Impact of Sinwar’s Death on Hamas and the Gaza War

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in 2021 (AP)
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in 2021 (AP)
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Impact of Sinwar’s Death on Hamas and the Gaza War

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in 2021 (AP)
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in 2021 (AP)

No one in Israel or Palestine expected the Israeli army to kill Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in what is described as an “accidental” strike, according to Israel’s account since Oct.7.

Israel officially announced Sinwar’s death in an strike on a house in Rafah, southern Gaza, just hours after the army began investigating whether he had been killed. Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz called it a “major victory.”

Since Sinwar orchestrated Hamas’ “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack in October last year, he has become Israel’s top target.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi had vowed to kill him, using military and intelligence resources, along with US and Western support, to make his death a key war objective.

Turning Point

The war has reached a significant “turning point” with the killing of Sinwar, which may allow Israel to end the conflict. This development could also give Hamas more flexibility after losing its hardline leader, who has reshaped the group in recent years.

Before Israel confirmed Sinwar’s death, Gallant, Halevi, and Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar visited the Gaza border for a security assessment. They also briefed US President Joe Biden about the situation.

Political analyst Mustafa Ibrahim told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sinwar’s assassination will have major impacts on future events.

A Hamas source described the news as a “shock.”

Following confirmation of Sinwar’s death, the source said Hamas leaders began discussions about their future, including the selection of a new leader, current confrontations, and ceasefire negotiations.

Sources familiar with Hamas’ decision-making suggest that Sinwar’s absence will shift control back to the leadership outside Gaza. This change could make negotiations for a ceasefire easier and quicker, which may align with Israeli interests.

Israeli public broadcaster Kan reported that urgent discussions occurred between the negotiation team and security officials following Sinwar’s killing.

Sinwar was among those released in the 2011 prisoner exchange between Hamas and Israel.

After his release, he quickly rose to power and was first elected head of Hamas in Gaza in 2017, succeeding Ismail Haniyeh, who then became the overall leader of the movement. Sinwar took over the leadership role in August.

Radical Control

One key change Sinwar made in Hamas was a “firmness of leadership,” according to a source close to the group. The source explained that Sinwar was a strong leader who made significant decisions about who would rise or fall within the organization.

He successfully pushed the military faction's agenda and took firm control of decision-making, even when communication with him became difficult for a time.

Most of Hamas’ leadership abroad, including members from Gaza and the West Bank, participated in crucial meetings and unanimously approved Sinwar as the leader without any competition.

Sinwar’s selection highlights the continued control of Gaza’s leadership within Hamas for the second consecutive term. This leadership, which includes Ismail Haniyeh and now Sinwar, has worked to align Hamas with the Iranian-led axis, according to analysts.

Comprehensive Review

A source close to Hamas told Asharq Al-Awsat that the movement has been significantly weakened by the loss of many of its hardline leaders. He suggested that Hamas is likely to conduct a thorough review of its policies, though a complete change is not guaranteed.

Regarding potential impacts, the source noted several key points: first, decision-making may shift back to leaders abroad, leading to significant changes; second, Hamas may have to make concessions that were difficult under Sinwar’s leadership, especially concerning the conflict, prisoner exchanges, and relations with the Palestinian Authority; and third, Hamas will seek to navigate current challenges, requiring extensive discussions.

The assassination of Sinwar is another setback for Hamas, which is already facing multiple difficulties.



Lessons from Iran Missile Attacks for Defending against China's Advanced Arsenal

A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu
A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu
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Lessons from Iran Missile Attacks for Defending against China's Advanced Arsenal

A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu
A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu

Iran's missile barrage this month against Israel, after a similar large-scale attack in April, shows the value, as well as the shortcomings, of US and allied missile defenses in a potential Indo-Pacific conflict with China, analysts say.
Although differences between the two scenarios limit the lessons that can be learnt, the nearly 400 missiles of different types that Iran has fired at Israel this year offer the United States and China some idea of what works and what does not.
For Washington, the main takeaway from Iran's Oct. 1 attacks - the largest sample yet of ballistic missiles fired against modern defenses - could be that Beijing's missiles would be more difficult to intercept than Iran's and that the ability to strike back would be needed to deter a mass attack, said Collin Koh of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
"If we look purely through the lenses of deterrence, no longer can one pin hopes on deterrence by denial only - that is, the hope that effective defenses can blunt the efficacy of missile strikes," Koh said. "Deterrence by punishment might have to become normative going forward."
There is no immediate threat of missile conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. The distances, thousands of kilometers, are greater than in the Middle East. China's weapons are more advanced, including maneuvering warheads and precision guidance. And the target areas are scattered across the region, making a massed attack more difficult.
China's military launched a new round of war games near Taiwan on Monday, saying it was a warning to the "separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces". A Taiwan security source said there were so signs so far of any missile launches.
The United States has developed and deployed new weapons in the region this year to counter China, including the AIM-174B air-to-air missile and the ground-based Typhon missile battery in the Philippines, which can launch SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles.
The US Indo-Pacific Command and China's Ministry of Defense did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
CHINA'S MISSILES LONGER-RANGE, LESS ACCURATE
On the other hand, simply being better informed about how offensive and defensive systems perform after Iran's missile fusillades - many were intercepted - may reduce the chance of conflict, said Ankit Panda of the US-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
"Any military force planning long-range missile strikes will need to plan around the possible effects of missile defenses," Panda said. "Of course, without clarity on how well a given missile defense system might perform, this could lead to massive escalation."
Israel's layered air and missile defenses - from its long-range Arrow systems to the Iron Dome shield meant to handle slower, less complex threats - are tailored to the threats it faces: guided ballistic missiles from powers such as Iran mixed with unguided rockets launched from just over Israel's borders.
The picture is much different in the Indo-Pacific region for the US and its allies, which use the Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Patriot, THAAD and sea-based Aegis systems for missile defense.
The accuracy of China's DF-26, its most numerous conventional intermediate-range ballistic missile, is estimated to be as good as 150 m (500 feet), according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Missile Defense Project. Its DF-21 is shorter-ranged, though some variants have an accuracy of 50 m.
Both can hit most US and allied targets in the region. The DF-26 can reach Guam, the site of major US military facilities. The Pentagon has estimated that China may have several hundred of the missiles.
By contrast, Iran's missiles such as the Fattah-1 are theoretically more accurate - within tens of meters - but are much shorter-ranged. The number of these newer missiles is not public, but US Air Force General Kenneth McKenzie told Congress last year that Iran had more than 3,000 ballistic missiles of all types.
China's capabilities outstrip Iran's in other ways, said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Missile attacks would most likely be coordinated with anti-satellite strikes and cyberwarfare, both designed to complicate defense.
"Western (integrated air and missile defense) systems in the Indo-Pacific would have a much tougher time defeating a large Chinese missile strike, comprising hundreds or even thousands of missiles, compared to what the Iranians are capable of," Davis said.