Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
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Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)

No history of the Arab world in the past seven decades could be written without stopping at length at the Palestinian Fatah movement. The history of the movement itself cannot be written without stopping at one of its founders, Farouk al-Qaddoumi (Abu al-Lutf), who passed away on Thursday at the age of 94.

Qaddoumi was one of the original founders of the movement in 1965, alongside Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil al-Wazir. He had moved away from the spotlight in the past 30 years over his opposition to the Oslo Accord and concern that Israel would use it against the Palestinian leadership and its people.

Before that, Qaddoumi was a prominent Palestinian figure who championed the cause as foreign minister of the Palestine Liberation Organization at international meetings. He was clear and firm in his speeches before the United Nations, Arab and Islamic summits and others.

A member of the Baath party, I asked him one day of his thoughts about Arafat (Abu Ammar) and his sole leadership of the Palestinians. He replied: “Abu Ammar is the leader of the Fatah tribe. According to our norms, the tribe leader enjoys privileges that others don't.” Whatever reservations he had about Arafat never led him to question his position as the top Palestinian leader.

I met Qaddoumi in Tunis in 1998 and will share some moments of that meeting in Asharq Al-Awsat in wake of his passing:

Early years

*How was the Fatah movement born?

Acts of resistance emerged after the occupation of Gaza in 1956. The Arab world was also being swept up in revolts from Algeria to Iraq and others. This left an impact on us. In fact, the success of the revolution in Algeria helped spur freedom fighter, “fidai”, work in our region.

Palestine’s Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini had, during his stay in Egypt and then Lebanon, advocated for Palestinian resistance and struggle. The Higher Arab Commission existed at the time, paving the way eventually for the fidai movement. The armed struggle was also prompted by the lack of political achievements at the time.

With the dour political mood, Algeria’s independence was a beacon of hope that inspired the formation of fidai movements, and so Fatah began to take shape in Kuwait and later Qatar in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The formation of Fatah would pave the way for the formation of the PLO in 1964.

*When did you meet Arafat for the first time?

I was in Cairo in 1954. Along with Arafat, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), and I were members of the General Union of Palestine Students. Arafat was its president. I was a student at the American university, Arafat was a student at Cairo University and Abu Iyad went to al-Azhar University.

I was a member of the Baath part, Abu Iyad of the enlightened Muslim Brotherhood and Arafat was religious but independent. We spent three years in Cairo. Arafat graduated and then headed to Kuwait where he worked as an engineer. He was followed by Abu Iyad and I worked in the health ministry. I took up positions in Libya, then Saudi Arabia and later Kuwait in 1960.

We didn’t hold meetings together. Rather, we limited our talks to bilateral contacts to maintain secrecy. I used to get in touch with Arafat, and he with Abu Iyad. Adel Abdel Karim used to coordinate our meetings. Among the Fatah founders were Abu al-Adeeb and Khaled al-Hassan.

The central committee was formed later and it began to meet as a group in 1965. For years, we made contacts with brothers throughout the region, especially Arab and Palestinian national figures, including figures in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Farouk al-Qaddoumi at an Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference in Malaysia in 2003. (Getty Images)

*How was the official launch of Fatah decided in 1965?

We debated whether to announce the formation of Fatah before the establishment of the PLO in 1964 or after. In the end, we decided to reinforce resistance movements and to garner Arab support for the Palestinian national identity embodied in the PLO. This facilitated the way for armed struggle and fidai operations.

The national congress was held in Jerusalem in 1964. It brought together Arafat, Khaled al-Hassan and others. It was followed by a resistance operation that called for striking water pipelines in northern Palestine. The fighters came in from the Syrian border. The operation resulted in our first prisoner Mahmoud Hijazi and first martyr Ahmed Moussa.

We later formed a “revolutionary council”, regional committees and a central committee.

*What was Arafat’s position during that time?

He was first appointed deputy to the general commander, Abu Youssef al-Najjar. He rose to general commander in 1966 and named official spokesman. I chaired the inaugural meeting of the central committee and was named its secretary.

*Where there any disputes between members during the early days of the central committee?

