The Syrian Prison: Bureaucracy of Death, Marketplace of Extortion

Munir Al-Faqir, co-founder of the Association of Sednaya Prison Detainees and Missing Persons (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Munir Al-Faqir, co-founder of the Association of Sednaya Prison Detainees and Missing Persons (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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The Syrian Prison: Bureaucracy of Death, Marketplace of Extortion

Munir Al-Faqir, co-founder of the Association of Sednaya Prison Detainees and Missing Persons (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Munir Al-Faqir, co-founder of the Association of Sednaya Prison Detainees and Missing Persons (Asharq Al-Awsat)

From the Raid Department that falls under the Military Security’s Branch 215—commonly referred to as the “Branch of Death”—Asharq Al-Awsat began its tour of the prisons of the ousted Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad.

We were accompanied in this journey by a former detainee who had been transferred between this branch, Military Hospital 601—dubbed “The Slaughterhouse”—where the infamous “Caesar” photographs were taken, and finally the larger slaughterhouse, Sednaya Prison.

The former detainee is Munir Al-Faqir, an engineer from Damascus and a co-founder of the Association of Sednaya Prison Detainees and Missing Persons. He shed light on the inner workings of Syria’s prison system, revealing how detainees—both alive and dead—are meticulously archived, while their families are extorted for immense sums of money estimated at nearly $1 billion, according to the association.

Amid the systematic abuse of documents, the chaos of legal frameworks, and over 100,000 forcibly disappeared persons, local and international organizations, as well as Syria’s current administration, face a colossal challenge in establishing truth commissions, ensuring accountability, and laying the foundation for comprehensive transitional justice.

More Than Just Sednaya

The Syrian prison experience over the past fifty years cannot be summed up by Sednaya Prison alone, despite its unique horrors. Sednaya represents only the tip of the iceberg, beneath which lies a network of security branches, detention centers, and prisons no less terrifying in their brutality.

If anyone could be considered the “ultimate survivor” of this hell, it would be Al-Faqir. Over two years, he was transferred between multiple detention centers, starting with Branch 215, the “Raid Department” of Military Security, followed by Military Hospital 601 and finally Sednaya.

When asked how he managed to survive, Al-Faqir says: “It’s a miracle I made it out alive from the first two branches. When I reached Sednaya, and my family learned of my whereabouts, the extortion business had already begun. My family, like many others, tried to secure my release with money. I was lucky enough that it worked for me.”

Remarkably, the head of the military court, Major General Mohamed Kanjo Hassan, who sentenced Al-Faqir to Sednaya in a trial lasting barely two minutes, was the same official who approved his release after receiving a substantial bribe through an extortion network.

Al-Faqir, to this day, remains unaware of the charges against him. He explains:

“I still don’t know my alleged crime or the length of my sentence. Throughout my detention, I was never informed of anything and was prohibited from asking. I could only guess based on the questions directed at me, but I never learned the truth.”

A Marketplace of Extortion

Al-Faqir outlines three types of release cases. Those include presidential pardons, which are extremely rare and granted only in exceptional circumstances to specific individuals; Prisoner exchanges, which are equally rare, involving swaps between detainees held by the regime and those held by opposing factions; and financial extortion - by far the most common.

He explains: “General Kanjo Hassan, who amassed immense wealth and properties, worked with brokers to identify high-value detainees. These brokers would contact the families—primarily mothers, followed by wives and sisters—to negotiate ransoms.”

According to Al-Faqir, his organization has documented this phenomenon and published a report to raise awareness among families about the extortion networks. They estimate that between 2011 and 2020, these networks extracted roughly $1 billion. While other human rights organizations estimate even higher figures, the association’s calculations are based on a statistical sample, not a comprehensive survey.

The extortion process thrives on the families’ hopes of finding their missing loved ones and their fears of losing another son.

Al-Faqir explains: “The marketplace begins with small payments for vague information about the missing person. As the family’s resources dwindle, they are either promised the detainee’s release or told that the person has died or cannot be located.”

For some families, the ordeal ends with a death certificate or the delivery of a body for burial—often after signing documents stating the death was due to natural causes like heart failure or kidney failure. However, most families are neither notified of the death nor given a body to bury.

A Descent into Horror

Leaving the well-organized bureaucratic section of the detention system, the journey takes a grim turn into the lower floors of Branch 215. Here lie the dormitories, solitary cells, and a former shooting range repurposed into mass detention and torture chambers. During peak periods, it also served as an execution site, earning Branch 215 its “Death Branch” reputation.

