As Famine Ravages Sudan, the UN Can’t Get Food to Starving Millions

Raous Fleg sits outside a hut in a displaced persons camp she fled to in Sudan’s South Kordofan state. There’s no food in the camp, so Fleg and the other residents have resorted to eating boiled leaves and seeds. REUTERS/Thomas Mukoya
Raous Fleg sits outside a hut in a displaced persons camp she fled to in Sudan’s South Kordofan state. There’s no food in the camp, so Fleg and the other residents have resorted to eating boiled leaves and seeds. REUTERS/Thomas Mukoya
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As Famine Ravages Sudan, the UN Can’t Get Food to Starving Millions

Raous Fleg sits outside a hut in a displaced persons camp she fled to in Sudan’s South Kordofan state. There’s no food in the camp, so Fleg and the other residents have resorted to eating boiled leaves and seeds. REUTERS/Thomas Mukoya
Raous Fleg sits outside a hut in a displaced persons camp she fled to in Sudan’s South Kordofan state. There’s no food in the camp, so Fleg and the other residents have resorted to eating boiled leaves and seeds. REUTERS/Thomas Mukoya

More than half the people in this nation of 50 million are suffering from severe hunger. Hundreds are estimated to be dying from starvation and hunger-related disease each day.

But life-saving international aid – cooking oil, salt, grain, lentils and more – is unable to reach millions of people who desperately need it. Among them is Raous Fleg, a 39-year-old mother of nine. She lives in a sprawling displaced persons camp in Boram county, in the state of South Kordofan, sheltering from fighting sparked by the civil war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces.

Since Fleg arrived nine months ago, United Nations food aid has gotten through only once – back in May. Her family’s share ran out in 10 days, she said. The camp, home to an estimated 50,000 people, is in an area run by local rebels who hold about half the state.

So, every day after dawn, Fleg and other emaciated women from the camp make a two-hour trek to a forest to pick leaves off bushes. On a recent outing, several ate the leaves raw, to dull their hunger. Back at the camp, the women cooked the leaves, boiling them in a pot of water sprinkled with tamarind seeds to blunt the bitter taste.

For Fleg and the thousands of others in the camp, the barely edible mush is a daily staple. It isn’t enough. Some have starved to death, camp medics say. Fleg’s mother is one of them.

“I came here and found nothing to eat,” said Fleg. “There are days when I don’t know if I’m alive or dead.”

The world has an elaborate global system to monitor and tackle hunger in vulnerable lands. It consists of United Nations agencies, non-governmental aid groups and Western donor countries led by the United States. They provide technical expertise to identify hunger zones and billions of dollars in funding each year to feed people.

Sudan is a stark example of what happens when the final, critical stage in that intricate system – the delivery of food to the starving – breaks down. And it exposes a shaky premise on which the system rests: that governments in famine-stricken countries will welcome the help.

Sometimes, in Sudan and elsewhere, governments and warring parties block crucial aid providers – including the UN’s main food-relief arm, the World Food Program (WFP) – from getting food to the starving. And these organizations are sometimes incapable or fearful of pushing back.

In August, the world’s leading hunger monitor reported that the war in Sudan and restrictions on aid delivery have caused famine in at least one location, in the state of North Darfur, and that other areas of the country were potentially experiencing famine. Earlier, the hunger watchdog, known as the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), announced that nine million people – almost a fifth of Sudan’s population – are in a food emergency or worse, meaning immediate action is needed to save lives.

It was just the fourth time the IPC has issued a famine finding since it was set up 20 years ago. But despite this year’s dire warnings, the vast majority of Sudanese who desperately need food aid aren’t getting it. A major stumbling block: the main provider of aid, the United Nations relief agencies, won’t dispense aid in places without the approval of Sudan’s army-backed government, which the world body recognizes as sovereign.

Parts of Sudan have become a “humanitarian desert,” said Christos Christou, the president of Doctors Without Borders, which is active on the ground in Darfur. The UN is in “hibernation mode,” he said.

A RISING DEATH TOLL

People are dying in the meantime: A Reuters analysis of satellite imagery found that graveyards in Darfur are expanding fast as starvation and attendant diseases take hold. More than 100 people are perishing every day from starvation, the UK’s Africa minister, Ray Collins, told parliament this month.

Aid is being distributed far more widely in areas controlled by the army. But relief workers say the military doesn’t want food falling into the hands of enemy forces in areas it doesn’t control and is using starvation tactics against civilians to destabilize these areas. The army-backed government, now based in Port Sudan, has held up aid delivery by denying or delaying travel permits and clearances, making it tough to access areas controlled by an opposing faction.

In internal meeting minutes reviewed by Reuters, UN and NGO logistics coordinators have reported for four months in a row, from May to August, that Sudanese authorities are refusing to issue travel permits for aid convoys to places in South Kordofan and Darfur.

