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Israeli Intelligence, Financial Incentives Pressure Gaza Residents to Leave the Enclave

Palestinians inspect the damage caused by an Israeli strike in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Tuesday. (AP)
Palestinians inspect the damage caused by an Israeli strike in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Tuesday. (AP)
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Israeli Intelligence, Financial Incentives Pressure Gaza Residents to Leave the Enclave

Palestinians inspect the damage caused by an Israeli strike in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Tuesday. (AP)
Palestinians inspect the damage caused by an Israeli strike in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Tuesday. (AP)

Israel’s approach to the issue of displacement in Gaza remains unclear as it resorts to bombing and fear on the one hand, and promises and incentives on the other.

Israel is using both force and persuasion: striking areas to push people to flee, while at the same time hinting at “voluntary” departure through softer, indirect messages.

Caught between fear and false hope, residents of Gaza face growing confusion and chaos over what many see as Israel’s attempt to push them out through a mix of pressure and persuasion.

For nearly 19 months, relentless bombardment and bloodshed have left Gazans desperate for safety and stability — a vulnerability Israel appears to be exploiting through varied strategies aimed at forcing displacement.

The picture grew even murkier in recent days, as many residents received text messages from Israeli phone numbers urging them to contact intelligence officers via WhatsApp to coordinate their departure.

Some messages proposed specific times to meet near the Netzarim Corridor, a site often used for Israeli military operations inside Gaza. Several Gaza residents reported receiving calls from Israeli lawyers, urging them to sign powers of attorney to facilitate their displacement from the enclave.

Shattered dreams

One such individual, a man in his late 30s, shared that he received a call last Thursday from a law firm in Tel Aviv. The firm offered him the chance to sign documents to secure papers enabling his travel out of Gaza.

The offer extended beyond paperwork. The lawyer’s office assured him he would receive $5,000 before being arranged for travel through Ramon Airport to a European country, or potentially to Indonesia or Malaysia.

The man, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, explained that he had previously visited a European country, hoping to stay and obtain residency. However, that attempt failed, and he returned to Gaza.

A screenshot of a phone message Hamas says is from Israeli intelligence to a resident of Gaza. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

This might have been one of the reasons he was targeted again, as the firm seemed to want to rekindle a long-lost hope.

After declining the offer, he began receiving multiple messages on his phone urging him to contact an Israeli intelligence officer via WhatsApp to expedite his travel arrangements.

As Israel’s efforts to displace Gazans intensify, more residents are coming forward with stories of offers and coercion aimed at convincing them to leave the region.

An academic from Gaza, who asked to be identified by a false name, Bassam, recently received a notification inviting him to prepare for departure alongside fellow researchers and artists and their families.

The invitation came as part of a program backed by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, designed to attract and support scholars and professionals by facilitating their integration into higher education, research institutions, and cultural organizations in France.

Bassem explained that they were instructed to gather at a designated location in Gaza before being transported by land to the Kerem Shalom crossing and then flown to Paris via Ramon Airport.

He shared that he would leave with his wife and their four children, hoping the opportunity would allow them to build a new future that not only benefits their academic prospects, but also contributes to the rebuilding efforts in Gaza.

Among the dual nationals contacted by Asharq Al-Awsat, Fares, also using a fake name, described how he traveled to a European country after securing approval from the embassy of the nation he holds citizenship with. He signed documents confirming his voluntary departure from Gaza, having applied for the move nearly a year earlier. He left Gaza with his family just recently.

Deceptive messages

Amid the uncertainty, Gaza’s Ministry of Interior and National Security issued a warning on Tuesday about what it called “campaigns to deceive citizens” into leaving their homeland.

In a statement posted on its official Facebook page, the ministry condemned the ongoing psychological pressure and misleading messages reaching residents' phones. These messages, often accompanied by phone calls, urge people to meet with Israeli intelligence agents under the pretense of allowing them to travel abroad.

The ministry strongly advised citizens to ignore any such messages or calls, stressing the potential dangers posed by these deceptive tactics.

It also called on the international community to exert pressure on Israel to halt its “malicious campaigns” targeting Palestinians, which says constitutes a violation of international law and amounts to forced displacement.

“What the occupation failed to achieve after months of genocide and aggression against our people, it will not accomplish through deception and manipulation,” the ministry said in a statement.

The ministry, which is affiliated with Hamas, also warned it would take legal action against anyone found cooperating with the misleading messages.

