Experts: Baby in Gaza Has Strain of Polio Linked to Mistakes in Eradication Campaign

The mother of Palestinian boy Abdul Rahman Abu Al-Jidyan, who is the first person to contract polio in Gaza in 25 years, gestures as she looks after him in their tent, in Deir Al-Balah, in the central Gaza Strip August 28, 2024. REUTERS/Ramadan Abed
The mother of Palestinian boy Abdul Rahman Abu Al-Jidyan, who is the first person to contract polio in Gaza in 25 years, gestures as she looks after him in their tent, in Deir Al-Balah, in the central Gaza Strip August 28, 2024. REUTERS/Ramadan Abed
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Experts: Baby in Gaza Has Strain of Polio Linked to Mistakes in Eradication Campaign

The mother of Palestinian boy Abdul Rahman Abu Al-Jidyan, who is the first person to contract polio in Gaza in 25 years, gestures as she looks after him in their tent, in Deir Al-Balah, in the central Gaza Strip August 28, 2024. REUTERS/Ramadan Abed
The mother of Palestinian boy Abdul Rahman Abu Al-Jidyan, who is the first person to contract polio in Gaza in 25 years, gestures as she looks after him in their tent, in Deir Al-Balah, in the central Gaza Strip August 28, 2024. REUTERS/Ramadan Abed

The baby in Gaza who was recently paralyzed by polio was infected with a mutated strain of the virus that vaccinated people shed in their waste, according to scientists who say the case is the result of “an unqualified failure” of public health policy.
The infection, which marked the first detection of polio in the war-torn Palestinian territory in more than 25 years, paralyzed the lower part of one leg in the unvaccinated 10-month-old child. The baby boy was one of hundreds of thousands of children who missed vaccinations because of the fighting between Israel and Hamas.
Scientists who have been monitoring polio outbreaks said the baby's illness showed the failures of a global effort by the World Health Organization and its partners to fix serious problems in their otherwise largely successful eradication campaign, which has nearly wiped out the highly infectious disease. Separately, a draft report by experts deemed the WHO effort a failure and “a severe setback.”
The polio strain in question evolved from a weakened virus that was originally part of an oral vaccine credited with preventing millions of children worldwide from being paralyzed. But that virus was removed from the vaccine in 2016 in hopes of preventing vaccine-derived outbreaks.
Public health authorities knew that decision would leave people unprotected against that particular strain, but they thought they had a plan to ward off and quickly contain any outbreaks. Instead, the move resulted in a surge of thousands of cases, The Associated Press reported.
“It was a really horrible strategy,” said Columbia University virologist Vincent Racaniello, who was not involved with the report or the WHO. “The decision to switch vaccines was based on an incorrect assumption, and the result is now we have more polio and more paralyzed children.”
A draft copy of the report commissioned by the WHO and independent experts said the plan underestimated the amount of the strain in the environment and overestimated how well officials would be able to squash outbreaks.
The plan led to vaccine-linked polio outbreaks in 43 countries that paralyzed more than 3,300 children, the report concluded.
Even before the Gaza case was detected, officials reviewing the initiative to tinker with the vaccine concluded that “the worst-case scenario has materialized,” the report said.
The report has not yet been published, and some changes will likely be made before the final version is released next month, the WHO said.
The strain that infected the baby in Gaza had lingered in the environment and mutated into a version capable of starting outbreaks. It was traced to polio viruses spreading last year in Egypt, according to genetic sequencing, the WHO said.
In 2022, vaccine-linked polio viruses were found to be spreading in Britain, Israel and the US, where an unvaccinated man was paralyzed in upstate New York.
Scientists now worry that the emergence of polio in a war zone with an under-immunized population could fuel further spread.
Racaniello said the failure to track polio carefully and to sufficiently protect children against the strain removed from the vaccine has had devastating consequences.
“Only about 1% of polio cases are symptomatic, so 99% of infections are silently spreading the disease,” he said.
The oral polio vaccine, which contains a weakened live virus, was withdrawn in the US in 2000. Doctors continued to vaccinate children and eventually moved to an injected vaccine, which uses a dead virus and does not come with the risk that polio will be present in human waste. Such waste-borne virus could mutate into a form that triggers outbreaks in unvaccinated people.
The report's authors faulted leaders at the WHO and its partners, saying they were unable or unwilling “to recognize the seriousness of the evolving problem and take corrective action.”
WHO spokesman Oliver Rosenbauer acknowledged that the vaccine strategy “exacerbated” the risk of epidemics linked to the vaccine.
He said in an email that immunization “was not implemented in such a way to rapidly stop outbreaks or to prevent new strains from emerging.” Rosenbauer said not hitting vaccination targets was the biggest risk for allowing vaccine-linked viruses to emerge.
“You need to reach the children with the vaccines ... regardless of which vaccines are used,” he said.
The WHO estimates that 95% of the population needs to be immunized against polio to stop outbreaks. The UN health agency said only about 90% of Gaza’s population was vaccinated earlier this year.
To try to stop polio in Gaza and the wider region, the WHO and its partners plan two rounds of vaccination campaigns later this week and next month, aiming to cover 640,000 children. Authorities will use a newer version of the oral polio vaccine that targets the problematic strain. The weakened live virus in the new vaccine is less likely to cause vaccine-derived outbreaks, but they are still possible.
Racaniello said it was “unethical” that the WHO and its partners were using a vaccine that is unlicensed in rich countries precisely because it can increase the risk of polio in unvaccinated children.
The oral polio vaccine, which has reduced infections globally by more than 99%, is easy to make and distribute. Children require just two drops per dose that can be administered by volunteers. The oral vaccine is better at stopping transmission than the injected version, and it is cheaper and easier to administer.
But as the number of polio cases caused by the wild virus have plummeted in recent years, health officials have been struggling to contain the increasing spread of vaccine-linked cases, which now comprise the majority of polio infections in more than a dozen countries, in addition to Afghanistan and Pakistan, where transmission of the wild virus has never been stopped.
“This is the result of the Faustian bargain we made when we decided to use" the oral polio vaccine, said Dr. Paul Offit, director of the Vaccine Education Center at the University of Philadelphia. “If we really want to eradicate polio, then we need to stop using the vaccine with live (weakened) virus.”