The stench of death still lingers in these spaces, with dark walls bearing the marks of unspeakable past atrocities. Al-Faqir recalls moments of overwhelming rage, punching his cell door until his hands bled, only to compose himself and continue his story.

In these overcrowded cells, blankets stamped with the UNHCR logo serve every purpose—spreading diseases, lice, and bacteria. Open wounds fester, and gangrene often sets in.

Al-Faqir says: “Many times, a detainee would die, and their body would remain in the cell for hours or days before being removed. The corpse would lie on these same blankets, which were later reused.”

In the same detention center, solitary cells resemble upright graves—narrow spaces that leave no room to move. Yet for many detainees, these cells offer a reprieve from the horrors of communal living and the unsanitary conditions of the shared blankets.

Generalized Terror Beyond the Prison Walls

One of the most insidious aspects of Syria’s decades-long systemic cruelty and widespread terror lies in the deliberate placement of detention centers within residential neighborhoods in Damascus. These locations, often tucked between branching streets, seem designed to normalize the violence within them, embedding it into the everyday lives of ordinary people. While Sednaya Prison is distant from public view and imagination, these security branches are situated in the heart of the capital, standing alongside “normal” life outside their walls.

To reach Branch 215, located within the security district between Kafr Sousa and Mezzeh—a site that marked the beginning of Munir’s grim detention journey—we traveled along the famous “Mezzeh Highway,” made a slight turn, and entered through an open gate on a public street. It felt as if we were heading into any other government office in an open, public space. Upon leaving the darkness of the detention corridors and stepping back into daylight, administrative buildings appeared on the rear side, their windows overlooking the compound’s yards. Office workers would likely sneak glances at the scene below during coffee and cigarette breaks before returning to their meticulously organized bureaucratic tasks.

On another side, residential buildings with shaded balconies—crowded with hanging laundry—also overlooked the branch. The sight of the laundry evoked both a strange sense of normalcy and a pervasive fear.

Many stories circulate about families who sold their homes and moved to escape the oppressive proximity to these centers. For some, it was the inability to endure the sounds of torture seeping into their living rooms and bedrooms that pushed them away.

“Trauma Section” and the Caesar Photos

A leaked directive from mid-2018, dated December 18, 2012, issued by the Military Intelligence Branch, instructs all affiliated security branches to report the death of any prisoner on the same day. The directive mandated direct communication with the branch chief via Telegram, including details such as the reason for arrest, investigation results, and cause of death.

This document, now used by human rights groups in international prosecutions, serves as explicit evidence of the systematic nature of detainee deaths. It also confirms that these deaths, in their overwhelming numbers, occur with the knowledge and direct approval of the highest levels of leadership.

Branch 215 played a central role in this “production line” of death, followed by the “Trauma Section” at the Mezzeh Military Hospital (formerly known as Yusuf Al-Azma), also referred to as Hospital 601.

According to Al-Faqir: “This is where deaths were processed medically, or patients were deliberately finished off under the guise of medical care.”

The Trauma Section was established after the 2011 revolution within the hospital’s old building, which dates back to the French Mandate era. Its purpose was to “treat” detainees as the systematic torture and killings in the security branches escalated, and as the number of victims increased. The section became essential for “disposing” of corpses and easing overcrowding. Simultaneously, it became an additional site for “medical torture” and a place where bodies were stored, archived, and numbered—many of which later appeared in the Caesar photos taken in the hospital’s courtyard.

Al-Faqir explained the role of medical staff in the Trauma Section.

“The supervisors were primarily security officers and military doctors. The section was managed by two security agencies: Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence. Each had its own ‘Angel of Death,’ as we used to call them because of their penchant for killing and their creativity in doing so.”

According to Munir—corroborated by other sources—a significant number of doctors, nurses, and even female nurses collaborated extensively with the military. These medical professionals would guide officers on how to inflict fatal injuries without leaving visible traces of torture, such as inducing internal bleeding, kidney failure, or asphyxiation. This allowed deaths to be officially recorded as “natural causes” in medical records, completing the meticulous administrative and bureaucratic cycle of murder.

While we waited for about two hours at the hospital’s main gate, many cars arrived with various requests: some came to hand over individual weapons, others sought non-existent medical services, and one former employee tried to retrieve personal belongings from her old office in exchange for handing over her office keys. Like others, she left disappointed. Only those turning in weapons received any attention or welcome from the armed guards.

