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Europe’s Military Personnel Shortfalls Exposed as Trump Warns US Security Priorities Lie Elsewhere 

Lithuanian Land Force soldiers attend the Allied Spirit 25 exercise in Hohenfels, Germany, 12 March 2025. (EPA)
Lithuanian Land Force soldiers attend the Allied Spirit 25 exercise in Hohenfels, Germany, 12 March 2025. (EPA)
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Europe’s Military Personnel Shortfalls Exposed as Trump Warns US Security Priorities Lie Elsewhere 

Lithuanian Land Force soldiers attend the Allied Spirit 25 exercise in Hohenfels, Germany, 12 March 2025. (EPA)
Lithuanian Land Force soldiers attend the Allied Spirit 25 exercise in Hohenfels, Germany, 12 March 2025. (EPA)

In the year after Russia launched outright war on Ukraine, NATO leaders approved a set of military plans designed to repel an invasion of Europe. It was the biggest shake-up of the alliance’s defense readiness preparations since the Cold War.

The secret plans set out how Western allies would defend NATO territory from the Atlantic to the Arctic, through the Baltic region and Central Europe, down to the Mediterranean Sea. Up to 300,000 troops would move to its eastern flank within 30 days, many of them American. That would climb to 800,000 within six months.

But the Trump administration warned last month that US priorities lie elsewhere. Europe must take care of its own security, and those goals now seem questionable. Mustering just 30,000 European troops to police any future peace in Ukraine is proving a challenge.

Billions of euros are being shifted to military budgets, but only slowly, and the Europeans are struggling to fire up production in their defense industries.

Beyond funding, tens of thousands more European citizens might have to complete military service, and time is of the essence. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has warned that Russian forces could be capable of launching an attack on European territory in 2030.

Concerned about Russia's intentions, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk wants to introduce large-scale military training for every adult male, and double the size of Poland's army to around 500,000 soldiers.

“If Ukraine loses the war or if it accepts the terms of peace, armistice or capitulation ... then, without a doubt — and we can all agree on that — Poland will find itself in a much more difficult geopolitical situation,” Tusk warned lawmakers last week.

The scale of Europe's military personnel shortage

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that Europe, including the UK, has almost 1.5 million active duty personnel. But many can't be deployed on a battlefield, and those who can are hard to use effectively without a centralized command system.

The number of Russian troops in Ukraine at the end of 2024 was estimated to be around 700,000.

NATO troops are controlled by a US general, using American air transport and logistics.

Analysts say that in the event of a Russian attack, NATO’s top military officer would probably dispatch around 200,000 US troops to Europe to build on the 100,000 US military personnel already based there.

With the Americans out of the picture, “a realistic estimate may therefore be that an increase in European capacities equivalent to the fighting capacity of 300,000 US troops is needed,” the Brussels-based Bruegel think tank estimates.

“Europe faces a choice: either increase troop numbers significantly by more than 300,000 to make up for the fragmented nature of national militaries, or find ways to rapidly enhance military coordination,” Bruegel said.

The question is how.

Making up the numbers NATO is encouraging countries to build up personnel numbers, but the trans-Atlantic alliance isn't telling them how to do it. Maintaining public support for the armed forces and for Ukraine is too important to risk by dictating choices.

“The way they go about it is intensely political, so we wouldn’t prescribe any way of changing this — whether to go for conscription, elective conscription, bigger reserves,” a senior NATO official said on the condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to brief journalists unless he remained unnamed.

“We do stress the point that fighting with those regional plans means that we are in collective defense and likely in an attrition war that requires way more manpower than we currently have, or we designed our force models to deliver,” he added.

Eleven European countries have compulsory military service: Austria, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, and non-European Union nation Norway. The length of service ranges from as little as two months in Croatia to 19 months in Norway.

Poland isn't considering a return to universal military service, but rather a reserve system based on the model in Switzerland, where every man is obliged to serve in the armed forces or an alternative civilian service. Women can volunteer.

Belgium’s new defense minister plans to write a letter in November to around 120,000 citizens who are age 18 to try to persuade at least 500 of them to sign up for voluntary military service. Debate about the issue goes on in the UK and Germany.

Confronting the challenges

Germany’s professional armed forces had 181,174 active service personnel at the end of last year — slightly lower than in 2023, according to a parliamentary report released Tuesday. That means it’s no closer to reaching a Defense Ministry target of 203,000 by 2031.

Last year, 20,290 people started serving in the German military, or Bundeswehr, an 8% increase, the report said. But of the 18,810 who joined in 2023, more than a quarter — 5,100 or 27% of the total — left again, most at their own request during the six-month trial period.

The German parliament’s commissioner for the armed forces, Eva Högl, said that army life is a hard sell.

