Ukraine Fights Russia in Sudan

Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan visits a military base in the coastal city of Port Sudan on August 28, 2023. (AFP)
Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan visits a military base in the coastal city of Port Sudan on August 28, 2023. (AFP)
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Ukraine Fights Russia in Sudan

Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan visits a military base in the coastal city of Port Sudan on August 28, 2023. (AFP)
Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan visits a military base in the coastal city of Port Sudan on August 28, 2023. (AFP)

Ukrainian special forces have begun training members of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Wall Street Journal reported, citing unnamed Ukrainian and Sudanese military officials.

The newspaper said when Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s military ruler, found himself besieged by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the country’s capital last summer, he called an unlikely ally for help: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Zelensky responded positively because "Burhan had been quietly supplying Kyiv with weapons since shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022," it wrote.

The first wave of Ukrainian troops—nearly 100 soldiers, mostly from HUR's Timur unit—landed on a charter jet in Sudan in mid-August.

The Ukrainians' first mission was to help get Burhan out of Khartoum, where the RSF had surrounded him. But not long after they arrived, Burhan drove in a convoy to the compound outside the capital where the Ukrainians were based.

Burhan thanked the Ukrainians for their efforts, then headed to Port Sudan, a city on the Red Sea that his forces still controlled. He met Zelensky at Ireland's Shannon Airport a few weeks later.

Following the meeting, the Ukrainian President wrote on Telegram: "We discussed our common security challenges, namely the activities of illegal armed groups financed by Russia."

The Ukrainian troops supplied Burhan's guards with new AKM rifles and silencers.

A 30-year-old officer from the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, known by the call sign King, who led the first group of Ukrainians to arrive in Sudan, said his team found strong differences between the Russian-Ukrainian war and the local conflict.

According to him, soldiers from both sides fought in sandals and fired at the enemy while holding their weapons above their heads. A large part of the Sudanese army was unmotivated and had not been paid for months. Soldiers did not wear insignia, which constantly led to losses due to friendly fire.

Taking advantage of the poor equipment of the "pro-Wagner" RSF, the Ukrainian military focused on night operations using night vision devices and night drones.

The intelligence officers went on missions at dusk around 8:00 p.m., traveling in vans and moving in several groups of six soldiers each. All operations were completed before dawn so they could return unnoticed at night.

"Even if we wanted to do something during the day, we're a group of white people," King said. "Everyone would realize what was going on."

Source of gold, arms

The WSJ said Sudan has become a battlefield in the Russia-Ukraine war because it is rich in two resources: weapons and gold.

During frequent conflicts in the country over several decades, arms poured in—directly and indirectly—from the US, Russia, China and elsewhere.

As a result, Sudan had plenty of weaponry to spare in early 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine and Kyiv was searching for all the arms it could find.

"We took a lot of weapons out of Sudan. Different countries paid for them. Sudan had a wide range of weapons, from Chinese to American," said Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.

Meanwhile, Russia has long been plumbing Sudan for gold. Wagner led Moscow's operation in the country, as it did in several other African nations. They trained RSF fighters, who in turn provided security for Russian entities at the mines.

Before the conflict in Sudan began last spring, only 30% of the gold mined in the country was officially registered with the central bank, leaving $4 billion of gold annually unaccounted for, according to Sudanese officials and activists. Much of that smuggled gold ended up in Russian hands, activists say.

RSF and Wagner

When the war erupted, the RSF initially refused Wagner's offer of heavy weapons, concerned about alienating the US.

But following military setbacks in April, the group reversed course, according to international security officials.

On April 28, a convoy of Toyota pickups supervised by Wagner brought weapons, including shoulder-mounted antiaircraft missiles from the neighboring Central African Republic, where Wagner had established a power base in recent years.

Wagner also began recruiting men from the Central African Republic to fight in Sudan and the RSF soon advanced into Khartoum, WSJ reported.

After the death of Wagner's leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin last year, the Russian Defense Ministry took control of the group's operations in Africa, though it is still widely known as Wagner.

Wagner

In November, King's team went home, and another arrived with new troops from the Timur unit. His team captured one Russian Wagner fighter and killed two others.

A 40-year-old Ukrainian officer, who goes by the call sign Prada and led one of the Ukrainian teams in Sudan, told the newspaper the man was detained during a fight in Omdurman, Khartoum's twin city on the west bank of the Nile River, after he had grown confused about which fighters were on which side, and stayed after his own side retreated.

"Wagner has become like a franchise in Sudan. They fight using locals. They give them patches, pay them a salary, and say, 'Now you're Wagner,' " Prada said. "It was never our goal to chase individual Wagner soldiers."

He said: "The goal was to disrupt Russian interests in Sudan."



Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
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Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)

The arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, marked by periods of resolution and banning of activities, is not disconnected from the long history of the group’s journey in the kingdom, dating back to the mid-1940s when it was first established.

However, this journey—characterized by varying relations with successive governments—began with collaboration and ended in conflict. How did this unfold?

