What to Know about Israel's Ground Invasion in Southern Lebanon

A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)
A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)
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What to Know about Israel's Ground Invasion in Southern Lebanon

A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)
A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)

Israel’s ground invasion in Lebanon stretched into its second week, as the Hezbollah militant group fired hundreds of rockets deep into Israel — with no end in sight to the escalating conflict.
More than 1,400 people have been killed in Lebanon — mostly in airstrikes — and over a million displaced since the fighting intensified in mid-September. At least 15 Israeli soldiers and two civilians have been killed since the ground operation began, and more than 60,000 people have been displaced from towns along the border for more than a year.
Hezbollah began firing rockets into Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, a day after Hamas, the Palestinian militant group, attacked southern Israel, which sparked the war in Gaza. Israel and Hezbollah have exchanged fire almost every day since, coming close to a full-fledged war on several occasions but stepping back from the brink until this month, The Associated Press said.
Here’s what to know about the current ground incursion in southern Lebanon:
What is the aim of the Israeli military’s ground invasion? The Israeli military began what they called a “limited, localized and targeted ground raids” in southern Lebanon on Oct. 1. The same day, the military said that it had carried out dozens of secretive cross-border operations to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure over the past year. The aim, Israel says, is to allow its displaced residents to return home.
A military official said that thousands of Israeli troops are currently operating along the roughly 100-kilometer-long (62-mile) border, clearing the area just along the border to try to remove the launch pads where Hezbollah fires rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles into Israeli towns, as well as infrastructure they say would allow for an Oct. 7-style invasion of Israel.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the military’s strategy, said the troops haven’t ventured deep inside Lebanon so far, and have conducted operations from distances of a few hundred meters (yards) up to 2 to 3 kilometers (1.5 to 2 miles) into Lebanese territory.
The Israeli military has shared videos of what it says are underground tunnels chiseled into rock used by Hezbollah. The tunnels are used to store weapons and stage attacks. One tunnel stretched from Lebanon into Israeli territory, according to the military.
The goal is not to destroy Hezbollah, and the army is aware that this will not remove the threat of longer-range rockets and missiles, the official said.
Elijah Magnier, a Brussels-based military and counterterrorism analyst, said Israeli forces haven’t seized any ground positions yet.
“They need to go in, harass, test and come out,” Magnier said. In order to hold ground positions, Israel would need tanks to come in and take high critical ground overlooking territory, he said. He estimates it would require clearing some 10 kilometers of Hezbollah presence, which is still a long way off.
It is not clear how long the operation will last or how long Israel will maintain a presence in these towns. The official said the hope is that this can lead to a diplomatic arrangement pushing Hezbollah away from the border. But the plans could change. A previous Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, initially intended to push back Palestinian militants, turned into an 18-year occupation.
What is Hezbollah’s strategy? Hezbollah officials, including assassinated leader Hassan Nasrallah, have conceded that the Israeli military has the superior air force and intelligence. But Hezbollah has the advantage in direct confrontations on Lebanese turf.
Hezbollah forces have better equipment and training compared to Hamas, which Israel has been battling for more than a year in Gaza. Hezbollah forces gained experience in wars in Syria and Iraq. Lebanon’s terrain is also more rugged and challenging than the Palestinian enclave, which is mostly flat and sandy.
Hezbollah’s strategy, led by its elite Radwan Forces, has been drawing in and ambushing incoming Israeli troops, detonating explosive devices or firing rockets at them, and firing artillery and rockets at Israeli border towns. Although Hezbollah has lost many of its top officials and commanders in recent weeks, militants have continued to fire rockets deeper into Israel, including heavy barrages on the city of Haifa.
Former Lebanese Army General Hassan Jouni said that he assessed Israel is still conducting reconnaissance ahead of its main attack, but that it had already suffered heavy losses in the smaller operations. Jouni said Hezbollah had dug many tunnels in the south and were well equipped with weapons caches and ammunition.
“The land always works in the favor of those who own it,” he said.
How does this compare to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah? Israel and Hezbollah last went to war in 2006, a 34-day conflict that ended with the United Nations Resolution 1701, which was supposed to push Hezbollah further north and keep the border region exclusively under the control of the Lebanese army and UN peacekeepers.
Israeli leaders say they want Lebanon to implement the resolution. Hezbollah says Israel hasn’t held up its part of the treaty and will stop firing rockets when there is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
Israel’s searing air campaign in southern Lebanon and Beirut in recent weeks is similar to the 2006 war, though this time, better intelligence has enabled Israel to kill several of Hezbollah’s top leadership.
“The Air Force is better and is using all kinds of methods to penetrate deeper into the ground, like dropping bomb after bomb after bomb,” said Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. Israel killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in September by dropping more than 80 bombs on an apartment complex built over an underground compound in quick succession.
In the 2006 war, Israel sent ground troops into Lebanon after 10 days of airstrikes before withdrawing them about four weeks later. Troops attempted to reach the Litani River, about 30 kilometers (18.5 miles) north of the border, but suffered heavy losses before a ceasefire ended the operation and the war.
Could there be a diplomatic solution? Hezbollah’s acting leader signaled Tuesday that the group is open to a cease-fire. Guzansky believes Israeli troops will stay on the ground in southern Lebanon until there is an internationally enforced diplomatic solution that’s stronger than the current UN peacekeeping force. If Israeli troops retreat, he said, they risk the same situation as 2006, where Hezbollah simply rearmed and resumed operations.
But former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who was Israel’s leader during the 2006 war, said that war served as a lesson that immediate diplomacy, rather than military force, is the only way to keep the border quiet.
“Why not try and make a deal now rather than to fight for half a year?” he asked in an interview with The Associated Press. “You lose how many soldiers, kill how many innocent people? And then in the end we’ll make a deal which may have been made in advance.”

