A Year After the Surprises

Palestinians inspect a destroyed building after an Israeli air strike on Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip (dpa)
Palestinians inspect a destroyed building after an Israeli air strike on Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip (dpa)
TT

A Year After the Surprises

Palestinians inspect a destroyed building after an Israeli air strike on Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip (dpa)
Palestinians inspect a destroyed building after an Israeli air strike on Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip (dpa)

The world may have witnessed the beginning of the current round of the Palestinian-Israeli war, but it sure won't know when and how it will end.

This round of the conflict is different, marked by a series of unexpected turns.

- The first surprise: Israel

Hamas' sudden massive invasion of the settlements around the Gaza Strip took Israel by surprise during its Yom Kippur celebrations. As soon as it woke up from its almost coma-like slumber, Hamas had killed, destroyed, and taken numerous captives to Gaza.

- The second surprise: Hamas

Hamas' modest capabilities compared to its opponent's surprised me.

This time, the surprise came from the Hamas movement, not the other side. No one could have predicted this level of unforeseen success, or it could have yielded this number of spoils.

The unexpected outcome left Israel contemplating its response, ranging from a ground invasion to limited action.

- The third surprise: the US

In the world's eyes, the firm notion that the superpower's intelligence and its regional branch, Israel, possess complete knowledge of what is happening above and below the ground was shattered.

The US itself was surprised. Under the shock, there was no time to assess the situation carefully and instead seemed to have pulled the gun immediately.

Without hesitation, it ordered its giant aircraft carriers to move to the nearest location opposite Gaza and Israel. President Joe Biden quickly dispatched the Secretary of State in anticipation of his visit.

The institutions of the major state began preparing for a danger that threatened the existence of the Hebrew state and risked a comprehensive regional war, with "exposed" US interests as a target.

- Fourth surprise: The old equation no longer applies

US intuitive assessment of the Israeli military force was that a brief intervention in a few days or weeks would suffice.

Israel itself had the same assessments, and it still considers the war, especially in Gaza, to be merely a disciplinary act that results in death and destruction greater than what it lost.

Tel Aviv deluded itself that Gaza is under control and that a tight siege and some bombings are enough to silence it. It believed no small or large war didn't end with a ceasefire or a medium- or long-term truce.

Israel was maintaining a fragile truce through limited concessions, such as increasing the number of workers, expanding the fishing area, and other things that were extremely limited, effective, and cheap to the point that it settled on protecting its southern borders within an equation that included a great deal of reassurance that Gaza would not do anything.

On October 7, the two partner allies, the US and Israel, were surprised that the old equation with Hamas no longer worked.

- Fifth surprise: resistance

Israel grew accustomed to a seemingly comfortable, calm Gaza, which provided it with additional capabilities to devote itself entirely to the West Bank, its central goal.

The West Bank, and Jerusalem in its heart, represents Israel's biggest and most dangerous challenge, with its broader geography and many entrances and exits that lead to every place in Israel.

The empty and crowded settlements cover the entire West Bank from its southernmost point to its northernmost point. Gaza is different because the settlements are still there, and the settlers, estimated at hundreds of thousands, are the reservists ready to participate without the need to be called up.

The resistance in the West Bank does pose no surprise. However, Gaza posed a different story.

Surprisingly, the Israeli army was shocked by the ferocity of the resistance in Gaza, placing the generals' estimates that the war was under control from beginning to end as an unreachable target.

They are fighting over every square meter of the Strip, which, under military standards, is considered the narrowest place on Earth exposed to the greatest amount of fire, with no decisive end in sight, according to the Israeli announced goals.

Every surprise of this war brings about subsequent surprises, and all estimates drawn from previous wars are no longer of value.

- Sixth surprise: global perception

Israel was content with the narrative shared with the US, portraying the Gaza war as a fight against ISIS and what it described as its "Palestinian branch."

The story lasted a few days but later declined, faded, and is no longer debatable. Thus, the Israeli behavior appears more "ISIS-y" than a defensive war, as it claimed at the beginning.

Israel's behavior awakened the conscience of the world shaken by the destruction of Gaza and the killing of thousands of civilians, half of whom were children, without mentioning those under the rubble.

The term "Israel's self-defense" has become mere nonsense that the world does not accept.

Israel was not surprised on a propaganda and narrative level only but also on a political level, as the world unanimously agreed that getting out of this cycle meant reaching a radical political solution to the Palestinian issue after it had become certain that its liquidation was impossible. This may be the seventh surprise.

As we approach the end of the year, two possibilities emerge, one positive and the other negative.

The first is for the world to move seriously towards a two-state solution, offering a real opportunity for the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Alternatively, the world's enthusiasm may wane, relegating the two-state solution to a mere slogan that Israel can obstruct.



Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
TT

Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website

As the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation by Hamas and the Gaza war began, Iran was already dealing with the fallout from protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, making the autumn of 2022 one of the bloodiest in the country’s recent history.

The war in Gaza erupted at a crucial time for Iran’s leadership, which was facing international pressure over its crackdown on protests, its drone supply to Russia, and stalled nuclear talks.

From the start, Tehran described Hamas’ attack as a “natural and spontaneous reaction” to what it called Israel's “provocative war policies” and actions by the far-right Israeli Prime Minister.

Iranian officials denied any role in planning the operation, but their diplomatic moves suggested they were prepared for the conflict’s impact on the region.

