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ISIS Women in Syria’s Al-Hol, Roj Camps: Uncertain Fates Ahead

One of the main streets in Al-Hol camp (Asharq Al-Awsat)
One of the main streets in Al-Hol camp (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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ISIS Women in Syria’s Al-Hol, Roj Camps: Uncertain Fates Ahead

One of the main streets in Al-Hol camp (Asharq Al-Awsat)
One of the main streets in Al-Hol camp (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Over the years, Al-Hol camp has grown into a bustling city of tents, home to nearly 43,000 people, mostly women and children from Iraq and Syria. Another section hosts families from 54 different Western and Arab countries.
Situated around 45 kilometers east of Al-Hasakah Governorate in Syria’s far northeast, Al-Hol’s population has surged from just a few hundred in 2016 to over 70,000 during the ISIS era.
About 136 kilometers away lies Roj camp, seeming similar to other refugee camps at first glance. But beyond its gates are high walls, surveillance cameras, and hundreds of tents housing jihadist women, fighters’ wives, and ISIS leaders.
While some women try to leave, others still hold onto beliefs that drew them to join the terror group, turning these camps into uncertain waiting grounds.
In the market of Al-Hol camp in eastern Syria, Iraqi and Syrian women shop for groceries, fruits, and even cosmetics. Some also get their phones fixed while vendors sell everything from dresses to Valentine’s Day gifts and perfumes, once banned under ISIS.
According to the UN refugee agency, the camp hosts 43,477 people, mostly Iraqi refugees followed by Syrian displaced persons, and around 6,500 foreign migrants, with women and children forming the majority.
Threats and Killings Persist in Al-Hol Camp
Al-Hol camp is run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their military branch, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Despite security efforts, violence continues, with attempted mass escapes being stopped by security.
The camp director reported receiving complaints of armed men threatening and robbing organizations operating at Al-Hol during the day.
The Iraqi government has brought back 1,400 families from Al-Hol camp in six groups by the end of 2023. However, many countries refuse to take back their citizens, even in humanitarian cases.
Women Search for Missing Husbands
“I've been in the camp for 6, 7, or maybe 10 years... Honestly, I can't remember. We're tired of waiting,” said Noran, a seventy-year-old Iraqi woman in Al-Hol camp. She, like many others, can’t recall when she arrived, living without much hope.
She came to Syria in mid-2016 when the borders dissolved due to the conflict. Now, she lives with her widowed daughter and granddaughter; her daughter’s husband died in battles in Deir ez-Zor.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Noran expressed her readiness to return to Iraq if given the chance because she’s endured enough suffering.
Raghad Rasool, another Iraqi refugee in Al-Hol camp for six years, left her hometown in 2015, unsure of her husband and four brothers’ fate. They were captured after the Baghouz battle five years ago. Raghad longs to see them again.
Rassol sat selling parsley, onions, and mint in the market to support her family of five.
At 54, wrinkles marked her face as she lamented her situation.
“There’s no safety, life is tough, and we know nothing about the prisoners. But seeing my children without a future is the hardest,” she told Asharq Al-Awsat.
Many Iraqi refugee women share Raghad’s pain, not knowing what happened to their husbands or male family members held by coalition forces and the SDF.
Azhar, 32, dressed in black with only her eyes visible, spoke in a low voice to Asharq Al-Awsat, fearing surveillance.
“My husband has been missing for five years. I don't know if he's alive or dead. I have the right to know his fate, but I fear him being taken to Iraq and tried for belonging to the organization (ISIS),” she said.
Azhar, the Iraqi refugee, recounted moving between several Syrian cities to escape ISIS until they ended up in Baghouz.
After the men surrendered, the women and children were taken to Al-Hol camp.
All my family is here, including my parents and 30 relatives with my children, the oldest being 18 and the youngest 10,” she added.
Survivors Speak Out Amidst 150 Murders in Al-Hol Camp
In a guarded section of Al-Hol camp, security forces stand watch, restricting access to only those with written permission. Known as the “safe zone,” it shelters 25 families who escaped ISIS retaliation.
Lina, 23, a displaced Syrian from Al-Safira, shares her ordeal. Married off at 12 to a Tunisian fighter 33 years her senior, she reflects on her mother’s death in childbirth and her stepmother’s pressure to marry quickly.
Moving between ISIS-held areas, Lina settled in Baghouz, where her husband died, leaving her with two children who later succumbed to illness.
“Now I'm alone, hoping for a safer place,” she told Asharq Al-Awsat.
In Al-Hol, threats from pro-ISIS groups haunted Lina, culminating in an assassination attempt that forced her into the safe zone.
Al-Hol has seen over 150 murders, with 36 in 2023 alone.
Dima, 28, from Manbij, shares her fear: “Even in the safe zone, I fear for my life as night falls.”
Her husband, once an ISIS nurse, refused their orders, leading to an assassination attempt on Dima’s life. She’s now sheltered in the safe zone, hoping for safety.

