Israel’s Path of Destruction in Southern Lebanon Raises Fears of an Attempt to Create a Buffer Zone

 This Oct. 24 2024, satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows the village of Ramyah in southern Lebanon. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
This Oct. 24 2024, satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows the village of Ramyah in southern Lebanon. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
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Israel’s Path of Destruction in Southern Lebanon Raises Fears of an Attempt to Create a Buffer Zone

 This Oct. 24 2024, satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows the village of Ramyah in southern Lebanon. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
This Oct. 24 2024, satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows the village of Ramyah in southern Lebanon. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)

Perched on a hilltop a short walk from the Israeli border, the tiny southern Lebanese village of Ramyah has almost been wiped off the map. In a neighboring village, satellite photos show a similar scene: a hill once covered with houses, now reduced to a gray smear of rubble.

Israeli warplanes and ground forces have blasted a trail of destruction through southern Lebanon the past month. The aim, Israel says, is to debilitate the Iran-backed Hezbollah armed group, push it away from the border and end more than a year of Hezbollah fire into northern Israel.

Even United Nations peacekeepers and Lebanese troops in the south have come under fire from Israeli forces, raising questions over whether they can remain in place.

More than 1 million people have fled bombardment, emptying much of the south. Some experts say Israel may be aiming to create a depopulated buffer zone, a strategy it has already deployed along its border with Gaza.

Some conditions for such a zone appear already in place, according to an Associated Press analysis of satellite imagery and data collected by mapping experts that show the breadth of destruction across 11 villages next to the border.

The Israeli military has said the bombardment is necessary to destroy Hezbollah tunnels and other infrastructure it says the group embedded within towns. The blasts have also destroyed homes, neighborhoods and sometimes entire villages, where families have lived for generations.

Israel says it aims to push Hezbollah far enough back that its citizens can return safely to homes in the north, but Israeli officials acknowledge they don’t have a concrete plan for ensuring Hezbollah stays away from the border long term. That is a key focus in attempts by the United States to broker a ceasefire.

Orna Mizrahi, a senior researcher at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, said Israel's immediate aim is not to create a buffer zone — but that might change.

“Maybe we’ll have no other choice than staying there until we have an arrangement that promises us that Hezbollah will not come back to the zone,” she said.

A path of destruction

Troops pushed into southern Lebanon on Oct. 1, backed by heavy bombardment that has intensified since.

Using satellite images provided by Planet Labs PBC, AP identified a line of 11 villages — all within 4 miles (6.5 kilometers) of Lebanon's border with Israel — that have been severely damaged in the past month, either by strikes or detonations of explosives laid by Israeli soldiers.

Analysis found the most intense damage in the south came in villages closest to the border, with between 100 and 500 buildings likely destroyed or damaged in each, according to Corey Scher of CUNY Graduate Center and Jamon Van Der Hoek of Oregon State University, experts in damage assessments.

In Ramyah, barely a single structure still stands on the village’s central hilltop, after a controlled detonation that Israeli soldiers showed themselves carrying out in videos posted on social media. In the next town over, Aita al-Shaab — a village with strong Hezbollah influence — bombardment turned the hilltop with the highest concentration of buildings into a gray wasteland of rubble.

In other villages, the damage is more selective. In some, bombardment tore scars through blocks of houses; in others, certain homes were crushed while their neighbors remained intact.

Another controlled detonation leveled much of the village of Odeissah, with an explosion so strong it set off earthquake alerts in Israel.

In videos of the blast, Lubnan Baalbaki, conductor of the Lebanese Philharmonic Orchestra, watched in disbelief as his parents’ house — containing the art collection and a library his father had built up for years — was destroyed.

“This house was a project and a dream for both of my parents,” he told the AP. His parents’ graves in the garden are now lost.