The UN’s reticence to confront Sudan’s government over the blocking of aid has effectively made it a hostage of the government, a dozen aid workers told Reuters.

“The UN has been very shy and not brave in calling out the deliberate obstruction of access happening in this country,” said Mathilde Vu, the Norwegian Refugee Council’s advocacy adviser for Sudan.

Four UN officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said they fear that if they defy the military, aid workers and agencies could be expelled from Sudan. They point to 2009, when the now-deposed autocrat, Omar al-Bashir, kicked out 13 non-government aid groups after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest on war-crimes charges.

A spokesperson for the UN’s emergency-response arm, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), said aid organizations “face serious challenges” in reaching people who need help in Sudan. These include the volatile security situation, roadblocks, looting and “various restrictions on the movement of humanitarian supplies and personnel imposed by the parties to the conflict,” said Eri Kaneko, the OCHA spokesperson.

The World Food Program said it has assisted 4.9 million people so far this year across Sudan. That amounts to just one in five of the 25 million people who are enduring severe hunger. The organization didn’t say how many times these people received aid, or how much each person got.

The army’s main foe, the RSF, is also using food as a weapon, Reuters reporting has shown. The two sides, formerly allies, went to war 17 months ago for control of the country. The RSF has looted aid hubs and blocked relief agencies from accessing areas at risk of famine, including displaced persons camps in Darfur and areas of South Kordofan. The group has also conducted an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Masalit people in Darfur, driving hundreds of thousands from their homes and creating the conditions for famine.

BREAKING THE IMPASSE

Some at the UN are calling on Washington and its allies to do more to break the impasse. Among them is Justin Brady, the Sudan head of OCHA. He says the main donor countries – primarily the United States, the United Kingdom and European Union nations – need to engage directly with the Sudanese government on the ground in Port Sudan. After the army seized power in 2021, the US cut off economic aid to Sudan. Western funding for food aid to the hungry is channeled mainly through the UN.

“It’s the donor governments that have the leverage,” Brady said. “We are left on our own” in dealing with the Sudanese authorities.

The Sudanese military and the RSF are to blame for the country’s food crisis, according to Tom Perriello, the US special envoy to Sudan. “This famine was not created by a natural disaster or drought,” he told Reuters. “It was created by men – the same men who can choose to end this war and ensure unhindered access to every corner of Sudan.”

Sudan’s army-backed government and the RSF didn’t respond to questions for this story. The two warring parties have blamed each other for hold-ups in the delivery of aid. Army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo both said this week they were committed to facilitating the flow of aid.

Another impediment may come from inside the World Food Program itself. The WFP has been rocked by alleged corruption within its Sudan operation, which some humanitarian officials and diplomats worry may have affected aid flows. Reuters revealed in late August that the WFP is investigating two of its top officials in Sudan over allegations of fraud and concealing information from donors about the army’s role in blocking aid.

The disarray in Sudan comes as the global famine-fighting system faces one of its greatest tests in years. The IPC estimates that 168 million people in 42 nations are enduring a food crisis or worse, meaning they live in areas where acute malnutrition ranges from 10% to more than 30% of the populace. Like Sudan, many of the worst hunger zones are also conflict zones – including Myanmar, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Haiti, Nigeria and Gaza. War makes it all the harder for the international community to intervene.

'HUNGER KILLED HER'

Before the war, South Kordofan had some two million people. The need for outside help has intensified as some 700,000 displaced people have poured into camps and towns in SPLM-N areas since the war erupted.

Food stocks in the state were already low before the war. A poor harvest in 2023 was compounded by a locust plague that devoured crops. The war and the resulting refugee influx made things far worse.

In the communities Reuters visited, hunger and disease are everywhere. In one camp in the county of Um Durain, home to some 50,000 people, children have been dying of malnutrition and diarrhea for the past year, said community leader Abdel-Aziz Osman.

Nutrition workers at a treatment center in the camp are seeing 50 cases a month of children and mothers suffering malnutrition. Before the war, medics were treating five to 10 cases of malnutrition a month in the entire county.

In the camp in Boram, toddlers with bloated stomachs and rail-thin arms stood outside huts made of sticks, plastic and clothes – vulnerable to rain, snakes and scorpions.

Raous Fleg, the woman who makes the leafy mush, arrived in the camp from Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, in December with her mother and six of her children. She left three of her children behind with her husband, a soldier in the Sudanese army. They made the treacherous journey on foot over a pass in the Nuba Mountains, an area that’s home to a mix of ethnic groups.

Fleg is a member of the Nuba people, who form the main support base of the SPLM-N. Growing up in the Kadugli area, Fleg says, she endured repeated aerial bombardments by government forces.

