Tehran, Tel Aviv Exchange Displays of Power During Gaza Conflict

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)
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Tehran, Tel Aviv Exchange Displays of Power During Gaza Conflict

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)

Since the start of the Gaza conflict following Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, Iran has been visibly involved in the regional crisis. This involvement spans its support for allied militant groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, as well as political, diplomatic and military actions under President Ebrahim Raisi.

Two hundred days into the war on Gaza, tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran have intensified. This escalation signals a shift from years of a shadow Iranian-Israeli conflict towards a potentially direct confrontation, primarily driven by Iran.

In the early days of the war, Iranian officials hinted at their ability to escalate the conflict and confront Israel by unifying fronts if Gaza continued to be targeted. This was seen as a political maneuver.

While Iran implied involvement in the confrontation, Western reports, especially American ones, differed on Iran’s role in Hamas’ Oct. 7 Al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked the war.

In the blame game and attempts to involve international parties, based on Israeli sources, some Western newspapers accused Iran of orchestrating the attack. On the other hand, media outlets and agencies turned to Iranian sources to challenge the Israeli narrative.

As Iran tried to leverage Israel’s surprise over the Al-Aqsa Flood, Iranian Revolutionary Guard leaders sent a strong message. They mentioned Iran’s motives for the attack, including revenge for Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani’s killing in a US strike in early 2020. Yet, Iran swiftly denied any direct link to Hamas’ attack to avoid upsetting the delicate balances it has achieved in the region.

Diplomatic moves

Iran has been quick to amp up its regional diplomacy under Raisi, aiming to improve ties with neighboring countries and counter its international isolation, especially after the Ukraine conflict complicated efforts to revive its nuclear deal with Western powers.

Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian’s recent statement at Tehran University, suggesting that Iran must be consulted for any Palestine agreement, has meanwhile raised eyebrows.

Abdollahian’s visits to Jeddah, Geneva, and New York for Palestine-related conferences have sparked questions in Iranian media about the authorities’ delayed actions on pressing domestic issues, including nuclear negotiations to lift US sanctions.

However, the aftermath of the war has somewhat eased Western pressure on Iran’s nuclear program, with Western powers avoiding turning to the UN Security Council or issuing condemnations of Iran because they don’t want to deepen the crisis with Tehran amid the Gaza conflict.

Iran has highlighted its ties to powers around Israel while pursuing diplomacy. It continues to support Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, with top Iranian officials, like the foreign minister, visiting Doha, Beirut, and Damascus to coordinate with the two groups.

Iran also backs armed groups linked to Tehran, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi militias in Yemen and Iraqi armed factions.

The Iranians see the Gaza war as the greatest evidence of coordination between diplomacy and field activities by the Revolutionary Guard and allied groups. However, Tehran officially denies direct involvement in decisions or operations of these groups, though it still supports their actions.

Maritime developments

In early November, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for disrupting Israel’s key supply routes by blocking maritime access for energy, food and trade.

Following his statement, the Houthi militias in Yemen began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea.

These attacks sparked renewed tensions at sea. The US and UK responded with strikes on Houthi positions to deter further assaults. Meanwhile, Western and regional powers formed maritime alliances to safeguard navigation routes.

The Revolutionary Guard further heightened tensions by announcing Iranian naval escorts to the Red Sea and threatening to block key waterways like the Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar, as well as disrupting navigation in the Mediterranean.

They also formed a “Naval Basij” unit comprising maritime units of groups loyal to Iran.

Israel strikes back

As tensions rose in the Red Sea and Iran-aligned factions targeted US forces, Israel launched two precise airstrikes in December. The first, in Damascus on December 2 killed two Revolutionary Guard officers: Brigadier Generals Panah Taghizadeh and Mohammad-Ali Ataie Shourcheh.

They were reportedly killed during “advisory operations” at a military base in the Sayyida Zainab area.

On December 25, Razi Mousavi, the logistics chief for the Revolutionary Guard in Syria and Lebanon, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on his home in the Sayyida Zainab area. The strike came shortly after he left his office at the Iranian embassy compound.

The third strike occurred in the Mazzeh area on January 20, killing Brig. Gen. Hojjatollah Amidwar, the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence chief in Syria, and four other Iranian officers.

Later, the Revolutionary Guard reported the deaths of three more officers in separate operations in Damascus, Homs and Deir Ezzor between February and March.

