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Experts to Asharq Al-Awsat: Trump Confronts Houthis with New Reality, Strikes Not Enough to Defeat them 

A plume of smoke billows during a US strike on Yemen's Houthi-held capital Sanaa early on March 16, 2025. (AFP)
A plume of smoke billows during a US strike on Yemen's Houthi-held capital Sanaa early on March 16, 2025. (AFP)
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Experts to Asharq Al-Awsat: Trump Confronts Houthis with New Reality, Strikes Not Enough to Defeat them 

A plume of smoke billows during a US strike on Yemen's Houthi-held capital Sanaa early on March 16, 2025. (AFP)
A plume of smoke billows during a US strike on Yemen's Houthi-held capital Sanaa early on March 16, 2025. (AFP)

Experts said US President Donald Trump has confronted the Iran-backed Houthi militias in Yemen with a new reality in wake of the airstrikes Washington has launched against them over the weekend.

Trump launched the strikes on Saturday to deter the Houthis from attacking military and commercial vessels in the Red Sea.

The Houthi-run Health Ministry said the overnight US strikes killed at least 53 people, including five women and two children, and wounded almost 100 in the capital of Sanaa and other provinces, including the northern province of Saada, the Houthi stronghold.

The White House announced on Sunday the killing of major Houthi leaderships in the attacks. The Houthis have yet to comment.

The Houthis have repeatedly targeted international shipping in the Red Sea, sinking two vessels, in what they call acts of solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza, where Israel has been at war with Hamas, another Iranian ally.

The attacks stopped when a Israel-Hamas ceasefire took hold in January — a day before Trump took office — but last week the Houthis said they would renew attacks against Israeli vessels after Israel cut off the flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza this month.

There have been no Houthi attacks reported since then.

The Houthis on Sunday claimed to have targeted the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group with missiles and a drone.

Washington and the Houthis have vowed escalation.

In the first official remarks by the government since the US strikes, deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa Numan said the militias believed their own delusions that they could confront the entire world.

“Instead, they have brought catastrophe to our country and innocent people,” he lamented to Asharq Al-Awsat, adding that the Houthis cannot wage this “reckless” war.

He recalled the concessions his government had made to end the war and move forward towards peace. The Houthis, however, dismissed all of these efforts, “stalled and rejected Saudi attempts to end the war.”

“The Houthis have crossed all red lines and brazenly defied the international community by promoting attractive slogans that are in effect useless,” Numan said.

Senior Fellow at the Washington Center for Yemeni Studies Sadeq Al-Wesabi criticized the Biden administration for lacking the will to understand the nature of the Houthis and how they operate.

“Trump has now come along to address the Houthis the only way they know well: force,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

President of surprises

Trump took the world by surprise when the announced the launch of the attacks on Saturday.

Trump, in a post on social media, promised to “use overwhelming lethal force” and ordered Iran to “immediately” cut its support.

“Your time is up, and your attacks must stop, starting today. If they don’t, hell will rain down upon you like nothing you have ever seen before,” he said in a statement on Truth Social, his social media site.

“I have ordered the US military today to launch a decisive and powerful military operation against the Houthi terrorists in Yemen,” he said, adding that Washington “will use overwhelming lethal force until we have achieved our objective”.

Co-founder of the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies Maged al-Madhaji said the strikes will push the Houthis towards two options, either seek calm and make a weak gesture after the attacks, or resort to major escalation in the Red Sea.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, he said the US strikes marked a major shift in position towards Yemen. He noted that the strikes were preceded by Washington re-designating the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, in a sign that it wanted to inflict damage on the militias, not just contain them.

Motives and messages

The balances of power in the region have been upended since Hamas launched its deadly attack against Israel on October 7, 2023. Iran’s proxies in the region, namely Hezbollah and Hamas, have been severely weakened by Israel and Iran itself was targeted twice by Israeli attacks.

Tehran is being confronted with Trump who is again applying his “maximum pressure campaign.” It is now in an unprecedented and weaker position should it return to negotiations over its nuclear program.