Fatah embodied work, ideology and organization. Meaning we enrich our thought and organization, and improve our work through operations and experiences on the ground. We used to say that carrying arms was the foundation of our work and that the purpose of carrying arms was not financial or material, but rather, it had national, moral and noble goals.

We were initially accused to roping in Egypt and Gamal Abdul Nasser in our operations. We were also accused of poorly timing our operations. We were accused of being an Arab nationalist movement. Soon, however, our armed struggle began to bear fruit and raise the morale of the people.

The Karameh battle of 1968 gave Fatah an accomplishment. With the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, the people yearned for the formation of a revolutionary movement. People turned to Fatah and we built foundations along the River Jordan. Eventually our work became more organized and we reached out to various Palestinian groups to unite under a single banner and so, the PLO was formed with Arafat at the helm.

*How were relations with Abdel Nasser?

We always sought to establish ties with him. We tried to meet him once in late 1965 or early 1966. I was accompanied by Arafat and Mahmoud Sawda. We couldn’t manage an audience with him and instead were met with the head of intelligence. At the time, the Palestinian revolution had not yet rose to prominence and swept headlines. It was not the focus of attention in Egypt or by its president.

That changed after the 1967 defeat of Arab armies. We met with Mohammed Hassanein Haykal, who facilitated a meeting with Abdel Nasser.

Abdel Nasser loved Arafat and saw in him the spirit of Arab youths who had hope in the future. In 1969, Abdel Nasser invited Arafat to join him on a trip to the Soviet Union and so, relations between Moscow and the PLO were forged.

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. (Getty Images)

Ties with Syria

*When did you meet Syrian President Hafez al-Assad?

We’ve known each other since the 1960s when he was defense minister. In 1966, two Fatah officers were killed during an argument in Syria. Soon after, Syrian authorities imprisoned the Fatah leadership of Arafat, Mamdouh Saidam, Walid Ahmad Nimr, al-Wazir and others. Eleven leading members were sent to jail.

Along with a colleague, I traveled to Syria to tackle the situation. We contacted Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad and Ahmed Sweidan. The meeting with Assad was good. The truth was that Arafat and his comrades were suspected of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were surprised to learn that I was part of the Palestinian revolution and knew that I was not a member of the Brotherhood, but of the Baath party.

Arafat was jailed for some 51 days in Mezzeh prison where he came under investigation. We sought out Assad, who was defense minister. We told him that we had heard rumors that the Syrian leadership wanted to execute the detainees. “Who told you this?” he asked. We told him that they were rumors we heard in Damascus. He replied: “Please, come and receive them.” And so, we secured the release of Arafat and the others.

Later, Arafat took part in an operation from Lebanese territories and was arrested by the Lebanese army. It also arrested the Palestinian group that carried out the operation. Through Syrian mediation, we succeeded in securing Arafat’s release.

*The Syrian and Palestinian leaderships had thorny relations. What was the toughest moment that you experienced with it?

The 1976 period when the Syrian army was deployed to Lebanon was the most difficult. The “national movement” in Lebanon was opposed to the deployment. We believed that the deployment would lead to a clash with the Palestinian revolution.

*Some Palestinians accused Syria of trying to seize Palestinian decision-making.

It wasn’t about seizing this power. The Palestinian cause was the top issue for Syria and the focus of its concern, otherwise it would never have offered us what it did. Assad and Syrian officials had repeatedly said that the Palestinians control Syrian decision-making, not the other way around.

Our relations with Assad were strong and coordination was always ongoing. Assad long underscored the strategic alliance between Syria and the Palestinian revolution. He is a member of the Baath and perhaps this background allows me to understand him since we are both members of the party. At the time, more than 60 percent of Syria’s budget went to supporting the Palestinian cause.

*Did Assad have reservations about the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon?

Not until the clash happened with the Syrian army. That prompted the question: Why did the Palestinian resistance oppose the deployment of the Syrian military? Assad is a calm, patient and persevering person. He listens to everyone and can discuss several issues at length. He has the patience that is lacking in several leaders and heads of state.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein receives Farouk al-Qaddoumi in Baghdad in 2002. (Getty Images)

Ties with Iraq

*What about your relations with Saddam Hussein?