Before returning to the celebrations at Umayyad Square, Al-Faqir paused for a long time at a sign posted on the hospital’s main entrance. It read:

“The hospital administration wishes patients a speedy recovery.”



Russia, China Unlikely to Back Iran Against US Military Threats

A man stands by the wreckage of a burnt bus bearing a banner (unseen) that reads "This was one of Tehran’s new buses that was paid for with the money of the people’s taxes,” in Tehran's Sadeghieh Square on January 15, 2026. (AFP)
A man stands by the wreckage of a burnt bus bearing a banner (unseen) that reads "This was one of Tehran’s new buses that was paid for with the money of the people’s taxes,” in Tehran's Sadeghieh Square on January 15, 2026. (AFP)
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Russia, China Unlikely to Back Iran Against US Military Threats

A man stands by the wreckage of a burnt bus bearing a banner (unseen) that reads "This was one of Tehran’s new buses that was paid for with the money of the people’s taxes,” in Tehran's Sadeghieh Square on January 15, 2026. (AFP)
A man stands by the wreckage of a burnt bus bearing a banner (unseen) that reads "This was one of Tehran’s new buses that was paid for with the money of the people’s taxes,” in Tehran's Sadeghieh Square on January 15, 2026. (AFP)

While Russia and China are ready to back protest-rocked Iran under threat by US President Donald Trump, that support would diminish in the face of US military action, experts told AFP.

Iran is a significant ally to the two nuclear powers, providing drones to Russia and oil to China. But analysts told AFP the two superpowers would only offer diplomatic and economic aid to Tehran, to avoid a showdown with Washington.

"China and Russia don't want to go head-to-head with the US over Iran," said Ellie Geranmayeh, a senior policy expert for the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank.

Tehran, despite its best efforts over decades, has failed to establish a formal alliance with Moscow and Beijing, she noted.

If the United States carried out strikes on Iran, "both the Chinese and the Russians will prioritize their bilateral relationship with Washington", Geranmayeh said.

China has to maintain a "delicate" rapprochement with the Trump administration, she argued, while Russia wants to keep the United States involved in talks on ending the war in Ukraine.

"They both have much higher priorities than Iran."

- Ukraine before Iran -

Despite their close ties, "Russia-Iranian treaties don't include military support" -- only political, diplomatic and economic aid, Russian analyst Sergei Markov told AFP.

Alexander Gabuev, director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said Moscow would do whatever it could "to keep the regime afloat".

But "Russia's options are very limited," he added.

Faced with its own economic crisis, "Russia cannot become a giant market for Iranian products" nor can it provide "a lavish loan", Gabuev said.

Nikita Smagin, a specialist in Russia-Iran relations, said that in the event of US strikes, Russia could do "almost nothing".

"They don't want to risk military confrontation with other great powers like the US -- but at the same time, they're ready to send weaponry to Iran," he said.

"Using Iran as a bargaining asset is a normal thing for Russia," Smagin said of the longer-term strategy, at a time when Moscow is also negotiating with Washington on Ukraine.

Markov agreed. "The Ukrainian crisis is much more important for Russia than the Iranian crisis," he argued.

- Chinese restraint -

China is also ready to help Tehran "economically, technologically, militarily and politically" as it confronts non-military US actions such as trade pressure and cyberattacks, Hua Po, a Beijing-based independent political observer, told AFP.

If the United States launched strikes, China "would strengthen its economic ties with Iran and help it militarize in order to contribute to bogging the United States down in a war in the Middle East," he added.

Until now, China has been cautious and expressed itself "with restraint", weighing the stakes of oil and regional stability, said Iran-China relations researcher Theo Nencini of Sciences Po Grenoble.

"China is benefiting from a weakened Iran, which allows it to secure low-cost oil... and to acquire a sizeable geopolitical partner," he said.

However, he added: "I find it hard to see them engaging in a showdown with the Americans over Iran."

Beijing would likely issue condemnations, but not retaliate, he said.

Hua said the Iran crisis was unlikely to have an impact on China-US relations overall.

"The Iranian question isn't at the heart of relations between the two countries," he argued.

"Neither will sever ties with the other over Iran."