President of Girton College at the University of Cambridge Dr. Elisabeth Kendall said the US strikes are driven by three factors: protecting international shipping, preempting any Houthi attack and intensifying the pressure on Iran.

The Biden administration had frequently said that it wanted to target Houthi capabilities, not its members. But Trump is making it clear that he is targeting both, in a direct message to Iran.

Kendall told Asharq Al-Awsat that the strikes may be a precursor to a direct attack on Iran.

With Hamas and Hezbollah weakened and the ouster of Iran-ally Bashar al-Assad from Syria, the Houthis are Tehran’s only remaining powerful group.

A weakening of the Houthis’ military capabilities will limit Iran’s retaliation options should the US and Israel carry out direct strikes against it to prevent it from pursuing its nuclear ambitions, Kendall explained.

Al-Madhaji noted that the Houthis have limited options in which to respond. They can no longer rely on Hezbollah for backup. The Houthis are effectively the last remaining Iranian proxy that can spark any escalation in the region.

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Mark Kimmitt predicted that the Houthis will retaliate to the strikes by targeting more ships in the Red Sea.

The conflict in Yemen will not end until the Houthis realize that their war has not achieved its goals and that they have run out of ammunition, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Houthi narrative

It has taken the US and western powers ten years to realize that the Houthis do not want peace, said a Yemeni source who chose to remain anonymous.

In 2018, Asharq Al-Awsat reported on how the Saudi-led Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen had waged an unprecedented battle in the southern Red Sea to protect global shipping from the Houthis.

The militias responded by sending messages to the world that they do not harbor hostile intentions, all the while the Coalition was neutralizing booby-trapped Houthi vessels and escorting vessels in the vital waterway.

The coalition had repeatedly warned that the Houthis must not be allowed to acquire sophisticated weapons from Iran. The world ignored the warnings and is now grappling with the Houthi threat to international marine navigation.

The West had long believed the Houthis were a local Yemeni problem and that their influence will remain confined to the country. It believed that the militias were not closely tied to Iran and that they actually wanted to take part in resolving the Yemeni conflict through political means.

This was the narrative that the Houthis and Iran and its “Resistance Axis” sought to promote to the world, said a senior Yemeni official on condition of anonymity. This narrative was dashed as the Houthis escalated their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and threatened international trade and western interests.

Will strikes succeed?

The question remains: Will the US strikes have any impact on the Houthis who have withstood western strikes before?

In a post on the X platform, Hannah Porter, a senior research officer at ARK Group, said: “I don't know how many times this needs to be repeated, but if airstrikes were enough to stop the Houthis, the group would have been defeated many, many times over the past decade.”

She told Asharq Al-Awsat that there was a very real chance that the Houthis – who thrive in times of war – may not be defeated by military force.

The Trump administration is hoping that its attacks and terrorist designation will lead to the defeat of the Houthis, but the militias have demonstrated over the years their ability to withstand a lot of pressure, she added.

She expected that the Houthis will almost certainly respond to the strikes with escalation, either by attacking ships or American interests or the interests of its allies.

Al-Wesabi stressed that the current US strikes are more intense and accurate than the limited ones launched by the Biden administration.

Their success, however, hinges on whether they take out the top Houthi leaders which would be a blow to the militants’ morale and pave the way for the legitimate government forces, which are on alert, to act.

Failure to take out these leaders will only prolong the conflict, he warned.

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Toufic Sultan: Kamal Jumblatt Was not Impressed by Assad or his Likes

A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
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Toufic Sultan: Kamal Jumblatt Was not Impressed by Assad or his Likes

A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).

After the 1973 war, former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad realized that reclaiming the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights through military means was impossible. His frustration grew when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat took a different approach, negotiating to regain the Sinai Peninsula. As a leader from a minority sect, Assad feared a similar path would leave his successor inheriting an Israeli flag in Damascus. With limited options, he turned to Lebanon, a country he had never forgotten was once part of Greater Syria.