Libya Political Process Deadlocked

Col. Muammar Gaddafi
Col. Muammar Gaddafi
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Libya Political Process Deadlocked

Col. Muammar Gaddafi
Col. Muammar Gaddafi

Libya has undergone significant changes since the fall of Col. Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The Libyans have struggled to establish a stable government, leading to the country being split into two main factions: One in the west backed by Türkiye and another in the east supported by Russia.

However, the reality is more complex than just two competing governments.

This report highlights the main players in the power struggle in Libya today, focusing on the Government of National Unity led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh in Tripoli and the eastern government backed by parliament and Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces.

The report also explains why the UN-led political process has stalled and explores the influence of five key figures in Libya’s political landscape, the armed groups in Tripoli, and the rise of powerful families in both the east and west.

In 2011, Libyan rebels closed in on Tripoli, Gaddafi’s stronghold, and stormed his heavily fortified complex at Bab al-Aziziya. Armed groups, including some with ties to extremist movements, took over the complex, signaling the collapse of Gaddafi’s rule, though he continued to resist until he was killed near Sirte in October of that year.

Thirteen years after Gaddafi’s fall, Libya remains divided between two rival governments.

The Libyan army, which fell with Gaddafi’s regime, has largely been rebuilt in the east under Haftar’s command. In the west, the situation is more chaotic, with various armed groups operating under Dbeibeh’s government, each controlling different areas.

The conflict is further complicated by foreign involvement: Türkiye supports the western forces with troops and allied Syrian mercenaries, while Russia backs Haftar in the east and south, first through the Wagner Group and now with a direct military presence, raising concerns about a new Russian foothold on the Mediterranean.

The political process to reach a settlement in Libya has been stalled for years. International envoys come and go, but none have succeeded, and there is no solution in sight.

Since Gaddafi’s fall, Libya has changed a lot, but the new system remains unclear. To help explain the current situation, we spoke with Tim Eaton, a top Libya analyst at Chatham House in London.