Beirut’s Commodore Hotel, a Haven for Journalists During Lebanon’s Civil War, Shuts Down

People stand outside the closed Commodore hotel, in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday, Jan. 11, 2026. (AP)
People stand outside the closed Commodore hotel, in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday, Jan. 11, 2026. (AP)
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Beirut’s Commodore Hotel, a Haven for Journalists During Lebanon’s Civil War, Shuts Down

People stand outside the closed Commodore hotel, in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday, Jan. 11, 2026. (AP)
People stand outside the closed Commodore hotel, in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday, Jan. 11, 2026. (AP)

During Lebanon’s civil war, the Commodore Hotel in western Beirut's Hamra district became iconic among the foreign press corps.

For many, it served as an unofficial newsroom where they could file dispatches even when communications systems were down elsewhere. Armed guards at the door provided some sense of protection as sniper fights and shelling were turning the cosmopolitan city to rubble.

The hotel even had its own much-loved mascot: a cheeky parrot.

The Commodore endured for decades after the 15-year civil war ended in 1990 — until this week, when it closed for good.

The main gate of the nine-story hotel with more than 200 rooms was shuttered Monday. Officials at the Commodore refused to speak to the media about the decision to close.

Although the country’s economy is beginning to recover from a protracted financial crisis that began in 2019, tensions in the region and the aftermath of the Israel-Hezbollah war that was halted by a tenuous ceasefire in November 2024 are keeping many tourists away. Lengthy daily electricity cuts force businesses to rely on expensive private generators.

The Commodore is not the first of the crisis-battered country’s once-bustling hotels to shut down in recent years.

But for journalists who lived, worked and filed their dispatches there, its demise hits particularly hard.

“The Commodore was a hub of information — various guerrilla leaders, diplomats, spies and of course scores of journalists circled the cafes and lounges,” said Tim Llewellyn, a former BBC Middle East correspondent who covered the civil war. “On one occasion (late Palestinian leader) Yasser Arafat himself dropped in to sip coffee with” with the hotel manager's father, he recalled.

A line to the outside world

At the height of the civil war, when telecommunications were dysfunctional and much of Beirut was cut off from the outside world, it was at the Commodore where journalists found land lines and Telex machines that always worked to send reports to their media organizations around the globe.

Across the front office desk in the wide lobby of the Commodore, there were two teleprinters that carried reports of The Associated Press and Reuters news agencies.

“The Commodore had a certain seedy charm. The rooms were basic, the mattresses lumpy and the meal fare wasn’t spectacular,” said Robert H. Reid, the AP’s former Middle East regional editor, who was among the AP journalists who covered the war. The hotel was across the street from the international agency’s Middle East head office at the time.

“The friendly staff and the camaraderie among the journalist-guests made the Commodore seem more like a social club where you could unwind after a day in one of the world’s most dangerous cities,” Reid said.

Llewellyn remembers that the hotel manager at the time, Yusuf Nazzal, told him in the late 1970s “that it was I who had given him the idea” to open such a hotel in a war zone.

Llewellyn said that during a long chat with Nazzal on a near-empty Middle East Airlines Jumbo flight from London to Beirut in the fall of 1975, he told him that there should be a hotel that would make sure journalists had good communications, “a street-wise and well-connected staff running the desks, the phones, the teletypes.”

During Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and a nearly three-month siege of West Beirut by Israeli troops, journalists used the roof of the hotel to film fighter jets striking the city.

The parrot

One of the best-known characters at the Commodore was Coco the parrot, who was always in a cage near the bar. Patrons were often startled by what they thought was the whiz of an incoming shell, only to discover that it was Coco who made the sound.

AP’s chief Middle East correspondent Terry Anderson was a regular at the hotel before he was kidnapped in Beirut in 1985 and held for seven years, becoming one of the longest-held American hostages in history.

Videos of Anderson released by his kidnappers later showed him wearing a white T-shirt with the words “Hotel Commodore Lebanon.”

With the kidnapping of Anderson and other Western journalists, many foreign media workers left the predominantly-Muslim western part of Beirut, and after that the hotel lost its status as a safe haven for foreign journalists.

Ahmad Shbaro, who worked at different departments of the hotel until 1988, said the main reason behind the Commodore’s success was the presence of armed guards that made journalists feel secure in the middle of Beirut’s chaos as well as functioning telecommunications.

He added that the hotel also offered financial facilities for journalists who ran out of money. They would borrow money from Nazzal and their companies could pay him back by depositing money in his bank account in London.

Shbaro remembers a terrifying day in the late 1970s when the area of the hotel was heavily shelled and two rooms at the Commodore were hit.