 



'Currently Impossible': North Korea Defections in Freefall

Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP
Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP
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'Currently Impossible': North Korea Defections in Freefall

Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP
Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP

A building-sized North Korean flag waves from a tower on the de facto border with South Korea, marking territory that experts say has become nearly impossible to escape.

The combined total of North Koreans to reach South Korea in the past six years is less than the number that typically defected each year for decades -- and appears to be declining further in 2026, said AFP.

The main cause is leader Kim Jong Un's aim to preserve his family dynasty by sealing the country off from the outside, keeping people in and information out, experts say.

"As I understand it, bringing family members directly from North Korea is currently impossible," 29-year-old Chae Yoon-seo, who fled in 2019, told AFP.

She swam across a river into China at night with a smuggler's help, and travelled through Laos, Vietnam and Thailand before finally flying to South Korea.

Defections to the South hit a peak of more than 2,900 in 2009 and stayed well above 1,000 per year for the next decade.

But there were just 63 in the first half of this year -- down by over a third from the same period in 2025, said Seoul's Unification Ministry.

- 'Soviet-style border' -

Arrivals have fluctuated over the decades, but plunged sharply during the Covid pandemic when many nations shut their borders.

A key change in North Korea, however, started years before.

After taking power in 2011, Kim began restricting the informal trade and migration links along the roughly 1,415-kilometer (880-mile) northern border with China.

In addition to being an economic lifeline, the Chinese border region has also been the first step in most defectors' escapes.

The long frontier was relatively porous, unlike the heavily mined, fenced and surveilled Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that serves as the Koreas' de facto border.

Along the boundary with China, Kim's government has erected fences and installed cameras as well as strips of sand that preserve the footprints of anyone who crosses.

"North Koreans built a real Soviet-style border security system," said Andrei Lankov, an expert on the North at Kookmin University in Seoul.

Beijing has helped too, said Lankov, noting China's preference to keep the status quo of the Kim dynasty by opposing potential instability from defectors or their supporters.

As part of its efforts, China reportedly has put in place hundreds of facial recognition cameras, noted Rachel Minyoung Lee, senior fellow with the Stimson Center's 38 North.

She added that Beijing also added more patrol boats and new or planned deportation facilities along its northeastern border.

- Ousted, killed or exiled -

The roughly 34,500 defectors to reach the South since 1998 are a fraction of North Korea's 26.6 million people, UN figures show, but the plunging number of escapes has consequences.

"Defectors are the main source of information about the North," said Fyodor Tertitsky, lecturer at Seoul's Korea University, noting both South Korean intelligence and researchers interrogate them.

Though some people still do get out.

Defector Gyuri Kang's 2023 escape by boat with her mother and aunt -- across the maritime border with the South, an extremely rare feat -- was a "miracle", she told a UN hearing.

She is also a case in point for why North Korea has made great efforts to seal itself off.

Kang noted the influence of South Korean dramas smuggled in on USB drives, finding them "so refreshing and more credible than North Korea state propaganda".