Israel’s persistent displacement efforts

The deceptive messages serve as a reminder of Israel’s ongoing, relentless attempts to force the displacement of Gaza’s population. These efforts have ranged from enforcing a policy of “scorched earth” to establishing an administration aimed at facilitating voluntary migration, and even releasing media reports suggesting that foreign countries might accept Gaza migrants. These reports have been widely denied by the countries involved.

Last month, Egypt rejected claims circulated by Israeli media that it had agreed to temporarily house half a million Gaza residents in a designated city in northern Sinai as part of a reconstruction plan for the enclave.

The Egyptian State Information Service issued a statement firmly rejecting “any attempt to forcibly or voluntarily displace Palestinian brothers from Gaza, particularly to Egypt,” emphasizing that such a move would constitute a liquidation of the Palestinian cause and pose a direct threat to Egypt’s national security.

US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meet at the White House on February 4, 2025. (AFP)

In February, US President Donald Trump proposed, during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, a plan to “relocate Palestinians” from Gaza to Egypt and Jordan, while the US would take control of the territory and transform it into the “Riviera of the Middle East.”

This proposal was met with widespread Arab and international condemnation, particularly from Egypt and Jordan.

In response to the US proposal, Egypt developed a reconstruction plan for Gaza, which was approved during the Arab League’s Emergency Summit on Palestine in Cairo on March 4.

Meanwhile, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto announced in April that his country was prepared to temporarily host Palestinians affected by the conflict in Gaza, particularly those wounded or traumatized, as well as orphans.

However, he emphasized that this move would be “temporary” until conditions in Gaza improved and safe return was possible. Indonesia reaffirmed its support for a two-state solution.

In March, Israel revealed plans to set up an office for “voluntary migration,” aimed at facilitating the departure of Gaza residents to third countries.

Sick and injured, not migrants

According to Gaza’s government agencies, the few individuals who have recently left the territory are primarily patients and wounded individuals, not migrants, who have completed the necessary travel procedures to receive treatment abroad.

In the past four days, several families with injured individuals, patients, and dual nationals have left Gaza. These groups gathered in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis before traveling through the Kerem Shalom crossing into Jordan or Ramon Airport, from where they flew to various destinations.

No sources have confirmed the claims that these individuals were forced to sign papers agreeing not to return or to be removed from the civil registry.

Wasem Attiya pushes his father, Mohamed, 54, in a wheelchair as they head to Shifa hospital in Gaza City for a dialysis session, Monday, April 14, 2025. (AP)

Europe tightens migration policies

Palestinians who left Gaza during or prior to the war have described how many European countries had already imposed stricter immigration policies even before October 7, 2023, Hamas attack.

With the rise of the far-right in several European countries, immigration has become one of the most contentious issues, with some calls to expel Palestinians and Arabs from these countries. Others have even rejected offers to take in patients or injured individuals from Gaza.

Independent sources and expatriates in Europe confirmed that the majority of those allowed to travel from Gaza are primarily patients and the injured, with coordination between Israel and the World Health Organization.

Some European nations had allowed limited family reunification for Gaza residents already living in Europe, though this has almost entirely stopped, the sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Currently, those permitted to travel are individuals holding foreign nationalities, with a small number of students allowed to go to Ireland. However, severe restrictions make it nearly impossible for Palestinians to obtain official visas to enter Europe.

Amidst the ongoing destruction and displacement, the residents of Gaza continue to suffer.

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Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)

A US defense agreement with Ethiopia was announced days before an important visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Cairo that saw agreements and memorandums of understanding signed in several fields and coincided with joint Egyptian-Chinese air exercises.

The timing raised questions over whether Washington’s military cooperation with Addis Ababa was driven by “US anger at Cairo” and what objectives it serves amid tensions in the Horn of Africa.

The United States and Ethiopia signed a defense agreement on Aug. 21 during an official visit by an Ethiopian military delegation to Washington. Both sides described it as a strategic framework aimed at strengthening military and security cooperation, protecting national interests and securing mutual benefits.

Raafat Mahmoud, head of the African Affairs Research Unit at the Egyptian Cabinet's Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC), told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington was seeking to rebuild ties with Addis Ababa after years of tension, particularly over the Tigray war and US criticism of Ethiopia’s human rights record.

He argued that the agreement showed Ethiopia had become part of broader US calculations involving Red Sea security, countering Chinese and Russian influence and combating armed groups in the Horn.

Ethiopian lawmaker Mohammed Al-Arusi noted that Washington views the Horn as directly linked to Red Sea security, international trade and maritime routes, while also facing terrorist threats.

“Ethiopia lies at the heart of this geography, with its demographic, political and military weight across a broad region, and it hosts the permanent headquarters of the African Union,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. Washington, he added, was not seeking a temporary stance but it is “rebuilding its position in a region where the balance of power is changing.”