We met Saddam in Cairo and used to travel to Baghdad, which had opened its doors to us after the Karameh battle. We even opened offices in Baghdad. Sabri al-Banna's (Abu Nidal) defection from Fatah though, created tensions between Iraq and the PLO.

*It was believed that the Iraqi leadership was influencing Banna.

Yes, we also sensed that. But Iraq acted out of a clear political vision. Iraq never hides its stances.

*What about Saddam?

He tried to understand who he was speaking with him. He was calm and focused on the person talking to him. He was never severe in dealing with us. Our requests were quickly met. He was generous with us and even more so after he became president. Iraq gave us so much. Iraq offered the PLO greater support after it was forced out of Beirut. The tensions between the PLO and Syria also helped bring us closer to Baghdad.

*Was Iraq a main backer of the PLO?

The truth is Saudi Arabia was. It provided us with so much. We must be fair in saying that Gulf countries helped the Palestinian people a lot.



Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
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Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)

A report by The Atlantic said the strike that hit a region close to Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s residence in the first days of the war on Iran has returned to the spotlight a still controversial political figure even though he left office for over a decade ago.

On the first day of the Iran war, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei overshadowed news of a strike near Ahmadinejad’s home, said the report.

“Many who remembered his term in office - marked by Holocaust denial, atom-bomb fetishism, and shoving revolutionary ideology down the throats of a country already weary of it - celebrated his reported assassination,” it added. He was president from 2005 to 2013.

“Among those who have followed Ahmadinejad’s post-presidential career, however, his targeting was more of an enigma. Since leaving office, Ahmadinejad has harshly criticized the Iranian government, and as a result, Iran’s Guardian Council has formally excluded him from running for president,” said the report.

For more than a decade, he has been known more as a regime opponent than as a supporter. “I don’t understand why Israel would want to kill him in the first place,” Meir Javedanfar, who co-wrote a biography of Ahmadinejad, told The Atlantic. “Perhaps to settle scores? It makes no sense.”

Contrary to early reports, Ahmadinejad is alive, his associates revealed, requesting anonymity. “The circumstances of his survival may prove significant as the war drags on. Whatever the intent, Ahmadinejad’s associates say the strike was in effect a jailbreak operation that freed the former president from regime control.”

“Long before the war, the government had posted a small number of bodyguards near Ahmadinejad, nominally to protect a prominent citizen but also to keep tabs on him. The regime has never been sure what to do with him,” said the report.

About a month ago, after the January protests, his freedom of movement was further reduced, his phones confiscated, and the contingent of bodyguards increased from single digits to about 50. The bodyguards were based a few hundred meters from Ahmadinejad’s residence itself, at the entrance to a cul-de-sac in Narmak, in northeast Tehran. They established a checkpoint to monitor the houses and high school on that street.

“A February 28 strike hit not the residence, but the security forces nearby. In the ensuing mayhem, Ahmadinejad and his family evidently escaped their home and went underground. The government believed he had died, and his death was announced by official channels, as well as the reformist daily Sharq.”

“When rumors arose that Ahmadinejad had escaped, regime elements immediately suspected that he had been spirited away to take part in a coup,” said The Atlantic. “Ahmadinejad’s only public statement since the attack has been a brief eulogy for the supreme leader, calculated to show that Ahmadinejad was alive and to dispel speculation that he had declared himself an enemy of the state. His location is unknown to the government.”

In 2018, former Defense Minister Hussein Dehghan likened Ahmadinejad to “the door of the mosque, which can’t be burned or thrown away” without torching the mosque itself.

“Arresting Ahmadinejad could unsettle the regime,” Javedanfar said. “He knows a hell of a lot about it.”

“Ahmadinejad’s fans say that he has popular support, and that any postwar government will want him around to lend that support. If the current regime survives, it will need all the legitimacy it can get. If it does not, the United States might need someone with intimate - if outdated - knowledge of the Iranian state to be involved with what comes next. Ahmadinejad could still be useful,” the report said.