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How the Yemeni Gov’t Handled Iran’s Sanaa Airport Escalation

Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
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How the Yemeni Gov’t Handled Iran’s Sanaa Airport Escalation

Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)

Yemen’s leadership viewed an Iranian aircraft’s attempt to land at Sanaa airport last Monday as more than an aviation incident that could be overlooked to avoid further escalation.

It saw the attempted landing as a direct challenge to state sovereignty and an effort to impose a new political and military reality outside the country’s legitimate institutions at a time of unprecedented regional tension.

Unlike in previous crises, the government responded through a coordinated mix of calculated military action, organized political measures, and legal and diplomatic efforts. It also sought to avoid a wider confrontation that it believed Tehran wanted in order to turn Yemen once again into an arena for regional conflict.

From the first hours of the crisis, Yemen’s leadership emphasized a central message: defending sovereignty does not conflict with pursuing peace, and the state can enforce the law without abandoning its responsibility to protect civilians or preserve the prospects of a political settlement.

The targeting of Sanaa airport’s runway to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing was therefore the final step in a long series of political and legal measures that preceded the use of force.

The government said it had exhausted all official channels to operate the airport and had offered alternatives to ensure the continuation of civilian flights via Yemenia Airways, the national carrier legally authorized to operate them.

What distinguished the government’s handling of the crisis was that it did not merely respond to the incident but also sought to shape the political narrative surrounding it.

From the outset, official statements stressed that the dispute was not over the operation of Sanaa airport or citizens’ ability to travel. It concerned an attempt to seize one of the state’s most important sovereign powers: control over its airspace and international ports of entry.

The Yemeni leadership repeatedly said the problem was not the aircraft itself, but the operation of international flights without the approval of the legitimate authorities, in violation of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and UN Security Council resolutions on Yemen.

The government also said it had proposed practical solutions before the escalation, including transporting the Houthi delegation from Tehran aboard an aircraft chartered by Yemenia Airways.

It said the group rejected the offer, strengthening the government’s argument before the international community that it had resorted to force only after exhausting other options.

Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chairman Rashad al-Alimi said the priority was to protect civilian lives and public property and avoid widening the confrontation in a way that would serve Iran’s goal of drawing Yemen into regional conflicts.

The message was intended to reassure the public and show that the military decision remained subject to careful political calculations rather than emotional reactions.

The government’s continuous meetings and the formation of a national crisis-management team also reflected a shift toward a unified approach combining military, political, diplomatic and media efforts.

This gave the official response greater coherence than in previous crises.

Domestic, International Support

Observers say the Yemeni government also succeeded in turning the crisis from a confrontation between itself and the Houthis into an issue concerning respect for the sovereignty of a UN member state.

Domestically, the House of Representatives, the Shura Council, the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission and the National Bloc of Political Parties and Components quickly declared their full support for the measures taken by the PLC.

They described the incident as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty rather than merely a political dispute.

The significance of this alignment was that it came from official institutions and political parties affiliated with the legitimate authorities, giving the leadership political cover against attempts to portray it as lacking internal consensus in its handling of the crisis.

Internationally, Yemen’s diplomatic efforts appeared to have preceded the UN Security Council meeting, after the government succeeded in persuading several major powers to adopt positions close to its account of the incident.

The United States described the Iranian landing as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty and linked it to the possible transfer of military experts and equipment to the Houthis, saying this would breach Security Council resolutions.

Britain said any flights conducted without the approval of the legitimate government constituted a violation of international law and called for an investigation through UN mechanisms.

France went further, linking the incident to what it described as Iran’s destabilizing conduct in the region.

