Iran Trims Military Presence in Syria

File photo of Iranian military leaders in eastern Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
File photo of Iranian military leaders in eastern Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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Iran Trims Military Presence in Syria

File photo of Iranian military leaders in eastern Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
File photo of Iranian military leaders in eastern Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Iranian forces have pulled out of bases in Damascus and southern Syria, moving away from the border with the Golan Heights. This suggests Iran might be stepping back from its confrontation with Israel, but it's not clear if this is a temporary move or part of a bigger regional shift.

The withdrawal follows strikes targeting key figures in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Iran says it’s a precautionary move after recent attacks it blames on Israel.

In early April, a missile attack, which Tehran accuses Israel of mounting, hit the Iranian consulate, killing seven Revolutionary Guard members, including senior commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the highest-ranking Iranian military official in Syria.

Iran responded with a drone and missile strike on Israel, its first direct assault. Israel reportedly retaliated with strikes inside Iran.

This shift marks a change in Iran’s military presence in Syria, potentially signaling a new approach to the region’s dynamics.

Recent reports, some citing Iranian sources, suggest Iran is reducing its presence in Syria. However, Iraqi politicians, including a key Shiite leader, reject the idea that Iran is giving up on Syria’s strategic importance in its conflict with Israel.

One politician suggests that Iran’s presence in Syria has always been limited, despite talk of Iraqi militants filling the gap left by Iranian forces.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat under the conditions of anonymity, the Iraqi politician said that “despite Iraqi militants’ readiness to fill the void left by Iranian military personnel, the operation could be a camouflage.”

They also pointed out that “Iran's presence – in the commonly understood field sense – has been limited from the start.”

According to a source close to the Lebanon-based Hezbollah, fighters from the group and Iraq have replaced Iranian forces in areas around Damascus, Daraa, and Quneitra.

Two other sources familiar with Iraqi factions say Iran has asked for fighters with Syrian experience, but it’s unclear if they’ve been sent yet.

“Kataib Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces have received requests from Tehran to send fighters with previous field experience in Syrian territories,” the sources, who requested anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat.

These discussions raise questions about Iran’s intentions in Syria.

A former Iraqi official, familiar with Syrian affairs and who had met Syrian President Bashar al-Assad several times between 2015 and 2019, says Iran suspects that Syrian security officers collaborated against Iranians and leaked their movements to others.

The official told Asharq Al-Awsat that “Iran is investigating, and tis close to a conclusion,” but “is taking precautionary measures,” noting that “the reduction in military presence only involves high-ranking figures openly linked to the Revolutionary Guard.”

On April 13, Iranian media quoted Gen. Morteza Qorbani, a senior advisor to the Revolutionary Guard commander, saying that an investigation was ongoing into whether the whereabouts of Zahedi had been leaked.

“Spies are rampant in Syria and Lebanon, and enemies can track individuals through satellites and communication networks (...) It only takes one infiltrator to pass information to enemies,” said Qorbani.

Iran’s suspicions focus on 18 commanders assassinated in attacks attributed to Israel.

According to Bloomberg, a Syrian defector claimed to have spoken with an Iranian official about this.

The defector’s statement suggests that Iran and Syria are jointly investigating security breaches. At one point, Iran conducted a separate investigation with Hezbollah to avoid dealing with Syrian intelligence.

An Iraqi official told Asharq Al-Awsat that Iran admits to facing challenges in Syria. Iraqi groups have been advised by Tehran to enhance phone security or shut them down completely, a tactic also used by Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

Despite suspicions of Syrian security betraying Iran, it’s not prompting Iran to leave Syria.

“Assad offers little strategic value except Syria’s position, crucial for affecting Israel’s security. Iran won't give that up, even if Assad asks them to leave,” revealed the official.

Reports suggest Assad was unaware of security breaches targeting Revolutionary Guard leaders. Iranian forces started withdrawing from Syrian provinces earlier this year, with recent acceleration.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Iranian advisors left various areas, including Baniyas, in March.

Iran still has forces in Aleppo (north) and Deir Ezzor (east), key areas of its influence in Syria.



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.