Losses and Gains: What Next after Western Strikes against the Houthis?

An aircraft takes off to join the US-led coalition to conduct air strikes against military targets in Yemen, aimed at the Iran-backed Houthi militias that have been targeting international shipping in the Red Sea, from an undisclosed location, in this handout picture released on January 12, 2024. (US Central Command via X/Handout via Reuters)
An aircraft takes off to join the US-led coalition to conduct air strikes against military targets in Yemen, aimed at the Iran-backed Houthi militias that have been targeting international shipping in the Red Sea, from an undisclosed location, in this handout picture released on January 12, 2024. (US Central Command via X/Handout via Reuters)
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Losses and Gains: What Next after Western Strikes against the Houthis?

An aircraft takes off to join the US-led coalition to conduct air strikes against military targets in Yemen, aimed at the Iran-backed Houthi militias that have been targeting international shipping in the Red Sea, from an undisclosed location, in this handout picture released on January 12, 2024. (US Central Command via X/Handout via Reuters)
An aircraft takes off to join the US-led coalition to conduct air strikes against military targets in Yemen, aimed at the Iran-backed Houthi militias that have been targeting international shipping in the Red Sea, from an undisclosed location, in this handout picture released on January 12, 2024. (US Central Command via X/Handout via Reuters)

The American and British strikes against weapons caches and camps of the Iran-backed Houthi militias in Yemen didn't come as a surprise after Washington and London had threatened to carry them out days earlier in response to the militias’ attacks on Red Sea shipping.

However, questions have been raised over the impact of the strikes on the Yemeni crisis and the power of the Houthis themselves.

The strikes were a precedent in the Yemeni conflict and may lead to new developments and veer the political process off its course. The United Nations had declared in December a roadmap for peace that the Yemeni warring parties were set to discuss this month.

Mark Kimmitt, former US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the strikes succeeded in hitting their targets, even though the order to take them may have come too late.

He said it would be “interesting” to see whether the Houthis understood the consequences of their continued attacks in the Red Sea.

They must think twice before retaliating, he remarked, but added that since they are the Houthis, they will likely respond.

Kimmitt predicted that more strikes will be carried out if the initial barrage didn’t hit all their targets.

The United States carried out an additional strike against the Houthis on Friday. The guided missile destroyer Carney used Tomahawk missiles in the follow-on strike early on Saturday local time "to degrade the Houthis' ability to attack maritime vessels, including commercial vessels," the US Central Command said in a statement on X, formerly Twitter.

US and British warplanes, ships and submarines on Thursday launched missiles against targets across Yemen controlled by the militias, which have cast their maritime campaign as support for Palestinians under siege by Israel in Hamas-ruled Gaza.

Kimmitt said the Houthi escalation in response to the raids depends on what Iran wants. He stressed that the militias are being trained, equipped and supported by Tehran.

Moreover, he refuted claims by Iran that it has no control over its proxies in the region. Tehran says the groups take their decisions independently from it, while Kimmitt stated that US assessments show otherwise.

Furthermore, he added that it was necessary for the Houthis to be again designated as terrorist.

The Biden administration had removed their designation soon after it came to power, believing that the Houthis would become more moderate and less hostile.

The contrary happened, noted Kimmitt. The Houthis today are worse than they were before the designation was removed, he went to say, adding that he believes Washington may decide to blacklist them again.

Political gains

Aide to the Yemeni prime minister Ali al-Sarari said the Houthis have made political gains after the western strikes.

He explained that the militias will likely gain more support in Yemen and beyond. They will be seen in the same vein as Hamas in that they are both fighting Israel and the US because of the war on Gaza and Israel’s escalation in the occupied West Bank.

He noted the recent regional efforts, led by Saudi Arabia and Oman, to speed up the peace process in Yemen and agree on a roadmap. The western strikes will only strengthen the Houthis’ negotiations position, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The Houthis have gained greater support on the local and Arab levels, he continued, expecting that the peace process will probably come to a halt after the strikes.

Moreover, he doubted the strikes had really impacted the Houthis’ military capabilities, explaining that the West had warned that it would carry out the attacks, so the militias had ample time to move their weapons to safer locations, such as caves and other hideouts.

In addition, the strikes killed and wounded no more than six Houthis, which is a small figure compared to the 73 raids the West carried, meaning they weren’t very effective, he said.

Shirking responsibilities

It seems the US and its western allies are at a loss over how to protect their economic interests and achieve a political settlement in Yemen while still keeping the Houthis in the picture despite their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

Yemeni political researcher Abduljalil Alhaqab echoed al-Sarari's remarks that the western strikes will strengthen the Houthi position and claim they are confronting Israel and the West.

What is actually happening really serves Israel, the Houthis and Iran, all of whom are opposed by the Yemeni people, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Ultimately, all these developments will severely harm the Yemeni people themselves, their state and political and economic future, he lamented.

Alhaqab said the western strikes will not impact the Houthis’ military capabilities unless they are carried out over a prolonged campaign.

