What Are Hamas' Military Options as Gaza War Resumes?

People sit as Palestinians make their way to flee their homes, after the Israeli army issued evacuation orders for a number of neighborhoods, following heavy Israeli strikes, in the northern Gaza Strip March 18, 2025. REUTERS/Mahmoud Issa
People sit as Palestinians make their way to flee their homes, after the Israeli army issued evacuation orders for a number of neighborhoods, following heavy Israeli strikes, in the northern Gaza Strip March 18, 2025. REUTERS/Mahmoud Issa
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What Are Hamas' Military Options as Gaza War Resumes?

People sit as Palestinians make their way to flee their homes, after the Israeli army issued evacuation orders for a number of neighborhoods, following heavy Israeli strikes, in the northern Gaza Strip March 18, 2025. REUTERS/Mahmoud Issa
People sit as Palestinians make their way to flee their homes, after the Israeli army issued evacuation orders for a number of neighborhoods, following heavy Israeli strikes, in the northern Gaza Strip March 18, 2025. REUTERS/Mahmoud Issa

Until the final moments before Israel resumed its military operations against Gaza, Hamas continued to receive invitations to negotiate and assurances that Tel Aviv preferred a political path over a military one to secure the return of its hostages.

However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, backed by the United States, delivered a surprise blow to the Palestinian faction with a massive airstrike that targeted dozens of locations and killed hundreds.

Since the official expiration of the ceasefire on March 1, Hamas has instructed its leaders and members to take heightened security precautions, move cautiously, avoid using vehicles and modern communication tools, and revert to traditional methods of communication.

In the lead-up to the renewed offensive, Israel ramped up its intelligence operations in Gaza—a move Palestinian faction sources had previously confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat—aiming to update its target database.

This was reflected in the overnight strike, which hit senior and field-level Hamas figures across all its wings, as well as military leaders from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Tough Choices Ahead for Hamas

Despite Israel’s large-scale assault, Hamas and other Palestinian factions have yet to mount a military response. But what are their options?

Hamas now faces difficult choices regarding its response to the latest escalation.

Sources within the group told Asharq Al-Awsat that it is weighing all options, including a political course, to prevent a broader Israeli offensive in Gaza while allowing its armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the opportunity to reassert control and retaliate for what it described as “massacres.”

Hamas still retains some military capabilities to strike Israeli forces, sources told Asharq Al-Awsat. However, the decision on how and when to respond lies with the military leadership of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, depending on battlefield conditions and the progress of mediation efforts aimed at de-escalation, the sources said.

“We are in the holy month of Ramadan and approaching Eid al-Fitr. The movement has no intention to escalate, contrary to Israel’s claims before its attack, which were merely a pretext for its crimes,” one source said.

According to the sources, Hamas will determine its stance in the coming hours—whether to allow its military wing to set the “zero hour” for a response or to pursue mediation efforts that would ensure the immediate opening of border crossings and the entry of humanitarian aid without delay.

What Remains of Hamas’ Military Capabilities?

After 15 months of war, Hamas has suffered significant losses in its military capabilities, particularly its stockpile of long-range rockets once fired at Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and other deep Israeli cities. This decline has been evident over the past three months, with fewer rocket launches.

Despite these setbacks, the al-Qassam Brigades managed a partial recovery, producing a limited number of long-range rockets. On December 28, 2024—just 21 days before a ceasefire agreement—Hamas launched two rockets toward Jerusalem.

Notably, they were fired from Beit Hanoun, in northern Gaza, where Israeli ground forces were operating at the time. The group has also continued to fire short-range rockets at Israeli settlements near Gaza, particularly from southern areas of the enclave.

Field sources, including some from Hamas, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades managed to retrieve manufacturing tools and equipment from tunnels and production sites targeted and destroyed by Israel.

The group rehabilitated some of the equipment and found certain devices intact despite Israeli airstrikes, the sources said.

According to the sources, Hamas' military wing had hoped the ceasefire would last longer, allowing it to resume producing rockets, explosive devices, and other weaponry. However, efforts were severely limited due to a shortage of raw materials.

The sources added that a significant number of rockets—including guided missiles such as Kornet anti-tank missiles and Yassin 105 shells—were recovered from storage sites, homes of Hamas commanders and fighters, and even tunnels, following extensive searches beneath the rubble.

On the personnel front, Hamas has been restructuring its military brigades and recruiting new fighters in preparation for a potential resumption of hostilities—an effort it had already begun amid the fighting in northern Gaza, the sources said.