US Republican and strategic affairs expert Adolfo Franco cautioned that the agreement lacks formally binding treaties and direct financial funding, adding that future defense exports remain subject to strict restrictions and case-by-case assessments, including human rights considerations.

Al-Arusi pointed to a US-Ethiopian dialogue launched in May covering economics, trade, investment, defense and security. The defense track advanced just three months later, a sequence he said showed Washington was approaching Ethiopia with long-term considerations.

Mahmoud said growing US support could strengthen Ethiopia’s negotiating position not only on water but also in its efforts to secure maritime access and expand its presence in the Red Sea region.

Recent media reports have portrayed the US-Ethiopian rapprochement as Washington’s response to Egypt’s growing ties with China, highlighted by Xi’s visit to Cairo this week.

Mahmoud countered that Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement was not new, although recent developments naturally raised sensitivities in Washington, particularly amid expanding economic and security cooperation.

In January 2026, Ethiopia and China elevated their relations to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” nearly two years after Egypt and China upgraded their ties to a “strategic partnership” in 2024.

Al-Arusi argued that Washington’s expanding partnership with Addis Ababa should not be viewed as replacing one partner with another, but rather as evidence of Ethiopia’s growing strategic value.

Former US diplomat Henry Ensher told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington wants a security partner in the Horn and that Ethiopia is the best option given its capabilities.

While China and the United States compete in Africa, Egypt is the more important partner, he said, making it unlikely that Washington would use this approach to confront or punish Cairo.

Features

Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
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Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)

Ahmad al-Hilali, deputy governor of Hasakah, told Asharq Al-Awsat on Friday that the integration process stipulated in the “January 29, 2026 Agreement” has moved, following the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the former Kurdish Autonomous Administration, from “the stage of understandings and negotiations to actual implementation, whether in civilian institutions or in the security and military sectors.”

He described the security situation as “much better” and said “stability is gradually strengthening,” stressing that the process “is moving toward completion, and what we want is for it to take place calmly.”

Since SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced from the presidential palace in Damascus on August 25 the dissolution of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration, Hasakah has witnessed a series of developments and changes signaling the emergence of a new phase in the governorate. Its defining features are the restoration of state authority across all sectors, stronger security and stability, the unification of institutions, and the end of administrative duplication, in accordance with the January 29 Agreement.

In his remarks, al-Hilali said that “the integration process is not simply a matter of transferring buildings or changing names. It is about reunifying institutional authority, administrative decision-making, and security and military command under the umbrella of the Syrian state.”

He said significant steps had already been completed in this direction, while work was underway to address the remaining files in an orderly manner that would prevent any institutional or security vacuum and preserve stability in the governorate.

Before the announcement of the SDF's dissolution, most cities and areas in Hasakah had experienced security disorder involving the Revolutionary Youth. Such incidents increased after the signing of the January 29 Agreement, when members of the group prevented the handover of institutions to the government. That situation, however, has now disappeared.

Al-Hilali attributed the disappearance of the previous unrest primarily to the fact that “the phase has changed.”

“Previously, there were attempts to obstruct the process of transferring state institutions, and some activities emerged aimed at disrupting this course. But as implementation of the agreement progressed and the direction toward ending institutional and security duplication became clear, these manifestations declined significantly,” he said.

According to al-Hilali, “There is now a growing conviction among everyone that state institutions should not be a subject of conflict or confrontation, and that the integration process is moving toward completion.”

“What we want is for this process to take place calmly, away from provocation and tension, and for all residents of the governorate to feel that the return of state institutions means the return of services, the rule of law and stability, and is not directed against any component of society,” he said.

Asked when the integration of military, security and civilian institutions would be fully completed, the deputy governor said: “I do not want to set an artificial date for a process of this scale and complexity, because some files require technical, administrative and security procedures before they can be formally closed.”

He added: “But I can say that we are at a very advanced stage and that the overall direction is clearly toward completing the integration as soon as possible.”

He noted that “the bulk of the work is now in the implementation phase, while what remains consists of detailed files requiring the completion of arrangements, verification and coordination among the ministries and relevant authorities.”

Women fighters from the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) take part in military traning in Hasakah, Syria, August 22, 2026. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

Pending Files

Al-Hilali said: “What matters most to us is that the integration be complete, genuine and sustainable, rather than merely a political announcement whose impact fades after a short period.”

Asked about the main outstanding issues preventing the completion of the integration process, al-Hilali said the remaining files could be divided into three main tracks.