It renewed its call for an end to the transfer of military equipment to the Houthis while reaffirming its support for Yemen’s unity and sovereignty.

Although the United Nations maintained its traditional call for de-escalation, it also stressed the need to respect Yemen’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, giving the government additional political support in defending its position.

Multiple Messages

The legitimate Yemeni authorities’ handling of the Iranian aircraft crisis can be seen as an attempt to deliver three parallel messages.

The first was directed at Iran: Yemen was no longer an open arena where new realities could be imposed through air traffic or sovereign ports of entry, and any attempt to bypass state institutions would face practical measures, even as the government remained committed to peace.

The second message was aimed at the Houthis: using civilian suffering or Sanaa airport as political leverage would not lead to recognition of authorities operating in parallel to the state.

The government would not allow sovereign powers to be established outside its institutions.

The third message had an international dimension.

The government called on the Security Council to move from condemnation to deterrence by strictly enforcing sanctions and council resolutions, particularly resolutions 2140 and 2216.

It said continued tolerance of violations would encourage their repetition.

Despite the political and diplomatic gains achieved by the legitimate authorities, however, the crisis has not ended in practical terms.

It remains tied to the international community’s ability to translate condemnation into measures that prevent similar incidents and ensure respect for the Yemeni state’s sovereignty over all land, sea and air entry points.

The continuing efforts of UN envoy Hans Grundberg, alongside international positions supporting de-escalation, also reflect growing recognition that preserving the fragile truce requires addressing the roots of the crisis.

These include ending the Houthi coup and preventing humanitarian issues and sovereign ports of entry from being used as tools of conflict.

For the Yemeni government, observers say, the crisis was more a political test than a military one.

Through its response, it sought to establish a new equation: defending sovereignty does not contradict the pursuit of peace, and the state can combine restraint with resolve while respecting international law and asserting its authority.

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How Could Growing Egypt-Türkiye Ties Shape Regional Conflicts?

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sign a military cooperation agreement in Cairo on Feb. 4. (Turkish Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sign a military cooperation agreement in Cairo on Feb. 4. (Turkish Presidency)
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How Could Growing Egypt-Türkiye Ties Shape Regional Conflicts?

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sign a military cooperation agreement in Cairo on Feb. 4. (Turkish Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sign a military cooperation agreement in Cairo on Feb. 4. (Turkish Presidency)

A series of high-level meetings between Egypt and Türkiye has culminated in the first visit by an Egyptian defense minister to Ankara in 13 years, raising questions about whether the two countries’ rapidly expanding ties could help ease conflicts across the Middle East.

The visit, which began Sunday, included the signing of a letter of intent on defense cooperation.

Experts interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat differed, however, on the extent to which the rapprochement has translated into tangible gains. While some argued it has helped reduce tensions, particularly in Libya, others said it has yet to produce meaningful progress in the region’s major crises.

Türkiye and Egypt signed the defense cooperation letter on Monday following talks in Ankara between Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler and his Egyptian counterpart, Ashraf Salem Zaher.

The visit followed the conclusion of the Anatolian Eagle 2026 joint air exercise, which brought together the Egyptian, Turkish and Azerbaijani air forces, with the participation of a NATO airborne early warning aircraft. It also came after the fifth meeting of the Egyptian-Turkish Joint Military Committee.

The two countries held the inaugural meeting of their High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council during Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s visit to Ankara in September 2024, after reviving the mechanism during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Cairo earlier that year.
A second council meeting in Cairo last February produced a joint statement highlighting closer positions on the Palestinian issue and the crises in Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia and the Sahel, as well as counterterrorism.

Bashir Abdel Fattah, a Türkiye affairs specialist at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said the rapprochement had at least prevented confrontation in Libya, where Cairo and Ankara once backed rival interests.

He noted that the growing political understanding between the two countries has helped de-escalate the conflict and support efforts toward a political settlement that preserves Libya’s territorial integrity.

Türkiye analyst Mahmoud Alloush shared that assessment, describing Egyptian-Turkish coordination as a turning point in Libya and noting parallel efforts involving Saudi Arabia to advance a political solution.

Not everyone is convinced. Rokha Ahmed Hassan, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, said expectations that Egyptian-Turkish understandings would help resolve Libya’s crisis have yet to be realized, largely because of divisions among Libyan parties.

