (AFP file)

Ghazaleh was named to his post in Lebanon in 2002. He followed in Kanaan’s bloody footsteps of killing and torture. They had set up base in the town of Anjar in the Bekaa and the Beau Rivage Hotel in Beirut, both of which became synonymous with the Syrian regime’s oppression. They also sponsored drug and weapons smuggling networks whose revenues they reaped, along with the regime and their allies in the “Axis of Resistance”.

Ghazaleh was known for his utmost loyalty to the regime. Perhaps it was because he was a Sunni and needed to prove himself to his Alawite masters. Kanaan, a Alawite, didn’t need to go that far and years later would go on record and speak proudly of his friendship with Hariri.

At any rate, with Syrian troops out of Lebanon, the regime feared that all of its plotting to kill Hariri would be revealed. So, Ghazaleh, the regime’s secret keeper and owner of the “rifle of the resistance” was killed in 2015. Kanaan was shot and killed in his office in 2005. He was shot with two or three bullets, but the regime famously preferred to call his death a suicide. A few years later, two of his brothers also committed “suicide” - also using two or three bullets.

Tying the brother to the sister

Throughout the hegemony of “sister” Syria over “brother” Lebanon, the latter was under the Baathist theory of “Lebanon’s Arabism”. Describing what the regime did to Arabism is an insult to the word. In reality, it required that Lebanon stand by Syria and non-Arab Iran, through thick and thin, against Egypt, Iraq and Arab Gulf and Maghreb. For the first time in Lebanon’s modern history, it had an official ideology that identified “friend” and “foe”, replacing freedom of expression that was a hallmark of Lebanon’s official stances.

Hafez had also tightened the bond between Damascus and Beirut with the 1991 treaty of “Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination” that tied Lebanon’s foreign policy to Syria’s. Damascus was also granted the final say in administrative and public appointments, especially security and military ones. It was allowed to name judges and ministers and outline media policies of various outlets.

This form of “Arabism” continued under Bashar, who at first attempted to display some openness towards Syria and Lebanon. He gave some breathing room for civil society activists in Syria and Lebanese banks opened branches in Syria. Bashar also approached Christian Lebanese parties that are traditionally opposed to the Assads.

War with Israel

Bashar’s relative “openness” led to the establishment of the “Beirut-Damascus Declaration” in May 2006. It was signed by hundreds of Syrian and Lebanon intellectuals and activists and called on the Syrian government to “correct” relations with Lebanon and respect its sovereignty and independence and end its series of political assassinations. The declaration marked the end of the openness. The Syrian signatories soon found themselves in jail or fired from their jobs.

Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon left Hezbollah and its allies isolated. They were also confronted with a national agenda championed by the March 14 movement. Syrian voices chimed in solidarity with the Lebanese people. Hezbollah and its allies therefore sensed the need to shift attention elsewhere. And as usual, what best way to do that than sparking a war with Israel? Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, leading Israel to declare war on the party.

Hezbollah would declare “divine victory” some 33 days later. Soon after, Iran-backed Hezbollah would assume in Lebanon the role once played by Ghazaleh. Iran’s role in Lebanon would become more pronounced, while Syria still held sway, albeit in back alleys, instead of the rooftops.

Lebanese mourners hold up a sign during the funeral of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut, Lebanon, February 16, 2005 (Reuters)

A deadly duality emerged: a popular and parliamentary majority represented by Fuad Siniora’s government on the one hand, and the “divine victory” camp whose weapons and alliances would prevent the establishment of any stable form of rule on the other. The camp obstructed the government functioning and crippled the entire capital with a sit-in in Downtown Beirut that extended for over a year.

In May 2007, members of the so-called Fatah al-Islam group killed 27 Lebanese soldiers in their sleep. Clashes soon ensued in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp between the group and the army. Later, it would be revealed that the leader of the group, Shaker al-Absi, was working for Syrian intelligence. He had been imprisoned in Damascus and later released. He was tasked with sending terrorists to Iraq. After the Nahr al-Bared battle, he fled to Damascus and was later unsurprisingly killed in mysterious circumstances.

With Hezbollah and its allies holding sway in Lebanon, meeting constitutional deadlines became impossible. It took six months to elect Michel Suleiman president and that was only after Hezbollah and its allies turned their weapons against the Lebanese people in May 2008. The Doha conference was held to restore calm and end the political impasse and Suleiman was elected president.

Even after the crisis was resolved, Hezbollah continued to obstruct political life when things did not go in its favor even though the 2009 parliamentary elections, just like the 2005 polls, handed the March 14 camp a majority.

Syrian revolution and Assad’s downfall

The Syrian revolution erupted in 2011 and people in Lebanon hoped that it would positively impact their country and sweep away the rot and corruption that had been eating away at it. Voices of solidarity rose with the Syrian people, this time calling for freedom and dignity, not Arabism and resistance. Thugs affiliated with Damascus loyalists and Hezbollah soon cracked down on people expressing solidarity.

The northern city of Tripoli suffered the brunt of the crackdown. Its close proximity to Syria had always made it a prime target for the regime’s oppressive practices. In 2013, two mosques in the city were bombed, leaving 49 people dead and over 800 wounded. Unsurprisingly, the terrorist group that had claimed responsibility for the attack was actually affiliated with Damascus.

In 2012, scandal shook Lebanon when former minister Michel Samaha was busted for smuggling explosives from Syria to Lebanon where he planned on carrying out bombings. Ali al-Mamlouk, Bashar’s security advisor, was the mastermind behind the plot.

Ousted Syrian President Bashar all-Assad. (SANA file)

In 2019, as the sanctions tightened around the regime, it turned to Lebanon to ease the strain. The regime’s financial ties to Hezbollah were deepened during that phase, especially when it came to smuggling captagon.

While Syria kept a low profile in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s role in Syria grew more prominent. It reached a glaring peak in 2013 when it intervened militarily in Syria to help the regime fight the opposition seeking its ouster.

On the official level, Lebanon had sought to distance itself from the conflict in Syria. The Baabda Declaration was issued in 2012, stressing that Lebanon would keep a distance from the unrest. All parties, including Hezbollah, had agreed to it. Iran, Hezbollah’s backer, had other plans and soon the party scrambled to the aid of its ally, sowing death and destruction in Syria.

On August 4, 2020, Beirut was in store for yet another tragedy. Ammonium nitrate unsafely stored at the Beirut port mysteriously detonated, destroying swathes of the capital and killing over 200 people. The explosion was the third largest non-nuclear explosion in history. A lot was written about how associates of the Assad regime, who were complicit in shady deals and smuggling operations, had been storing the nitrate at the port.

The claims gained ground when Hezbollah thwarted investigations into the explosion. The party had no problem dispatching its enforcer and security official Wafik Safa to threaten the judge in charge of the probe to shut it down. And so it was, and the investigations have been stalled for years.

Much can be said about the Syrian refugees who fled to Lebanon during their country’s conflict. Strong bonds were forged between them and the locals, but they also strained Lebanon’s already fragile economy, fueling resentment and racism against them.

The Syrian regime collapsed on December 8 and Bashar fled to Moscow. The Lebanese people shared the Syrian people’s delirium in seeing the downfall of their oppressor.

However, Lebanon is not out of the woods yet. Members of the regime fled Syria to Lebanon and local authorities are demanded to arrest them, otherwise risk jeopardizing relations with the new rulers in Damascus. But everyone can safely say, that at the moment, the past 25 years of oppression, death and ruin at the hands of the regime are truly over.