When asked whether its intention was to create a buffer zone, Israel’s military said it was “conducting localized, limited, targeted raids based on precise intelligence" against Hezbollah targets. It said Hezbollah had “deliberately embedded” weapons in homes and villages.

Israeli journalist Danny Kushmaro even helped blow up a home that the military said was being used to store Hezbollah ammunition. In a television segment, Kushmaro and soldiers counted down before they pressed a button, setting off a massive explosion.

Videos posted online by Israel’s military and individual soldiers show Israeli troops planting flags on Lebanese soil. Still, Israel has not built any bases or managed to hold a permanent presence in southern Lebanon. Troops appear to move back and forth across the border, sometimes under heavy fire from Hezbollah.

October has been the deadliest month of 2024 for the Israeli military, with around 60 soldiers killed.

Attacks on UN peacekeeping troops and the Lebanese Army

The bombardment has been punctuated by Israeli attacks on UN troops and the Lebanese Army — forces which, under international law, are supposed to keep the peace in the area. Israel has long complained that their presence has not prevented Hezbollah from building up its infrastructure across the south.

Israel denies targeting either force.

The Lebanese military has said at least 11 of its soldiers were killed in eight Israeli strikes, either at their positions or while assisting evacuations.

The peacekeeping force, known as UNIFIL, said its forces and infrastructure have been harmed at least 30 times since late September, blaming Israeli military fire or actions for about 20 of them, “with seven being clearly deliberate.”

A rocket likely fired by Hezbollah or an allied group hit UNIFIL’s headquarters in Naqoura on Tuesday, causing some minor injuries, said UNIFIL spokesperson Andrea Tenenti.

UNIFIL has refused to leave southern Lebanon, despite calls by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for them to go.

Experts warn that could change if peacekeepers come under greater fire.

“If you went from the UN taking casualties to the UN actually taking fatalities,” some nations contributing troops may “say ‘enough is enough,’ and you might see the mission start to crumble,” said Richard Gowan of the International Crisis Group.

The future of the territory is uncertain

International ceasefire efforts appear to be centered on implementing UN Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.

It specified that Israeli forces would fully withdraw from Lebanon while the Lebanese army and UNIFIL — not Hezbollah — would be the exclusive armed presence in a zone about 25 kilometers (15 miles) from the border.

But the resolution was not fully implemented. Hezbollah never left the border zone, and Lebanon accuses Israel of continuing to occupy small areas of its land and carrying out frequent military overflights above its territory.

During a recent visit to Beirut, US envoy Amos Hochstein said a new agreement was needed to enforce Resolution 1701.

Israel could be trying to pressure an agreement into existence through the destruction wreaked in southern Lebanon.

Yossi Yehoshua, military correspondent for the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth, wrote that the military needs to “entrench further its operational achievements” to push Hezbollah, the Lebanese government and mediating countries “to accept an end (of the war) under conditions that are convenient for Israel.”

Some Lebanese fear that means an occupation of parts of the south, 25 years after Israel ended its occupation there.

Lebanese parliamentarian Mark Daou, a critic of both Hezbollah and of Israel’s military operations in Lebanon, said he believed Israel was trying to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and turn the Lebanese public “against the will to resist Israeli incursions.”

Gowan, of the International Crisis Group, said one aim of Resolution 1701 was to give the Lebanese army enough credibility that it, not Hezbollah, would be seen “as the legitimate defender” in the south.

“That evaporates if they become (Israel’s) gendarmerie of southern Lebanon,” he said.



Angry Groups Emerge and Fade in Syria, Terror Cells or Shadows?

Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
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Angry Groups Emerge and Fade in Syria, Terror Cells or Shadows?

Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)

When Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa met US President Donald Trump in Riyadh on May 14, the encounter marked a striking departure from Syria’s political norm, and one that sent ripples of surprise through both allies and adversaries.

While many Syrians expressed enthusiasm over the unexpected meeting, the reaction was far from unanimous.

