How Will the ‘Battle for Damascus’ Resonate in Beirut and Baghdad?

A Syrian anti government fighter poses for a picture in front of one of the water wheels, or norias, of Hama, after forces captured of the city of Hama on December 6, 2024. (Photo by OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP)
A Syrian anti government fighter poses for a picture in front of one of the water wheels, or norias, of Hama, after forces captured of the city of Hama on December 6, 2024. (Photo by OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP)
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How Will the ‘Battle for Damascus’ Resonate in Beirut and Baghdad?

A Syrian anti government fighter poses for a picture in front of one of the water wheels, or norias, of Hama, after forces captured of the city of Hama on December 6, 2024. (Photo by OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP)
A Syrian anti government fighter poses for a picture in front of one of the water wheels, or norias, of Hama, after forces captured of the city of Hama on December 6, 2024. (Photo by OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP)

The chances of the Syrian conflict turning into an open and possibly long-lasting war between competing regional powers are growing, following a sudden shift in the balance of power.

For years, foreign forces have been drawn to Syria, using their military strength to support President Bashar al-Assad’s government.

The conflict reached its height after 2011 when Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and allied Iraqi factions, backed by Russia, joined the civil war. At the same time, the United States stationed troops in Syria to fight ISIS.

Later, key international players agreed to a political deal to reduce tensions, known as the “Astana Process.” However, Iran kept its military presence to secure the supply route between Tehran and Beirut, while the US set up military bases in northeastern Syria.

Roots of 2011

Response: When the Syrian uprising began in 2011, before it turned into a civil war, Türkiye was uncertain about its political and military options. The Turkish National Security Council spent weeks in May 2011 reviewing reports on the "Syrian crisis" from Hakan Fidan, then head of intelligence and now foreign minister.

Two years later, Türkiye saw Iran's Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias taking positions in Syria. Meanwhile, Türkiye focused on countering Kurdish forces in northern Syria with support from Arab allies. It also hosted millions of refugees, creating both an economic burden and political tensions at home between the ruling AKP and opposition CHP.

Extremist Groups: ISIS and other extremist groups expanded across Syria and Iraq, prompting a range of forces to join the fight. These included the US-led coalition, Kurdish factions, Iran’s Popular Mobilization Forces, the Revolutionary Guard, and the Syrian army.

Russian Role: Russia entered the Syrian conflict at a time when it was not yet focused on the war in Ukraine. It took control of Syria's coastline, strengthened its presence in the Middle East, and deepened its alliance with President Bashar al-Assad.

Syria’s ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

Tehran and Moscow: After the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon, Iran found itself unable to act. When Syrian armed factions launched a rapid advance beyond Aleppo and Idlib, Iran did not respond clearly. Meanwhile, Russia was too focused on the war in Ukraine to intervene.

Turkish Timing: Türkiye made its move clear, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stating just days ago that the situation in Syria is "managed calmly," showing Türkiye’s intentions to act ahead of others towards Damascus.

Syrian Factions’ Organization: The opposition groups fighting against both Assad and Iran showed increasing organization last week. While their leaders are linked to radical movements, the groups have so far avoided war crimes, maintaining discipline. It remains to be seen if this continues.

Syrian Army: The Syrian army’s retreat was notable as cities fell, including those after Aleppo. This could indicate a political decision to avoid fighting, weakening any political solution, or that the army is too weak and disorganized to protect the cities.

Battle for Damascus

“Iran’s options are now limited,” says an Iraqi political advisor who recently visited Washington and heard “new” views on Syria.

“Tehran has no bargaining power left, which makes it more dangerous if it decides to act with no political leverage,” the advisor warned.

Historically, Iran has never allowed Assad’s fall. However, sending forces now to support Assad would mean declaring war on Türkiye, especially with Russian hesitation and US indifference.

In Baghdad and Beirut, risks are growing as factions advance toward southern Syria, reaching the town of Qusayr and heading toward Damascus.

Iraqi faction leaders say, “Baghdad is tightening the pressure for the first time in years,” but “the religious and ideological factors won’t be easy to manage” if Syria’s minority groups or Shiite shrines in Damascus are threatened.

