Fearing Another War with Israel, Iran Begins Rebuilding Missile Sites, but Key Component Is Missing

 This satellite photo provided by Planet Labs PBC shows Iran's Shahroud solid propellant plant outside of Shahroud, Iran, after an Israeli attack on June 25, 2025. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
This satellite photo provided by Planet Labs PBC shows Iran's Shahroud solid propellant plant outside of Shahroud, Iran, after an Israeli attack on June 25, 2025. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
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Fearing Another War with Israel, Iran Begins Rebuilding Missile Sites, but Key Component Is Missing

 This satellite photo provided by Planet Labs PBC shows Iran's Shahroud solid propellant plant outside of Shahroud, Iran, after an Israeli attack on June 25, 2025. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
This satellite photo provided by Planet Labs PBC shows Iran's Shahroud solid propellant plant outside of Shahroud, Iran, after an Israeli attack on June 25, 2025. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)

Iran has begun rebuilding missile-production sites targeted by Israel during its 12-day war in June, satellite images analyzed by The Associated Press show, but a key component is likely still missing — the large mixers needed to produce solid fuel for the weapons.

Reconstituting the missile program is crucial for Tehran, which believes another round of war with Israel may happen. The missiles are one of Iran’s few military deterrents after the war decimated its air defense systems — something that Tehran long has insisted will never be included in negotiations with the West.

Missile experts told AP that obtaining the mixers is a goal for Tehran, particularly as it prepares for possible United Nations sanctions to be reimposed on the country later this month. The sanctions would penalize any development of the missile program, among other measures.

Known as planetary mixers, the machines feature blades that revolve around a central point, like orbiting planets, and offer better mixing action than other types of equipment. Iran could purchase them from China, where experts and US officials say they've purchased missile fuel ingredients and other components in the past.

"If they’re able to reacquire some key things like planetary mixers, then that infrastructure is still there and ready to get rolling again,” said Sam Lair, a research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies who studied Iranian missile sites.

Iran's mission to the United Nations did not respond to questions about the country's efforts to rebuild its missile program.

Israeli war targeted solid-fuel missile sites

Solid-fuel missiles can be fired faster than those using liquid fuel, which must be loaded just before launch. That speed can make the difference between launching a missile and having it destroyed in a launcher — something that happened during the war with Israel.

Iran has solid-fuel missile manufacturing bases at Khojir and Parchin, two sites just outside Tehran, as well as at Shahroud, some 350 kilometers (215 miles) northeast of the capital. Even before the most recent war, all of those sites came under Israeli attack in October 2024 during hostilities between the countries.

Attacks during the war in June appeared aimed at destroying buildings that housed the mixers, which are needed to ensure the missile fuel is evenly combined, according to experts. Other sites struck by Israel included manufacturing facilities that likely could be used to make the mixers.

Satellite images from Planet Labs PBC taken this month and analyzed by AP show construction at both the Parchin and Shahroud facilities.

At Parchin, mixing buildings appear to be under repair, Lair said, and similar rebuilding is happening at Shahroud involving mixing buildings and other structures.

The speed at which Iran is rebuilding shows the importance Tehran puts on its missile program. Iran's bombed nuclear sites so far have not seen the same level of activity.

During the war, Iran fired 574 ballistic missiles at Israel, according to the Washington-based Jewish Institute for National Security of America, which has a close relationship with the Israeli military. In two exchanges of fire before the war, Iran launched another 330 missiles, the think tank said.

The Israeli military had estimated Iran's total arsenal at around 2,500 missiles, meaning that over a third of its missiles were fired.

Before the war, Iran was on track to be able to produce more than 200 solid-fuel missiles a month, said Carl Parkin, a summer fellow at the James Martin Center. That drew Israeli strikes to missile-building facilities.

“Israel’s targeting indicates that they believed mixing was a bottleneck in Iran’s missile production,” he said. “If Iran is able to overcome their mixing limitations, they’ll have all the casting capacity that they need to start producing at high volumes again.”

The Israeli military declined to respond to questions over its strategy. Iran's defense minister, Gen. Aziz Nasirzadeh, recently claimed Tehran now has new missiles with more advanced warheads.

“The 12-day war with Israel has altered some of our priorities," he said on Aug. 22. "We are now focused on producing military equipment with higher precision and greater operational capabilities.”

Chinese mixers seen at Syria missile site affiliated with Iran

Iran may choose to rely on China to obtain mixers and the chemicals to make solid fuel.

Such chemicals may have caused a massive explosion in April that killed at least 70 people at a port in Iran. Iran still has not explained the blast, which happened as its diplomats met with Americans in Oman over its nuclear program.

Just days after the explosion, the US State Department sanctioned Chinese firms it said provided Iran with “ballistic missile propellant ingredients.”

Meanwhile, Iran's Revolutionary Guard likely supplied a planetary mixer to an underground ballistic missile construction facility in Syria near the town of Masyaf, some 170 kilometers (105 miles) north of the capital, Damascus, near the Lebanese border. Footage released by the Israeli military months after the September 2024 raid on the facility showed the mixer, which bore a resemblance to others sold online by Chinese firms.