For extremist circles, the image of al-Sharaa seated beside a US president, long portrayed in their rhetoric as the embodiment of a hostile international order, triggered deep unease and, in some cases, fury.

The backlash was swift and fragmented. Although not centrally coordinated, it was visible across encrypted Telegram channels - the platform of choice for many extremist groups - as well as in private gatherings and scattered posts on the social media platform X.

Reactions ranged from suspicion and ideological denunciation to outright accusations of apostasy. The criticism largely targeted al-Sharaa’s growing openness to the West, particularly Israel, and debated the legitimacy of such outreach under Islamic law.

Despite the noise, these objections appear to carry little political weight inside Syria’s emerging state institutions. Analysts and insiders say the dissent does not reflect the views of the security and military apparatus that has taken shape following the collapse of the former regime.

At the heart of this new order is a coalition of former factions, notably those once aligned with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which now forms the backbone of Syria’s restructured army and civil institutions. These groups have largely rallied around al-Sharaa, endorsing his foreign policy moves and viewing his leadership as best suited for steering the country through a fragile transition.

The new Syrian army, drawn from multiple factions that once formed the joint operations room which toppled the Assad government in Damascus, has since consolidated under state command.

Most of its components now back al-Sharaa, even as he pushes for diplomatic normalization, including tentative overtures to Israel - a shift they see as necessary for post-conflict stability.

While Syria’s new institutions rally around al-Sharaa’s push for reconciliation and international engagement, a defiant voice has emerged from outside the state structure - one that rejects his overtures and threatens to reignite instability.

The group calling itself Saraya Ansar al-Sunna has so far been the only actor to publicly oppose al-Sharaa’s trajectory. Shrouded in secrecy, the group is among the newest armed movements to surface following the collapse of the Assad regime.

Its presence remains confined to encrypted Telegram channels, where it has adopted a hardline tone steeped in religious denunciation and threats of violence. It has yet to establish a visible presence on the ground or disclose a clear organizational identity.

In a recent statement circulated online, the group vowed to escalate attacks across Syrian provinces and in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli - where it previously claimed activity.

The message marked a sharp warning from a faction that, despite its limited footprint, could stir trouble through lone-wolf operations, a method favored in such ideological circles.

Saraya Ansar al-Sunna first claimed responsibility for an attack in February in the village of Arzeh in Hama province, which killed more than ten civilians.

The group’s founding statement framed the assault as part of a campaign of “sectarian revenge” targeting Alawites and Shiites, whom it referred to using derogatory sectarian terms. The communiqué also described the group as “decentralized” and reliant on autonomous cells with no identifiable leadership or headquarters.

Although Syria’s Interior Ministry declined to provide details on the group, officials confirmed they are closely monitoring its activity – a sign that authorities consider the threat credible, despite the group's lack of formal structure.

Who are Saraya Ansar al-Sunna?

Sources in northern Syria told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has claimed responsibility for a series of assassinations in rural Hama and Homs, targeting Alawite civilians.

The group framed the killings as “retribution” against alleged Assad loyalists, or “shabiha”, whom they accuse the state of failing to prosecute. The sources said growing frustration over the lack of transitional justice has fueled accusations that the state is delivering “selective justice,” a phrase increasingly used to mock what some see as a stalled reconciliation process.

Despite fiery rhetoric and threats, the shadowy group has yet to establish a tangible presence on the ground.

So far, its activities remain confined to anonymous, closed Telegram channels, where it disseminates sharply worded statements steeped in religious condemnation and anti-government sentiment.

According to sources familiar with extremist activity in central Syria, the group relies entirely on text-based messaging and has shown no visual evidence of leadership or organized operations.

Two names have emerged frequently in connection with the group: “Abu Aisha al-Shami” and “Abu al-Fath al-Shami” - likely pseudonyms. Both are believed to be former members of Hurras al-Din, an offshoot of al-Qaeda. Intelligence suggests they have since reemerged in small clandestine cells operating quietly in parts of rural Homs and Hama.