He argued that while bilateral coordination has strengthened political dialogue across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, it has not yet delivered concrete results.

On July 11, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan agreed during a phone call to continue consultations on shared security concerns and work to prevent further military escalation in the region.

On Syria, Abdel Fattah said Cairo and Ankara agree on preserving the country’s unity despite differences over Türkiye’s military presence.

He stressed that expanding political and military coordination is creating the trust needed to address contentious issues, including Israeli actions in Syria, reconstruction and burden-sharing.

Hassan, however, said the rapprochement has yet to produce a positive impact on Syria because Cairo and Ankara continue to differ over Türkiye’s approach to Islamist groups.

The two countries are more closely aligned on Somalia. Hassan emphasized that their shared support for Somalia’s territorial integrity has had positive, albeit gradual, effects, though significant security challenges remain.

Alloush described Somalia as an example of “competitive cooperation,” arguing that managed competition between Egypt and Türkiye could ultimately strengthen stability there.

Abdel Fattah, for his part, noted that the emerging partnership provides a solid strategic framework that could help cool regional conflicts. He called for broader coordination with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to curb destabilizing external interference and establish a regional order that better serves the interests of Middle Eastern states.

On June 21, El-Sisi called for institutionalizing the consultative mechanism bringing together Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, which was launched three weeks after the outbreak of the US-Iran war in late February.

Features

Ticking Time Bomb? Europe’s Ageing Population Brings Challenges

A resident of a nursing home eats fruit to beat the heat in Munich, Germany, July 14, 2026. (Reuters)
A resident of a nursing home eats fruit to beat the heat in Munich, Germany, July 14, 2026. (Reuters)
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Ticking Time Bomb? Europe’s Ageing Population Brings Challenges

A resident of a nursing home eats fruit to beat the heat in Munich, Germany, July 14, 2026. (Reuters)
A resident of a nursing home eats fruit to beat the heat in Munich, Germany, July 14, 2026. (Reuters)

The population of the 27-nation European Union will peak in 2029 before falling in the coming decades, according to a report published Tuesday that spotlights the major challenges the bloc faces from an ageing population.

Today there are 450.6 million people, but researchers say this will peak at 453.3 million in 2029 before a slow long-term decline.

The population will fall to 398.8 million people by 2100, an overall drop of 11.7 percent and a level that was last experienced in the 1970s.

Europeans are living longer than ever before thanks to vastly improved healthcare, and better life and social conditions.

But an ageing population poses challenges for society and the EU economy, and while migration could help, it's not the fix Europe might hope for.

The EU executive's Joint Research Center said life expectancy at birth reached 81.5 years in 2024.

By 2050, nearly one in three EU residents will be aged 65 or older, compared to one in five today, the center said.

By 2100, life expectancy could exceed 90 years for women and 86 for men.

Such trends present "significant challenges", the EU said, including labor shortages, strained public budgets, and pressure on care and education systems.

It is, however, not all negative as the report points to the rise of the "silver economy" -- a growing market for goods and services for older citizens.

- 'Migration is a necessity' -

Migration can help offset some effects of Europe's demographic change, the researchers said, but it would have a limited impact on "fully" addressing the challenges posed by an ageing population.

But as fertility rates fall, migration counterbalances the negative effects of an ageing population and labor force contraction, the report said.

"Migration is a necessity," EU commissioner Dubravka Suica told reporters.

Fewer babies are being born to each woman in Europe, a decline that has been steady since the 1960s.

The fertility rate fell to 1.34 children per woman in 2024, well below the replacement level of 2.1 needed to keep the population stable without migration.

The median age of a European was 44.9 in 2025, and there are major disparities between EU countries. Ireland is relatively young with a median age of 39.6 years while Italy's was 49.1.

"We are living longer, healthier lives than ever before -- one of our greatest achievements. But demographic change is reshaping our societies, our economies and our labor markets," Suica said in a statement.

"We must act now to turn this transformation into an opportunity," she added.

The EU insists the bloc must boost productivity and cut unemployment to offset the effects of a shrinking workforce.

Currently around 20 percent of working-age Europeans are outside the labor force, the report said, while some eight million young people are neither in employment, education nor training.

The situation is particular to Europe as the global population is not falling.

Population growth is increasingly concentrated in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and some Middle Eastern countries, the report said.