Iran's president and military officials visited Beijing earlier this month for China's Victory Day parade. Iran's government has provided no detailed readout on what Masoud Pezeshkian said to Chinese President Xi Jinping, and China's state-run media offered no indications that Tehran asked for help.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry, asked about possibly supplying Tehran mixers and fuel ingredients, told AP that Beijing is “willing to continue leveraging its influence to contribute to peace and stability in the Middle East.”

“China supports Iran in safeguarding its national sovereignty, security and national dignity,” the ministry said. “At the same time, China is deeply concerned about the continued escalation of tensions in the Middle East.”

Can Kasapoğlu, a senior fellow with the Washington-based Hudson Institute, said Beijing could supply guidance systems and microprocessors as well for Iran's ballistic missiles.

“If Iran uses its relationship with China to bolster its disruptive military capabilities, the 12-day war could be a mere speed bump for the Iranian regime, rather than a decisive defeat,” he wrote.

Lair, the analyst, said if Iran restarts its production at prewar levels, the sheer number of missiles produced will make it harder for the Israelis to preemptively destroy them or shoot them down.

“They are clearly very invested in their missile program, and I don’t think that they’re going to negotiate it away, ever," he said.



Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
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Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights

China has increased purchases of Russian oil and gas since ‌the start of the conflict with Ukraine in 2022, with Moscow and Beijing declaring a "no limits" partnership just days before the war began. The energy relationship between the two countries is expected to be an important topic when presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on Wednesday.

Here are some facts about the energy ties between the two countries:

GAS

Russia's energy giant Gazprom supplies natural gas to China through a 3,000-km (1,865 mile) pipeline called Power of Siberia under a 30-year, $400 billion deal launched at the end of 2019.

In 2025, exports jumped by around a quarter to 38.8 billion cubic meters (bcm), exceeding the pipeline's planned annual capacity of 38 bcm.

During Putin's visit to China in September, the countries agreed to increase annual volumes on the route by an additional 6 bcm, to 44 bcm, a year. In February 2022, China also agreed to buy up to 10 bcm of gas annually ‌by 2027 via ‌a pipeline from Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East. The countries later ‌agreed ⁠to raise the ⁠volumes to 12 bcm.

Russia's gas exports to China are still a small fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19 annually.

Russia's share in European Union gas imports has shrunk during the Ukraine war, particularly in pipeline flows. Russia remained the EU's second-largest liquefied natural gas supplier last year with a 16% share but the gap with the EU's main LNG partner, the United States, widened considerably. Russia and China are still in talks about a new Power of Siberia 2 pipeline capable of delivering 50 bcm of gas per year ⁠from Russia to China via Mongolia.

Gazprom began a feasibility study for the ‌pipeline in 2020, but the project has gained urgency as Russia ‌turns to China to replace Europe as its major gas customer. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said in September that the ‌countries signed a "legally binding memorandum" on the pipeline, but a firm contract is still elusive.

Russia's liquefied natural ‌gas exports to China rose last year by 18.2% to 9.79 million metric tons, according to China's customs data, cited by TASS news agency.

Russia was, after Australia and Qatar, the third-largest supplier of LNG to China, which is the world's largest buyer of seaborne gas.

OIL China is Moscow's top client for oil shipments via the sea and pipelines. Exports have been ‌high amid Western sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine. China's imports from Russia were at 2.01 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2025 (or 100.72 ⁠million metric tons in ⁠total), a decline of 7.1%, according to China's General Administration of Customs. That represented 20% of China's total imported oil by volume.

Yury Ushakov, Putin's foreign policy aide, said Russian oil exports to China grew by 35% in the first quarter of 2026 to 31 million tons.

China, which is the world's top oil importer, primarily buys Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) crude exported via the Skovorodino-Mohe spur of the 4,070-km (2,540-mile) ESPO pipeline, which connects Russian oil fields to refineries in China and from the Russian Far East port of Kozmino. Russia's oil pipeline operator Transneft has said it was expanding the ESPO pipeline to increase exports via Kozmino, seeking to complete the expansion work in 2029. China also imports oil from the Pacific island of Sakhalin, taking Sakhalin Blend and Sokol oil grades. The availability of ESPO Blend oil has remained high since July 2025, when exports had been expanded to 1 million barrels per day. Transneft has kept exports via Kozmino at around this level.

Russia has also agreed to raise its oil exports to China via Kazakhstan through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline by 2.5 million tons per year to 12.5 million tons.


Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
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Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)

Multiple Hamas sources in the Gaza Strip revealed that the movement’s armed wing, the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, is now led by Mohammed Awda, succeeding Ezzedine al-Haddad, who was killed by Israel last Friday after decades of pursuit.

Three Hamas sources in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that Awda had effectively been selected to command the Qassam.

He was close to al-Haddad and remained in regular contact with him, particularly over plans to “rebuild the organizational structure” after the killings of former Qassam commanders Mohammed Deif and Mohammed Sinwar, they added.

