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South Lebanon Front: Military or Political Solution?

The funeral of Qassem Bazzi, Mohammed Hashem and Abbas Hammoud, the three paramedics who were killed last Saturday in an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon (Reuters)
The funeral of Qassem Bazzi, Mohammed Hashem and Abbas Hammoud, the three paramedics who were killed last Saturday in an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon (Reuters)
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South Lebanon Front: Military or Political Solution?

The funeral of Qassem Bazzi, Mohammed Hashem and Abbas Hammoud, the three paramedics who were killed last Saturday in an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon (Reuters)
The funeral of Qassem Bazzi, Mohammed Hashem and Abbas Hammoud, the three paramedics who were killed last Saturday in an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon (Reuters)

Israeli threats against Lebanon have intensified along with renewed military tensions with Hezbollah. This escalation comes amid failed ceasefire negotiations for Gaza, which Hezbollah links to restoring calm on the southern front—a condition reportedly not accepted by Tel Aviv, according to multiple Israeli officials.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdullah Bou Habib has conveyed through intermediaries that Tel Aviv is not interested in a ceasefire in Lebanon, even if a truce in Gaza is achieved. This message was communicated by US envoy Amos Hochstein a few months ago, raising concerns about whether a military solution will prevail over a political one.

While some analysts believe that a de-escalation in Gaza might lead to heightened tensions in the South, given Israeli officials’ readiness for a northern conflict following the Gaza conflict, others argue that escalation is unlikely and that both fronts will face a similar fate.

Retired Brigadier General Dr. Khalil Helou and Professor of Political Science and International Relations Dr. Imad Salameh agree that the current situation is unlikely to change, predicting that the status quo will persist with “no ceasefire and no expansion of the war.”

In contrast, Riad Kahwaji, Head of the Middle East and Gulf Military Analysis Center – Enigma, sees an increased likelihood of war expansion in Lebanon due to the failed Gaza ceasefire negotiations.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Kahwaji said: “With the failure of negotiations in Gaza, attention is now shifting to the southern front of Lebanon, which remains in the eye of the storm and within the danger zone.”

For his part, Helou stated: “For 11 months, Tel Aviv has been threatening escalation and will continue to do so. However, the likelihood of war has decreased compared to previous months due to internal and external political factors related to Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to take actions that would harm US interests, especially before the American elections.”

Helou noted that Israel continues to systematically destroy areas in the South, over five kilometers from the border, to prevent attacks on northern regions. Despite this, ongoing shelling and rockets from Hezbollah targeting northern towns suggest that the situation will remain unchanged.

Salameh agreed, describing the current situation as a media and psychological war with fluctuating intensity.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Tel Aviv’s renewed threats are part of this ongoing conflict and do not indicate an imminent large-scale invasion of Lebanon or a major conflict with uncertain regional and domestic consequences.”

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has recently announced shifting military focus northward in preparation for a comprehensive ground operation.

On Tuesday, during a tour of the border area with Lebanon, he stated: “We are shifting the focus of military operations northward in preparation for completing tasks in the South.”

He urged military personnel to “prepare for a comprehensive ground operation at all levels to change the security situation and return residents to their homes.”

Gallant’s statement followed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s instruction for the army to prepare for “changing the situation in the North.”

In contrast, Hezbollah continues to link the southern front with the developments in Gaza.

“The enemy will not be able to return settlers to their homes except through one way: stopping the aggression on Gaza,” Deputy Chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Council Sheikh Ali Damoush said.

He added: “The resistance will not accept changes to the rules of engagement or breaking existing equations. The more the enemy persists in its aggression and expands its attacks, the more the resistance will respond and escalate its operations... Escalation will be met with escalation, and we are not afraid of threats or intimidation."

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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.