Nawaf Salam: Lebanon’s Prime Minister ‘Judge’ in Joseph Aoun’s First Term in Office

Lebanese Ambassador to the United Nations Nawaf Salam speaks to reporters after Security Council consultations on the situation in Libya, March 14, 2011 at United Nations headquarters. (AP)
Lebanese Ambassador to the United Nations Nawaf Salam speaks to reporters after Security Council consultations on the situation in Libya, March 14, 2011 at United Nations headquarters. (AP)
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Nawaf Salam: Lebanon’s Prime Minister ‘Judge’ in Joseph Aoun’s First Term in Office

Lebanese Ambassador to the United Nations Nawaf Salam speaks to reporters after Security Council consultations on the situation in Libya, March 14, 2011 at United Nations headquarters. (AP)
Lebanese Ambassador to the United Nations Nawaf Salam speaks to reporters after Security Council consultations on the situation in Libya, March 14, 2011 at United Nations headquarters. (AP)

Years after his name had been suggested by the Lebanese opposition to become prime minister, Judge Nawaf Salam was finally tasked on Monday with the formation of a new government under newly elected President Joseph Aoun’s first term in office.

Salam, currently serving as the head of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), was nominated by the majority of lawmakers during consultations with Aoun.

Salam was born in Beirut on December 15, 1953. He was elected as head of the ICJ in February 2024.

His nomination as prime minister was first floated by the opposition in wake of the October 2019 anti-government protests, after the resignation of Saad Hariri as PM.

The opposition at the time had proposed him as a neutral-technocratic figure who was not affiliated with the current political class. His candidacy was “vetoed” by the Shiite duo of Hezbollah and its ally the Amal movement, headed by parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.

They deemed him as the “United States’ candidate” and effectively thwarted his nomination. Hassan Diab was appointed prime minister instead.

The duo had on Monday refrained from nominating any candidate for the position of prime minister.

Diab’s government resigned after the August 4, 2020, Beirut Port explosion. Salam was again suggested as prime minister, but an agreement between the majority of political blocs led to Mustafa Adib’s appointment with 90 votes.

Adib would step down days later due to differences over the formation of the government.

Throughout that time, Salam had not taken political sides, but expressed his appreciation for MPs who had suggested his nomination.

Call for reform

He stressed the need to “save Lebanon from its plight, which demands change in how crises are handled and how work should be done. This starts with the implementation of financial and political reforms, which should focus on confronting the mentality of clientelism and quotas.”

He also underlined the importance of establishing an independent judiciary and “fortifying state institutions against sectarianism and favoritism.”

“The reforms will be meaningless if they are not based on the principles of fairness, social justice and the protection of rights and public and private freedoms.”

He vowed that he will always work alongside figures who “are committed to change to reform the state and allow it to impose its sovereignty throughout its territory and restore Lebanon’s position in the Arab world and the world’s trust in it.”

Salam and the ICJ

Salam’s appointment as head of the ICJ had alarmed Israel. He had taken clear stances against Israel and openly supported the Palestinian cause.

Israel’s Jerusalem Post said he has a “long history in opposing Israel through his statements and stances.” It recalled a tweet aimed at Israel in 2015, in which he said: “Unhappy birthday to you, 48 years of occupation.”

Salam is a member of a prominent family from Beirut. His grandfather “Abou Ali” Salim Ali Salam (1868-1938) was a leading figure in the capital. He was a member of the Ottoman parliament and head of its municipality in 1908.

Nawaf’s father, Abdullah Salam, was a prominent businessman and one of the founders of Middle East Airlines, Lebanon’s national carrier.

One of his uncles is former Prime Minister Saeb Salam, who served in that post four times between 1952 and 1973. Tammam Salam is a cousin who served as prime minister twice between 2014 and 2016.

Nawaf Salam holds a doctorate in political science from France’s prestigious Sciences Po university as well as a doctorate in history from France’s Sorbonne University. He also has a Master of Laws degree from Harvard Law School. Salam has worked as a lecturer at several universities, including the American University of Beirut.

Prior to heading the ICJ, he served as Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations between 2007 and 2017. He also represented the country at the UN Security Council between 2010 and 2011.

His publications include “Lebanon Between Past and Future”, published in Beirut in 2021.



Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
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Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)

The arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, marked by periods of resolution and banning of activities, is not disconnected from the long history of the group’s journey in the kingdom, dating back to the mid-1940s when it was first established.

However, this journey—characterized by varying relations with successive governments—began with collaboration and ended in conflict. How did this unfold?

Leaders of Jordan’s Islamic movement, encompassing both the banned Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, consistently supported Jordan’s stability during the last decades of the 20th century.

This support, however, shifted into decades of confrontation with the authorities after the divisions within the movement emerged.

