After a Huge Setback in Local Elections, Which Way Forward Now for Türkiye’s Erdogan?

Two women sit near a campaign banner of Turkish President and leader of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, Recep Tayyip in Istanbul, Türkiye, Monday, March 11, 2024. (AP)
Two women sit near a campaign banner of Turkish President and leader of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, Recep Tayyip in Istanbul, Türkiye, Monday, March 11, 2024. (AP)
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After a Huge Setback in Local Elections, Which Way Forward Now for Türkiye’s Erdogan?

Two women sit near a campaign banner of Turkish President and leader of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, Recep Tayyip in Istanbul, Türkiye, Monday, March 11, 2024. (AP)
Two women sit near a campaign banner of Turkish President and leader of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, Recep Tayyip in Istanbul, Türkiye, Monday, March 11, 2024. (AP)

The huge gains made by the opposition in Türkiye’s local elections are raising the possibility that the long-serving President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling party could step back from some of the populist leader’s more polarizing policies ahead of the next round of voting in four years’ time.

There is no doubt that Sunday's local polls were a blow to both Erdogan and his Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party, or AKP, which won last year’s presidential and parliamentary elections.

In the balloting, the main opposition center-left Republican People’s Party, or CHP, kept hold of Istanbul and the capital of Ankara by wide margins, but also added wins in conservative provinces — such as Adiyaman and Kilis in the south — to municipalities it gained in the 2019 balloting.

WHAT HAPPENS NOW? Some analysts said on Monday the outcome was a warning and that they expect Erdogan’s government will pursue a path of "normalization" that also includes soothing ties with NATO allies such as the United States and neighboring Greece — and adopting less antagonistic programs at home.

Erdogan, who has presided over Türkiye for more than two decades — as prime minister since 2003 and president since 2014 — acknowledged the electoral setback in a speech from the balcony of the presidential palace late Sunday, saying his party had suffered "a loss of altitude" across Türkiye.

The people delivered a "message" that AKP will "analyze" by engaging in "courageous" self-criticism, he said.

Seda Demiralp, a political science professor at Isik University in Istanbul, said she has already seen this pattern when Erdogan upset predictions of an opposition win in last May's elections after the devastating earthquake that killed more than 53,000 people in the country’s south.

Despite its demoralizing performance last year, the CHP won the popular vote in many major cities.

"This was a warning," Demiralp said. "I expect Erdogan to continue normalization ... or (the AKP) will keep losing further."

WHAT ABOUT RELIGIOUS AND FAMILY VALUES? Others who have been watching Türkiye closely don't see Erdogan making any radical U-turns or drastic changes in his conservative Islamist policies. But a toning-down may be on the cards.

Wolfango Piccoli, the co-president of New York-based consulting firm Teneo, suggests Erdogan may put a brake on his planned constitutional changes that would emphasize "family values" and safeguard, for example, the rights of women wanting to wear Islamic-style headscarves.

Still, "Erdogan will not move towards greater political accommodation, given his aversion to share power, and will not tone down his polarizing rhetoric due to this stinging defeat," Piccoli said.

Sunday’s elections saw the opposition CHP win 35 of Türkiye’s 81 provinces — including the country’s five most populous cities — while Erdogan’s AKP, took 24.

Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, director of the German Marshall Fund in Ankara, described the results as unprecedented for Erdogan.

Turnout was around 78%, according to the state-run Anadolu Agency, compared to 87% in last year's election. The results suggested it was mostly AKP supporters who failed to vote.

"We have never seen him lose like this," he said. "Now the CHP is leading the AKP in the polls for the first time ... This is a landslide for the CHP because they got more votes than the AKP for the first time."

"Türkiye is ready for change," said Unluhisarcikli.

WHERE IS THE ECONOMY GOING? The elections took place against the backdrop of an ongoing cost-of-living crisis, with voters facing annual inflation that rose to 67% in February. Meanwhile, Erdogan has allowed borrowing costs to rise to 50% in a bid to combat soaring prices.

Erdogan has long been a proponent of an unorthodox policy of cutting interest rates to fight inflation and had fired central bank governors who resisted his rate-slashing policies. That runs counter to traditional economic thinking, and many blame Erdogan’s unusual methods for Türkiye’s economic turmoil.

Commentators said that although the economic crisis left Erdogan’s popularity largely unaffected in last year’s national polls, AKP voters felt more inclined to express discontent when his name was not on the ballot paper.

"I think Turkish voters sent the clear message to Erdogan that enough is enough," said Berk Esen, associate professor of political science at Istanbul’s Sabanci University.

"If Erdogan does not get his act together and change his ruling party, this ... decline that we have experienced vis-a-vis AKP’s vote share is going to continue," Esen added.

HOW HAS THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE CHANGED? Although Istanbul, where Erdogan was born and raised and where he began his political career, was seen as the main battleground in the election and where the opposition retained its hold on the city, in the southeast, the pro-Kurdish Equality and Democracy Party took 10 provinces — despite years of repression that have seen Kurdish mayors removed and replaced with government appointees, and thousands of political activists arrested.

The Erdogan-allied Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, won eight scattered across the country. The New Welfare Party, or YRP, which largely competed with the AKP over the support of conservative voters, took two provinces.

It was the third biggest party in terms of nationwide votes, taking 6.2%. The IYI Party and the Great Unity Party won the remaining two provinces.

Those who had expected the opposition to perform poorly in Sunday’s election were stunned.

A change in the leadership in the CHP after last year's elections — from the 75-year-old Kemal Kilicdaroglu to Ozgur Ozel, 49 — appeared to have revitalized the party and paved the way for incumbent CHP mayors and other candidates to secure conclusive victories.

Analysts contrasted the strong candidates fielded by the opposition — such as Ekrem Imamoglu in Istanbul and Mansur Yavas in Ankara — to those for the AKP, who were largely overshadowed by Erdogan during the campaign.

Imamoglu won by a margin of more than 11 points while Yavas secured a gap of nearly 29 points on his AKP rival.

The results could position Imamoglu as a potential challenger for the presidency in 2028, despite an outstanding legal case that could see him banned from politics.

"Leadership is becoming more important than parties and ideologies," Demiralp said. "Especially in a country like Türkiye where institutions are weak, people connect to leaders rather than parties and other institutions."

WHAT IS THE WORD ON THE STREET? Sentiments were mixed on Monday on the streets of Istanbul, where many lauded the opposition's victory but others expressed concerns amid the economic crisis and their daily struggles.

"We woke up to a good day," said opposition supporter Ayse Poplata, adding the results "will be beneficial for our country."

Hicabi Pekdemir, 54, said he voted against Erdogan's AKP, citing a six-fold increase in his rent over the last two years.

"I live by myself and I have two kids," he said. "How do I make ends meet?"

Fatma Hanedar, 40, said she was "devastated and very upset" by the outcome and said the voters showed "such ungratefulness" for Erdogan's leadership through Türkiye’s recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and rebuilding efforts after last year’s earthquake.

"Thank God our president is still at the helm," said another AKP supporter, Husamettin Ezer, 52.



ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.