Should Lebanon Fear the ‘New Syria’?

People wait with their belongings at the Al-Masnaa crossing as they prepare to return to Syria, on the Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanon, 11 December 2024. (EPA)
People wait with their belongings at the Al-Masnaa crossing as they prepare to return to Syria, on the Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanon, 11 December 2024. (EPA)
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Should Lebanon Fear the ‘New Syria’?

People wait with their belongings at the Al-Masnaa crossing as they prepare to return to Syria, on the Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanon, 11 December 2024. (EPA)
People wait with their belongings at the Al-Masnaa crossing as they prepare to return to Syria, on the Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanon, 11 December 2024. (EPA)

Celebration may have swept Lebanon over the collapse of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria given its decades of brutal hegemony over its smaller neighbor, but some Lebanese officials have warned of imminent dangers should extremists assume rule in Damascus.

Head of the Free Patriotic Movement MP Gebran Bassil spoke of an “existential concern among all segments that fear the Islamist groups that are now in control in Syria.”

He questioned the assurances from the groups, recalling how they had occupied some eastern Lebanese regions in recent years, which could force Lebanon into taking a defensive position.

Bassil and others fear a repeat of the 2014 attacks by ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front against the eastern Lebanese border. The groups had attacked the border town of Arsal, killing soldiers and civilians, and occupying regions across the border with Syria.

Lebanese security agencies have intensified measures along the border to prevent a reoccurrence of such an attack, which seems pressing given the presence of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees throughout Lebanon.

FPM deputy leader Dr. Naji Hayek stressed that as long as the Syrians “don’t meddle in the affairs of our country, then they are free to choose what they want.”

He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We wish the Syrian people well and hope the new regime will meet the aspirations of the people, who alone can shape the form of their government.”

“Our one fear is meddling in Lebanon’s affairs,” he added.

He hoped democracy would prevail in Syria, warning against totalitarianism. “We did not agree on the form of the previous regime and hope the new one will be better,” he remarked.

Member of the Strong Republic bloc MP Ghada Ayoub said she was not surprised with Bassil’s comments, saying that the regime in Syria was not the only thing that fell, “but so have the masks of Lebanese officials, including Bassil, who were banking on the survival of this regime.”

Bassil lost an ally in Assad and an integral part of the “Axis of Resistance”, which the FPM struck an understanding with in 2006 that allowed then FPM leader Michel Aoun to become president of Lebanon, she told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The Strong Republic bloc positively views the change in Syria, she stressed, saying the former regime was “hostile to Lebanon for 50 years.”

“It believed that Lebanon should be annexed to Syria and that decisions should be taken from Damascus, not Beirut. We mustn't forget all the wars it waged in Lebanon and against the Lebanese people, as well as the crimes, assassinations and arrests that it carried out,” she went on to say.

“The Assad regime also allowed Syria to become a passage for Iranian militias that meddled with Lebanon’s fate and allowed Iran to seize control of Lebanon,” Ayoub added.

“So, a new phase has started in Syria with the collapse of the regime. We must congratulate the Syrian people on their newfound freedom,” she stressed.

“Lebanon wants to build normal relations with Syria based on respect for each other’s sovereignty, away from Assad’s old slogan of ‘one people in two countries’,” she stated.

Islamist movements and terrorist affairs expert Ahmed al-Ayyoubi said Lebanon has nothing to fear from the “new Syria.”

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the extremist threat comes from the remaining ISIS cells, which the ousted regime and Iran sought to exploit and that they may exploit against the alliance of revolutionaries in Damascus.

He said that Damascus’ new rulers have obstacles to overcome, but extremism is not one of them.

He stressed the need to always focus on preserving freedoms and building a just civilian state.

Moreover, Ayyoubi explained that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was not the sole component of the victorious factions in Syria. Rather, they are formed of various diverse groups that will be represented in the expected transitional council.

Furthermore, he noted that Iran has sought to pin the label of terrorism on Sunni groups to present itself and its militias as a leader of an anti-terrorism axis.

The reality is far from the truth, Ayyoubi added, saying that the Assad regime “was harboring the most extremist and terrorist groups, and they are Hezbollah and the Shiite militias that are aligned with Iran.”

On December 6, two days before the ouster of the regime, the armed Syrian factions addressed the Lebanese people to reassure them that they were hoping to establish “diplomatic ties with them that achieve mutual interests.”



Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.