“First is the military and security file, involving the completion of the restructuring of personnel and cadres and the integration of those who meet the requirements into the Ministries of Defense and Interior in accordance with the established procedures,” he said.

“The second is the administrative and civilian file, particularly the status of employees and staff, the mechanisms for confirming their positions and paying their entitlements, and the integration of institutions and departments whose transfer to the state has not yet been completed.”

“The third involves a number of service-related, technical and administrative files linked to the transfer of powers and the reunification of operating systems, databases and resources.”

Al-Hilali said these issues “do not represent an obstacle to the integration process so much as they are implementation files that need to be completed.”

“The political decision is clear and the overall direction has been settled: state institutions will be unified, authority will rest with the Syrian state, and the rights of all citizens and components of the governorate will be preserved,” he said.

The rise of the Autonomous Administration

The first foundations of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, which sought to establish a “Kurdish project in Syria,” emerged through the formation of the Kurdish Supreme Committee. It was established by Syria's Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council following the signing of the Erbil Agreement on July 12, 2012.

A military wing was subsequently established for the committee, comprising the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) and the Asayish security forces. The SDF was later formed in 2015, under predominantly Kurdish leadership.

The geographic footprint of the Autonomous Administration expanded from three cantons in 2014 to six in 2016 and seven by 2023. This territorial expansion was accompanied by the growth of its military and security apparatus and civilian institutions, which collectively included tens of thousands of personnel.

The SDF subsequently lost a significant portion of its territory during armed clashes that erupted between its fighters and the Syrian army in late 2025 and early 2026. The fighting lasted about two weeks and was followed by the signing of the January 29, 2026 Agreement.

The agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF called for a ceasefire and the gradual integration into Syrian state institutions of the military and civilian institutions established by the Kurds during the years of conflict. It also called for the handover of border crossings and oil and gas fields, as well as the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the region.

Features

Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
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Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)

Southern Lebanon's Ali al-Taher ridge, which the Israeli army on Thursday said it captured, was a strategic position for Iran-backed Hezbollah, where it was believed to have established a command center.

Hezbollah did not confirm losing the highland, which is around 10 kilometers (six miles) from the border with Israel and was targeted by several Israeli strikes in recent weeks despite a ceasefire.

The ridge, a flashpoint since Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in March, lies close to the major city of Nabatieh and the Litani River.

It is just a few kilometers from UNESCO-listed Beaufort castle, another strategic site that Israel captured in recent months and continues to occupy.

Ali al-Taher ridge, on the edge of the Israeli-proclaimed occupied "security zone", overlooks surrounding areas and key districts further north, and sits atop a network of tunnels.

During US-mediated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, Washington proposed the Lebanese military take over the ridge, but Hezbollah refused, according to a source close to the talks.

Military expert Riad Kahwaji told AFP that the ridge is "in between several villages and adjacent to the city of Nabatieh" with a "web of tunnels (that) connects these villages around it".

On Friday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the capture "marks the completion of the phase of securing control in the security zone in southern Lebanon", meaning the Lebanese territory Israel occupied during the war.

- 'Command centers' -

The Israeli military on Thursday said that the tunnel network included "command centers (and) weapons storage rooms".

"The infrastructure is a strategic underground network that was built over two decades and funded and planned by the Iranian terror regime," it added.

Kahwaji, who heads the INEGMA military analysis institute, said the hilltops overlook Iqlim al-Tuffah, an area further from the border where Hezbollah holds sway, as well as part of the country's east.

Control of the area would therefore "give the Israelis an easy passage to move on both sides".

Speaking to journalists including AFP last month, Hezbollah spokesman Youssef al-Zein refused to say how many of the group's fighters were at the Ali al-Taher position. He denied any Iranian personnel were there, as had been reported in some media outlets.

He claimed that Israel had "exaggerated the importance of Ali al-Taher" as a military objective but also vowed that Hezbollah would "defend this position as much as it can".

The ridge is located right above the Litani. Hezbollah agreed to disarm in areas south of the river under a 2024 ceasefire that sought to end its previous war with Israel.

Two years later, Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into the broader Middle East war by attacking Israel in support of Iran.

Israel responded with airstrikes and a ground invasion that Lebanon says have killed more than 4,300 people.

The conflict has calmed since a US-Iran memorandum of understanding and a framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel agreed in June. But Israeli strikes continue and violence persisted around Ali al-Taher.

On August 15, Israel's army launched its deadliest strikes in weeks in response to what it said was a Hezbollah attack against its soldiers in the area.

In June, Israel's army published an updated map showing the parts of south Lebanon it considers within its "security zone" where its troops are operating, expanding the area to include the Ali al-Taher ridge.