A key moment in the movement's history came when Jordanian authorities accused the group of plotting to “stir chaos” and possessing “explosive materials,” marking a significant turning point for the Islamic movement in the kingdom.

This came especially after recordings revealed the arrested individuals’ ties to the unlicensed Brotherhood group in Jordan.

Founded in 1946, the Brotherhood initially operated as a charitable society, providing aid through fundraising efforts. It attracted young people who were influenced by its leaders’ calls for public activism.

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an alliance with the government. Its leaders gradually moved into senior official positions, using their power to expand their grassroots support and promote their message within Jordanian society, which historically had a strong conservative religious base.

During this time, the Brotherhood’s influence on school students was significant. It encouraged protests and sit-ins against political forces opposed to them, particularly the Communist and Ba’ath parties before the latter's split. Clashes occurred between these groups in downtown Amman and in key cities across the kingdom.

In the 1970s, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the government evolved into one of partnership and alliance, particularly under the leadership of former Prime Minister Wasfi Tal. This period saw prominent Islamic leader Ishaq Farhan appointed as Minister of Education and later as Minister of Awqaf, overseeing important reforms in educational curricula.

Farhan’s task of reforming the education system included incorporating the Brotherhood’s religious teachings into school textbooks, reflecting the growing influence of the group in shaping Jordanian public life.

Meanwhile, members of the Brotherhood, funded by the government, pursued advanced studies in the United States, returning to hold key positions in the Ministry of Education, with Abdullatif Arabiyat, a senior member, serving as the ministry’s deputy for almost a decade.

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Brotherhood sought to capitalize on regional developments, aiming to increase its political influence. Its leadership, particularly in key urban centers such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, began to broaden its outreach.

The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Awqaf became critical battlegrounds for the Brotherhood, enabling it to infiltrate mosques through imams and transform them into organizational hubs.

This religious outreach laid the groundwork for political mobilization, with gatherings and lessons organized after evening prayers, further solidifying the Brotherhood’s presence in the public sphere.

The political journey of the Brotherhood in Jordan took a dramatic turn in 1989, when the country lifted martial law and resumed parliamentary life after decades of authoritarian rule.

The Brotherhood seized the opportunity, winning a powerful bloc in the 11th Parliament and securing popular support, positioning itself as a key political player.

That era also marked the Brotherhood’s first foray into governance, backing Prime Minister Mudar Badran’s cabinet as part of a national effort to support Iraq against a US-led coalition. It was a rare alignment with the state, underscored by the election of Arabiyat as parliamentary speaker for three consecutive terms — a move widely seen as part of a government-Brotherhood alliance.

In 1992, the group formalized its political arm with the creation of the Islamic Action Front, cementing the link between its religious mission and political ambitions. But the distinction between party and group remained blurred, with critics arguing that the party remained under Brotherhood control.

That same year, tensions flared when the Brotherhood opposed Jordan’s participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, prompting a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Taher Masri. Although Masri resigned voluntarily, the incident marked the start of growing rifts between the Brotherhood and the state.

The following parliamentary elections in 1993 deepened internal fractures, both within the movement and between the Brotherhood and its political allies. The rift widened further in 1994, when Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the vote on the treaty, signaling a decisive shift from cooperation to confrontation.

In the aftermath of the peace treaty, the Brotherhood distanced itself from official alliances and became a staunch opponent of normalization with Israel. The group boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections, a move that triggered an exodus of leaders who opposed the boycott. Some dissidents went on to form the moderate Islamist Wasat Party, led by Abdel Rahim Akkour.

Distrust between the Brotherhood and the government deepened under the shadow of King Hussein’s illness and the succession of King Abdullah II. The movement remained politically dormant until 2003, when the Islamic Action Front re-entered parliament following a two-year suspension of legislative life during the Second Intifada. The party secured 16 seats in the 14th Parliament.

However, the rocky relationship persisted. In 2007, the Brotherhood and its party participated in elections again after negotiations with then-Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit. But allegations of large-scale vote rigging saw the Islamic Action Front secure only six seats — a result it denounced as a betrayal of the agreement with the government.

The controversial election result sparked a leadership crisis within the Brotherhood. The group’s hardline faction, known as the Hawks, overpowered the traditional moderates (the Doves) in internal polls, leading to a purge of long-standing leaders.

Accusations emerged that the group had been hijacked by Hamas sympathizers, reshaping the Brotherhood’s identity and guiding principles.

In the years that followed, former leaders split from the movement, accusing its new leadership of dragging the Brotherhood and its political arm into a confrontational path aligned with regional Islamist movements.

From mainstream political player to marginalized actor, the Brotherhood’s trajectory in Jordan mirrors a broader regional trend — one where Islamist movements rise through democratic openings but often clash with the state over ideology, foreign policy, and the limits of political power.