How Have US Presidents Tapped Strategic Petroleum Reserves During War?

GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP
GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP
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How Have US Presidents Tapped Strategic Petroleum Reserves During War?

GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP
GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP

The US plans to release 172 million barrels of oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, more than 40% of a wider release coordinated with allies, to help dampen prices spiked by supply disruptions from the US-Israeli war on Iran.

The US sale, announced late on Wednesday, is part of a 400-million-barrel release by members of the International Energy Agency. The US Department of Energy said the US drawdown would begin next week and take about four months.

The SPR currently holds about 415 million barrels, most of which is high sulfur, or sour ‌crude, that US ‌refineries are geared to process. The crude is ‌held ⁠underground in hollowed-out salt ⁠caverns on the coasts of Texas and Louisiana that can store 714 million barrels.

Here is how US presidents have tapped the SPR in times of war:

RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE

In March 2022, the month after Russia invaded Ukraine, former President Joe Biden ordered the release of 180 million barrels over six months - the largest sale ever from the emergency stash. Biden, ⁠and later President Donald Trump, slowly bought some oil ‌to replenish the reserves, but little ‌has been added back as Congress needs to provide more money to ‌do so.

LIBYA CIVIL WAR

In ⁠June 2011, former ⁠President Barack Obama ordered the release of 30 million barrels of oil from the reserve to offset disruptions to global markets from civil war in oil producer Libya. That sale was coordinated with the Paris-based IEA, resulting in an additional 30-million-barrel release from other member countries.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

In 1990-1991, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, former President George H. W. Bush sold about 21 million barrels in two phases. In October 1990, the US ordered a 3.9-million-barrel test sale. In January 1991, after US and allied warplanes began attacks against Baghdad and other military targets in OPEC-member Iraq as part of Operation Desert Storm, Bush ordered the sale of 34 million barrels, of which half was sold.


How Trump and his Advisers Miscalculated Iran’s Response to War

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times
Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times
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How Trump and his Advisers Miscalculated Iran’s Response to War

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times
Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Mark Mazzetti, Tyler Pager, Edward Wong

On Feb. 18, as President Trump weighed whether to launch military attacks on Iran, Chris Wright, the energy secretary, told an interviewer he was not concerned that the looming war might disrupt oil supplies in the Middle East and wreak havoc in energy markets.

Even during the Israeli and US strikes against Iran last June, Wright said, there had been little disruption in the markets. “Oil prices blipped up and then went back down,” he said.

Some of Trump’s other advisers shared similar views in private, dismissing warnings that — the second time around — Iran might wage economic warfare by closing shipping lanes carrying roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply.

The extent of that miscalculation was laid bare in recent days, as Iran threatened to fire at commercial oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic choke point through which all ships must pass on their way out of the Arabian Gulf.

In response to the Iranian threats, commercial shipping has come to a standstill in the Gulf, oil prices have spiked, and the Trump administration has scrambled to find ways to tamp down an economic crisis that has triggered higher gasoline prices for Americans.

The episode is emblematic of how much Trump and his advisers misjudged how Iran would respond to a conflict that the government in Tehran sees as an existential threat.

Iran has responded far more aggressively than it did during last June’s 12-day war, firing barrages of missiles and drones at US military bases, cities in Arab nations across the Middle East, and on Israeli population centers.

US officials have had to adjust plans on the fly, from hastily ordering the evacuation of embassies to developing policy proposals to reduce gas prices.

After Trump administration officials gave a closed-door briefing to lawmakers on Tuesday, Senator Christopher S. Murphy, Democrat of Connecticut, said on social media that the administration had no plan for the Strait of Hormuz and did “not know how to get it safely back open.”

Inside the administration, some officials are growing pessimistic about the lack of a clear strategy to finish the war. But they have been careful not to express that directly to the president, who has repeatedly declared that the military operation is a complete success.

Trump has laid out maximalist goals like insisting that Iran name a leader who will submit to him, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have described narrower and more tactical objectives that could provide an off-ramp in the near term.

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out, and vowed that oil prices would drop after it ended.