In the early 2000s, when she was a teenager, fighter jets dropped barrel bombs on her home. Seven members of her family died, including her father and two siblings. She recalls being buried beneath the rubble and getting pulled out alive. Her mother also survived.

“The blood flowed like this,” she said, holding a plastic bottle filled with water and pouring it onto the ground.

Thirteen years later, her in-laws and two more siblings were killed in another air strike by government forces. A third sibling died in hospital after losing two limbs in the attack. Again, she and her mother survived.

After they arrived in Boram county, Fleg’s mother felt weak. There was nothing to eat, so Fleg gave her some water with seeds to drink. But it gave her diarrhea. Doctors at a nearby clinic said her mother was suffering from dehydration and hunger, said Fleg.

On the evening of Jan. 5, Fleg felt her mother’s chest to check if she was still breathing. She wasn’t. After she’d survived years of air strikes, “hunger killed her,” said Fleg.



US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
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US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)

Syrians have lived under the shadow of US sanctions for 46 years, spanning generations who know no other reality. These sanctions have become woven into every aspect of daily life, from banking and international aviation to construction and food supplies. Their burden has fallen hardest on ordinary people, rather than on the symbols of the ousted Assad regime.

While lifting sanctions now would undoubtedly unlock planning and reconstruction efforts, political and security concerns persist, and Syria’s dilapidated infrastructure may impede private-sector investment.

Most importantly, we must ask whether US President Donald Trump’s move to begin lifting sanctions was as improvised as his 2018 announcement to withdraw militarily from Syria, or whether it marks a pivotal shift in US foreign policy toward Syria.

On May 13, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump announced the lifting of US sanctions on Syria. This triggered a period of confusion and internal reviews before his administration outlined an initial mechanism that balanced implementing his announcement with addressing his advisors’ worries over unfettered engagement with the new Syrian leadership.

Before assessing this current phase of easing sanctions, we need a historical overview of them, their context, underlying rationale, implementation methods, and what their potential impact might be for Syria and its people. Sanctions on Syria can be divided into three eras: under Hafez al-Assad, under his son Bashar, and now under interim President Ahmed al‑Sharaa.

Shift toward Iran (1979–2000)

US sanctions on Syria began in 1979, following the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel and the rise of Iran’s revolution. With the end of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Damascus, Hafez al-Assad viewed Iran’s emerging regime as a counterweight to Iraq and Israel.

Washington designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979 due to its role in Lebanon and its support for fighters opposed to Israel. Consequently, the US imposed restrictions on foreign aid, defense exports, and the transfer of dual‑use goods. In November 1986, President Ronald Reagan barred Syrian planes from landing in the US.

The Iraq War (2001–2010)

Sanctions entered a new phase as US policy shifted after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, coinciding with Bashar al‑Assad’s arrival to power in July 2000. In his 2002 State of the Union, President George W. Bush labeled Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and North Korea the “Axis of Evil”, prompting Iran to form a “Resistance Axis” that included Syria and Hezbollah.

With these strains came stricter measures: the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty Act of 2003, enforced by OFAC at the US Treasury in 2004 under Executive Order 13338, targeted Syria’s role in Lebanon and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, as well as its opposition to the US-led occupation of Iraq.

On May 7, 2025, the Trump administration signed a notice extending the national emergency concerning Syria until May 7, 2026, encompassing executive orders from 2003 to 2012.

The Syrian uprising and Caesar Act

Following Syria’s uprising in March 2011, the US imposed a wave of sanctions targeting violence and human rights abuses. President Barack Obama’s April 29, 2011 executive order froze Assad regime assets, followed by an August 2011 ban on oil, asset freezes, and broad trade prohibitions, excluding food and medicine.

However, the defining moment came with the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019, signed by Trump in December 2019 and implemented in June 2020. Targeting infrastructure, military maintenance, energy, and those funding the Assad regime, it also banned foreign investment in Syria’s reconstruction. This legislation aimed to check both Russian and Iranian influence and serve as leverage for negotiations with Moscow, permitting temporary waivers if productive talks occurred.

Though enacted long after the internal conflict began, the Act functioned less as a response to internal dynamics and more as an economic restraint on reconstruction efforts.

Al‑Sharaa after Assad

By late 2024, with Bashar al-Assad’s regime fallen and Trump back in power, Syria had not been a US priority, with internal debate over how to engage the new al‑Sharaa administration. That shifted after Trump spoke with Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 16, signaling alignment with Turkish‑Saudi policy against the hardline Israeli stance.

In Saudi Arabia, Trump began rolling back sanctions on Syria, but the fate of the Caesar Act remains uncertain, currently suspended in 180‑day increments, extendable. Although it was briefly lifted for humanitarian relief during the Feb 2023 Türkiye-Syria earthquakes and in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), its full repeal remains on hold.

