Hack of Hezbollah Devices Exposes Dark Corners of Asia Supply Chains

Japanese radio equipment maker Icom Inc director Yoshiki Enomoto shows its model IC-V82 device, which the company said they stopped production in 2014, during an interview at its headquarters in Osaka, Japan, September 19, 2024. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
Japanese radio equipment maker Icom Inc director Yoshiki Enomoto shows its model IC-V82 device, which the company said they stopped production in 2014, during an interview at its headquarters in Osaka, Japan, September 19, 2024. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
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Hack of Hezbollah Devices Exposes Dark Corners of Asia Supply Chains

Japanese radio equipment maker Icom Inc director Yoshiki Enomoto shows its model IC-V82 device, which the company said they stopped production in 2014, during an interview at its headquarters in Osaka, Japan, September 19, 2024. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
Japanese radio equipment maker Icom Inc director Yoshiki Enomoto shows its model IC-V82 device, which the company said they stopped production in 2014, during an interview at its headquarters in Osaka, Japan, September 19, 2024. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

The lethal hack of Hezbollah's Asian-branded pagers and walkie-talkies has sparked an intense search for the devices' path, revealing a murky market for older technologies where buyers may have few assurances about what they are getting.

While supply chains and distribution channels for higher-margin and newer products are tightly managed, that's not the case for older electronics from Asia where counterfeiting, surplus inventories and complex contract manufacturing deals can sometimes make it impossible to identify the source of a product, analysts and consultants say, according to Reuters.

The response from the companies at the center of the booby-trapped gadgets that killed 37 people and wounded about 3,000 in Lebanon this week has underlined difficulties in discerning how and when they were weaponised.

Taiwan-based Gold Apollo put the blame on a Europe-based licensee of its pager, sparking investigations in Hungary, Bulgaria, Norway and Romania into the origins of the deadly device. Japan's Icom said it could not tell if the walkie-talkies bearing its name were real, in a market awash with fake products.

"If the supply chain was compromised to put explosives inside ... it's incredible engineering to do that. But the actual supply chain compromise is not that hard. Probably the easiest part was the supply chain compromise," said David Fincher, a China-based technologist and consultant.

He said counterfeit products are prevalent, especially in big manufacturing centers like China where fake components can be easily produced, adding that it isn't a big leap to go from fake components to supply chain compromise.

"As the technologist I am, I can tell you getting a little explosive in a radio is not that hard."

Hezbollah acquired the devices around five months ago, according to a security source, who added that the armed group thought it was buying the pagers from Gold Apollo.

The hand-held radios, which the source said were purchased around the same time as the pagers, had labels bearing the name of Osaka-based Icom and the phrase "Made in Japan", images of one exploded device showed.

Both companies have ruled out the possibility that any of the deadly components were made in factories in either of their home locations.

Taiwan's Economy Minister Kuo Jyh-huei has also said the components used in the pagers that detonated in Lebanon were not made in Taiwan.

A preliminary investigation by Lebanese authorities into the devices found that the explosives were implanted before they arrived in the country, according to a letter to the UN Security Council by Lebanon's mission to the United Nations.

-FAKE GOODS

But, for now, that's about all anyone is certain of. It's not clear how or when the pagers and walkie-talkies were weaponised so they could be remotely detonated.

Joe Simone, partner with Chinese intellectual property firm East IP, said part of the problem is that smaller brands tend to invest less in policing counterfeits, due in large part to costs that could impact their profitability.

"Authorities are happy to deal with low-tech counterfeits but the IP owners need to monitor, investigate and file complaints and that doesn't always happen as much as it might for high-tech and bigger technology brands," he said.

For Icom, one problem is that it stopped making the IC-V82 model in question a decade ago, around the time it started introducing holographic stickers as a protection against counterfeit products, the company said.

The company has long warned about imitation products, especially of its older models.