Losses and heightened tensions

As tensions rose, Damascus saw the deadliest blow to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in the ongoing power struggle between Tehran and Tel Aviv.

The Iranian consulate in Mazzeh was struck, killing Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the Revolutionary Guard forces in Syria and Lebanon, along with Hezbollah’s advisory council member and five other senior Guard officers.

Iran promised retaliation, sparking intense speculation, and Khamenei declared the consulate Iranian soil and pledged a response.

Israel remained quiet after all the attacks, while Iran launched over 300 missiles and drones two weeks later. Israel claimed to have intercepted most.

Khamenei stated Iran aimed to show its power.

In response, Israel threatened retaliation deep in Iranian territory. Western powers tried to discourage Israel, but it struck a military airport near Isfahan. Satellite images showed damage to the S-300 radar system protecting nuclear facilities.

The exchange continues, with its lessons likely to keep tensions high between Israel and Iran, even after the dust settles in the Gaza conflict.



Reconstruction Studies Begin in Lebanon, Costs Exceed $6 Billion

A man walks past near the rubble of a building in Beirut's southern suburbs, after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanon November 29, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
A man walks past near the rubble of a building in Beirut's southern suburbs, after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanon November 29, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
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Reconstruction Studies Begin in Lebanon, Costs Exceed $6 Billion

A man walks past near the rubble of a building in Beirut's southern suburbs, after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanon November 29, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
A man walks past near the rubble of a building in Beirut's southern suburbs, after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanon November 29, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

As Lebanese return to their ruined cities and villages after the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, the main question on their minds is: “When will reconstruction begin, and are the funds available, and if so, where will they come from?”

Unlike the aftermath of the 2006 war, which saw funds flow in automatically, the situation now is different.

The international conditions for reconstruction may be tougher, and Lebanon, already struggling with a financial and economic collapse since 2019, will not be able to contribute any funds due to the severity of the recent war.

Former MP Ali Darwish, a close ally of Prime Minister Najib Mikati, said a plan for reconstruction would likely be ready within a week.

The plan will identify the committees to assess damage, the funds for compensation, and whether the South Lebanon Council and Higher Relief Commission will be involved.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Darwish explained that the matter is being discussed with international partners, and more details will emerge soon.

He added that the process is unfolding in stages, beginning with the ceasefire, followed by army deployment, and eventually leading to reconstruction.

To reassure its supporters, many of whom have lost their homes and been displaced, Hezbollah promised before the ceasefire that funds were ready for reconstruction.

Sources close to the group say Iran has set aside $5 billion for the effort, with part of it already available to Hezbollah and the rest arriving soon.

Political analyst Dr. Qassem Qassir, familiar with Hezbollah’s operations, said a reconstruction fund would be created, involving Iran, Arab and Islamic countries, international partners, religious leaders, and Lebanese officials.

He added that preparatory work, including committee formations and studies, has already begun.

However, many affected people are hesitant to start rebuilding, wanting to ensure they will be reimbursed.

Some reports suggest that party-affiliated groups advised not making repairs until damage is properly documented by the relevant committees. Citizens were told to keep invoices so that those who can pay upfront will be reimbursed later.

Ahmad M, 40, from Tyre, told Asharq Al-Awsat he began repairing his damaged home, paying extra to speed up the process. The high costs of staying in a Beirut hotel have become unbearable, and he can no longer wait.

Economist Dr. Mahmoud Jebaii says that accurate estimates of reconstruction costs will depend on specialized committees assessing the damage. He estimates the cost of destruction at $6 billion and economic losses at $7 billion, bringing total losses from the 2024 war to around $13 billion, compared to $9 billion in 2006.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Jebaii explained that the 2024 destruction is much greater due to wider military operations across the south, Bekaa, and Beirut.

About 110,000 housing units were damaged, with 40,000 to 50,000 completely destroyed and 60,000 severely damaged. Additionally, 30 to 40 front-line villages were entirely destroyed.

Jebaii emphasized that Lebanon must create a clear plan for engaging the Arab and international communities, who prefer reconstruction to be managed through them.

This could involve an international conference followed by the creation of a committee to assess the damage and confirm the figures, after which financial support would be provided.

He added that Lebanon’s political system and ability to implement international decisions will be key to advancing reconstruction.