“The hotel was full and all of us, staffers and journalists, spent the night at Le Casbah,” a famous nightclub in the basement of the building, he said.

In quieter times, journalists used to spend the night partying by the pool.

“It was a lifeline for the international media in West Beirut, where journalists filed, ate, slept, and hid from air raids, shelling, and other violence,” said former AP correspondent Scheherezade Faramarzi.

“It gained both fame and notoriety,” she said, speaking from the Mediterranean island of Cyprus.

The hotel was built in 1943 and kept functioning until 1987 when it was heavily damaged in fighting between Shiite and Druze militiamen at the time. The old Commodore building was later demolished and a new structure was build with an annex and officially opened again for the public in 1996.

But Coco the parrot was no longer at the bar. The bird went missing during the 1987 fighting. Shbaro said it is believed he was taken by one of the gunmen who stormed the hotel.


Key Details of Greenland’s Rich but Largely Untapped Mineral Resources

Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on Monday, Jan. 12, 2026. (AP)
Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on Monday, Jan. 12, 2026. (AP)
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Key Details of Greenland’s Rich but Largely Untapped Mineral Resources

Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on Monday, Jan. 12, 2026. (AP)
Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on Monday, Jan. 12, 2026. (AP)

The Danish and Greenlandic foreign ministers will meet US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Wednesday after President Donald Trump recently
stepped up threats to take over Greenland.

The autonomous territory of Denmark could be useful for the ​United States because of its strategic location and rich mineral resources. A 2023 survey showed that 25 of 34 minerals deemed "critical raw materials" by the European Commission were found in Greenland.

The extraction of oil and natural gas is banned in Greenland for environmental reasons, while development of its mining sector has been snarled in red tape and opposition from indigenous people.

Below are details of Greenland's main mineral deposits, based on data from its Mineral Resources Authority:

RARE EARTHS
Three of Greenland's biggest deposits are located in the southern province of Gardar.

Companies ‌seeking to ‌develop rare-earth mines are Critical Metals Corp, which bought the ‌Tanbreez ⁠deposit, ​Energy Transition Minerals, ‌whose Kuannersuit project is stalled amid legal disputes, and Neo Performance Materials.

Rare-earth elements are key to permanent magnets used in electric vehicles (EV) and wind turbines.

GRAPHITE
Occurrences of graphite and graphite schist are reported from many localities on the island.
GreenRoc has applied for an exploitation license to develop the Amitsoq graphite project.
Natural graphite is mostly used in EV batteries and steelmaking.

COPPER
According to the Mineral Resources Authority, most copper deposits have drawn only limited exploration campaigns.

Especially interesting are the underexplored areas ⁠in the northeast and center-east of Greenland, it said.

London-listed 80 Mile is seeking to develop the Disko-Nuussuaq deposit, which has ‌copper, nickel, platinum and cobalt.

NICKEL
Traces of nickel accumulations are numerous, ‍according to the Mineral Resources Authority.

Major miner ‍Anglo American was granted an exploration license in western Greenland in 2019 and has ‍been looking for nickel deposits, among others.

ZINC
Zinc is mostly found in the north in a geologic formation that stretches more than 2,500 km (1,550 miles).

Companies have sought to develop the Citronen Fjord zinc and lead project, which had been billed as one of the world's largest undeveloped zinc resources.

GOLD
The most prospective ​areas for gold potential are situated around the Sermiligaarsuk fjord in the country's south.

Amaroq Minerals launched a gold mine last year in Mt Nalunaq in ⁠the Kujalleq Municipality.

DIAMONDS
While most small diamonds and the largest stones are found in the island's west, their presence in other regions may also be significant.

IRON ORE
Deposits are located at Isua in southern West Greenland, at Itilliarsuk in central West Greenland, and in North West Greenland along the Lauge Koch Kyst.

TITANIUM-VANADIUM
Known deposits of titanium and vanadium are in the southwest, the east and south.

Titanium is used for commercial, medical and industrial purposes, while vanadium is mainly used to produce specialty steel alloys. The most important industrial vanadium compound, vanadium pentoxide, is used as a catalyst for the production of sulfuric acid.

TUNGSTEN
Used for several industrial applications, tungsten is mostly found in the central-east and northeast of the country, with assessed deposits in the south and west.

URANIUM
In 2021, ‌the then-ruling left-wing Inuit Ataqatigiit party banned uranium mining, effectively halting development of the Kuannersuit rare-earths project, which has uranium as a byproduct.