Lebanon became Assad’s strategic battleground, defensive shield, and political bargaining chip. His regime never tolerated any attempt to “steal Lebanon” from its grasp, whether the perceived threat came from Kamal Jumblatt, Bachir Gemayel, René Moawad, or Rafik Hariri. Jumblatt’s defiance was particularly intolerable—he was a close ally of Yasser Arafat and resisted Assad’s efforts to dominate Palestinian decision-making.

Toufic Sultan, a key political figure and close associate of Kamal Jumblatt, witnessed these events firsthand. As Jumblatt’s deputy in both the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Lebanese National Movement (a coalition supporting Palestinian and leftist causes), Sultan recalls:

“I attended multiple meetings between President Assad, Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, and Kamal Jumblatt. Jumblatt, always polite yet direct, spoke candidly. In 1976, he established a structured relationship with Assad, who insisted that meetings occur regularly. He frequently told Hikmat Shihabi (Syrian Army Chief of Staff) that these discussions should be ongoing—and they were.”

Jumblatt Refused to Praise Assad

During one visit to Damascus, Jumblatt met with Baath Party leaders, including Abdullah al-Ahmar and Palestinian official Zuheir Mohsen. The meeting, like many in Syria, was likely monitored. At one point, a Syrian Baathist asked Jumblatt why he wouldn’t align with them. Jumblatt dismissed the idea, saying, “Because I don’t form alliances with parties that take orders from external powers.”

Later that day, at a lunch hosted by Assad at the Rawda Palace, a joint statement was released. Sultan recalls:

“I saw Jumblatt take out a pen and start crossing out lines. He had completely removed a passage praising Assad’s so-called ‘Corrective Movement.’ He turned to me and said, ‘We never said this. Why should we?’ He did this in front of Assad, who then instructed his aides to remove the phrase.

On the way back to Beirut, Jumblatt had the car radio tuned in to check if Syrian media had inserted any false statements. I asked him, ‘Would it have hurt to flatter Assad with a couple of words, given our daily dealings with him?’ He firmly replied, ‘I don’t flatter anyone.’

That was the moment I realized I could no longer sustain this relationship. He had erased just two words of praise, but that was enough to collapse everything.”

Jumblatt’s Final Meeting with Assad

Tensions escalated as Jumblatt refused to accept Syrian military intervention in Lebanon. Sultan recalls:

“Hikmat Shihabi called me, urging me to bring Jumblatt to Damascus, even if just to talk about philosophy or agriculture—anything to maintain dialogue. But Jumblatt was firm: it was either full agreement or total opposition. He personally oversaw the placement of mines in Bhamdoun to resist Syrian troops. Even President Anwar Sadat advised him to step back, but he refused.”

Jumblatt repeatedly warned Assad:

“If you enter Lebanon militarily, you’ll give Israel an excuse to intervene. Our conflicts with other Lebanese factions can be settled—win, lose, or compromise—but with Israel, there is no such option.”

Assad ignored the warning. Eleven years later, during a meeting with Lebanese warlord-turned-politician Elie Hobeika, Assad lamented, “Pierre Gemayel lied to me.” A Lebanese minister pointed at Hobeika and said, “He’s Gemayel’s disciple.” Hobeika quickly responded, “I had nothing to do with it.”

The Assassination of Kamal Jumblatt

Sultan did not accompany Jumblatt to his last meeting with Assad, despite his insistence. Yasser Arafat urged Jumblatt to go, but Sultan knew there was no hope of reconciliation. When Jumblatt was delayed in returning, Sultan called Hikmat Shihabi, who responded, “How can it be? The atmosphere was terrible.”

The next morning, newspapers carried optimistic headlines about the meeting. When Sultan visited Jumblatt, he dismissed them: “None of it is true. We couldn’t reach an understanding.”

On March 16, 1977, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated.

The Druze community was shaken. The Progressive Socialist Party and the Lebanese National Movement were thrown into uncertainty. Jumblatt had been not just a Druze leader but also a national and leftist figure.