Iran Leader Khamenei Sees His Inner Circle Hollowed Out by Israel 

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei looks on, in a televised message following the Israeli strikes in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei looks on, in a televised message following the Israeli strikes in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters
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Iran Leader Khamenei Sees His Inner Circle Hollowed Out by Israel 

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei looks on, in a televised message following the Israeli strikes in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei looks on, in a televised message following the Israeli strikes in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters

Iran's 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei cuts an increasingly lonely figure.

Khamenei has seen his main military and security advisers killed by Israeli air strikes, leaving major holes in his inner circle and raising the risk of strategic errors, according to five people familiar with his decision-making process.

One of those sources, who regularly attends meetings with Khamenei, described the risk of miscalculation to Iran on issues of defense and internal stability as "extremely dangerous".

Several senior military commanders have been killed since Friday including Khamenei's main advisers from the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's elite military force: the Guards' overall commander Hossein Salami, its aerospace chief Amir Ali Hajizadeh who headed Iran's ballistic missile program and spymaster Mohammad Kazemi.

These men were part of the supreme leader's inner circle of roughly 15-20 advisers comprising Guards commanders, clerics, and politicians, according to the sources who including three people who attend or have attended meetings with the leader on major issues and two close to officials who regularly attend.

The loose group meets on an ad-hoc basis, when Khamenei's office reaches out to relevant advisers to gather at his compound in Tehran to discuss an important decision, all the people said. Members are characterized by unwavering loyalty to him and the ideology of the regime, they added.

Khamenei, who was imprisoned before the 1979 revolution and maimed by a bomb attack before becoming leader in 1989, is profoundly committed to maintaining Iran's system of government and deeply mistrustful of the West.

Under Iran's system of government, he has supreme command of the armed forces, the power to declare war, and can appoint or dismiss senior figures including military commanders and judges.

Khamenei makes the final decision on important matters, though he values advice, listens attentively to diverse viewpoints, and often seeks additional information from his counsellors, according to one source who attends meetings.

"Two things you can say about Khamenei: he is extremely stubborn but also extremely cautious. He is very cautious. That is why he has been in power for as long as he has," said Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute think-tank in Washington.

"Khamenei is pretty well placed to do the basic cost-benefit analysis which really fundamentally gets to one issue more important than anything else: regime survival."

KHAMENEI'S SON AT THE FORE

The focus on survival has repeatedly been put to the test. Khamenei has deployed the Revolutionary Guards and its affiliated Basij militia to quell national protests in 1999, 2009 and 2022.

However, while the security forces have always been able to outlast demonstrators and restore state rule, years of Western sanctions have caused widespread economic misery that analysts say could ultimately threaten internal unrest.

The stakes could barely be higher for Khamenei who faces an escalating war with Israel, which has targeted nuclear and military sites and personnel with air attacks, drawing retaliatory Iranian missile fire, insiders and analysts said.

The five people familiar with Khamenei's decision-making process stressed that other insiders who have not been targeted by Israel's strikes remain important and influential, including top advisers on political, economic and diplomatic issues.

Khamenei designates such advisers to handle issues as they arise, extending his reach directly into a wide array of institutions spanning military, security, cultural, political and economic domains, two of the sources said.

Operating this way, including in bodies nominally under the elected president, means Khamenei's office is often involved not only in the biggest questions of state but in executing even minor initiatives, the sources said.

His son Mojtaba has over the past 20 years grown ever more central to this process, the sources said, building a role that cuts between the personalities, factions and organizations involved to coordinate on specific issues, the sources said.

A mid-ranking cleric seen by some insiders as a potential successor to his ageing father, Mojtaba has built close ties with the Guards giving him added leverage within across Iran's political and security apparatus, the sources said.

Ali Asghar Hejazi, the deputy of political security affairs at Khamenei's office, has been involved in sensitive security decisions and is often described as the most powerful intelligence official in Iran, the sources said.

Meanwhile, the head of Khamenei's office, Mohammad Golpayegani, as well as former Iranian foreign ministers Ali Akbar Velayati and Kamal Kharazi, and ex-parliament speaker Ali Larijani, remain trusted confidants on diplomatic and domestic policies issues such as the nuclear dispute, the sources said.

The loss of the Revolutionary Guards commanders nonetheless decimates the top ranks of a military organization that he has put at the center of power since becoming supreme leader in 1989, relying on it for both internal security and Iran's regional strategy.

While the regular army chain of command runs through the defense ministry under the elected president, the Guards answer personally to Khamenei, securing the best military equipment for their land, air and sea branches and giving their commanders a major state role.

As he faces one of the most dangerous moments in the country’s history, Khamenei finds himself further isolated by the recent losses of other key advisers in the region as Iran's "Axis of Resistance" coalition has been hammered by Israel.

Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, who was personally close to the Iranian leader, was killed by an Israeli airstrike in September last year and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was overthrown by opposition factions in December.