He said defeating the Houthis demands a military solution on the ground and support to the Yemenis from the international community. The Houthis have the means to develop their capabilities, make up for their losses and recruit more fighters, he warned.

Meanwhile, a Yemeni government official said the Houthis’ intransigence will push them to expand the confrontation, which may escalate the situation and incur greater dangers, disasters and tragedies in Yemen and the region, and allow them to shirk their responsibilities towards peace.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, he criticized the international community for dealing with the Red Sea tensions without consulting the legitimate Yemeni government.

He noted that the international community’s pressure on Yemen had allowed the Houthis to expand their influence over the war-torn country over the years. It is now time for it to realize that its interests cannot be secured without ending the Houthi coup and their deployment at Yemeni ports and coastal regions.

Limited impact

The Houthis have vowed to retaliate to the western strikes by attacking American and British vessels in the Red Sea. The militias’ leaders warned the two powers that they will not be the ones who decide how the fight ends.

Yemeni political researchers Salah Ali Salah said the western strikes will have a “very limited” impact on the Houthis.

Politically, the militias can escalate their tone to underscore their claims that they are confronting foreign powers, and in return, they will gain more local support and recruit more fighters, he explained.

Moreover, he said the West lost the element of surprise when it warned that it would carry out attacks in response to the Houthi attacks. The warning allowed the militias to take precautions.

Furthermore, he revealed that the strikes actually hit positions the Arab coalition had previously attacked. He speculated that the attacks could not have been aimed at weakening the Houthis’ military capabilities, but simply delivering a message.

Weakening the Houthis’ military capabilities demands operations on the ground, he went on to say.

Another political analyst warned that the Houthis will exploit the strikes to garner Arab support, including financial donations and even recruit fighters. This will only bolster Iran’s position in the region.

Tehran wants to sow division among Arabs, which will favor Israel, he told Asharq Al-Awsat from Sanaa on condition of anonymity.

The Houthis believe that the US and its allies don’t want to wage an open confrontation with them. Rather, the militias are carrying out the attacks in the Red Sea to improve their position at any negotiations table.

The days will tell what sort of confrontation is in store for the Houthis, he said, noting the fate of ISIS in Iraq which may be in wait for the militias if they continue with their intransigence and hostile behavior.



Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
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Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)

Journalists sometimes hear shocking statements—ones they lock away in their memory, fearing their repercussions. Some are too violent, too damaging, or too costly to repeat. Others risk swift denial from those who made them.

That was the case in late January 1987, when Kuwait hosted the fifth Islamic Summit.

Among the leaders in attendance were Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat.

I had requested an interview with Arafat, and he agreed to meet. After an exchange of pleasantries, he delivered a series of startling remarks.

“What’s happening in Beirut?” he asked.

“You know the country is grappling with the aftermath of the war of the camps,” I replied.

“No, Ghassan,” he shot back. “This is not the ‘war of the camps.’ The real name is the ‘war on the camps.’ It was personally ordered by Hafez al-Assad. Regrettably, the Amal Movement, led by Nabih Berri, is carrying out the decision, aided—unfortunately—by the Lebanese Army’s Sixth Brigade.”

Arafat must have noticed my surprise at his bluntness, because he raised his voice in anger.

“Assad is trying to finish what Ariel Sharon started in the 1982 invasion but failed to achieve. This is a continuation of Sharon’s mission to eliminate the PLO,” he charged.

Veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Assad: A Souk Al-Hamidiya merchant

I pointed out that his accusations were grave, targeting Syria’s head of state. His frustration only grew.

“Assad is not Syria’s president,” Arafat fumed.

“He is a merchant from Souk al-Hamidiya. If only he focused on reclaiming the Golan instead of blocking Palestinian independence to please America and Israel. Mark my words: time will prove me right. Hafez al-Assad does not recognize Palestine, nor Lebanon. He loathes Iraq under the guise of hating Saddam Hussein.”

Stunned, I listened as he went on.

“What they call an ‘uprising’ within Fatah is a conspiracy orchestrated by Assad and funded by [Libyan leader Moammar] al-Gaddafi. Assad’s only dream is to turn the Palestinian cause into a bargaining chip and to dominate Lebanon.”

As Arafat’s anger subsided, our conversation shifted to other topics.

A few days ago, I met with veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan—a man who carries the collective memory of two cities. Born in Tripoli, he has also witnessed Beirut’s political twists and turns, having been a close associate of Kamal Jumblatt and his son, Walid, as well as former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and his son, Saad.

He maintained ties with Arafat and participated in meetings with Assad and other Arab leaders. His recollections are rich with pivotal moments, particularly from his time as deputy leader of the National Movement, a coalition of leftist and nationalist forces led by Kamal Jumblatt.

Rocky start: Assad and Arafat’s strained relationship

Arafat’s relationship with Damascus was troubled from the outset. After a bloody internal dispute within Fatah, he was briefly detained in Syria, where the defense minister at the time was Hafez al-Assad.