Since the Oct. 7, 2023 attack, Israel has eliminated a series of Qassam commanders and key figures involved in planning and directing Hamas’s attack on Israeli communities near Gaza during nearly two years of war in the enclave.

One source said Awda, who headed military intelligence within the Qassam at the time of the Oct. 7 attack, had been offered leadership of the armed wing after the killing of Mohammed Sinwar in May 2025, but declined, leading the role to pass to al-Haddad.

The two other sources said they could not independently verify that account.

Awda appears to face no serious rival for the position as he remains one of the core members of the movement’s military council. The only other surviving member of the original council is home front commander Imad Aqel, whom Hamas sources said did not play a direct role in planning or supervising the Oct. 7 operation, unlike “other commanders who were not informed of the full details or even the zero hour.”

Military intelligence role

Awda previously oversaw military intelligence operations in Gaza, including gathering information on Israeli military positions around the enclave.

Sources said he also supervised the exploitation of surveillance equipment uncovered after an Israeli undercover unit infiltrated Gaza and remained there for an extended period before being exposed in November 2018. Hamas officials at the time described the information recovered from the devices as an “intelligence treasure.”

The military intelligence branch under Awda concentrated heavily on identifying vulnerabilities in the Israeli army’s Gaza Division.

According to the sources, Awda later assumed responsibility for the northern sector after al-Haddad became commander of the Qassam Brigades. In that role, he coordinated with newly appointed commanders in Gaza City and northern Gaza while continuing to oversee intelligence operations.

Early Hamas ties

Sources said Awda’s relationship with Hamas dates back to the first Palestinian intifada, which erupted in 1987. He also spent time in the “Majd” security apparatus established by slain Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to pursue Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel.

Believed to be in his late forties or early fifties, Awda ranked among the early members of the Qassam Brigades during the second intifada, which began in late 2000.

He is originally from the Khulafaa al-Rashideen area of Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza.

For years, the area functioned as a military hub for the Qassam Brigades. Mohammed Deif and several senior commanders were based there, and it became an early meeting point between Deif and a generation of future Qassam leaders, including Awda.

Although Awda’s career has been closely associated with intelligence and security operations, he also advanced through field command positions.

He served for several years as commander of the central Jabalia battalion, worked in military manufacturing and later headed the “northern brigade” between 2017 and 2019.

During his tenure as northern brigade commander, Awda hosted Mohammed Sinwar, then responsible for overseeing the Brigades’ military and strategic operations.

Hamas sources credit Awda with playing a major role in transforming the military intelligence branch into one of the most influential divisions in the Qassam.

“Awda has always preferred intelligence work and avoided direct field operations,” one Hamas source said. “He also avoids relying on personal guards or drivers, preferring to move alone because of his strict security precautions.”

Awda has reportedly survived several assassination attempts, both before and during the Gaza war. After the ceasefire of Oct. 10, 2025, his father’s home in Jabalia refugee camp was bombed, killing his eldest son, Amr.


In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
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In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)

In a small sewing workshop in southern Gaza, Nisreen Al-Rantisi pulls fabric from a pile and reshapes worn wedding dresses, trying to keep a fading tradition alive amid war and soaring costs.

Families said they have been struggling to find new wedding dresses and many search instead for places that refurbish gowns and other kinds of clothes for their children.

Importers cite delays, high shipping costs, and restrictions on materials, such as the crystals encrusted into the elaborate wedding dresses, as key factors behind the shortages ‌and price hikes.

Many workshops ‌have also been damaged during the conflict.

“We try ‌to ⁠reuse the old ⁠gowns that we have, produce them by fixing them a bit, work on them, wash them, arrange them, shape them,” said Rantisi, adding that work initially relied on a bicycle-powered sewing machine due to electricity shortages.

Rantisi said she used to buy the fabric for about 120 to 150 shekels ($41 to $51) before the war, but now pays around 500 shekels ($171).

“This has caused a big rise ⁠in the cost of bridal dresses and children’s gowns. We ‌are living in a vicious circle ‌from the war that affected us,” she added.

COGAT, the Israeli military agency that controls ‌access to Gaza, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Most ‌of Gaza's more than 2 million people have been displaced, many now living in bombed-out homes and makeshift tents pitched on open ground, roadsides, or atop the ruins of destroyed buildings after two years of war with Israel.

HIGH PRICES BEYOND REACH ‌FOR MOST IN GAZA

Despite the hardships, some couples still find ways to celebrate, with mass weddings held in ⁠Gaza offering a ⁠rare moment of joy amid the devastation.

Shop workers say the war has driven prices beyond reach.

“Before the war, prices were reasonable for everyone,” said Rawan Shalouf, an employee at a bridal shop.

“But now, given the circumstances we’re in, the price of a dress is ridiculous.”

Across Gaza, brides and families are struggling to afford even basic wedding needs. Shahed Fayez, 21, is due to marry in about four days but has been searching in vain for a dress.

“I don’t care about its style, what’s important is that it's new,” she added.

“The cheapest dress is $1,000 or more, that's the minimum, and all we have is less than $200. The entire dowry does not cover the price of a dress.”