Less than a week after the attack, Iran’s late Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, began a regional tour, meeting with leaders of countries and groups allied with Iran, including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar.

His aim was to coordinate efforts and send regional messages.

Iran also warned Israel that it could face multiple fronts if its military actions in Gaza didn’t stop.

Tehran has since worked to strengthen the image of armed groups in the region, pushing to legitimize its support for these factions amid the ongoing political and regional unrest.

This marked a key moment for Iran, as Tehran claimed it had elevated the “Resistance Axis” groups from a regional to a “global” level, referring to this shift as a move from the “World of Resistance” to the “Global Resistance.”

In doing so, Iran, which had been trying to ease tensions with its neighbors, adopted a more aggressive stance towards groups linked to it. Many saw this as part of Iran’s broader strategy to expand its influence across the region.

Officially, Iran told the international community that these groups act independently, make their own decisions, and produce their own weapons.

However, several Iranian officials have acknowledged the role of Gen. Qassem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guards in supplying weapons and technology to these groups.

Iran’s second significant move after the Al-Aqsa Flood came a month into the Gaza war when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for cutting off Israel’s “economic lifelines,” especially oil and energy routes.

Iranian-backed groups, especially the Houthis, began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, disrupting shipping for months.

At the same time, Iran-aligned militias in Iraq launched drone attacks on Israel and US bases in the region.

The US responded after one of its bases in Syria was attacked, striking positions held by these militias.

Politically, Iran insisted that its allied groups’ demands be met for any Gaza ceasefire, and it opposed international peace proposals, especially the “two-state solution.”

In December, Iran’s foreign minister even noted that both Iran and Israel rejected the two-state plan.

In the third phase, Israel ramped up airstrikes against Iranian forces in Syria. In December, an Israeli strike killed Razi Mousavi, a key Iranian logistics officer.

A month later, the Revolutionary Guards confirmed the death of their intelligence chief in Syria. The biggest blow came in April, when an Israeli airstrike on a meeting at the Iranian consulate killed Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahdi, Iran’s top military commander in Syria and Lebanon.

In its fourth major escalation, Iran nearly went to war with Israel after responding to the bombing of its consulate by launching hundreds of missiles and drones directly from its territory.

Israel claimed it intercepted the attack but retaliated by striking a radar system at a military airport in Isfahan, near a key nuclear site.

This clash heightened fears of a shift in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with growing talk in Tehran about developing deterrent weapons and Israel threatening to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The fifth key moment for Iran followed the deaths of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in a helicopter crash near the Azerbaijani border. Authorities quickly denied conspiracy theories, ruling out an Israeli attack.

Three months later, Iran’s military confirmed the crash was caused by bad weather, but some questions remained unanswered.

During this period, Iran’s political focus shifted away from the Gaza war due to the presidential election and efforts to form a new government.

Candidates in the election avoided discussing the Gaza conflict or Iran’s support for Hamas, despite criticism over ignoring pressing issues like sanctions and stalled nuclear negotiations.

Most candidates only praised Iran’s missile program and vowed to strengthen deterrence against Israel.

The sixth major event occurred during the inauguration of Iran's new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, on July 30, when Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated at a Quds Force facility in northern Tehran, marking a significant turn in the Gaza war.

Khamenei promised to respond to the “violation of Iranian sovereignty” following the assassination of a “guest of Iran.”

Officials and military leaders varied in their tone and language of threats but consistently stressed the need for a response as time passed and doubts about Iran’s actions increased.

Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran raised significant questions about the operation, especially regarding potential security breaches.

The seventh key moment was marked by the “Pager Bombings,” alongside a message of de-escalation from Pezeshkian, particularly towards the US and Israel.

Before traveling to New York, Pezeshkian stated at a press conference that Iran does not want to destabilize the region or export its revolution. He expressed a willingness to engage with the US if it shows it is not hostile, even referring to the US as “brotherly.”

During meetings at the UN General Assembly, he reiterated, “Iran is ready to set aside its weapons if Israel does the same,” according to an audio recording.

Pezeshkian explained that the delay in Iran’s response to Haniyeh’s assassination was due to indications that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas was imminent, expressing frustration over the lack of progress and ongoing Israeli attacks.

Pezeshkian downplayed Hezbollah’s ability to confront Israel independently, challenging the narrative from officials close to Khamenei.

His remarks, along with concerns about possible security breaches during the “Pager Bombings” and the targeting of Hezbollah leaders, raised suspicions in Tehran about vulnerabilities in Iran’s defense and heightened fears of internal security lapses.

The eighth and most critical phase began with the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, a key figure in Iran’s regional strategy, second only to Gen. Soleimani.

The Israeli airstrike on Nasrallah’s headquarters also led to a significant loss for the Revolutionary Guards.

Nasrallah is highly regarded among Iran’s leaders, especially conservatives. His name has occasionally been mentioned as a potential successor to Khamenei, but such a candidacy would likely face opposition from various political factions due to his non-Iranian status.

In response to the assassinations of Haniyeh and Nasrallah, Iran launched its second direct missile attack on Israel.

This prompted Israel to threaten retaliation, indicating it could target various facilities, including oil refineries, fuel stations, and nuclear and military sites.

The situation between Israel and Iran remains highly volatile, with the potential for further escalation.