Following the violent clashes between Palestinian factions and the Jordanian army in 1970, Assad came to view the presence of armed Palestinian groups as a source of chaos. This belief shaped his stance toward Arafat and the Palestinian resistance movement for years to come.

Assad grew uneasy when Palestinian factions relocated to Beirut and forged a broad alliance with Lebanon’s leftist parties and nationalist forces. He closely monitored Arafat’s rise as the dominant player on the Lebanese scene.

Despite Syria’s attempts to control the Palestinian file, Damascus struggled to rein in Fatah’s overwhelming influence and Arafat’s growing stature. His power extended to Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, where he effectively held decision-making authority.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Sultan recalled: “Hafez al-Assad never truly respected the idea of Palestinian resistance. I heard it from him directly and from those around him. His prevailing view was that there was no real resistance—just armed groups operating in coordination with intelligence agencies. The divide between Assad and Arafat was clear from the start.”

Sultan recounted an episode that underscored the deep divide between Assad and Arafat.

“One day, Assad told Arafat that Palestine did not exist—it was simply southern Syria. Arafat fired back, saying there was no such thing as Syria, only northern Palestine. There was an attempt to mask the exchange with humor, but the reality was that Assad genuinely viewed the issue through this lens,” Sultan said.

He explained that several Arab regimes sought to control the Palestinian cause, hoping to benefit from it without bearing its consequences.

“From the Baathist perspective, both in Baghdad and Damascus, there was a belief that the issue was too significant for the PLO to unilaterally determine its fate.”

Crackdown on Palestinian media

Sultan recalled a particularly tense moment in the PLO’s relationship with the Syrian regime.

“The organization operated a radio station in Syria. One day, it aired a segment quoting Arafat, including the phrase ‘There is water in my mouth’—a cryptic remark hinting at unspoken grievances. Syrian authorities responded swiftly, sending bulldozers to demolish the station and arresting several staff members.”

That night, Palestinian officials approached Sultan, urging him to speak with Kamal Jumblatt.

“Jumblatt suggested we arrange a meeting with Assad. It was Ramadan, so I contacted Hikmat al-Shihabi, then head of Syrian intelligence and our liaison,” recalled Sultan.

As the meeting neared sunset, Jumblatt sat across from Assad, with Sultan seated beside the Syrian president. The discussion quickly turned hostile toward Arafat.

“The conversation was filled with insults. Phrases like ‘We’ll bring him in’—implying they’d arrest him—and ‘We’ll flip him over’—a reference to how prisoners were beaten—were thrown around. Jumblatt, always polite and measured, stopped eating. Sensing his discomfort, Assad turned to me and asked me to intervene.”

Sultan responded: “Mr. President, the Palestinian fighters are not our schoolmates. We are committed to the Palestinian cause, and today, the PLO and Arafat represent that cause. These men have endured extreme hardships.”

Assad listened and then conceded: “Abu Rashid is right. Consider it settled, Kamal Bey.” The detainees were subsequently released.

A meeting between Kamal Jumblatt and Arafat attended by Toufic Sultan, George Hawi, Mohsen Ibrahim, and Yasser Abed Rabbo. (Courtesy of Toufic Sultan)

Deep-seated mutual hatred

Asked whether the animosity between Assad and Arafat was evident at the time, Sultan did not hesitate.

“Of course. It was well known,” he said. “One way to ingratiate oneself with Assad was to openly attack Arafat.”

He recalled a meeting with Walid Jumblatt, Assem Kanso—the head of Lebanon’s Baath Party—and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“When Arafat’s name came up, Khaddam abruptly declared, ‘Yasser Arafat is an Israeli spy.’ I remained silent. He turned to me and asked for my opinion. I simply said, ‘I heard you.’”

Khaddam pressed further: “What do you think?”

Sultan replied: “I respect your opinion, and this is your office. But if you want my honest view, it won’t please you.”

The atmosphere surrounding Assad was particularly hostile toward Fatah. Syrian authorities used every means at their disposal to infiltrate the group.

After years of effort, they succeeded in orchestrating major defections, the most notable led by Abu Saleh, Abu Musa, and Abu Khaled al-Omleh. Damascus provided these factions with logistical support, training camps, and other resources.

“Syria had the power to shrink or amplify political movements,” remembered Sultan.

Despite knowing that geography gave Assad a strategic advantage, Arafat was not an easy adversary.

He countered Syria’s animosity with his trademark defiance—flashing the victory sign and invoking phrases like “the Palestinian bloodbath” and “the longest Arab-Israeli war.”

These references underscored the resilience of Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies during Israel’s 1982 siege of Beirut, led by then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.

At the time, many believed that Arafat’s relentless emphasis on “independent Palestinian decision-making” was aimed more at Assad than at any other party.

Damascus, in turn, saw Arafat as dismissive of the sacrifices made by the Syrian army during Israel’s invasion of Beirut.

Syrian officials also suspected that he was waiting for an opportunity to join peace negotiations with Israel—an option that had eluded him after he failed to follow in the footsteps of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the late 1970s.