This depends heavily on the actions of the Syrian factions.

They acknowledge that moving now is difficult due to limited time, resources, and supply lines. However, retaliation could soon start in Beirut and Baghdad.



Türkiye’s Gas Shift Threatens Russia and Iran’s Last Big European Market

A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)
A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)
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Türkiye’s Gas Shift Threatens Russia and Iran’s Last Big European Market

A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)
A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)

Türkiye could meet more than half of its gas needs by the end of 2028 by ramping up production and increasing US imports, in a shift that threatens to shrink the last major European market for Russian and Iranian suppliers.

Washington has publicly pressured allies, including NATO member Türkiye, to cut energy ties with Moscow and Tehran. At their White House meeting on September 25, US President Donald Trump pressed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to cut Russian energy purchases.

Diversifying supply would also strengthen Türkiye’s energy security and support its ambitions to become a regional gas hub. Ankara aims to re-export imported liquefied natural gas and its own gas production to Europe while burning Russian and Iranian gas domestically, analysts said.

" Türkiye has been signaling that it will take advantage of the (global) LNG abundance," said Sohbet Karbuz, from the Paris-based Mediterranean Organization for Energy and Climate.

Russia remains Türkiye’s largest gas supplier, but its share of the market has fallen from more than 60% two decades ago to 37% in the first half of 2025. Most European countries halted imports following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

RUSSIA'S PIPELINE CONTRACTS NEAR EXPIRY

Russia's long-term pipeline contracts with Türkiye to supply 22 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually via the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines are close to expiry. Iran's 10 bcm contract expires in the middle of next year, while Azerbaijan’s contracts, totaling 9.5 bcm, run until 2030 and 2033.

While Türkiye is likely to extend some of these contracts, it is likely to seek more flexible terms and smaller volumes to increase the diversity of its supply, Karbuz said.

At the same time, Türkiye is rapidly expanding alternative sources. State-owned TPAO is boosting output from local gas fields, while state and private companies have expanded LNG import terminals to bring gas in from the US and Algeria.

Domestic production and contracted LNG imports are set to exceed 26 bcm annually from 2028 from 15 bcm this year, according to Reuters calculations.

US LNG IMPORTS SET TO DOUBLE

That would cover more than half of Türkiye’s gas demand of around 53 bcm, reducing the gap for pipeline imports to around 26 bcm - well below the 41 bcm of current contracted supplies from Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan combined.

To support this shift, Türkiye has signed a series of LNG deals with US suppliers worth $43 billion, including a 20-year agreement with Mercuria in September.

The country has built 58 bcm annual LNG import capacity, enough to cover its entire demand, according to Türkiye’s energy exchange.

Despite this, Russian gas continues to flow at full capacity, and the Kremlin has said cooperation with Ankara remains strong.

Since Türkiye needs less Russian gas, BOTAS could, in theory, stop imports from Moscow in two to three years, said Alexey Belogoryev of the Moscow-based Institute for Energy and Finance.

"However, it won't do so, because Russian gas is price-competitive and creates a surplus that BOTAS can use to pressure other suppliers," Belogoryev said.

Türkiye’s energy minister Alparslan Bayraktar said in a TV interview in October that Türkiye must source gas from all available suppliers, including Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan, but noted that US LNG offers cheaper alternatives.

The energy ministry declined to comment on future supply deals and pricing. Russian gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom did not reply to a request for comment.

Türkiye could burn Russian and Iranian gas at home, export its own production and re-export imported LNG after Europe bans Russian energy imports by 2028, said Karbuz.

Türkiye’s BOTAS has already signed deals to supply Hungary and Romania with small volumes of gas in its bid to become a regional gas trading hub.

Beyond gas, Ankara has deep ties with Moscow. Russia's Rosatom is building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant and Moscow is also the country's top crude and diesel supplier.


Tehran Losing Rounds in Iraq, but Not the War Yet

Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)
Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)
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Tehran Losing Rounds in Iraq, but Not the War Yet

Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)
Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)

Two years ago, Iraq’s armed factions were eager to make their presence felt in the “Al-Aqsa Flood” scenes. That enthusiasm faded in the months after October 2023 amid what officials described as highly complex negotiations between the government and those groups to keep Iraq out of the war.