“The biggest problem is boredom,” Högl said. “If young people have nothing to do, if there isn’t enough equipment and there aren’t enough trainers, if the rooms aren’t reasonably clean and orderly, that deters people and it makes the Bundeswehr unattractive.”

At the other end of the scale, tiny Luxembourg has unique demographic challenges. Of its roughly 630,000 passport holders, only 315,000 are Luxembourgers. The number of people of military service age — 18 to 40 — is smaller still.

Around 1,000 people are enlisted. That’s small compared to some European powers, but bigger per capita than the UK armed forces. Recently, Luxembourg — where unemployment is low and salaries are high — has struggled to find just 200-300 military personnel.

Military service comes with many challenges too, not least convincing someone to sign up when they might be sent to the front, and hastily trained conscripts can't replace a professional army. The draft also costs money. Extra staff, accommodation and trainers are needed throughout a conscript's term.

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Toufic Sultan: Kamal Jumblatt Was not Impressed by Assad or his Likes

A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
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Toufic Sultan: Kamal Jumblatt Was not Impressed by Assad or his Likes

A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).

After the 1973 war, former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad realized that reclaiming the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights through military means was impossible. His frustration grew when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat took a different approach, negotiating to regain the Sinai Peninsula. As a leader from a minority sect, Assad feared a similar path would leave his successor inheriting an Israeli flag in Damascus. With limited options, he turned to Lebanon, a country he had never forgotten was once part of Greater Syria.

Lebanon became Assad’s strategic battleground, defensive shield, and political bargaining chip. His regime never tolerated any attempt to “steal Lebanon” from its grasp, whether the perceived threat came from Kamal Jumblatt, Bachir Gemayel, René Moawad, or Rafik Hariri. Jumblatt’s defiance was particularly intolerable—he was a close ally of Yasser Arafat and resisted Assad’s efforts to dominate Palestinian decision-making.

Toufic Sultan, a key political figure and close associate of Kamal Jumblatt, witnessed these events firsthand. As Jumblatt’s deputy in both the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Lebanese National Movement (a coalition supporting Palestinian and leftist causes), Sultan recalls:

“I attended multiple meetings between President Assad, Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, and Kamal Jumblatt. Jumblatt, always polite yet direct, spoke candidly. In 1976, he established a structured relationship with Assad, who insisted that meetings occur regularly. He frequently told Hikmat Shihabi (Syrian Army Chief of Staff) that these discussions should be ongoing—and they were.”

Jumblatt Refused to Praise Assad

During one visit to Damascus, Jumblatt met with Baath Party leaders, including Abdullah al-Ahmar and Palestinian official Zuheir Mohsen. The meeting, like many in Syria, was likely monitored. At one point, a Syrian Baathist asked Jumblatt why he wouldn’t align with them. Jumblatt dismissed the idea, saying, “Because I don’t form alliances with parties that take orders from external powers.”

Later that day, at a lunch hosted by Assad at the Rawda Palace, a joint statement was released. Sultan recalls:

“I saw Jumblatt take out a pen and start crossing out lines. He had completely removed a passage praising Assad’s so-called ‘Corrective Movement.’ He turned to me and said, ‘We never said this. Why should we?’ He did this in front of Assad, who then instructed his aides to remove the phrase.

On the way back to Beirut, Jumblatt had the car radio tuned in to check if Syrian media had inserted any false statements. I asked him, ‘Would it have hurt to flatter Assad with a couple of words, given our daily dealings with him?’ He firmly replied, ‘I don’t flatter anyone.’

That was the moment I realized I could no longer sustain this relationship. He had erased just two words of praise, but that was enough to collapse everything.”

Jumblatt’s Final Meeting with Assad

Tensions escalated as Jumblatt refused to accept Syrian military intervention in Lebanon. Sultan recalls:

“Hikmat Shihabi called me, urging me to bring Jumblatt to Damascus, even if just to talk about philosophy or agriculture—anything to maintain dialogue. But Jumblatt was firm: it was either full agreement or total opposition. He personally oversaw the placement of mines in Bhamdoun to resist Syrian troops. Even President Anwar Sadat advised him to step back, but he refused.”

Jumblatt repeatedly warned Assad:

“If you enter Lebanon militarily, you’ll give Israel an excuse to intervene. Our conflicts with other Lebanese factions can be settled—win, lose, or compromise—but with Israel, there is no such option.”

Assad ignored the warning. Eleven years later, during a meeting with Lebanese warlord-turned-politician Elie Hobeika, Assad lamented, “Pierre Gemayel lied to me.” A Lebanese minister pointed at Hobeika and said, “He’s Gemayel’s disciple.” Hobeika quickly responded, “I had nothing to do with it.”