“The purposeful disruption in the oil market by the Iranian regime is short term, and necessary for the long-term gain of wiping out these terrorists and the threat they pose to America and the world,” she said in a statement.

This article is based on interviews with a dozen US officials, who asked for anonymity to discuss private conversations.

‘Show Some Guts’

Hegseth acknowledged on Tuesday that Iran’s ferocious response against its neighbors caught the Pentagon somewhat off guard. But he insisted that Iran’s actions were backfiring.

“I can’t say that we anticipated necessarily that’s exactly how they would react, but we knew it was a possibility,” Hegseth said at a Pentagon news conference. “I think it was a demonstration of the desperation of the regime.”

Trump has displayed growing frustration over how the war is disrupting the oil supply, telling Fox News that oil tanker crews should “show some guts” and sail through the Strait of Hormuz.

Some military advisers did warn before the war that Iran could launch an aggressive campaign in response, and would view the US-Israeli attack as a threat to its existence. But other advisers remained confident that killing Iran’s senior leadership would lead to more pragmatic leaders taking over who might bring an end to the war.

When Trump was briefed about risks that oil prices could rise in the event of war, he acknowledged the possibility but downplayed it as a short-term concern that should not overshadow the mission to decapitate the Iranian regime. He directed Wright and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to work on developing options for a potential spike in prices.

But the president did not speak publicly about these options — including political risk insurance backed by the US government, and the potential of US Navy escorts — until more than 48 hours after the conflict started. The escorts have not yet taken place.

As the conflict has roiled global markets, Republicans in Washington have grown concerned about rising oil prices damaging their efforts to sell an economic agenda to voters ahead of the midterm elections.

Trump, both publicly and privately, has been arguing that Venezuelan oil could help solve any shocks coming from the Iran war. The administration announced on Tuesday a new refinery in Texas that officials said could help increase oil supply, ensuring that Iran does not cause any long-term damage to oil markets.

A Potential Off-Ramp

Trump has said both that the war could go on for more than a month and that it was “very complete, pretty much.” He also said the United States would “go forward more determined than ever.”

Rubio and Hegseth, however, appear to have coordinated their messaging for now on three discrete goals that they began laying out in public remarks on Monday and Tuesday.

“The goals of this mission are clear,” Rubio said at a State Department event on Monday before Trump held his own news conference. “It is to destroy the ability of this regime to launch missiles, both by destroying their missiles and their launchers; destroy the factories that make these missiles; and destroy their navy.”

The State Department even laid out the three goals in bullet-point fashion, and highlighted a video clip of Rubio stating them on an official social media account.

The presentation by Rubio, who is also the White House national security adviser, appeared to be setting the stage for the president to bring an end to the war sooner rather than later. In his news conference, Trump boasted of how the US military had already destroyed Iran’s ballistic missile capability and its navy. But he also warned of even more aggressive action if Iranian leaders tried to cut off the world’s energy supply.

Matthew Pottinger, who was a deputy national security adviser in the first Trump administration, said in an interview that Mr. Trump had indicated he could decide to pursue ambitions war goals that would take weeks at least.

“In his press conference, I could hear him circling back to a rationale for fighting a bit longer given that the regime is still signaling it won’t be deterred and is still trying to control the Strait of Hormuz,” said Pottinger, now the chair of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a group that advocates a close US partnership with Israel and confrontation with Iran.

“He doesn’t want to have to fight a ‘sequel’ war,” Pottinger added.

The search for pathways out of the war has gained urgency since the weekend, as global oil prices surge and as the United States burns through costly munitions.

Pentagon officials said in recent closed-door briefings on Capitol Hill that the military used up $5.6 billion of munitions in the first two days of the war alone, according to three congressional officials. That is a far larger amount and munitions burn rate than had been publicly disclosed. The Washington Post reported on the figure on Monday.

Iranian officials have remained defiant, saying they will use their leverage over the world’s oil supply to force the United States and Israel to blink.

“Strait of Hormuz will either be a Strait of peace and prosperity for all,” Ali Larijani, Iran’s top national security official, said in a social media post on Tuesday. “Or it will be a Strait of defeat and suffering for warmongers.”

The New York Times