Forty days later, his son Walid Jumblatt visited Hafez Assad, accompanied by some of his father’s closest aides, including Toufic Sultan. Years later, Walid would recall his mother’s advice:

“A Chinese proverb says, ‘Sit by the riverbank and wait for your enemy’s corpse to float by.’”

Decades later, news came of Bashar al-Assad’s flight from Syria and the arrest of General Ibrahim Huweija, accused of orchestrating Kamal Jumblatt’s assassination.

The Story of the Two Assads and Hariri

Hafez al-Assad controlled Lebanon through local proxies, ensuring no political leader could challenge Syrian influence. When Rafik Hariri became prime minister in 1992, Assad initially viewed him as just another politician. However, Hariri was different—he had vast financial resources and international connections that no Lebanese leader before him possessed.

When Hafez al-Assad died, his son Bashar inherited not only power but also the same anxiety about Hariri. He feared Hariri was gradually pulling Lebanon out of Syria’s orbit with international support. On February 14, 2005, Rafik Hariri was assassinated. Though suspicion immediately fell on the Syrian regime, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon later convicted members of Hezbollah in absentia.

Sultan recalls Hariri’s initial dealings with Hafez al-Assad:

“Hariri built a relationship with Assad, who invited him to Damascus. Hariri and his wife, Nazik, arrived from Paris with gifts. Assad hosted them for dinner and even prepared a place for them to stay overnight. However, Hariri surprised him by saying, ‘I will return tonight.’ Assad asked, ‘How?’ Hariri replied, ‘My plane is like a house; it has a bedroom.’”

Hariri had allies within the Syrian regime, including Abdel Halim Khaddam and Hikmat Shihabi. However, Bashar Assad’s inner circle—especially his sister Bushra—strongly opposed him.

“There was an anti-Hariri faction in Syria that had a significant influence on Lebanese politics. But Hariri always found ways to overcome obstacles. Even Rustum Ghazaleh, Syria’s intelligence chief in Lebanon, received financial incentives.”

Warnings of Assassination

Sultan recalls that Hariri was warned multiple times about threats to his life.

“On the Friday before his assassination, a prominent Lebanese figure told me, ‘Hariri and Walid Jumblatt are on a kill list.’ When I relayed this to Hariri, he dismissed it, saying he had guarantees. But as events proved, those guarantees were meaningless.”

Sultan also describes a tense encounter between Hariri and Bashar Assad:

“You, Walid [Jumblatt], and your man Chirac want to bring in a president? I will crush the country over your heads!”

Hariri believed that US assurances would protect him. His assassination proved otherwise.

Bashar Assad: “Weak and Lacking Judgment”

Sultan criticizes Bashar Assad’s leadership:

“It is well known that Bashar is politically weak. Had he been more strategic, he would have realized that UN Resolution 1559 was serious. Instead, he acted recklessly. Syria feared Hariri because he could unite Lebanon’s most powerful factions. They thought eliminating him would solve the problem within 48 hours. Instead, they ignited a crisis that changed Lebanon forever.”

Sultan expressed his regret that the Lebanese had squandered many opportunities, often choosing to concede to external forces rather than compromise with their fellow countrymen. He stated that had an understanding been reached between Kamal Jumblatt and Bashir Gemayel, the Lebanese could have spared themselves much suffering. They missed opportunities at other critical junctures as well.

Sultan voiced his hope that the state-building project would see a serious revival with the election of General Joseph Aoun as President and the formation of a government led by Nawaf Salam.

He speaks with the wisdom of those who have witnessed the weaknesses and sensitivities of Lebanon’s political structure. His words carry a sense of nostalgia for the days when Beirut was a key meeting point for Lebanese, Arabs, and the international community. As he approaches his nineties, Sultan still holds on to some hope that the Lebanese have learned from their experiences and will work together to build a state governed by the rule of law, where dialogue is driven by reason rather than power struggles.