What to Know about the International Flotilla Seeking to Break Israel's Blockade of Gaza

(FILES) An activist waves the Palestinian flag as a boat carrying Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg and activists, part of a civilian flotilla aiming at breaking the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, leaves the port of Barcelona on August 31, 2025. (Photo by Lluis GENE / AFP)
(FILES) An activist waves the Palestinian flag as a boat carrying Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg and activists, part of a civilian flotilla aiming at breaking the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, leaves the port of Barcelona on August 31, 2025. (Photo by Lluis GENE / AFP)
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What to Know about the International Flotilla Seeking to Break Israel's Blockade of Gaza

(FILES) An activist waves the Palestinian flag as a boat carrying Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg and activists, part of a civilian flotilla aiming at breaking the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, leaves the port of Barcelona on August 31, 2025. (Photo by Lluis GENE / AFP)
(FILES) An activist waves the Palestinian flag as a boat carrying Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg and activists, part of a civilian flotilla aiming at breaking the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, leaves the port of Barcelona on August 31, 2025. (Photo by Lluis GENE / AFP)

Spain and Italy say they are sending navy ships to where a flotilla of boats carrying activists seeking to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza is sailing, after the activists said they were attacked by drones near Greece.

The Global Sumud Flotilla said on Friday it was preparing to set sail on the final leg to Gaza after being targeted by drones and communications jamming, with several explosions occurring on or near some of the boats. Some of the vessels were damaged, but no injuries were reported.

Here's what to know about the flotilla.

The flotilla's goal

Organizers say the flotilla includes 52 mostly small vessels carrying activists from dozens of countries. They are carrying a symbolic amount of humanitarian aid, mainly food and medicine, for Palestinians in the besieged enclave of Gaza.

The 23-month war has led to a humanitarian catastrophe in the territory that has seen much of it reduced to rubble. The world’s leading authority on the food crisis has declared famine in Gaza's largest city.

Activists hope their actions will focus attention on the plight of Palestinians. They say the flotilla is the largest attempt to date to break Israel’s maritime blockade of the Gaza Strip, which has now lasted 18 years, long predating the current war in Gaza.

Israel says the blockade is needed to prevent Hamas from importing arms, while critics consider it collective punishment.

The boats' journey

The core vessels set sail from Spain on Sept. 1, heading east across the Mediterranean Sea, and have been joined by boats from other countries along the way.

The flotilla includes larger vessels that are providing support and provisions for smaller boats.

Participants include high-profile activists such as Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg and former Barcelona Mayor Ada Colau, as well as members of Italy's parliament and the European parliament. Organizers say delegates from 46 countries had committed to participating, with activists including military veterans, doctors, clergy and lawyers.

The bulk of the flotilla was sailing south of the Greek island of Crete on Thursday, heading eastwards. Organizers said they expected to reach the Gaza area within a week.

Drone attacks

Organizers have reported at least three separate instances of participating boats being targeted by drones: twice in Tunisia on Sept. 8 and 9, and once while sailing south of Greece in the early hours of Wednesday.

In the latest attack, the flotilla said it was targeted during the night by “unidentified drones and communications jamming." Activists said “at least 13 explosions” were heard on and around several flotilla boats, while drones or aircraft dropped “unidentified objects” on at least 10 boats.

No casualties were reported but there was damage to the vessels and “widespread obstruction in communications,” it added.

Thunberg said on Thursday that she expects the attacks to intensify in the coming days, adding in an online post: “But we continue undeterred. And the closer we are to Gaza, the bigger grows the risk of escalation towards us.”

Israel vows to block the boats

Israel said Thursday it had no problem with Italy and Spain’s plan to send rescue ships to accompany the flotilla but renewed strong criticism of the aid initiative — warning that the boats would not be allowed to reach Gaza.

“The real purpose of this flotilla is provocation and serving Hamas, certainly not humanitarian effort,” Israeli Foreign Ministry official Eden Bar Tal said. "Israel will not allow any vessel to enter the active combat zone.”

Bar Tal warned the activists against attempting to reach Gaza. “Any further refusal will put the responsibility on the flotilla organizers,” he said, without elaborating.

The Israeli military did not immediately respond to questions regarding Wednesday’s drone attack.

Spain and Italy ready navy ships

Italy and Spain said they were sending military ships to provide assistance and possible rescues if needed.

“The Spanish Government demands that international law be complied with and that the right of our citizens to navigate the Mediterranean safely be respected,” Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said.

Spanish officials said a navy offshore patrol vessel, the Furor, was being prepared to sail from the Mediterranean port of Cartagena.

Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto condemned the drone attack on civilian boats as “totally unacceptable” during a parliamentary address Thursday. A day after Premier Giorgia Meloni delivered one of her toughest criticisms of Israel's actions in Gaza at the UN General Assembly, Italy was sending an Italian navy ship ready to assist the flotilla if needed.

Crosetto urged the flotilla to offload aid instead in Cyprus, suggesting Italy and the Catholic Church could deliver it safely to Palestinians. He emphasized that Italy couldn’t guarantee the flotilla’s security once it entered another country’s waters, noting Israel might view it as a “hostile act.”

Cypriot deputy government spokesman Yiannis Antoniou said Israel had stated its willingness to accept the aid from Cyprus. “Cyprus is ready to assist if any request for help is made,” he said.

Flotilla organizers rejected the Cyprus proposal and vowed to continue on to Gaza.

EU warns against use of force

In Athens, activists staged a protest outside the foreign ministry, urging the government to condemn the drone attacks, provide naval protection to the flotilla, and join other European nations in formally recognizing Palestinian statehood.

“I think (recognition) is the very least they could do,” protest organizer Mariketi Stasinou told The Associated Press. “But beyond that, more immediate measures are needed to have real impact and show meaningful solidarity with the Palestinian people.”

UN Human Rights Office spokesperson Thameen Al-Kheetan called for an investigation, while the European Union also warned against the use of any force. “The freedom of navigation under international law must be upheld,” said Eva Hrncirova, a European Commission spokesperson.

Past attempts to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza

It is not the first time activists trying to break Israel's Gaza blockade have come under attack.

Another vessel said it was attacked by drones in May in international waters off Malta. An overland convoy traveling across North Africa also attempted to reach the border but was blocked by security forces aligned with Egypt in eastern Libya.

In 2010, Israeli commandos raided the Mavi Marmara, a boat participating in an aid flotilla attempting to breach the maritime blockade of Gaza. Nine Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American on board were killed.

The current war

The war began on Oct. 7, 2023, when Hamas-led militants stormed into Israel and killed 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and took 251 others hostage. Israel says its offensive is aimed at pressuring Hamas to surrender and return the remaining 48 hostages, about 20 of whom Israel believes are still alive. Most of the rest were released in ceasefires or other deals.

The Israeli offensive has killed more than 65,000 Palestinians, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. It does not say how many were civilians or combatants, but says around half were women and children.



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.