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Trump Convinced Netanyahu to Take a Deal. Can He Keep Him Onboard? 

US President Donald Trump gestures next to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Ben Gurion International Airport as Trump leaves Israel en route to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, to attend a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, amid a US-brokered prisoner-hostage swap and ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas, in Lod, Israel, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump gestures next to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Ben Gurion International Airport as Trump leaves Israel en route to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, to attend a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, amid a US-brokered prisoner-hostage swap and ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas, in Lod, Israel, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
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Trump Convinced Netanyahu to Take a Deal. Can He Keep Him Onboard? 

US President Donald Trump gestures next to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Ben Gurion International Airport as Trump leaves Israel en route to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, to attend a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, amid a US-brokered prisoner-hostage swap and ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas, in Lod, Israel, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump gestures next to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Ben Gurion International Airport as Trump leaves Israel en route to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, to attend a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, amid a US-brokered prisoner-hostage swap and ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas, in Lod, Israel, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)

US President Donald Trump, a self-proclaimed peacemaker who has campaigned for a Nobel Prize, finally got a camera-ready diplomatic victory on Monday as world leaders flew to Egypt for the signing of the ceasefire and hostage-release deal he brokered between Israel and Hamas.

But if lasting peace is to take root, analysts and diplomats say, Trump will have to maintain pressure on the man whose support he'll need in the next phases of his plan: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

US presidents from Bill Clinton to Joe Biden have found the strong-willed Israeli leader difficult to work with, and even Trump administration officials have been frustrated by some Israeli military strikes they see as undermining US policy.

But this month Trump managed to push Netanyahu into accepting his framework for a broader peace deal while persuading other Middle Eastern countries to convince Hamas to return all the Israeli hostages, its key leverage in the war.

The work could get harder from here, however.

Israel and Hamas remain sharply divided over many aspects of Trump's 20-point plan and, as Israel prepares for next year's elections, Netanyahu's approach may shift as he attempts to keep his right-wing coalition together.

"We're entering a political year where everything is related to campaigns, and Netanyahu's calculations may flip from caving to pressure to trying to ensure his political survival," said Nimrod Goren, the president of Mitvim, an Israeli foreign policy think tank.

The strength of Trump's peace plan, said the diplomats and analysts, is also its weakness.

The document at the heart of the deal leaves much undefined, and neither side actually agreed to the fine print of each term. That vagueness was key to getting both sides to sign on, but it also means some of the most difficult diplomatic work is just beginning.

Among the potential sticking points of Trump's peace plan is an agreement that Hamas disarm and play no role in Gaza's future administration. While Hamas agreed to Trump's plan generally, the group's official response made no mention of those specific terms, and Hamas leaders have indicated that they do in fact see a role for themselves in governing a post-war Gaza.

"There are a number of ways this could go sideways," said Jon Alterman, a Middle East expert at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former State Department official.

"It's hard to remember an international agreement that left so much to be worked out later."

The Israeli embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

A senior US official suggested that Trump had gained influence with Netanyahu in part by strongly supporting Israel on other important matters.

Trump's first administration formally recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the disputed Golan Heights as part of the country, two things long sought by the Israeli government.

"One thing President Trump's done with Israel ... is that he's not trying to be a middle-of-the-roader," the US official said. "He's basically stood shoulder to shoulder with Israel 100%. But because of that, he's been able to help guide them in the right direction."

A STERNER TRUMP

Trump has a mixed record when it comes to applying political pressure on Netanyahu.

In July, Israel bombed the Syrian defense ministry in Damascus even as the US had made a point of expanding ties with the new Syrian government. The US president gave political cover in Gaza to Netanyahu for months amid mounting humanitarian concerns among European and Arab countries.

But in recent weeks, a sterner Trump has emerged. He forced Netanyahu to call the PM of Qatar to apologize after a failed bombing raid targeting Hamas negotiators in that country in September. Ultimately, he muscled Netanyahu into signing onto his 20-point plan despite the Israeli leader's misgivings.

At the moment, said Alterman, the Middle East expert, Trump can likely exert leverage over Netanyahu given the US president's significant popularity in Israel.

"Trump's greatest leverage is he's much more politically popular in Israel than Netanyahu," Alterman said, "and he can either support Netanyahu's political future or sabotage it."

At the speech before the Israeli parliament on Monday, Trump playfully poked at the Israeli leader in ways that indicated he did not feel the need to treat Netanyahu with special deference.

"Well, see, now you can be a little bit nicer, Bibi, because you're not at war anymore," Trump said to laughs.

But next year's elections could change Netanyahu's political calculations in ways that are difficult to predict.

Supporters of right-wing politicians Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich could in theory threaten Netanyahu's governing coalition if they are sufficiently angered by the decision to halt military operations against Hamas.

Analysts warn that foot-dragging by the Palestinian group over disarming could lead right-wing elements of the coalition to pressure Netanyahu to resume military operations in Gaza, effectively scuttling Trump's deal.

"We are troubled with the fact that Hamas still, today, declares it will stay in power in Gaza," Simcha Rothman, a member of the Religious Zionism party and of Netanyahu's governing coalition, told Reuters on Monday.

"We are not happy with any deal that is not total surrender of Hamas ... We will not accept any partial victory."

Another issue that could prove an irritant: a provision in the peace plan that admits the possibility of a future Palestinian state, which analysts say most Israelis would struggle to accept after Hamas' cross-border attack of October 7, 2023.

Dan Shapiro, a former US ambassador to Israel, said that if government and opposition politicians campaign heavily against the creation of such a state, it could limit the willingness of Arab countries to push Hamas to fulfill its obligations under Trump's deal.

"That was a very important inclusion to get the support of the Arab states to do their part," Shapiro said.

"If the political discourse is a full-on rejection of a Palestinian state for all time, I think that could color the enthusiasm of the Arab parties."

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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.

Features

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.

Features

Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.