Lessons from Iran Missile Attacks for Defending against China's Advanced Arsenal

A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu
A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu
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Lessons from Iran Missile Attacks for Defending against China's Advanced Arsenal

A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu
A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu

Iran's missile barrage this month against Israel, after a similar large-scale attack in April, shows the value, as well as the shortcomings, of US and allied missile defenses in a potential Indo-Pacific conflict with China, analysts say.
Although differences between the two scenarios limit the lessons that can be learnt, the nearly 400 missiles of different types that Iran has fired at Israel this year offer the United States and China some idea of what works and what does not.
For Washington, the main takeaway from Iran's Oct. 1 attacks - the largest sample yet of ballistic missiles fired against modern defenses - could be that Beijing's missiles would be more difficult to intercept than Iran's and that the ability to strike back would be needed to deter a mass attack, said Collin Koh of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
"If we look purely through the lenses of deterrence, no longer can one pin hopes on deterrence by denial only - that is, the hope that effective defenses can blunt the efficacy of missile strikes," Koh said. "Deterrence by punishment might have to become normative going forward."
There is no immediate threat of missile conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. The distances, thousands of kilometers, are greater than in the Middle East. China's weapons are more advanced, including maneuvering warheads and precision guidance. And the target areas are scattered across the region, making a massed attack more difficult.
China's military launched a new round of war games near Taiwan on Monday, saying it was a warning to the "separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces". A Taiwan security source said there were so signs so far of any missile launches.
The United States has developed and deployed new weapons in the region this year to counter China, including the AIM-174B air-to-air missile and the ground-based Typhon missile battery in the Philippines, which can launch SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles.
The US Indo-Pacific Command and China's Ministry of Defense did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
CHINA'S MISSILES LONGER-RANGE, LESS ACCURATE
On the other hand, simply being better informed about how offensive and defensive systems perform after Iran's missile fusillades - many were intercepted - may reduce the chance of conflict, said Ankit Panda of the US-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
"Any military force planning long-range missile strikes will need to plan around the possible effects of missile defenses," Panda said. "Of course, without clarity on how well a given missile defense system might perform, this could lead to massive escalation."
Israel's layered air and missile defenses - from its long-range Arrow systems to the Iron Dome shield meant to handle slower, less complex threats - are tailored to the threats it faces: guided ballistic missiles from powers such as Iran mixed with unguided rockets launched from just over Israel's borders.
The picture is much different in the Indo-Pacific region for the US and its allies, which use the Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Patriot, THAAD and sea-based Aegis systems for missile defense.
The accuracy of China's DF-26, its most numerous conventional intermediate-range ballistic missile, is estimated to be as good as 150 m (500 feet), according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Missile Defense Project. Its DF-21 is shorter-ranged, though some variants have an accuracy of 50 m.
Both can hit most US and allied targets in the region. The DF-26 can reach Guam, the site of major US military facilities. The Pentagon has estimated that China may have several hundred of the missiles.
By contrast, Iran's missiles such as the Fattah-1 are theoretically more accurate - within tens of meters - but are much shorter-ranged. The number of these newer missiles is not public, but US Air Force General Kenneth McKenzie told Congress last year that Iran had more than 3,000 ballistic missiles of all types.
China's capabilities outstrip Iran's in other ways, said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Missile attacks would most likely be coordinated with anti-satellite strikes and cyberwarfare, both designed to complicate defense.
"Western (integrated air and missile defense) systems in the Indo-Pacific would have a much tougher time defeating a large Chinese missile strike, comprising hundreds or even thousands of missiles, compared to what the Iranians are capable of," Davis said.



Qaani’s Uncertain Fate: A New Angle in the Shadow War

Ismail Qaani whispers in the ear of IRGC Commander Hossein Salami (IRNA)
Ismail Qaani whispers in the ear of IRGC Commander Hossein Salami (IRNA)
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Qaani’s Uncertain Fate: A New Angle in the Shadow War

Ismail Qaani whispers in the ear of IRGC Commander Hossein Salami (IRNA)
Ismail Qaani whispers in the ear of IRGC Commander Hossein Salami (IRNA)

There has been recently a surge of speculation about Ismail Qaani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, with reports presenting conflicting information.

Some leaks suggest Qaani may have been injured in an Israeli attack abroad or is being investigated for alleged collaboration with Israel. Iranian officials have provided little information, leaving his whereabouts uncertain and raising questions about his well-being.

Timeline of Events

Qaani was last seen on September 29 at the Lebanese Hezbollah office in Tehran, where he was offering condolences after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General in Beirut’s southern suburbs.

Five days later, during a eulogy for Nasrallah, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei spoke in Tehran, notably without Qaani and other leaders present.

On October 6, Tasnim news agency published photos of Khamenei presenting an award to Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the Aerospace Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, again without Qaani in attendance.

On October 9, Iran hinted at Qaani’s fate, stating that Khamenei would soon honor him with the same award. Tasnim reported that Qaani is in “good health.”

By October 10, numerous reports indicated that Qaani might be under investigation, deepening the confusion surrounding his situation.

Speculation Grows Around Qaani’s Status

Since Qaani’s last public appearance, speculation about his fate has intensified, with three key theories emerging by October 10.

The first theory arose immediately after Nasrallah’s assassination, claiming Qaani was either injured or killed. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) quickly denied these claims.

On October 5, Israel struck a building in the Beirut suburbs, alleging it was targeting Hashem Safieddine, Hezbollah's Executive Council chief. This led to speculation that Qaani was there and may have been harmed.

The IRGC took three days to deny these reports, with Deputy Commander Eiraj Masjedi confirming that Qaani was unharmed.

On October 10, military expert Babak Taghvaei posted on X (formerly Twitter) that Qaani was under investigation, with some reports claiming he suffered a heart attack “due to torture.”

In response, IRGC-affiliated news agencies Tasnim and Fars denied Qaani’s arrest, with Tasnim dismissing a report from “10 sources” and stating, “We can confidently say that 20 informed sources claim the ten sources are completely false.”

Confusion Surrounds Qaani's Status Amid Competing Narratives

Verifying leaks about Qaani’s status is challenging due to the IRGC’s complex media network, which shapes public opinion.

One theory suggests Tehran is shocked by the rapid loss of Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah’s leadership, leading them to believe significant intelligence breaches have occurred. As a result, they may be withholding information about Qaani’s location to protect him.

However, skepticism about Iran’s credibility has given rise to another theory: infighting within the IRGC may lead some factions to undermine Qaani’s image and distance themselves from him.

Doubts are also growing about Qaani’s ability to fill the void left by Qassem Soleimani, especially as tensions with Israel escalate and the conflict shifts to targeting Iranian-affiliated groups.

Another theory suggests that creating public speculation about Qaani’s fate could prompt Iranians to reveal his true status and location, particularly since he is reportedly on an Israeli target list.

Despite the uncertainty, Qaani’s fate won’t remain a secret for long. Iran may soon introduce new theories, especially if IRGC statements suggest that Khamenei will award Qaani the “Order of Fateh.”