After a Huge Setback in Local Elections, Which Way Forward Now for Türkiye’s Erdogan?

Two women sit near a campaign banner of Turkish President and leader of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, Recep Tayyip in Istanbul, Türkiye, Monday, March 11, 2024. (AP)
Two women sit near a campaign banner of Turkish President and leader of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, Recep Tayyip in Istanbul, Türkiye, Monday, March 11, 2024. (AP)
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After a Huge Setback in Local Elections, Which Way Forward Now for Türkiye’s Erdogan?

Two women sit near a campaign banner of Turkish President and leader of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, Recep Tayyip in Istanbul, Türkiye, Monday, March 11, 2024. (AP)
Two women sit near a campaign banner of Turkish President and leader of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, Recep Tayyip in Istanbul, Türkiye, Monday, March 11, 2024. (AP)

The huge gains made by the opposition in Türkiye’s local elections are raising the possibility that the long-serving President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling party could step back from some of the populist leader’s more polarizing policies ahead of the next round of voting in four years’ time.

There is no doubt that Sunday's local polls were a blow to both Erdogan and his Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party, or AKP, which won last year’s presidential and parliamentary elections.

In the balloting, the main opposition center-left Republican People’s Party, or CHP, kept hold of Istanbul and the capital of Ankara by wide margins, but also added wins in conservative provinces — such as Adiyaman and Kilis in the south — to municipalities it gained in the 2019 balloting.

WHAT HAPPENS NOW? Some analysts said on Monday the outcome was a warning and that they expect Erdogan’s government will pursue a path of "normalization" that also includes soothing ties with NATO allies such as the United States and neighboring Greece — and adopting less antagonistic programs at home.

Erdogan, who has presided over Türkiye for more than two decades — as prime minister since 2003 and president since 2014 — acknowledged the electoral setback in a speech from the balcony of the presidential palace late Sunday, saying his party had suffered "a loss of altitude" across Türkiye.

The people delivered a "message" that AKP will "analyze" by engaging in "courageous" self-criticism, he said.

Seda Demiralp, a political science professor at Isik University in Istanbul, said she has already seen this pattern when Erdogan upset predictions of an opposition win in last May's elections after the devastating earthquake that killed more than 53,000 people in the country’s south.

Despite its demoralizing performance last year, the CHP won the popular vote in many major cities.

"This was a warning," Demiralp said. "I expect Erdogan to continue normalization ... or (the AKP) will keep losing further."

WHAT ABOUT RELIGIOUS AND FAMILY VALUES? Others who have been watching Türkiye closely don't see Erdogan making any radical U-turns or drastic changes in his conservative Islamist policies. But a toning-down may be on the cards.

Wolfango Piccoli, the co-president of New York-based consulting firm Teneo, suggests Erdogan may put a brake on his planned constitutional changes that would emphasize "family values" and safeguard, for example, the rights of women wanting to wear Islamic-style headscarves.

Still, "Erdogan will not move towards greater political accommodation, given his aversion to share power, and will not tone down his polarizing rhetoric due to this stinging defeat," Piccoli said.

Sunday’s elections saw the opposition CHP win 35 of Türkiye’s 81 provinces — including the country’s five most populous cities — while Erdogan’s AKP, took 24.

Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, director of the German Marshall Fund in Ankara, described the results as unprecedented for Erdogan.

Turnout was around 78%, according to the state-run Anadolu Agency, compared to 87% in last year's election. The results suggested it was mostly AKP supporters who failed to vote.

"We have never seen him lose like this," he said. "Now the CHP is leading the AKP in the polls for the first time ... This is a landslide for the CHP because they got more votes than the AKP for the first time."

"Türkiye is ready for change," said Unluhisarcikli.

WHERE IS THE ECONOMY GOING? The elections took place against the backdrop of an ongoing cost-of-living crisis, with voters facing annual inflation that rose to 67% in February. Meanwhile, Erdogan has allowed borrowing costs to rise to 50% in a bid to combat soaring prices.

Erdogan has long been a proponent of an unorthodox policy of cutting interest rates to fight inflation and had fired central bank governors who resisted his rate-slashing policies. That runs counter to traditional economic thinking, and many blame Erdogan’s unusual methods for Türkiye’s economic turmoil.

Commentators said that although the economic crisis left Erdogan’s popularity largely unaffected in last year’s national polls, AKP voters felt more inclined to express discontent when his name was not on the ballot paper.

"I think Turkish voters sent the clear message to Erdogan that enough is enough," said Berk Esen, associate professor of political science at Istanbul’s Sabanci University.

"If Erdogan does not get his act together and change his ruling party, this ... decline that we have experienced vis-a-vis AKP’s vote share is going to continue," Esen added.

HOW HAS THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE CHANGED? Although Istanbul, where Erdogan was born and raised and where he began his political career, was seen as the main battleground in the election and where the opposition retained its hold on the city, in the southeast, the pro-Kurdish Equality and Democracy Party took 10 provinces — despite years of repression that have seen Kurdish mayors removed and replaced with government appointees, and thousands of political activists arrested.

The Erdogan-allied Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, won eight scattered across the country. The New Welfare Party, or YRP, which largely competed with the AKP over the support of conservative voters, took two provinces.

It was the third biggest party in terms of nationwide votes, taking 6.2%. The IYI Party and the Great Unity Party won the remaining two provinces.

Those who had expected the opposition to perform poorly in Sunday’s election were stunned.

A change in the leadership in the CHP after last year's elections — from the 75-year-old Kemal Kilicdaroglu to Ozgur Ozel, 49 — appeared to have revitalized the party and paved the way for incumbent CHP mayors and other candidates to secure conclusive victories.

Analysts contrasted the strong candidates fielded by the opposition — such as Ekrem Imamoglu in Istanbul and Mansur Yavas in Ankara — to those for the AKP, who were largely overshadowed by Erdogan during the campaign.

Imamoglu won by a margin of more than 11 points while Yavas secured a gap of nearly 29 points on his AKP rival.

The results could position Imamoglu as a potential challenger for the presidency in 2028, despite an outstanding legal case that could see him banned from politics.

"Leadership is becoming more important than parties and ideologies," Demiralp said. "Especially in a country like Türkiye where institutions are weak, people connect to leaders rather than parties and other institutions."

WHAT IS THE WORD ON THE STREET? Sentiments were mixed on Monday on the streets of Istanbul, where many lauded the opposition's victory but others expressed concerns amid the economic crisis and their daily struggles.

"We woke up to a good day," said opposition supporter Ayse Poplata, adding the results "will be beneficial for our country."

Hicabi Pekdemir, 54, said he voted against Erdogan's AKP, citing a six-fold increase in his rent over the last two years.

"I live by myself and I have two kids," he said. "How do I make ends meet?"

Fatma Hanedar, 40, said she was "devastated and very upset" by the outcome and said the voters showed "such ungratefulness" for Erdogan's leadership through Türkiye’s recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and rebuilding efforts after last year’s earthquake.

"Thank God our president is still at the helm," said another AKP supporter, Husamettin Ezer, 52.



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.