There is no evidence that Iran has lost Iraq entirely, as it did in Syria. But it has begun to lose round after round to the Americans in Baghdad’s arena, while its proxies have grown accustomed to living peacefully alongside “the two most dangerous men in the world these days, Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu,” as a former Iraqi minister put it.

Politicians in Baghdad cite three “boxing rounds” that the Americans have won over the Iranians: the release of Israeli researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov from Kataib Hezbollah custody without a deal; the withdrawal of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law that was ready for a parliamentary vote; and, before that, a long truce with US forces even during the 12-day US-Israeli attacks on Iran.

Two years after the “Unity of Fronts” declaration and following Hamas’s Oct. 7 operation, Iraq’s factions were missing from the closing scenes of the “Flood.” For many, that is good news — for now.

Searching for “Plan B”

A Shiite politician who recently visited Tehran returned to Baghdad with a vague outlook ahead of campaign season for the November 2025 parliamentary elections.

The politician, who officially launched his campaign on Oct. 3, said Tehran is looking for a “Plan B” to avoid a knockout blow. “It may surprise many with what it has in store,” he said, suggesting Iran might “make up for Syria elsewhere.”

Shiite politicians in Baghdad, he added, have a habit of “reading the election book in a language the Iranians understand.”

But how accurate is such a forecast? There is no clear metric to measure Iranian influence in Iraq. Analysts remain divided over whether it has diminished to the point that, after Syria’s “domino” fell, its allied groups in Iraq have also tumbled.

In reality, Iraqi public opinion — and the partisan instruments that shape it — often revolve around narratives that are constructed, improvised, or deliberately ambiguous.

Factions Ask, Iran Doesn’t Answer

Reports of a possible war against Iran have put Baghdad’s factions under pressure. According to sources, leaders of several groups met in late September 2025 and sent a consultation request to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seeking guidance on what to expect if war breaks out.

A senior member of a faction recently added to a US terrorism list said Tehran has yet to respond.

At the same time, an IRGC team tasked with managing Shiite electoral alliances in Iraq has been holding meetings with figures in the Coordination Framework coalition. Cross-cutting sources described the team as “Iran’s election committee,” overseeing the distribution of Shiite parties across competing lists — a group that previously engineered influential coalitions in past parliaments.

But this “expert” committee failed to convince Shiite party leaders to implement Tehran’s proposed blueprint to merge lists or reshuffle candidates in key constituencies across central and southern Iraq.

Some Shiite figures accused of defying Iranian directives belong to resistance factions that briefly joined the “Al-Aqsa Flood” front before retreating to the “backyard,” seeking new sources of leverage.

Empty Spaces

In cities liberated from ISIS, Sunni parties are running relatively stable campaigns. Many sense that the loosening of Iran’s grip has allowed them to move more freely — though few dare say so aloud. There are visible efforts to remain cautious and avoid provoking the “Axis of Resistance.”

Former parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi — ousted in 2023 by a Tehran-aligned coalition — is now staging a strong comeback. His associates attribute that to “personal skill and precise calculation,” though it also reflects his use of spaces left vacant by waning Iranian influence, whether by design or under US pressure.

Still, Sunni rivals seeking to counter Halbousi need alliances with Shiite power brokers to secure political “horses to bet on.” In Nineveh, Salahuddin, and Kirkuk, several Sunni figures are shaping their lists in coordination with factions loyal to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

For that reason, Iraq’s “empty” spaces may be little more than a mirage.

According to a Shiite politician, powerful factions recently received Iranian requests to help relocate activities of allied groups from other “resistance” countries to Baghdad — and that has already begun.

Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Ali Larijani, secretary-general of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, is overseeing arrangements to assist Tehran’s war-strained proxies. Larijani was recently in Beirut, where he said before departing: “Hezbollah is quickly regaining strength and will shift the balance.”

“Bin Laden’s Fate Is Not Inevitable”

Four Iraqi factions — Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Imam Ali, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada — were recently added to the US State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, bringing Iraq’s total to six.