In one statement posted on a Telegram channel, Abu al-Fath al-Shami - introduced as the group's “religious authority” - launched a scathing attack on President Ahmad al-Sharaa, accusing him of apostasy and betrayal.

His message, couched in harsh ideological language, cast the new Syrian government not merely as a political adversary but as a theological enemy - a marked escalation in tone.

Still, the group has so far refrained from direct armed confrontation with the Syrian state. Instead, it appears to be focused on retaliatory attacks against what it calls the “social incubators” of the former regime - a reference to Alawite civilian communities historically aligned with Bashar al-Assad.

This approach, emphasizing ideological hostility over direct conflict, reflects a broader, long-standing rift within the extremist landscape in Syria.

It mirrors the old divide between al-Qaeda’s traditionalist wing and the more localized, pragmatic faction led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Sharaa. Though this internal split had faded from prominence, al-Sharaa’s high-profile meeting with Trump in Riyadh appears to have reignited it, sparking renewed debate among radical ideologues.

Prominent extremist figures have stepped up criticism of al-Sharaa, accusing him of betraying ideological principles in pursuit of political gains, particularly following his unprecedented outreach to the US and Israel.

Among the loudest voices was Khaled Abu Qatada al-Ansari, a former senior figure in Hurras al-Din, who denounced the Syrian state as “treasonous” and accused it of deviating from the “true path.”

His comments were echoed by Samer al-Ali, also known as Abu Ubaida, a former religious authority in Jabhat al-Nusra, who charged al-Sharaa with abandoning the core tenets of the original project for political pragmatism.

Outside Syria, criticism followed a similar pattern. Abu Abdullah al-Shami, a well-known ideologue based in Iraq, described al-Sharaa’s foreign policy pivot as a “fundamental betrayal of doctrine.”

Meanwhile, a stark split emerged among veteran thinkers: cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi reaffirmed his staunch opposition to al-Sharaa, framing his overtures to Washington and Israel as a departure from religious “constants.”

In contrast, Abu Qatada struck a more nuanced tone, suggesting that such shifts might be necessary in the post-Assad era to safeguard the revolution’s gains.

The debate underscores a widening rift between two ideological camps - one branding al-Sharaa an apostate, the other viewing his actions as a pragmatic response to evolving realities and branding him as the “man of the moment.”

No Organized Opposition Within the State

Despite the heated rhetoric, former military commander Adham Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that there is no significant extremist bloc within Syria’s government or its security institutions challenging al-Sharaa’s policies.

“This is the policy of a state, not just one man - even if al-Sharaa is the architect,” he said.

“While there is still public and religious discomfort around peace with Israel, it's no longer as emotionally charged as it once was. Over time, these sentiments may coalesce into various forms of opposition, but they won’t be exclusively religious – they could be nationalist or political as well.”

He added that even radical factions, especially foreign fighters who once resisted integration, are now gradually shifting their focus.

“Most of them are moving toward reintegration, prioritizing daily life and stability. They may not fully endorse the new government, but they’re adapting - I’ve seen this happen in multiple cases,” Abdulrahman said.

Extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda are attempting to exploit discontent within Syria’s shifting political landscape, but analysts say al-Sharaa’s government – forged through years of conflict – is proving far from vulnerable.

“ISIS is actively seeking to regroup and recruit from disillusioned or marginalized segments, relying on its familiar slogans,” said former military commander Adham Abdulrahman.

“But this new government, born from an authentic organizational experience and equipped with deep security and military know-how, is not an easy target.”

Diverging Currents in HTS

According to Ahmad Sultan, a researcher specializing in Islamist movements, internal divisions are emerging within the HTS, the backbone of the new Syrian state.

“Some factions within HTS still cling to hardline ideology and remain visibly frustrated with al-Sharaa’s policy shifts,” Sultan told Asharq Al-Awsat. “They lack a coherent vision for governance beyond regime collapse and still regard any contact with perceived enemies as tantamount to apostasy.”

