What Could Happen Next in Sudan's Civil War

Sudanese men walk past a bullet-riddled building in Khartoum's twin-city Omdurman on March 20, 2025. (Photo by Ebrahim Hamid / AFP)
Sudanese men walk past a bullet-riddled building in Khartoum's twin-city Omdurman on March 20, 2025. (Photo by Ebrahim Hamid / AFP)
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What Could Happen Next in Sudan's Civil War

Sudanese men walk past a bullet-riddled building in Khartoum's twin-city Omdurman on March 20, 2025. (Photo by Ebrahim Hamid / AFP)
Sudanese men walk past a bullet-riddled building in Khartoum's twin-city Omdurman on March 20, 2025. (Photo by Ebrahim Hamid / AFP)

The war in Sudan appears to be reaching a critical juncture after nearly two years of fighting that has killed tens of thousands, driven millions from their homes and spread famine.

In recent months, the military has been making steady advances against its rival, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, and it says it has wrested back control of the capital, Khartoum. That includes the iconic Republican Palace. The RSF has not acknowledged the loss.

While the war is unlikely to end soon, here is a look at what the developments could mean, according to The Associated Press

What’s happening on the ground? The war erupted in April 2023 between the military and the RSF with battles in Khartoum and around the country. The leaders of the two forces had been allies who were meant to have overseen the democratic transition after a popular uprising in 2019, but instead worked together to thwart a return to civilian rule.

However, tensions exploded into a bloody fight for power.

Since then, at least 28,000 people have been killed, though the number is likely far higher. The war has driven more than 14 million people from their homes and pushed parts of the country into famine.

Will this end the war? The military victory in Khartoum likely just moves the war into a new chapter, creating a de facto partition of Sudan into military- and RSF-run zones.

Military chief Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan has shown no sign of engaging in serious peace talks. The RSF, headed by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, has seemed to be determined to keep fighting.

The RSF still holds much of western Sudan, particularly most of the Darfur region.

The advances in Khartoum may cause strains to break open in the military’s coalition. The military has been backed by a collection of armed factions — including former Darfur forces and armed brigades — that are historic rivals united only by the goal of fighting the RSF.

What is the significance of the RSF recently creating a ‘parallel government’? The RSF and its allies signed a charter in February in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, establishing a parallel government.

Burhan also has spoken of setting up a transitional government, raising the potential for two rival administrations jockeying for support as their forces battle — entrenching Sudan’s effective partition.

The RSF’s 16-page charter calls for “a secular, democratic and decentralized state,” maintaining what it called Sudan’s “voluntary integrity of its territory and peoples” — a nod to Sudan’s many communities demanding autonomy from Khartoum.

The RSF grew out of the notorious Janjaweed militias, mobilized two decades ago by then-president Omar al-Bashir against populations that identify as Central or East African in Darfur. The Janjaweed were accused of mass killings, rapes and other atrocities.

In the current war, the RSF has been accused of numerous atrocities. The Biden administration slapped Dagalo with sanctions, saying the RSF and its proxies were committing genocide. The RSF has denied committing genocide.

The military has also been accused of abuses and denies that.



Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality

Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
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Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality

Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s proposal for Hezbollah fighters to be merged with the army has been met with skepticism and provided fodder for political debate.

Aoun had suggested that the members be merged into the military the same way militia members, who were active during the 1975-90 civil war, were merged into the army.

The proposal has not been widely welcomed given the army’s inability to accommodate so many new members for various reasons. Experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat dismissed the proposal as a “consolation prize for Hezbollah in exchange for it to lay down its weapons to the state.”

They stressed that it would be impossible for members of an ideological group, who have received ideological training, to be part of the army.

Aoun, the former commander of the army, said it wouldn’t be possible to form a new military unit for the Hezbollah members, so they should instead join the army and sit for training, similar to the training former militants sat for at the end of the civil war.

Member of the Lebanese Forces’ parliamentary bloc MP Ghayath Yazbeck said the army simply cannot accommodate 100,000 Hezbollah fighters.

“Even if Hezbollah had 25,000 fighters, it would be impossible to merge them into the army, whose wages are being paid through foreign assistance,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Moreover, Lebanon needs a national defense strategy that should be drafted by the military with the president and government, he went on to say. The strategy does not stipulate how many members of the army and security forces are needed to protect Lebanon.

“Once the borders are demarcated and the reasons for the war are removed, we can embark on a political solution in Lebanon and ultimately, the current number of officers and soldiers will be enough,” Yazbeck said.

Former Lebanese officer and expert in security and military affairs Khaled Hamadeh said Aoun is trying to appease Hezbollah with his proposal and persuade it to lay down its arms in line with the ceasefire agreement.

The agreement was negotiated with Hezbollah ally parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, so it has the party’s approval.

There are several obstacles to Hezbollah members being merged into the army, Hamadeh said.

“Yes, the Lebanese state had succeeded in stopping the civil war and making hundreds of militia fighters join the army and security forces. But we cannot compare that situation to the one we now have with Hezbollah,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

At the end of the civil war, militias leaders signed and recognized the national pact and announced the dissolution of the militias. They then voluntarily handed over their arms to the state and became part of the political process, he explained.

Today, Iran-backed Hezbollah does not acknowledge the ceasefire agreement and has not agreed to turn over its weapons, he noted. The party does not even recognize that it is part of the political process and that its military wing has been destroyed by Israel, so the idea of merging with the army is “out of place.”

Yazbeck also noted Hezbollah’s ideology, saying it was the “greatest obstacle to its fighters’ merging with the army.”

“The party views Lebanon as a geographic extension of Iran. This ideology still stands, and was demonstrated with Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem’s declaration that the party will not disarm and that it is not concerned with talk about the state’s monopoly over arms,” he added.

Hamadeh echoed these remarks, saying that the civil war militias were Lebanese and took their orders from their Lebanese leaders. They chose to lay down their weapons and abide by Lebanese laws and the country's constitution.

As for Hezbollah, its takes orders from Iran and “has played dangerous military or security roles inside Lebanon and beyond,” he continued.

“Hezbollah has not declared its disengagement from Tehran. It has not declared that it will transform itself into a local political party and that it will dissolve its military wing. Once it does so, then we can talk about accommodating its fighters in the military,” stressed Hamadeh.

“How can we reconcile between a military group that follows the Wilayet al-Faqih ideology (...) and another that works under the constitution and according to democratic mechanisms?” he wondered.

Moreover, he asked: “Was the experience of merging the militias into the state’s civil and security agencies so successful that we should even be repeating it?”

Yazbeck noted that civil war militants were not really merged with the army as some would like to claim.

He explained that those who joined the security and military institutions were in a fact close to the Syrian regime, which was controlling Lebanon at the time.

“The fighters who were fighting for state sovereignty and who confronted Syrian occupation were persecuted and thrown in jail, so many were forced to flee Lebanon,” he revealed.

Furthermore, the level of discipline showed by the army does not apply to Hezbollah fighters. “Militias simply do not gel with army and the army does not gel with them either,” he stated.

Ultimately, said Hamadeh, whatever happens, Hezbollah must first hand over its weapons to the state. “Only then can its members choose to sit for assessments to enter state administrations – placing them on equal footing as other Lebanese citizens,” he added.

Hezbollah members are not isolated from society, and they must be merged, however, proposing their merger in an attempt to persuade them to lay down their arms will ultimately fail, he said.

Above all else, the party must first recognize the state and its right to monopoly over arms and decisions of war and peace, he urged.