Mechanisms and challenges

Trump’s administration has implemented three key executive measures: Treasury’s “GL‑25” on May 23, enabling sweeping economic coverage; a 180‑day suspension of Caesar sanctions; and a specific waiver for the Commercial Bank of Syria via the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, allowing re‑establishment of correspondent banking relationships.

GL‑25 has no set expiry and can be revoked anytime, while Caesar waivers renew every six months. An earlier GL‑24 waiver, issued in January, allowed limited official and energy sector transactions and personal transfers, but US banks have remained cautious.

The permit covers four sectors: finance, oil‑gas, maritime shipping, and aviation. US persons remain barred from transactions that may benefit Russia, Iran, or North Korea, meaning rigorous due diligence is necessary. The original executive orders remain in force, although press reports suggest possible cancellations.

Procedurally, Syria remains on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, as removal would require Congress to be notified by the US State Department. The Department of Commerce and State’s defense trade regulators have yet to remove export controls, which means that Syria still falls under International Traffic in Arms Regulations, necessitating export licenses for most goods, excluding basic food and medicine.

Furthermore, Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham is still designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Even after al‑Sharaa met Trump, the Treasury’s waiver excludes HTS leader Abu Mohammed al‑Golani, al-Sharaa's former nom de guerre, who remains sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1267, supported by a likely Russian veto of any attempt to remove HTS from global blacklists. Arms embargoes and surveillance‑tech restrictions will also persist.

The Caesar Act itself was renewed by Congress in January 2025 for five years, lasting until January 2030 unless overturned legislatively and its suspension may be extended in November 2025. But these continue as temporary waivers, not full repeals.

US politics and Congressional dynamics

Legislative repeal would require Act passage in Congress. Ironically, Trump’s allies in this are Democrats, as many Republicans, especially senators, remain wary.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jim Risch remarked that Trump lifted sanctions a bit more than what was expected, but cautioned that the sanctions could come back. US energy firms, together with Syrian‑American groups, have lobbied Trump to ease sanctions, while pro‑Israel lobby AIPAC insists any relief must hinge on demonstrable positive behavior from the new Syrian government.

Impact on economy and society

In 2018, the UN estimated at least $250 billion would be required to rebuild Syria fully, far beyond what domestic resources can furnish.

Serious barriers remain: destroyed roads, hospitals, and power networks hinder basic services. Reviving industry needs massive investment; millions displaced internally or abroad need rehousing; food, fuel, medical gear, and decent jobs are in short supply.

Even a partial lifting marks a seismic shift: essential imports like food, medicine, and technology could flow more freely; reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and roads becomes feasible; frozen international assets might be unfrozen, inviting foreign companies back to construction, energy, and trade.

The most immediate relief will come from reconnecting Syrian banks to global payment systems, especially SWIFT, dismantling the economic collapse born of widespread distrust. Yet Syria remains on the FATF grey list, deterring banks and obstructing liquidity, so regulatory frameworks must be built.

Future prospects

Ambitious domestic and regional projects have surfaced under al‑Sharaa, with some contracts bypassing competitive bids. The UAE has been granted an $800 million concession at the Port of Tartus, via a Dubai Ports World MoU, to develop multi-purpose terminals, industrial zones, dry ports, and logistics hubs.

Meanwhile, a 30‑year deal with French CMA CGM was signed to develop Latakia Port. China’s VDL company secured rights to 300,000 m² in the Adra Free Zone outside Damascus for 20 years to build industrial and commercial facilities with tax breaks, labor flexibility, and repatriable profits.

A Qatari-US-Turkish energy consortium plans a $7 billion, 5,000 MW power project.

All are seen as steps to lure foreign capital and reshape Syria’s foreign policy by leveraging international corporate interests.

Uncertain transition

The sanctions regime hinges on three pillars: Syria’s State Sponsor designation (since 1979), the Syria Accountability Act (2003), and the Caesar Act (2019). Only the first may soon shift, pending a State Department and Congressional review; the others remain entrenched.

While Syria will not likely see a flood of US investment tomorrow, the first visible presence would probably involve Turkish and Gulf investors, as the US must first verify the stability and reliability of the new Syrian leadership before enabling wider investors to return.

Damascus does not fully control its territory or armed factions, and fresh sanctions may target entities linked to coastal violence in recent months.

Thus, Caesar’s intent has transitioned from coercing the Assad regime to ensuring al‑Sharaa’s good behavior. But its six‑month renewals offer limited investor certainty, making regional neighbors the marginal beneficiaries.

Al‑Sharaa’s teams may aim to woo Trump with bold reconstruction plans akin to a Marshall Plan. But Trump isn’t easily swayed. He has yet to appoint an ambassador to Damascus; instead, US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack was named envoy to Syria, indicating Syria remains an extension of Turkish policy.

Trump is unpredictable and could reverse course swiftly, but current signs still point to provisional waivers rather than a full repeal of sanctions.