A few years ago, that same list included al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq was designated in 2020, while Kataib Hezbollah has been listed since 2009. Both groups still hold seats and cabinet posts in parliament and government.

“You don’t have to share bin Laden’s fate just because you’re on that list,” said a former Iraqi minister who served in Adel Abdul Mahdi’s 2018–2019 government. “Iran-backed groups are now learning to coexist with the world’s two most dangerous men — Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu.”

In Baghdad, voices within Shiite parties have begun to ask whether the US president is deliberately delaying Israeli strikes in Iraq, leveraging American pressure on the government and decision-makers to sever ties with Tehran.

“Will Trump Protect Us from Netanyahu?”

The same former minister, who asked not to be named, said Washington has won battles inside Tehran because Iraqis responded to pressure at a moment of Iranian confusion. “For months,” he added, “Shiite factions have been asking: Will Trump really protect us from Netanyahu? It appears so.”

He sees signs of the “Plan B” Iran is developing: “New Shiite political players who stayed out of the Al-Aqsa Flood fallout are now trying to rebrand themselves — updating their radical image with a civilian face to escape the danger zone.”

It’s like a man standing in a sniper’s sights, a laser dot fixed on his chest. He cannot move right or left — any motion could be fatal. The sniper will not tire as long as the target remains frozen.

“What if the target changes his face, name, and behavior?” the former minister asked. “Some militia leaders are now toying with the idea of returning weapons to storage and shaving their beards — which could make them very useful to both Washington and Tehran.”

A Shiite politician close to the scene agrees: “A militia commander thinking that far ahead will be valuable to Iran once the storm calms.” He added that “four years with Trump is a long time — and even longer with Netanyahu. Survival demands change.”

Autumn nights are settling over Baghdad amid a blazing election summer. Even as talk grows of a new Iran-Israel war, militia leaders who once spread out maps of Tel Aviv to plan rocket strikes are now opening their offices to liberal and secular elites — for long conversations about elections whose intrigue has already begun.


Gaza Babies Forced to Share Oxygen Masks as Israel Blocks Equipment, UNICEF Says

A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj
A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj
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Gaza Babies Forced to Share Oxygen Masks as Israel Blocks Equipment, UNICEF Says

A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj
A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj

Israel has repeatedly denied permission to transfer incubators from an evacuated hospital in North Gaza, a UN children's agency official said on Tuesday, adding to strain on overcrowded hospitals further south where newborn babies are now sharing oxygen masks.

Two years of war between Israel and Hamas has increased stress and malnourishment among pregnant mothers, leading to a rise in premature and underweight babies who the World Health Organization says now account for a fifth of all Gaza newborns.

Over the past month an Israeli assault on Gaza City in northern Gaza has shut hospitals in that area, worsening overcrowding in hospitals that remain open in the south.

James Elder, UNICEF spokesperson, described mothers and babies lining the corridor floors of Nasser Hospital in southern Gaza, and said that premature babies were being forced to share oxygen masks and beds. Meanwhile, vital equipment is stranded in hospitals that have been shut in the north.

"We've been trying to recover incubators from a hospital that was evacuated in the north, and we've had four missions denied simply to get those incubators," he told Reuters by video link from Gaza, referring to supplies now stuck at the damaged Al-Rantissi Children's Hospital in Gaza City.

At a hospital Elder visited in the south, meanwhile, "in one of the paediatric rooms, there were three babies and three mums on a single bed, one source of oxygen, and the mothers would rotate the oxygen 20 minutes to each child," he said. "This is the level of desperation mums have now got to."

Israel's COGAT, a military branch overseeing aid flows, did not immediately respond to a request for comment on UNICEF's remarks. Israel says it is committed to allowing aid deliveries in Gaza but must control it to prevent it being stolen by Hamas, which it blames for the crisis.

The UN humanitarian office said on Tuesday that Israel had either denied or impeded 45% of its 8,000 requested humanitarian missions within Gaza since Oct. 7, 2023.

UNICEF has called for the evacuation of ill and premature babies remaining in northern Gaza hospitals. The WHO transferred three of them last week to a hospital further south, but said one died before the mission. Only 14 of Gaza's 36 hospitals are currently even partially functional, the WHO says.