In fact, more than 7% of firms in Japan reported business losses from counterfeit products in 2020, according to the latest available report by the Japan Patent Office, with around a third of cases linked to China.

Icom has urged that customers only use its official distributor network to ensure they are buying genuine products.

But in China, there are dozens of shops selling Icom-branded walkie-talkies on e-commerce platforms such as Alibaba.com, Taobao, JD.com and Pinduoduo, including in some cases the IC-V82 model, according to Reuters checks.

Among three China-based vendors of Icom products on Alibaba.com, none of which were listed as official suppliers on Icom's website, Guangzhou Minxing Communications Equipment Co and Chengdu Bingxin Technology Co Ltd both said they sell authentic products, while Quanzhou Yitian Trading Co acknowledged selling "Chinese made imitations" in addition to original products.

Icom has said it makes all its products in its factories in Japan. It did not immediately reply to a request for comment on Icom-branded products sold in Chinese online sites.

The discontinued IC-V82 model is also sold in Vietnam on e-commerce platform Shopee, a Reuters check showed, indicating wide availability of such products.

For Gold Apollo, which licensed its brand to Budapest-based BAC, the supply chain devolved into a mysterious production trail that authorities in various countries are now trying to piece together.

"The widespread availability of cheap, second-hand manufacturing equipment meant counterfeiters were increasingly able to go beyond single components and even make full-fledged products," said Diganta Das from the University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Lifecycle Engineering, who studies counterfeit electronics.

"I wouldn't call it counterfeiting anymore, it's like illegal manufacturing," Das said.



Lebanon War... Why is it Difficult for Netanyahu and Nasrallah to Back Down?

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. AFP/Reuters
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. AFP/Reuters
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Lebanon War... Why is it Difficult for Netanyahu and Nasrallah to Back Down?

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. AFP/Reuters
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. AFP/Reuters

Informed sources in Beirut told Asharq Al-Awsat that any diplomatic efforts to stop the ongoing war between Israel and Lebanon would face the obstacle of the main parties to the conflict — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah — finding it difficult to back down.

Why is Netanyahu refusing to back down?

The sources noted that the war in Lebanon has achieved for Netanyahu what he could not accomplish in Gaza. They summarized it as follows:

- Netanyahu framed the war with a unifying message that has gained consensus across the Israeli political spectrum: the return of the northern residents who were displaced after Hezbollah launched cross-border attacks following the Oct. 7 attacks in Gaza. This means that the Israeli military operations enjoy broad political and public backing.

- Netanyahu began the war by striking Hezbollah’s communication networks, inflicting unprecedented losses on the group and sidelining around 1,500 of its members from the battlefield.

- He dealt a near-fatal blow to the leadership of the Radwan Forces, the elite military wing of Hezbollah, managing to eliminate prominent figures, some of whom were listed as US targets due to attacks that occurred in Beirut four decades ago.

- Netanyahu can claim that Hezbollah initiated the war and that Israel’s only demand is the return of northern residents and ensuring their safety.

- Thus, it seems difficult for Netanyahu to back down from the demand of returning the displaced, which practically means disengaging the Lebanese front from the Gaza front.

Why is Nasrallah refusing to back down?

The sources pointed to the following reasons:

- It is hard for Nasrallah to accept a setback in a war that he initiated.

- He also finds it difficult to accept disengagement after Hezbollah has suffered unprecedented losses, unlike anything it faced in its previous confrontations with Israel, including the 2006 war.

- Accepting a setback would signal that Iran is not willing to take concrete steps to confront Israel.

- If Hezbollah agrees to disengage from Gaza without a ceasefire there, many would view the cross-border attacks launched by the party in support of the Palestinian enclave as a reckless gamble.

- A setback for Hezbollah would demoralize the Axis of Resistance and have a ripple effect on Gaza itself.

- Agreeing to a ceasefire without securing even "limited gains" would reinforce the perception that Nasrallah launched a war that most Lebanese reject, and that Hezbollah bears responsibility for the resulting losses.