The Assassination of Kamal Jumblatt

Sultan did not accompany Jumblatt to his last meeting with Assad, despite his insistence. Yasser Arafat urged Jumblatt to go, but Sultan knew there was no hope of reconciliation. When Jumblatt was delayed in returning, Sultan called Hikmat Shihabi, who responded, “How can it be? The atmosphere was terrible.”

The next morning, newspapers carried optimistic headlines about the meeting. When Sultan visited Jumblatt, he dismissed them: “None of it is true. We couldn’t reach an understanding.”

On March 16, 1977, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated.

The Druze community was shaken. The Progressive Socialist Party and the Lebanese National Movement were thrown into uncertainty. Jumblatt had been not just a Druze leader but also a national and leftist figure.

Forty days later, his son Walid Jumblatt visited Hafez Assad, accompanied by some of his father’s closest aides, including Toufic Sultan. Years later, Walid would recall his mother’s advice:

“A Chinese proverb says, ‘Sit by the riverbank and wait for your enemy’s corpse to float by.’”

Decades later, news came of Bashar al-Assad’s flight from Syria and the arrest of General Ibrahim Huweija, accused of orchestrating Kamal Jumblatt’s assassination.

The Story of the Two Assads and Hariri

Hafez al-Assad controlled Lebanon through local proxies, ensuring no political leader could challenge Syrian influence. When Rafik Hariri became prime minister in 1992, Assad initially viewed him as just another politician. However, Hariri was different—he had vast financial resources and international connections that no Lebanese leader before him possessed.

When Hafez al-Assad died, his son Bashar inherited not only power but also the same anxiety about Hariri. He feared Hariri was gradually pulling Lebanon out of Syria’s orbit with international support. On February 14, 2005, Rafik Hariri was assassinated. Though suspicion immediately fell on the Syrian regime, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon later convicted members of Hezbollah in absentia.

Sultan recalls Hariri’s initial dealings with Hafez al-Assad:

“Hariri built a relationship with Assad, who invited him to Damascus. Hariri and his wife, Nazik, arrived from Paris with gifts. Assad hosted them for dinner and even prepared a place for them to stay overnight. However, Hariri surprised him by saying, ‘I will return tonight.’ Assad asked, ‘How?’ Hariri replied, ‘My plane is like a house; it has a bedroom.’”

Hariri had allies within the Syrian regime, including Abdel Halim Khaddam and Hikmat Shihabi. However, Bashar Assad’s inner circle—especially his sister Bushra—strongly opposed him.

“There was an anti-Hariri faction in Syria that had a significant influence on Lebanese politics. But Hariri always found ways to overcome obstacles. Even Rustum Ghazaleh, Syria’s intelligence chief in Lebanon, received financial incentives.”

Warnings of Assassination

Sultan recalls that Hariri was warned multiple times about threats to his life.

“On the Friday before his assassination, a prominent Lebanese figure told me, ‘Hariri and Walid Jumblatt are on a kill list.’ When I relayed this to Hariri, he dismissed it, saying he had guarantees. But as events proved, those guarantees were meaningless.”

Sultan also describes a tense encounter between Hariri and Bashar Assad:

“You, Walid [Jumblatt], and your man Chirac want to bring in a president? I will crush the country over your heads!”

Hariri believed that US assurances would protect him. His assassination proved otherwise.

Bashar Assad: “Weak and Lacking Judgment”

Sultan criticizes Bashar Assad’s leadership:

“It is well known that Bashar is politically weak. Had he been more strategic, he would have realized that UN Resolution 1559 was serious. Instead, he acted recklessly. Syria feared Hariri because he could unite Lebanon’s most powerful factions. They thought eliminating him would solve the problem within 48 hours. Instead, they ignited a crisis that changed Lebanon forever.”

Sultan expressed his regret that the Lebanese had squandered many opportunities, often choosing to concede to external forces rather than compromise with their fellow countrymen. He stated that had an understanding been reached between Kamal Jumblatt and Bashir Gemayel, the Lebanese could have spared themselves much suffering. They missed opportunities at other critical junctures as well.

Sultan voiced his hope that the state-building project would see a serious revival with the election of General Joseph Aoun as President and the formation of a government led by Nawaf Salam.

He speaks with the wisdom of those who have witnessed the weaknesses and sensitivities of Lebanon’s political structure. His words carry a sense of nostalgia for the days when Beirut was a key meeting point for Lebanese, Arabs, and the international community. As he approaches his nineties, Sultan still holds on to some hope that the Lebanese have learned from their experiences and will work together to build a state governed by the rule of law, where dialogue is driven by reason rather than power struggles.