Leaders of Jordan’s Islamic movement, encompassing both the banned Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, consistently supported Jordan’s stability during the last decades of the 20th century.

This support, however, shifted into decades of confrontation with the authorities after the divisions within the movement emerged.

A key moment in the movement's history came when Jordanian authorities accused the group of plotting to “stir chaos” and possessing “explosive materials,” marking a significant turning point for the Islamic movement in the kingdom.

This came especially after recordings revealed the arrested individuals’ ties to the unlicensed Brotherhood group in Jordan.

Founded in 1946, the Brotherhood initially operated as a charitable society, providing aid through fundraising efforts. It attracted young people who were influenced by its leaders’ calls for public activism.

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an alliance with the government. Its leaders gradually moved into senior official positions, using their power to expand their grassroots support and promote their message within Jordanian society, which historically had a strong conservative religious base.

During this time, the Brotherhood’s influence on school students was significant. It encouraged protests and sit-ins against political forces opposed to them, particularly the Communist and Ba’ath parties before the latter's split. Clashes occurred between these groups in downtown Amman and in key cities across the kingdom.

In the 1970s, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the government evolved into one of partnership and alliance, particularly under the leadership of former Prime Minister Wasfi Tal. This period saw prominent Islamic leader Ishaq Farhan appointed as Minister of Education and later as Minister of Awqaf, overseeing important reforms in educational curricula.

Farhan’s task of reforming the education system included incorporating the Brotherhood’s religious teachings into school textbooks, reflecting the growing influence of the group in shaping Jordanian public life.

Meanwhile, members of the Brotherhood, funded by the government, pursued advanced studies in the United States, returning to hold key positions in the Ministry of Education, with Abdullatif Arabiyat, a senior member, serving as the ministry’s deputy for almost a decade.

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Brotherhood sought to capitalize on regional developments, aiming to increase its political influence. Its leadership, particularly in key urban centers such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, began to broaden its outreach.

The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Awqaf became critical battlegrounds for the Brotherhood, enabling it to infiltrate mosques through imams and transform them into organizational hubs.

This religious outreach laid the groundwork for political mobilization, with gatherings and lessons organized after evening prayers, further solidifying the Brotherhood’s presence in the public sphere.

The political journey of the Brotherhood in Jordan took a dramatic turn in 1989, when the country lifted martial law and resumed parliamentary life after decades of authoritarian rule.

The Brotherhood seized the opportunity, winning a powerful bloc in the 11th Parliament and securing popular support, positioning itself as a key political player.

That era also marked the Brotherhood’s first foray into governance, backing Prime Minister Mudar Badran’s cabinet as part of a national effort to support Iraq against a US-led coalition. It was a rare alignment with the state, underscored by the election of Arabiyat as parliamentary speaker for three consecutive terms — a move widely seen as part of a government-Brotherhood alliance.

In 1992, the group formalized its political arm with the creation of the Islamic Action Front, cementing the link between its religious mission and political ambitions. But the distinction between party and group remained blurred, with critics arguing that the party remained under Brotherhood control.

That same year, tensions flared when the Brotherhood opposed Jordan’s participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, prompting a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Taher Masri. Although Masri resigned voluntarily, the incident marked the start of growing rifts between the Brotherhood and the state.

The following parliamentary elections in 1993 deepened internal fractures, both within the movement and between the Brotherhood and its political allies. The rift widened further in 1994, when Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the vote on the treaty, signaling a decisive shift from cooperation to confrontation.

In the aftermath of the peace treaty, the Brotherhood distanced itself from official alliances and became a staunch opponent of normalization with Israel. The group boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections, a move that triggered an exodus of leaders who opposed the boycott. Some dissidents went on to form the moderate Islamist Wasat Party, led by Abdel Rahim Akkour.

Distrust between the Brotherhood and the government deepened under the shadow of King Hussein’s illness and the succession of King Abdullah II. The movement remained politically dormant until 2003, when the Islamic Action Front re-entered parliament following a two-year suspension of legislative life during the Second Intifada. The party secured 16 seats in the 14th Parliament.

However, the rocky relationship persisted. In 2007, the Brotherhood and its party participated in elections again after negotiations with then-Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit. But allegations of large-scale vote rigging saw the Islamic Action Front secure only six seats — a result it denounced as a betrayal of the agreement with the government.

The controversial election result sparked a leadership crisis within the Brotherhood. The group’s hardline faction, known as the Hawks, overpowered the traditional moderates (the Doves) in internal polls, leading to a purge of long-standing leaders.

Accusations emerged that the group had been hijacked by Hamas sympathizers, reshaping the Brotherhood’s identity and guiding principles.

In the years that followed, former leaders split from the movement, accusing its new leadership of dragging the Brotherhood and its political arm into a confrontational path aligned with regional Islamist movements.

From mainstream political player to marginalized actor, the Brotherhood’s trajectory in Jordan mirrors a broader regional trend — one where Islamist movements rise through democratic openings but often clash with the state over ideology, foreign policy, and the limits of political power.