"North Korean authorities are keenly aware of the impact of outside media," she said.

In 2020, North Korea made possessing foreign media a crime punishable by years-long forced labor terms -- and potential death sentences for large-scale distribution, according to Amnesty International.

Lankov, from Kookmin University, said external information is the greatest threat to the long-term survival of North Korea's leadership.

"If they let their people interact with the outside world, they are highly likely to be overthrown, and maybe killed or driven into exile," he added.

Chae, the defector, said her hope was that the North's isolated people are not one day simply forgotten by the outside world.

"These days, there are a lot of cynical reactions on helping other countries, so I am a bit worried that one day, interest in North Korean human rights might fade away as well," she added.


How Israel’s Regional Neighbors See Its Upcoming Elections

 Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)
Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)
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How Israel’s Regional Neighbors See Its Upcoming Elections

 Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)
Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)

Israel's upcoming elections are being followed closely by its regional neighbors, who are aware that any outcome will have ramifications far beyond the country's borders.

In his Likud party's campaign launch this month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeated his refrain that he "has changed the face of the Middle East" and vowed to continue doing so.

He has been unapologetic about keeping Israeli troops in neighboring Lebanon and Syria, while his ministers tout plans to displace Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, creating a refugee crisis for Jordan and Egypt and making a future Palestinian state impossible.

Opinion polls show the October 27 elections are likely to be close. The bloc led by Netanyahu and his far-right and ultra-Orthodox allies are squaring off against that of his main opponent, centrist Gadi Eisenkot.

AFP correspondents around the region take a look at how different countries are following the contest:

- Jordan -

While Netanyahu has stopped short of formally annexing the West Bank, observers say unofficial annexation is creeping in, as his government -- the most right-wing in Israel's history -- approves an unprecedented number of settlements.

Government officials repeatedly call for the expulsion of over three million Palestinians across the Jordan River, posing "an existential threat" to the Hashemite kingdom, according to Oraib Rantawi, founder of Amman's Al-Quds Center for Political Studies.

At the UN on Tuesday, King Abdullah II said "the Israeli government's expansionist appetite is now a regional threat".

"In the medium and long term, Jordan and Israel are on a collision course," Rantawi said, as right-wing politicians try to push responsibility for "dealing with the Palestinian population" onto Amman.

Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, and "is maintaining a minimum level of political engagement" Rantawi said is unlikely to change, no matter the outcome.

- Egypt -

Israel's other neighbor, most often threatened by what Israeli ministers describe as "voluntary emigration", has kept a "cold peace" since it first recognized Israel in 1978.

Cairo maintains extensive security collaboration, but ties have been increasingly strained as Egypt says it has had to resist repeated efforts to force more than two million Palestinians into its territory.

The best-case scenario is "a government that is less ideologically driven and more focused on security, which could help lower the temperature around Gaza, even without changing the fundamental Israeli position," said former ambassador El-Sayed Shalaby.

Asked by AFP, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said Egypt "will deal with any government that is coming," before blaming Netanyahu for obstructing the Trump ceasefire plan, which Egypt brokered.

- Lebanon -

Israel's attacks on and invasion of southern Lebanon have killed more than 4,300 people and left 329,000 displaced since March, while Beirut pursues gradual talks with Israel centered on the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said this month that Israel "is turning southern Lebanon, its people and their properties into a ballot box soaked in blood" ahead of the vote.

"We are not optimistic," a former Lebanese minister and diplomat told AFP on condition of anonymity.

"The style may change... perhaps Eisenkot has a less radical discourse, but on the ground, the policy will remain unchanged. It is the far right that remains in power."

In an interview with AFP, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said the elections were an internal matter.

"But the question we want to ask the Israeli people, the State of Israel and all future governments is the following: do they want stability, security and no wars on their border, or not?" he said.

- Syria -

Since the December 2024 ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad, Israel has launched hundreds of strikes into Syria, sent troops into a UN-patrolled buffer zone on the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights and carried out regular incursions.

"For Damascus, the stakes are not whether the Israeli elections will completely change the rules of the game, but whether they will produce a government that is less inclined toward escalation and more willing to listen to Washington," a Syrian diplomatic source told AFP.

"A more centrist government, or a right-wing government that does not revolve around Netanyahu... could be less inclined to make political capital out of escalation," and work towards gradual security understandings.


From Jeddah to New York: Why Do Sudan's Truces Fail?

Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)
Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)
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From Jeddah to New York: Why Do Sudan's Truces Fail?

Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)
Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)

Sudanese doctor "S" needed a truce to get out of a health center where she and her colleagues were trapped in the first days of the war. She took a long route from Nile Street, crossing the Fiteihab and Halfaya bridges, until she reached her family in Kober.

She said she found bullet holes in the walls of her bedroom. Her siblings were waiting for her so they could leave together. The family fled and remains displaced today.

A brief halt in fighting in May 2023 allowed S to escape, but it did not last long enough for her family to remain in their home. Since that brief truce, initiatives and agreements have followed, while the hardest question has remained: How can mediators bring the two sides to agree to a cessation of fighting that is implemented and sustained?

The question returned to the fore on Sept. 23, when the Quad and Quintet met together for the first time in New York, under the co-chairmanship of the African Union and the United States. Participants called for a humanitarian truce and an end to hostilities.

They agreed to coordinate efforts to protect civilians and prepare to monitor and verify the implementation of any agreement. But the meeting's statement announced no agreement with the army or the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and set no date for talks between them.

A worker repairs a damaged building in Khartoum on September 20, 2026 (Photo by Ebrahim HAMID / AFP)

The sticking point lies in the terms of the truce itself. According to Reuters, the army-led government accepted most of a US proposal for a 90-day truce but rejected a provision that would limit the RSF's withdrawal to specified areas.

It demanded that the RSF withdraw from all cities it had seized. Sudan's Foreign Ministry said this week that it rejected any negotiating process it believed would legitimize a reality imposed by the RSF through force. The RSF, meanwhile, welcomed the truce proposal, but the fighting continued.

Even when the two sides signed an agreement, it did not guarantee its implementation. In Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the army and the RSF signed a declaration committing them to protecting civilians on May 11, 2023. On May 20, they signed an agreement on a short ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements.

But the ceasefire did not hold. In June, the army suspended its participation in the talks, accusing the RSF of violating the agreement.

Other efforts faced different obstacles. In December 2023, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization involved in peace efforts in the Horn of Africa, announced that army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, had agreed to meet face to face under its auspices. IGAD renewed the invitation in January, but the meeting never took place.

In Manama, Bahrain, a document titled "Principles and Foundations for a Comprehensive Solution to the Sudanese Crisis" was initialed on Jan. 20, 2024, in the names of Shams al-Din Kabbashi for the army and Abdel Rahim Dagalo for the RSF, according to the published text. But the initialing was not followed by a final agreement or a sustained negotiating process. Dagalo accused Kabbashi of backing away from the document, while Kabbashi did not comment on the reasons for the process coming to a halt.

In August 2024, the absence of one of the warring sides prevented direct ceasefire talks in Switzerland, shifting the focus to facilitating the delivery of aid and protecting civilians.

Rosalind Marsden, a researcher at Chatham House, wrote in an analysis published by the institute on Sept. 18, 2024, that the main reason the August 2024 ceasefire talks in Switzerland failed was that both the army and the RSF continued to seek a military victory. Their continued hopes of making military gains were a major reason for the negotiations' failure to make progress, despite limited progress in delivering aid to Darfur.

In September 2025, the Quad proposed a roadmap beginning with a three-month humanitarian truce, during which aid would reach areas across Sudan, followed by a permanent ceasefire and a political transition.

But the Quad's roadmap remained a proposal by the mediators and did not become an agreement between the warring parties. The dispute over withdrawal in the latest US proposal shows that the two sides have yet to agree on the terms under which a new truce could be tested.

Researcher Ahmed Soliman says the multiplicity of mediation groups and weak coordination among them make it necessary to link ceasefire efforts to a Sudanese political process led by civilian forces.

Hubert Kinkoh, a researcher at Chatham House, argued in an analysis published by the institute on Feb. 13, 2026, that the multiplicity of mediation tracks on Sudan, along with the absence of clear leadership and effective coordination among them, had allowed the army and the RSF to resist making serious concessions.

The New York meeting may help address the fragmentation of mediation efforts. Its real value, however, will become clear if it can bring the warring parties to a clear agreement and establish a mechanism to monitor compliance and address violations.

A brief truce allowed S to reach her family, but the family was then forced to leave their home. The truce that displaced people and refugees are waiting for today would allow aid to reach them and mark the beginning of a lasting end to the fighting, making a safe return to their homes and communities possible.