By contrast, other elements within HTS advocate a more pragmatic approach. “They view political openness as a tactical necessity for this phase,” Sultan said. “al-Sharaa’s administration is walking a fine line between these factions to preserve cohesion amid Syria’s complex reality.”

Sultan emphasized that the pro-al-Sharaa bloc remains dominant. “The opposition within HTS doesn’t represent the majority. The leading current supports Sharaa and wields greater power,” he said.

“The administration has made it clear that it won’t align with anti-engagement elements, though it may seek to pacify them to avoid destabilization - especially as al-Sharaa’s international legitimacy hinges on curbing extremism.”

Fears of Splits, Push for Consolidation

The researcher warned that any significant rift within HTS - the central pillar of the state - could destabilize the entire administration and potentially spark internal conflict.

“Al-Sharaa’s government is preparing to tackle critical files: the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast, the presence of foreign fighters, border control, and consolidating central authority,” Sultan explained. “To do that, it must neutralize ultra-hardline elements within.”

He added that al-Sharaa is relying on practical methods to prevent extremist drift inside his administration, including religious education and theological persuasion aimed at preserving unity.

“Some clerics close to al-Sharaa command real influence among hardline circles,” Sultan said. “If tensions escalate, these figures could play a key role in diffusing conflict through religious argumentation and appeals to collective responsibility.”

Al-Sharaa is prepared to take tough measures - including arrests and even eliminations - against hardline elements within the state who reject moderation and persist in incitement.

“Containment through religious dialogue is the preferred option,” said Sultan.

“But when that fails, the alternative may be surgical removal of factions that prove resistant to integration.”

Sultan warned that the government will not tolerate extremist mindsets if they shift toward agitation and destabilization. “If a radical current chooses confrontation, al-Sharaa will not hesitate to resort to decisive tools, including imprisonment or targeted action,” he said.

Strained Popular Base

Despite the state’s assertive posture, some observers caution that the strategy carries risks, particularly if it alienates the broader revolutionary base that once fueled Syria’s rebellion.

“The Syrian landscape remains fluid and unpredictable,” said Mohamed Ibrahim, also known as Abu Yahya al-Shami, a former military commander within an Islamist faction. “If the government wants long-term stability, it cannot afford to lose the core support of former revolutionaries.”

Al-Shami, who remains closely connected to Islamic movements, drew a clear line between constructive dissent and extremist rhetoric.

“Takfir- branding others as apostates - is the weapon of extremists and ISIS sympathizers. It’s unacceptable to many of us within the Islamist current,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He stressed that criticism of al-Sharaa’s government should be expressed through informed, balanced discourse.

“There is no such thing as ‘legitimate chaos.’ Sharia is the standard by which actions are judged. Disagreements must be addressed scientifically and socially, not through disorder.”

Al-Shami also warned that hardline rhetoric by extremist groups risks influencing disillusioned youth and fueling radicalization in Syria’s fragile post-war landscape.

“There is concern that some enthusiastic or overly zealous youth may be swayed by extremist narratives,” al-Shami told Asharq Al-Awsat, adding that “those with experience and awareness are working to contain these tendencies, which only aggravate problems rather than solve them.”

He also cautioned that ISIS remains a looming threat, capable of exploiting simmering discontent in Salafi circles and drawing in defectors from factions opposed to Syria’s new leadership under al-Sharaa.

“ISIS thrives in environments where ignorance and extremism take root,” he said.

“The group could recruit from those who once fought under revolutionary banners, only to find themselves later disillusioned with a political reality that doesn’t match the slogans they lived by,” explained al-Shami.

As al-Sharaa’s administration pushes ahead with normalization and international outreach, including controversial overtures to former foes, observers say the ability to manage backlash from former allies and militant hardliners will be key to preserving security and cohesion.