Political Process... Dead in the Water

When asked about the status of the UN-led political process in Libya, Eaton started by clarifying that it is currently in the hands of Stephanie Khouri, the acting head of the UN mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

She was initially appointed as the deputy to UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily, but after his resignation, she ended up leading the mission. However, since Khouri wasn’t appointed by the UN Security Council, she’s not an official special envoy, and her role is less defined, coming directly from the UN Secretary-General.

There’s ongoing discussion about who will be the next special envoy to Libya, but given the challenges within the Security Council, appointing someone has been difficult and remains a tough task. In short, it’s increasingly hard to get a new envoy through a Security Council vote.

As for the political stalemate that Libya is suffering from nowadays, Eaton stressed that the reason behind this is that the political process is dead and hasn't moved at all.

In 2021, under the then deputy head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for political affairs Stephanie Williams, the Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed.

It was the first government since 2014 to be recognized by both eastern and western Libya, and it was supposed to hold elections by the end of that year. But that didn’t happen.

Critics accused the GNU of blocking the elections, and there were disputes over who could run, with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s return causing particular controversy.

After the elections failed to happen in 2022, the eastern House of Representatives formed a new government, but it wasn’t accepted by the broader political scene. So, Libyans were back to having two rival governments.

Jan Kubis, who succeeded Williams, couldn’t move the election process forward. When he left, it was clear elections wouldn’t happen. Williams briefly returned, but was then replaced by Abdoulaye Bathily, the UN special envoy.

Instead of pushing the process forward, Bathily decided to take time to assess the situation and engage in shuttle diplomacy. He focused on trying to get agreement among the five key players but hasn’t made much progress.

The Big Five

According to Eaton, Libya’s “Big Five” are Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity; Mohamed Takala, President of the High Council of State (recently replaced by Khaled al-Mishri); Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the House of Representatives; Mohamed al-Menfi, Head of the Presidential Council; and military leader Khalifa Haftar.

Bathily’s plan focused on getting these five leaders to sit down and agree on the future, but he couldn’t make it happen. Each of them set conditions that blocked progress.

For example, Dbeibeh refused to participate if the talks were about forming a new government, as it would mean replacing him. Haftar demanded that if the western government was involved, the eastern one must be too. These obstacles led Bathily to resign, as there was nothing solid to build on.

This is where things stand now.

Despite seeming like rivals, the Big Five do cooperate in certain areas. For example, Haftar and Dbeibeh have an understanding on dividing oil revenues.

Family Rule

Eaton doesn’t think that the ongoing division between eastern and western Libya could lead to a real split of the country.

The connection between east and west Libya is stronger than many realize, the analyst affirmed.

What’s happening now is more about powerful families and their networks competing for control, rather than just an east-versus-west divide. In the east, those in power are closely linked to Haftar, while in the west, Dbeibeh’s family has strengthened its control and appointed people with ties to them.

Foreign Fighters

Foreign fighters and mercenaries have been involved in Libya since 2011. Initially, they came from places like Darfur and Chad. Recently, the situation has changed significantly.

During Haftar’s attempts to take Tripoli, he relied on Wagner Group mercenaries, which led Tripoli authorities to seek Turkish support. Türkiye established a permanent presence in the west and brought in Syrian mercenaries. Meanwhile, Wagner expanded its presence in Haftar’s areas.

Wagner’s involvement now seems more like a state relationship with Russia rather than just a mercenary group. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov has visited eastern Libya frequently, and there is significant Russian military equipment flowing into the region. This growing Russian presence is a major concern for the US.

In the west, the situation is more chaotic. No single family controls all security forces, and Türkiye supports specific groups, such as the 444 Brigade in Tripoli. Türkiye also took control of the Al-Watiya airbase.

Both Türkiye and Russia are firmly established in Libya now. Their presence makes a large-scale war less likely, as the costs would be high. Haftar cannot advance on Tripoli due to Turkish opposition, and when Misrata forces considered moving east, they were deterred by Russian aircraft and Egypt’s declared “red line.”

Foreign fighters have become a permanent part of the Libyan landscape and are likely to stay.